HE  STOKY  OF 

OUR  NAVY 


WILLIAM  O.STEVENS 


X 


11  i 


;-;  ,-• 


w 


FARRAGUT    AT    MOBILE    BAY 

From  a  painting  by  J.  W.  Ehninger,  1872 


THE  STORY  OF 

OUR    NAVY 


BY 

WILLIAM  O.  STEVENS,  Pn.D. 


PROFESSOR  OF  ENGLISH 
U.    S.    NAVAL    ACADEMY 


WITH  ILLUSTRATIONS 
AND  MAPS 


HARPER  &  BROTHERS  PUBLISHERS 

NEW    YORK    AND     LONDON 

M  CM  X  I  V 


HERS 


PRINTED    IN    THE     UNITED    STATES    OF    AMERICA 
PUBLISHED    OCTOBER.     1914 

K-O 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

INTRODUCTION ix 

I.  How  WE  CAME  TO  HAVE  A  NAVY „     .  i 

II.  THE  "BONHOMME  RICHARD"  AND  THE  "SERAPIS"     .  16 

III.  A  NAVAL  WAR  WITH  FRANCE       28 

IV.  WAR  WITH  TRIPOLI 38 

V.  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812 53 

VI.  THE  CAPTURES  OF  THE  "FROLIC,"  THE  "MACEDONIAN," 

AND  THE  "JAVA" 67 

VII.  JAMES  LAWRENCE 78 

VIII.  LAKE  ERIE  AND  THE  CRUISE  OF  THE  " ESSEX"     .     .  90 

IX.  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN  AND  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR    .     .     .  104 

X.  1812  TO  THE  CIVIL  WAR 118 

XL         THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR,  THE  IRONCLADS  131 

XII.  THE  UPPER  MISSISSIPPI 147 

XIII.  THE  LOWER  MISSISSIPPI 161 

XIV.  THE  BATTLE  OF  MOBILE  BAY 174 

XV.  TORPEDOES  AND  THE  "ALBEMARLE" 187 

XVI.  CONFEDERATE  CRUISERS       . 201 

XVII.  BLOCKADE-RUNNERS  AND  FORT  FISHER 218 

XVIII.  THIRTY  YEARS  OF  PEACE 231 

XIX.  THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  WAR       246 

XX.  THE  SANTIAGO  CAMPAIGN 262 

XXL      EVENTS  FROM  THE  SPANISH  WAR  TO  VERA  CRUZ    .     .  277 

XXII.    THE  MODERN  NAVY 287 

A  NAVAL  CHRONOLOGY 3°° 

INDEX 313 


997629 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

FARRAGUT  AT  MOBILE  BAY Frontispiece 

A  FRIGATE Page         3 

A  SHIP  OF  THE  LINE "           4 

LONG  GUN   ) 

CARRONADE  f 

UNIFORM  OF  A  CAPTAIN,  REVOLUTIONARY  WAR   ...  "         12 

THE  "RANGER"  AND  THE  "DRAKE"  IN  ACTION       .     .  Facing  p.     14 

THE  FIGHT  BETWEEN  THE  "BONHOMME  RICHARD"  AND 

THE  "SERAPIS"       "          18 

THE    FIGHT    BETWEEN    THE    "ENTERPRISE"    AND    THE 

BARBARY  CORSAIR  "TRIPOLI" 40 

THE  HARBOR  OF  TRIPOLI       Page       44 

THE  BURNING  OF  THE  FRIGATE  "PHILADELPHIA"     .     .  Facing  p.    46 

UNIFORM  OF  A  CAPTAIN,  TRIPOLITAN  WAR      ....  Page       50 

ESCAPE  OF  THE  "CONSTITUTION"        "         61 

THE  SURRENDER  OF  THE  "GUERRIERE" Facing  p.    64 

UNIFORM  OF  A  SAILOR,  WAR  OF  1812 Page       84 

UNIFORM  OF  A  CAPTAIN,  WAR  OF  1812 "         85 

UNIFORM  OF  A  MARINE,  WAR  OF  1812 "         86 

STATES  AND  TERRITORIES  IN  THE  SOUTH  AND  WEST — 

1812 "         91 

THE   "NIAGARA"    RAKING   THE   "DETROIT"   AND   THE 

"QUEEN  CHARLOTTE" Facing p,    96 

THE  "ESSEX"  BEING  CUT  TO  PIECES 102 

v 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

MAP  OF  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN  REGION Page  105 

PLATTSBURGH  BAY,  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN "  109 

TYPICAL  PRIVATEER  OF  WAR  OF  1812 "  114 

VISIT  OF  THE  JAPANESE  OFFICIALS  TO  COMMODORE  PERRY  ' '  125 

CAPTAIN  OF  THE  FIFTIES  IN  FULL  DRESS "  128 

MIDSHIPMAN  OF  THE  FIFTIES  IN  FULL  DRESS  ...  "  129 

MIDSHIPMAN  OF  THE  FIFTIES  IN  SERVICE  DRESS  .  .  "  130 

CAPTURE  OF  PORT  ROYAL  FORTS "  134 

BURNING  OF  THE  SHIPS,  NORFOLK  NAVY  YARD  ...  "  135 

THE  STEAM-FRIGATE  "MERRIMAC"  IN  1860  ....  "  138 

HAMPTON  ROADS "  140 

THE  "MONITOR"  AND  THE  "MERRIMAC" Facing  p.  144 

U.  S.  GUNBOAT  "LEXINGTON,"  A  WOODEN  RIVER-BOAT 

MADE  OVER  FOR  FIGHTING Page  148 

THE  "BENTON,"  THE  MOST  POWERFUL  OF  THE  UNION 

GUNBOATS "  149 

MAP  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI  RIVER,  CAIRO  TO  THE  GULF  OF 

MEXICO "  151 

MAP  OF  ISLAND  NUMBER  10 "  155 

THE  MISSISSIPPI  BELOW  NEW  ORLEANS "  164 

U.  S.  SLOOP  OF  WAR  "HARTFORD" "  166 

FARRAGUT'S  VICTORY  IN  MOBILE  BAY — THE  CAPTURE  OF 

THE  RAM  "TENNESSEE" Facing  p.  182 

THE  BARREL  TORPEDO Page  188 

A  MODERN  SUBMARINE "  189 

CONFEDERATE  "DAVID" "  191 

ALBEMARLE  AND  PAMLICO  SOUNDS "  194 

LAUNCH  USED  BY  LIEUTENANT  GUSHING "  198 

SECTION  OF  TORPEDO  USED  BY  GUSHING "  199 

THE  "ALABAMA" "  205 

THE  PATH  OF  THE  "WYOMING"  AT  SHIMONOSEKI  .  .  "  208 

vi 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

THE  "KEARSARGE"        Page  211 

MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  "ALABAMA"  AND  THE  "KEARSARGE"  "  213 

SINKING  OF  THE  "ALABAMA" "  217 

A  BLOCKADE-RUNNER "  219 

MAP  OF  CHARLESTON  HARBOR "  222 

CHASE  OF  A  BLOCKADE-RUNNER Facing  p.  224 

FORT  FISHER Page  226 

HARBOR  OF  APIA ' '  242 

DEWEY'S  ENTRANCE  INTO  MANILA  BAY "  254 

BATTLE  OF  MANILA,  MAY  i,  1898 "  257 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MANILA  BAY Facing  p.  258 

THE  LAST  OF  CERVERA'S  FLEET "  270 

THE  UNITED  STATES  BATTLE-SHIP  FLEET  ON  ITS  CRUISE 

AROUND  THE  WORLD "  280 

SEA-FIGHTERS  ON  THEIR  WAY  TO  MEXICAN  WATERS    .  "  284 

THE  U.  S.  S.  "WYOMING"  "  288 


INTRODUCTION 

purpose  of  this  book  is  to  tell  the  story  of  our 
I  navy  from  the  modern  point  of  view.  It  is  an  inspir 
ing  history,  and  its  tales  of  individual  prowess  against 
great  odds  and  of  devotion  to  country  and  to  duty  in  the 
face  of  death  are  emphasized,  as  they  should  be.  But 
the  author  believes  that  the  reader  of  to-day  is  interested 
in  something  more  than  a  mere  eulogy  of  our  naval  heroes ; 
that  he  would  like  to  know  the  real  reasons  for  successes 
and  failures,  the  importance  of  "sea  power"  in  war,  the 
changes  brought  about  by  steam,  electricity,  and  armor, 
and  the  less  familiar  services  rendered  by  the  navy  in  the 
years  of  peace. 

In  these  days,  when  "efficiency"  is  demanded  in  every 
occupation,  young  readers  can  readily  understand  that, 
where  forces  are  even,  victories  in  war  come  about,  as 
a  rule,  not  because  one  side  is  so  much  braver  or  more 
patriotic  than  the  other,  but  because  one  side  does  better 
thinking  and  better  shooting.  Now  the  modern  historical 
spirit  is  based  upon  research  and  guided  by  impartial 
inquiry,  and  the  application  of  modern  methods  gives 
a  broader  view  than  the  older  naval  histories  which 
emphasized  blood  and  smoke  and  victory,  and  exalted 
one  side  at  the  expense  of  the  other. 

The  modern  view-point  adds  much  to  the  picture,  for 
it  shows  not  only  the  pre-eminent  influence  of  brains, 
science,  discipline,  and  target  practice,  but  also  the  vital 
importance  of  freedom  from  political  influence,  and  the 
high  part  which  "sea  power"  plays  in  general  history. 
It  is  certain  that  the  splendid  record  of  our  navy  will 
gain  in  brilliancy  when  set  against  the  larger  background. 

W.  0.  S. 

ANNAPOLIS,  August,  1914. 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 


THE  STORY  OF  OUR  NAVY 


HOW  WE  CAME  TO  HAVE  A  NAVY 

Beginnings  in  ship-building,  commerce,  and  sea-fighting  in  the  colonies 
— Types  of  ships  and  guns  in  the  sailing-ship  days — Causes  of  the 
Revolutionary  War — Early  naval  attempts  against  Great  Britain — 
Paul  Jones  and  the  Ranger — Capture  of  the  Drake. 

IN  modern  times  the  United  States  exports  quantities  of 
farm  products  and  still  greater  amounts  of  manu 
factured  articles.  But  notwithstanding  all  the  exports 
which  are  to  be  carried  abroad  the  American  flag  is  rarely 
seen  on  the  high  seas.  Before  the  Revolution  it  was  dif 
ferent.  Crops  were  raised  chiefly  to  satisfy  the  needs  of 
the  settlers  themselves  and  there  were  no  manufactures 
worth  mentioning,  but  there  was  a  large  and  constantly 
increasing  carrying- trade.  In  fact,  as  late  as  the  Civil  War 
a  large  number  of  the  American  people  followed  the  sea, 
and  our  flag  was  known  in  every  port  in  the  world. 

The  conditions  of  life  in  colonial  days  developed  the 
seafaring  habit.  In  the  first  place,  the  early  settlements 
were  naturally  made  along  the  coast  within  reach  of  ships 
from  the  home  country.  Secondly,  the  sea  was  the  nat 
ural  highway  for  travel  and  trade  between  the  colonists, 
because  roads  through  the  wilderness  could  be  cut  only 
by  the  greatest  labor  and  expense,  and  were  much  more 

i 


THE    STORY   QF   OUR   NAVY 

exposed  to  attack  from  Indians.  Thirdly,  one  of  the  natural 
means  of  livelihood  was  fishing,  and  that  meant  not  only 
catching  mackerel  or  bluefish  along  the  coast,  but  long 
cruises  to  the  Grand  Banks  for  cod  and  still  longer  voyages 
hunting  the  whale. 

Even  when  the  settlements  were  thin  and  poor  the 
colonists  began  building  ships  for  themselves  out  of  the 
forests  that  grew  to  the  water's  edge,  and  by  the  time 
trouble  broke  out  with  Great  Britain  the  Americans  had 
whole  fleets  of  vessels,  big  and  little,  busy  in  the  fisheries 
and  commerce.  Indeed,  the  American  carrying  -  trade 
grew  so  large  as  to  rival  in  the  Atlantic  that  of  England 
herself,  and  the  mother  country  laid  severe  restrictions  on 
American  ships. 

The  colonists  had  experience  in  sea-fighting  also.  In 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  there  were 
pirates  from  the  Barbary  states  or  the  Spanish  Main 
hunting  the  seas  for  defenseless  merchantmen,  and  some 
of  these  rovers  were  bold  enough  to  pick  up  their  victims 
on  the  American  coast  within  sight  of  land.  This  state 
of  things  meant  that  every  ship  had  to  go  armed  and 
every  sailor  had  to  know  how  to  handle  a  cannon  and  shoot 
a  musket.  During  the  wars  with  the  French  the  colonists 
fitted  out  fleets  to  attack  towns  in  Canada  like  Port  Royal, 
Quebec,  and  Louisburg,  sometimes  acting  with  British 
men-of-war,  sometimes  operating  by  themselves. 

Before  going  a  step  further  let  us  see  what  ships  and 
guns  were  like  in  the  days  of  wood  and  canvas.  From 
the  time  of  Paul  Jones  to  that  of  David  Farragut  there 
were  three  main  classes  of  ships  in  the  navies  of  the  world — 
the  ship  of  the  line,  the  frigate,  and  the  sloop  of  war. 
All  three  types  were  ship-rigged — that  is,  they  had  three 
masts,  square-rigged,  called  the  fore,  the  main,  and  the 
mizzen,  respectively.  The  topmost  deck  of  a  ship  was 
called  the  spar-deck.  The  after  part  of  the  spar-deck, 
between  the  stern-rail  and  the  mainmast,  was  the  quarter- 

2 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

deck,  which  was  sacred  to  the  commissioned  officers.  The 
forward  part  of  the  spar-deck,  between  the  foremast  and 
the  bow,  was  the  forecastle,  the  territory  of  the  enlisted 
men.  Between  the  mainmast  and  the  foremast  was  usu- 


A  FRIGATE 

ally  an  open  space  revealing  the  deck  below,  with  gangways 
along  the  sides  connecting  the  quarter-deck  with  the  fore 
castle. 

The  ship  of  the  line  was  the  battle-ship  of  those  days. 
A  ship  of  the  line  was  distinguished  by  having  two  or  more 
gun-decks  below  her  spar-deck.  Gun-decks  were  indicated 
by  broad  bands  of  white  along  the  sides  of  the  ship.  It 
was  the  custom  to  grade  ships  according  to  the  number 
of  guns  they  carried,  and  ships  of  the  line  varied  from 
"  74's"  to  "  i2o's."  As  a  matter  of  fact,  ships  always  car 
ried  more  guns  than  their  actual  rating. 

The  frigate  was  the  cruiser  of  the  period.  A  frigate  was 
distinguished  by  the  fact  that  she  had  only  one  gun-deck 

3 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

below  her  spar-deck.  Frigates  were  rated  from  U28's"  to 
"44*8." 

The  sloop  of  war,  or  corvette,  as  she  was  sometimes 
called,  had  all  her  guns  mounted  on  her  spar-deck.  She 
was  the  smallest  type,  and  corresponded  to  the  gun-boat 
of  to-day.  Smaller  vessels  of  this  class  were  called  brigs, 
schooners,  etc.,  according  to  the  rig.  The  largest  sloop  of 
war  carried  about  twenty  guns. 

The  cannon  mounted  on  these  ships  were  cast-iron 
tubes  set  on  wooden  carriages.  They  were  all  muzzle- 
loaders,  and  were  fired  by  means  of  a  vent  near  the 
breech.  Some  had  flintlocks,  but  these  were  so  un 
reliable  that  usually  a  quill  filled  with  powder  was  thrust 
down  the  vent.  A  slow  match  touched  off  the  powder  in 
the  quill,  and  that  in  turn  set  off  the  charge  in  the  gun. 
The  cartridge  of  those  days  was  a  woolen  bag  holding  pow 
der.  About  the  time  of  the  War  of  1812  the  Americans 
invented  a  better  type  of  cartridge,  which  was  a  case  of 


A    SHIP    OF    THE   LINE 

4 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

thin  sheet  lead.  Just  before  inserting  the  quill,  or  primer, 
as  it  was  called,  the  gunner  ran  a  wire  down  the  vent  to 
prick  through  the  cartridge  casing,  so  as  to  make  sure  that 
the  priming  charge  would  explode  the  powder  in  the  car 
tridge. 

When  the  gun  was  discharged  a  heavy  hawser,   run 
through  the  ring  in  the  breech  of  the  gun,  checked  the 


LONG   GUN 


recoil.  Then  the  gun  crew  swabbed  out  the  piece,  loaded 
it,  and  ran  it  out  again  by  hauling  on  side- tackles.  There 
were,  as  a  rule,  no  sights  at  all,  and  all  the  aiming  was 
done  by  jacking  up  the  breech  with  a  handspike  and  pushing 
in  or  out  a  wooden  wedge,  called  a  quoin,  until  the  gun  was 
tilted  at  the  right  angle. 

Shortly  after  the  Revolution  a  short,  wide-mouthed  gun, 
the  carronade,  became  popular  for  use  on  the  spar-deck. 
The  value  of  this  type  lay 
in  its  deadly  splintering  ef 
fect  at  close  quarters,  but 
it  had  no  range.  The  "long 
gun"  was  relied  upon  for 
shooting  at  a  distance,  and 
the  gun -deck  batteries  of  CARRONADE 

ships  were  usually  composed 

of  long  guns.  The  heaviest  long  guns  on  our  frigates  threw 
a  ball  weighing  about  twenty-four  pounds.  In  the  year 
1812  a  gun  cast  in  1700  would  have  been  just  as  useful  as 

5 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

any  other.  Imagine  the  cannon  of  1812  on  a  battle-ship  of 
to-day!  The  combined  broadsides  of  all  of  Perry's  fleet 
on  Lake  Erie  scarcely  weighed  as  much  as  a  single  shell 
from  one  of  our  big  turret-guns!  And  in  accuracy,  range, 
and  rapidity  of  fire  there  can  be  no  comparison  at  all. 

The  crew  of  an  old-time  man-of-war  was  divided,  as  it  is 
to-day,  into  two  classes — sailors  and  marines.  This 
division  came  from  the  fact  that  in  early  naval  warfare 
ships  were  crowded  with  soldiers  for  fighting  purposes, 
but  carried  only  enough  seamen  to  handle  sails  and  steer. 
In  the  course  of  time  the  number  of  sailors  increased, 
and  they  were  used  to  work  the  guns  as  well  as  the  yards, 
but  down  to  the  present  day  a  force  of  marines,  or  sea- 
soldiers,  is  also  kept.  Of  their  services  to-day  we  shall  say 
more  in  the  concluding  chapter.  In  the  days  of  which  we 
are  speaking  marines  were  used  in  battle  chiefly  for  mus 
ketry.  Since  the  sailors  were  brutally  treated  in  those  days, 
particularly  in  the  British  navy,  tyrannical  captains  used 
to  foster  a  bad  feeling  between  sailors  and  marines  so  that 
they  should  not  join  forces  in  mutiny.  The  life  of  an 
ordinary  sailor  on  board  a  British  man-of-war  in  Nelson's 
day  was  the  most  degraded  form  of  slavery.  Flogging, 
even  for  petty  offenses,  was  horribly  brutal.  In  the 
American  navy  the  sailor's  life  was  no  bed  of  roses,  but 
twelve  lashes  was  the  limit  any  captain  could  inflict.  In 
the  English  fleets  men  were  sometimes  flogged  to  death. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  sailing  man-of-war  of  one 
hundred  years  ago,  compared  with  the  battle-ship  of  to 
day,  was  a  clumsy  and  crude  affair;  so  much  so,  in  fact, 
that  a  stout  merchantman  could  be  transformed  into  a 
fair  man-of-war  simply  by  putting  a  battery  of  cannon 
on  board.  That  fact  was  a  great  help  to  the  colonies  in 
their  fight  for  independence.  To-day  a  makeshift  navy 
would  be  impossible  on  account  of  the  tremendous  dif 
ference  between  ships  of  war  and  ships  of  peace.  On  the 
other  hand,  as  the  Americans  manufactured  neither  can 
non  nor  powder,  guns  and  ammunition  for  the  ships  were 

6 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

hard  to  get,  and,  what  was  equally  important,  the  Con 
tinental  navy  lacked  organization  and  discipline,  as  we 
shall  see.  In  that  respect  an  armed  ship  is  not  a  real  man- 
of-war  any  more  than  a  mob  with  guns  is  an  army. 

Now  let  us  consider  why  it  was  that  the  American 
colonies  should  have  found  it  necessary  to  equip  men-of- 
war  against  the  mother  country. 

As  late  as  the  French  and  Indian  War  the  American 
colonists  showed  themselves  loyal  Englishmen  by  freely 
contributing  ships  and  men.  Why  was  it  that  soon 
afterward  the  feeling  against  England  became  so  bitter 
that  the  same  men  were  willing  to  lay  down  their  lives  for 
independence?  The  cause  of  the  trouble  goes  back  a  long 
way.  In  the  early  years  of  the  American  colonies  the 
mother  country  naturally  left  the  settlers  unhindered  be 
cause  they  were  unproductive  and  they  had  trouble  enough 
as  it  was.  In  the  later  years,  when  the  tiny  settlements 
had  grown  to  prosperous  colonies,  the  same  "let-alone" 
policy  went  on  with  few  interruptions,  and  Americans 
learned  to  govern  themselves  without  help  or  hindrance 
from  England.  At  the  end  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  years 
they  had  managed  their  own  affairs  so  long  that  they  had 
developed  a  very  independent  spirit  about  what  they  con 
sidered  their  rights.  In  fact,  they  had  gone  far  ahead  of 
their  brothers  in  England  along  the  road  of  democracy 
and  self-government,  and  they  were  unwilling  to  turn 
back  for  any  Parliament  or  king  with  old-fashioned  ideas. 

After  1760  this  independent  spirit  of  the  colonists  was 
interfered  with  by  two  things.  For  years  there  had  been 
heavy  trade  restrictions  on  American  commerce,  but  these 
had  seldom  been  enforced.  When,  under  George  III.  and 
the  Tory  party,  these  laws  were  enforced  and  others  were 
added  to  prevent  the  Americans  from  manufacturing  any 
thing  that  might  rival  British  products,  the  colonists  of 
the  seacoast  towns  became  angry.  They  felt  that  these 
laws  were  unreasonable  and  unfair,  and  the  more  the  king's 

7 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

officers  tried  to  enforce  them  the  more  Americans  hated 
the  very  uniform  of  the  king. 

In  the  frontier  settlements  of  the  West  the  colonists  also 
felt  that  they  were  being  meddled  with.  Their  eyes  turned 
longingly  to  the  fertile  plains  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Alleghanies,  but  the  king,  by  a  proclamation  of  1763, 
forbade  them  to  buy  any  of  that  land  from  the  Indians  or 
settle  there  in  any  way  whatsoever.  The  frontiersmen 
felt  that  they  had  a  natural  right  to  spread  westward, 
and  any  king  or  Parliament  that  tried  to  stop  them  had 
no  claim  on  their  loyalty. 

These  were  the  deep-seated  causes  of  the  trouble.  They 
caused  a  smoldering  resentment  that  needed  only  the 
stamp  and  tea  taxes  to  set  it  afire. 

And  yet  all  this  growth  of  feeling  had  been  so  gradual  that 
Englishmen  in  America  and  Englishmen  in  England  did  not 
realize  how  differently  they  felt  about  these  things  until 
Parliament  in  1765  tried  to  lay  a  small  stamp  tax  on  the 
colonies.  Many  Englishmen,  realizing  that  Great  Britain 
was  becoming  a  great  empire,  especially  after  dive's  con 
quest  of  India,  asked  that  the  prosperous  American  colonies 
do  their  share  in  bearing  the  heavy  burden  of  taxes.  The 
Americans  answered  that  they  were  loyal,  but  that  they 
would  not  submit  to  paying  a  tax  ordered  by  a  Parliament 
in  which  they  had  no  representation. 

"This  is  impudent  talk!"  exclaimed  the  Ministry. 
"Isn't  that  just  what  colonies  are  for,  to  pay  taxes  for  the 
home  government  ?  Who  ever  heard  of  a  colony  being  rep 
resented  in  Parliament?" 

At  that  time  the  civilized  world  was  ringing  with  new 
ideas  about  the  "rights  of  man,"  and  the  great  Whig 
statesmen  of  England  agreed  with  the  American  patriots 
that  the  attitude  of  the  Tory  government  was  tyrannical. 
But  the  king  and  his  Parliament  refused  to  recognize  the 
principle  involved.  Where  a  little  tact  and  statesmanship 
could  easily  have  smoothed  things  over,  they  took  to 
persecution  instead.  The  result  was  that  the  refusal  to 

8 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

pay  a  tax  grew  into  an  insurrection,  and  then  into  a  success 
ful  war  for  independence. 

When  fighting  began  Great  Britain  was  the  greatest 
sea-power  in  Europe,  while  the  American  colonists  had  not 
a  single  man-of-war.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  they  had  a 
large  number  of  merchant  vessels  which  could  be  trans 
formed  into  passable  fighting-ships  by  mounting  a  row 
of  cannon  along  their  decks  and  cutting  a  corresponding 
row  of  ports  along  the  sides.  Of  course  such  a  ship  could 
not  stand  up  against  a  three-decker,  but  if  skilfully  handled 
she  might  hold  her  own  against  the  smaller  men-of-war 
and  could  become  a  formidable  commerce-destroyer. 

We  need  only  touch  on  the  well-known  story  of  the 
beginnings  of  the  Revolution.  By  1775  the  people  of 
Boston  had  grown  so  rebellious  that  as  a  punishment  the 
British  government  had  closed  the  port  and  quartered  on 
the  citizens  a  force  of  redcoats  under  General  Gage.  But 
these  tactics  did  not  make  the  Massachusetts  colonists  love 
King  George  any  the  better;  and  the  other  colonies,  in 
stead  of  taking  warning,  sent  the  Massachusetts  patriots 
encouragement  and  help. 

On  the  night  of  April  18,  1775,  General  Gage  sent  a 
detachment  of  soldiers  to  Lexington  and  Concord  for  the 
double  purpose  of  capturing  the  two  arch  rebels,  John 
Hancock  and  Samuel  Adams,  and  destroying  the  military 
supplies  which  the  patriots  had  collected.  The  result  the 
following  day  was  the  battle  of  Lexington  and  Concord, 
the  first  armed  conflict  between  the  British  troops  and  the 
American  colonists.  The  news  of  the  day's  fighting  spread 
like  wildfire,  and  the  patriots  sprang  to  arms. 

Although  the  Revolutionary  War  had  to  be  fought  out 
chiefly  on  land,  the  people  of  the  coast  towns  were  quick 
to  take  the  sea  against  England,  and  before  the  end  of  the 
war  they  had  destroyed  or  captured  about  eight  hundred 
ships.  The  first  naval  encounter  of  the  war  was  brought 
on  by  some  lumbermen  of  Machias,  Maine,  a  few  weeks 
after  the  battle  of  Lexington.  In  May,  1775,  General 

9 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Gage  sent  to  Machias  two  sloops  and  an  armed  schooner 
in  order  to  get  some  lumber  that  he  needed  for  the  British 
troops  in  Boston.  When  they  arrived  Jeremiah  O'Brien, 
with  about  forty  of  his  fellow-citizens  of  Machias,  decided 
that  the  lumber  must  not  be  delivered  to  the  redcoats  in 
Boston,  and  called  on  the  midshipman  in  command  of  the 
schooner  to  surrender.  But  he  only  laughed  and  sailed 
away.  At  this  O'Brien  and  his  men  seized  one  of  the 
sloops  lying  at  the  wharf,  already  loaded  with  pine,  and 
made  sail  in  pursuit  of  the  British  schooner.  As  the  latter 
was  very  slow,  it  was  not  long  before  she  was  over 
hauled. 

Among  the  Americans  there  were  a  good  many  more 
axes  and  pitchforks  than  muskets,  but  they  piled  up 
breastworks  of  the  pine  boards,  and  as  soon  as  they  came 
within  musket-shot  of  the  schooner  fired  away,  with  such 
guns  as  they  had,  to  good  effect.  The  English  were  full 
of  fight,  too,  and  the  two  little  vessels  banged  away  at  each 
other,  hammer  and  tongs,  for  over  half  an  hour,  at  the 
entrance  of  Machias  harbor.  By  the  end  of  that  time  the 
English  middy  lay  mortally  wounded  and  the  schooner 
surrendered. 

When  you  realize  that  the  latter  had  three  3 -pounder 
cannon  and  4  light  swivels  to  use  against  the  lumber-sloop, 
with  nothing  better  than  its  few  muskets,  O'Brien's  cap 
ture  was  something  to  be  proud  of.  The  victory  must 
have  been  due  to  the  backwoods  marksmanship  behind 
those  pine  breastworks.  Shortly  afterward  O'Brien  refitted 
his  prize,  raised  the  pine-tree  flag  over  her,  and  made  a 
very  successful  cruise  against  British  commerce. 

O'Brien's  example  was  quickly  followed  by  others,  and 
swarms  of  little  vessels  darted  out  from  New  England 
ports,  intent  on  plunder.  It  was  easy  enough  to  get  a 
" letter  of  marque,"  as  the  privateer's  warrant  was  called, 
and  a  good  many  did  not  even  bother  themselves  about  a 
trifle  like  that.  In  the  earlier  months,  before  English  ship 
masters  knew  about  the  breaking  out  of  war,  these  priva- 

10 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

teers  did  a  good  deal  of  damage,  but  most  of  them  were 
afterward  captured  by  the  British  blockading  squadrons. 

It  was  not  so  easy  to  collect  a  Continental  navy,  be 
cause  there  was  a  great  difference  between  the  hard  disci 
pline  and  small  pay  of  a  man-of-war  and  the  happy-go- 
lucky  ways  of  a  privateer  with  its  tempting  chances  of 
booty.  This  is  a  point  to  be  remembered  when  we  read 
later  on  of  the  poor  class  of  men  who  formed  the  crew  of 
the  Ranger.  Another  difficulty  was  the  jealousy  of  the 
colonies  toward  one  another,  which  time  and  time  again 
would  have  wrecked  the  cause  of  independence  had  it  not 
been  for  the  genius  and  patience  of  Washington.  Several 
of  the  colonies  organized  navies  of  their  own  and  kept  their 
ships  and  men  in  home  waters  for  selfish  reasons.  So  it 
was  that  those  who  toiled  to  build  up  a  Continental 
navy  had  to  make  the  best  of  materials  that  were  left 
by  the  privateers  and  the  colonies. 

But  the  Revolutionary  leaders  saw  from  the  first  that  a 
Continental  navy  was  indispensable,  and  early  in  1776 
a  fleet  of  eight  small  vessels  was  put  together  under  the 
command  of  an  old  sea-captain  named  Esek  Hopkins. 
Great  things  were  hoped  of  this  force,  but  it  made  a  cruise 
to  the  Bahamas  and  back  again  much  after  the  style  of 
the  King  of  France  and  his  four  thousand  men,  "who 
marched  up  the  hill  and  then  marched  down  again."  In 
short,  the  whole  expedition  was  a  fizzle. 

This  was  very  discouraging,  but  the  men  who  guided  our 
affairs  during  the  Revolution  were  not  the  kind  to  give  up 
at  the  first  failure.  They  went  doggedly  to  work  again, 
scraping  together  money,  ships,  men,  and  supplies  as  best 
they  could.  Many  a  timely  capture  of  arms,  clothing, 
and  powder  was  made  by  these  little  vessels,  especially  in 
the  early  months  of  the  war,  that  enabled  Washington's 
army  to  keep  on  fighting. 

Besides  the  difficulties  already  hinted  at  there  was  the 
greatest  confusion  in  the  management  of  the  Continental 
navy.  For  example,  there  was  no  proper  record  kept,  and 

ii 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 


if  an  officer  lost  his  commission  there  was  nothing  to  prove 
his  claim  for  pay  after  the  war.  Gustavus  Conyngham, 
one  of  the  most  daring  of  American  sailors,  one  day  had  to 
turn  over  his  commission  to  Ben  Franklin  in  Paris.  Some 
how  it  got  lost  there,  and  after  the  war  Conyngham  never 
got  any  recognition  of  his  rank  or  full  payment  of  the 
money  due  him  from  the  government. 
The  missing  document  turned  up  in  a 
Paris  book-shop  nearly  a  hundred  years 
after  the  poor  old  hero  had  gone  bro 
ken-hearted  to  his  grave. 

There  was  no  organization.  Almost 
any  official  could  make  out  a  commis 
sion  for  a  naval  officer.  At  the  same 
time  there  was  no  method  of  promo 
tion.  For  instance,  Paul  Jones  was  the 
senior  lieutenant  in  Hopkins's  fleet, 
and  from  the  first  showed  so  much 
ability  that  the  old  commodore  became 
very  jealous  of  him.  Thirteen  men 
were  promoted  over  Jones's  head  simply 
because  they  had  political  influence  be 
hind  them. 

Notwithstanding   all   its   drawbacks, 
CAP"  the  little  Continental  navy  had  no  lack 
of  heroic  commanders.    Men  like  Barry, 
Biddle,  Wickes,  and  Conyngham  left  in 
their  deeds  a  fine  tradition  for  the  American  navy  to  follow. 
But  one  man  stands  above  all — John  Paul  Jones — and  his 
wonderful  story  should  be  known  by  every  American. 

Of  his  career  before  the  Revolution  only  one  point  need 
be  touched  on  here — namely,  that  while  he  was  a  young 
ster,  long  before  he  emigrated  to  America,  he  served  some 
time  as  acting  midshipman  in  the  royal  navy.  When  he 
realized  that  there  was  no  chance  for  a  poor  boy  in  the 
British  navy  he  left  to  enter  the  merchant  marine,  but  his 
experience  with  the  organization  and  discipline  of  an 

12 


UNIFORM    OF    A 
TAIN,    REVOLUTION 
ARY    WAR 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

English  man-of-war  must  have  been  worth  a  good  deal 
to  him  when  he  was  fighting  under  the  Stars  and 
Stripes. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  he  threw  himself  into  the 
cause  of  his  adopted  country,  and  from  the  first  dis 
tinguished  himself  by  his  courage  and  skill.  The  enmity 
of  old  Hopkins  kept  him  more  than  once  from  receiving  the 
command  that  he  deserved,  and  when  in  the  summer  of 
1777  he  at  last  obtained  command  of  the  Ranger  it  was 
the  first  pleasant  experience  after  a  long  period  of  injustice. 
He  was  glad,  too,  to  receive  general  orders  to  attack  the 
enemy  in  foreign  waters,  where  he  could  use  his  own 
judgment  without  the  meddling  of  politicians.  It  is  said 
that  he  was  the  first  to  raise  the  Stars  and  Stripes  over  a 
man-of-war  when  he  hoisted  the  colors  of  the  Ranger,  and  it 
is  certain  that  he  was  the  first  to  obtain  a  salute  for  that 
young  flag  from  a  foreign  power.  Early  in  1778  a  secret 
treaty  was  made  between  America  and  France;  and  Jones, 
after  much  argument  with  the  commander  of  a  French 
man-of-war  in  Quiberon  Bay,  succeeded  in  getting  the  first 
formal  salute  of  guns  to  the  American  flag. 

In  April,  1778,  Jones  started  out  from  France  on  the  first 
of  his  two  cruises  around  the  British  Isles,  and  proceeded 
to  take  ships  and  even  make  landings  on  the  coast  right 
under  the  nose  of  King  George.  On  one  of  these  expedi 
tions  Jones  tried  to  capture  the  Earl  of  Selkirk,  whom  he 
wished  to  hold  as  a  hostage  for  the  better  treatment  of 
American  prisoners.  The  earl  was  not  at  home,  and  the 
sailors  consoled  themselves  by  taking  all  his  silverware  in 
stead.  This  was  in  keeping  with  the  practice  of  the  British 
in  their  raids  in  America,  with  a  difference  that  the  English 
and  Hessians  usually  burned  the  house  down  as  well.  But 
stealing  silver  was  not  to  Paul  Jones's  taste,  and  he  bought 
it  back  from  his  men  out  of  his  own  purse  and  returned  it 
to  Lady  Selkirk  with  elaborate  apologies.  There  in  the 
castle  to-day  the  American  visitor  may  still  see  the  silver 
service,  and  in  the  bottom  of  the  tea-urn  lie  the  very  same 
2  13 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

tea-leaves  that  were  left  in  it  when  the  sailors  of  the  Ranger 
carried  it  off. 

This  piratical  feat  of  the  Ranger's  crew  was  only  the 
least  of  their  offenses  during  this  cruise.  Officers  and 
men  were  inspired  simply  with  the  idea  of  booty.  They 
were  inefficient,  mutinous,  and  cowardly.  One  exception 
was  a  Swedish  officer  who  had  entered  the  American 
service,  and  showed  more  patriotism  and  decency  than 
these  Americans  themselves.  It  was  he  who  revealed  to 
Jones  the  dastardly  plot  to  kill  him,  put  a  craven  lieutenant 
in  his  place,  and  run  back  to  America.  In  fact,  things  were 
so  bad  on  the  Ranger  that  her  commander  scarcely  slept  at 
all  during  the  entire  cruise,  and  two  or  three  bold  attempts 
that  he  made  against  the  shipping  of  the  enemy  were  ruined 
by  the  cowardice  and  treachery  of  his  crew. 

Two  days  after  one  of  these  daring  attacks,  April  24, 
1778,  the  Ranger  appeared  off  Carrickfergus,  Ireland,  and 
lured  the  English  sloop  of  war  Drake  into  coming  out  to 
fight.  Not  long  before  Captain  Jones  had  sighted  this 
vessel  in  a  harbor  on  the  English  coast  and  would  have 
captured  her  by  a  surprise  attack  had  it  not  been  for  the 
bungling  of  a  drunken  quartermaster  on  the  Ranger. 
As  it  was,  the  crew  wanted  to  avoid  fighting  the  Drake  and 
were  almost  on  the  point  of  mutiny  when  the  Drake  came 
on  the  scene  offering  battle. 

But  the  English  captain  had  made  the  fatal  mistake 
of  underestimating  his  enemy.  He  hurried  out  to  catch 
"that  pirate  Jones,"  but  neglected  to  make  the  proper 
preparations  for  battle,  and  from  the  first  he  was  out- 
manceuvered  by  the  American  commander.  Jones  deftly 
threw  his  ship  athwart  the  Drake's  bows  for  a  raking 
position,  kept  her  there,  and  shot  his  enemy  to  pieces. 
The  English  fought  stubbornly,  but  at  the  end  of  an  hour 
and  a  quarter  the  Drake  lay  helpless,  with  forty  of  her 
crew  dead  or  wounded.  Both  the  captain  and  the  first 
lieutenant  died  of  their  wounds  shortly  after  the  surrender. 
On  the  American  side  only  two  were  killed  and  six  wounded. 

14 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

It  was  a  square,  stand-up  fight,  for  the  Ranger  and  the 
Drake  were  well  matched  in  point  of  size;  but  the  important 
thing  about  the  victory  is  the  fact  that  Jones  was  able 
to  accomplish  it  with  his  contemptible  crew.  After  the 
battle  the  lieutenant  who  was  put  in  charge  of  the  cap 
tured  Drake  tried  to  run  off  to  America  with  her  and  had 
to  be  hunted  down  and  caught  like  an  enemy. 

In  spite  of  his  mutinous  company  Paul  Jones  succeeded 
by  this  cruise  of  the  Ranger  in  bringing  about  the  chief 
thing  on  which  he  had  set  his  heart — namely,  compelling 
Great  Britain  to  exchange  prisoners.  Up  to  this  time 
American  prisoners  had  sickened  in  horrible  prisons  or 
prison-ships,  with  no  hope  of  being  exchanged,  but  when 
the  Ranger  carried  off  hundreds  of  Englishmen  to  France  it 
put  another  face  on  the  matter.  The  first  exchange  gave 
Paul  Jones  the  backbone  of  his  crew  on  the  Bonhomme 
Richard  the  following  year,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next 
chapter. 


II 

THE  "BONHOMME  RICHARD"  AND  THE  "SERAPIS" 

Fitting  out  the  Richard — Cruising  around  the  British  Isles — Battle 
with  the  Serapis — Assistance  of  France  and  French  sea  power  in  the 
Revolutionary  War — Yorktown  campaign. 

WHEN  Paul  Jones  returned  to  France  with  the  cap 
tured  Drake  he  became  the  hero  of  the  hour. 
Everybody  had  a  compliment  for  him;  and,  as  France  was 
just  then  on  the  verge  of  war  with  Great  Britain,  the 
French  Minister  of  Marine  promised  him  a  fine  squadron. 
Just  how  much  these  promises  and  fine  speeches  amounted 
to  he  had  to  learn  during  a  whole  year  of  dreary  waiting 
in  France. 

At  last  he  took  the  hint  from  Franklin's  Poor  Richard's 
Almanac — "If  you  want  a  thing  done,  do  it  yourself; 
if  not,  send."  Acting  on  this  advice,  Jones  went  di 
rectly  to  the  king  in  person  and  told  him  his  story 
of  broken  promises  and  hope  deferred.  The  result  was 
that  the  king  pledged  his  royal  word  that  Paul  Jones 
should  have  a  command  at  once.  The  Ministry  obeyed  the 
king's  order,  but  managed  to  give  Jones  an  old  hulk  of  a 
merchantman,  named  the  Duras.  By  that  time  the 
American  commander  was  thankful  to  get  anything,  and 
he  renamed  the  ship  Bonhomme  Richard,  in  honor  of 
Franklin's  Poor  Richard.  Then  he  made  long  and  ex 
hausting  journeys  from  one  end  of  France  to  the  other, 
collecting  cannon  for  his  ship.  At  last,  when  he  thought 
all  was  ready,  instead  of  receiving  the  guns  he  had  worked 
so  hard  to  get  together,  he  was  sent  a  lot  of  wretched 

16 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

pieces  that,  as  he  afterward  discovered,  the  government 
had  already  condemned. 

In  addition  to  the  Richard  he  obtained  four  other  ships, 
the  Alliance,  the  Pallas,  the  Vengeance,  and  the  Cerf,  all 
under  French  captains.  The  Alliance  was  a  fine  new 
frigate  built  in  America  and  turned  over  by  Congress  to 
the  command  of  one  Pierre  Landais,  whose  only  claim  to 
distinction  lay  in  the  fact  that  he  had  already  been  kicked 
out  of  the  French  navy.  During  a  little  preliminary  cruise 
that  Paul  Jones  made  with  this  squadron  in  June,  1779, 
he  had  a  taste  of  the  clumsiness  of  his  own  ship  and  the 
insubordination  of  Pierre  Landais.  Once  this  rascal 
actually  smashed  the  Alliance  into  the  Richard,  badly 
injuring  both  ships,  because  he  preferred  a  collision  to 
obeying  a  signal  from  an  upstart  American. 

On  August  1 4th  the  squadron  put  out  from  1'Orient  on  a 
longer  cruise  around  the  British  Isles.  Just  before  sailing 
the  American  commander  was  forced  by  the  French 
government  to  sign  a  paper  that  practically  took  away  all 
his  authority  over  his  squadron  and  left  the  French  cap 
tains  to  do  about  as  they  pleased.  As  Jones  walked  his 
quarter-deck  that  day  his  thoughts  must  have  been  bitter 
indeed.  He  had  just  been  robbed  of  his  proper  authority, 
his  commanders  were  jealous  and  insubordinate,  his  own 
ship  was  a  lumbering  old  tub  that  was  slower  than  any 
other  vessel  in  the  squadron,  and  so  rotten  and  worm- 
eaten  that  it  was  impossible  to  repair  her.  His  crew 
were  the  sweepings  of  a  seaport  town,  including  Malays, 
Portuguese,  raw  French  peasants,  and  even  a  lot  of  Brit 
ish  prisoners,  some  of  whom  were  already  in  irons  as  the 
result  of  an  attempt  to  take  the  ship.  The  only  men 
he  could  rely  on  were  about  eighty  Americans — mostly 
exchanged  prisoners — out  of  a  crew  of  two  hundred  and 
twenty-seven  officers  and  men.  One  of  these  American 
prisoners  was  the  gallant  young  Richard  Dale,  whom  Jones 
made  his  first  lieutenant. 

Nothing  of  great  importance  happened  during  the  earlier 

17 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

weeks  of  the  cruise.  The  squadron  rounded  the  British 
Isles  from  the  south,  taking  prizes  on  the  way.  An  attack 
that  Jones  planned  on  the  shipping  of  Leith,  Scotland,  was 
spoiled  by  the  inefficiency  of  two  of  the  French  captains, 
and  all  of  them  had  shown  insubordination  during  the 
entire  voyage.  One  of  them,  the  captain  of  the  Cerf,  had 
taken  advantage  of  a  fog  to  run  away. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  September  23,  1779,  the 
Americans  sighted  a  fleet  of  forty  merchantmen  heading 
northeast  from  Flamborough  Head  on  the  English  coast. 
These  ships  proved  to  be  under  the  convoy  of  two  men-of- 
war,  one,  the  Serapis,  a  brand-new  frigate  of  fifty  guns, 
the  other,  the  Countess  of  Scarborough,  of  twenty.  The 
merchantmen  promptly  turned  about  and  scurried  back  to 
port  like  a  flock  of  frightened  birds,  while  the  two  fighting- 
ships  waited  for  the  allied  squadron  to  come  up.  Paul  Jones, 
heading  the  Richard  for  the  Serapis,  signaled  his  captains 
to  form  line  of  battle;  but  Landais,  taking  advantage  of 
the  speed  of  his  ship,  sailed  ahead  till  he  could  judge  just 
how  strong  the  English  ships  were,  then  turned  about  and 
ran  away  to  a  safe  distance !  The  other  ships  held  off  also. 

As  the  wind  was  very  light,  it  was  not  till  evening  that  the 
Serapis  and  the  Richard  came  within  striking-distance  of 
each  other;  and  meanwhile  the  English  cliffs  were  black 
with  people  who  had  gathered  from  far  and  near  to  watch 
the  battle. 

"What  ship  is  that?"  cried  Captain  Pearson  of  the 
Serapis,  as  the  Richard  loomed  near. 

"I  can't  hear  what  you  say!"  answered  Jones,  hoping 
to  drift  a  little  nearer  his  enemy  before  the  firing  began. 
Again  the  Serapis  hailed,  and  a  moment  later  both  ships 
thundered  their  broadsides  into  each  other.  At  the  same 
instant  a  red  jet  of  flame  shot  up  through  the  Richard's 
deck.  Two  of  the  rotten  old  cannon  in  her  main-deck 
battery  had  burst  at  the  first  discharge,  killing  nearly  every 
man  stationed  at  them.  After  that  the  crews  of  the  other 
guns  in  the  battery  refused  to  serve  them. 

18 


THE  FIGHT  BETWEEN'  THE   BONHOMME  RICHARD   AND  THE 

From  a  painting  by  Howard  Pyle 


SERAPIS 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

What  a  disaster  for  the  American  captain !  Before  that 
first  broadside  the  Serapis  was  a  far  stronger  ship  in  guns 
as  well  as  in  every  other  respect.  Now,  at  the  very  first 
blow,  all  of  the  big  guns  in  the  Richard  were  silenced, 
leaving  only  a  few  light  cannon  on  the  upper  deck  to 
answer  the  full  broadsides  of  the  enemy. 

Each  side  now  tried  to  rake  the  other,  and  the  Serapis, 
being  able  to  sail  two  feet  to  the  Richard's  one,  had  all 
the  advantage.  She  repeatedly  got  a  position  across  the 
Richard's  stern  and  raked  the  Americans  with  deadly 
effect.  This  went  on  for  an  hour,  at  the  end  of  which  the 
poor  old  Richard  was  a  thoroughly  beaten  ship.  There 
was  a  great  chasm  in  her  deck  and  sides  where  the  explosion 
had  torn  its  way  and  where,  also,  a  number  of  British 
broadsides  had  smashed  through.  If  there  had  been  any 
sea  running,  the  old  hulk  would  have  been  swamped  in  a 
minute,  but,  fortunately,  the  water  was  as  smooth  as  a 
pond.  The  slaughter  on  the  Richards  decks  had  been 
terrible  as  well,  and  any  officer  would  have  been  honorably 
excused  for  surrendering  his  ship  then  and  there. 

But  Paul  Jones  was  one  officer  in  a  million.  There  was 
no  idea  of  surrender  in  his  mind.  He  was  watching  his 
enemy  like  a  skilled  fencer,  tense  and  alert  to  thrust  hard 
at  the  first  opening.  The  only  chance  left — and  that  a 
desperate  one — lay  in  grappling  with  the  Serapis.  On  that 
Jones  set  his  heart.  Once  he  almost  succeeded,  but  the 
grappling-irons  broke  loose  and  dropped  into  the  water. 
A  few  minutes  later  he  succeeded  in  swinging  his  ship 
across  his  enemy's  bow.  As  the  jib  boom  of  the  Serapis 
ran  between  the  shrouds  of  the  Richard's  mizzenmast 
Jones  sprang  to  the  place  with  the  shout: 

"Well  done,  my  brave  lads.     We  have  her  now!" 

At  the  same  instant  with  a  few  deft  turns  he  had  lashed 
the  bowsprit  so  fast  that  when  Pearson  dropped  his  anchor 
to  drift  free  the  hawser  held  like  a  vise.  Then  the  two 
ships  swung  together  bow  to  stern,  and  the  roar  of  battle 
went  on  at  such  close  quarters  that  there  was  hardly 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

room  enough  between  the  ships  to  use  a  rammer  in  load 
ing  the  guns. 

Meanwhile  Captain  Jones  had  called  up  his  men  from  the 
useless  gun-deck  to  fight  on  the  upper  deck,  or  in  the  rigging, 
but  the  gunners  of  the  Serapis  kept  thundering  away  at  the 
sides  of  the  Richard  till  they  had  shot  away  great  wide 
holes,  through  which  after  a  while  the  shot  passed  harm 
lessly  and  splashed  into  the  sea  beyond.  Luckily  some  of 
the  stanchions  were  out  of  the  reach  of  these  guns,  other 
wise  the  whole  upper  deck  would  have  crashed  down  upon 
the  wreck  of  the  lower. 

Jones  had  now  only  three  little  cannon  available — 
g-pounders — but  he  made  wonderful  use  of  them.  One 
he  aimed  himself  against  the  mainmast  of  the  Serapis,  the 
other  two,  filled  with  grape  and  canister,  swept  her  upper 
deck.  Meanwhile  he  had  sent  the  pick  of  his  crew,  Amer 
ican  marksmen,  into  the  rigging  and  tops,  and  their 
musketry  fire,  combined  with  the  grape  and  canister  of 
the  g-pounders,  succeeded  in  driving  the  English  sailors 
below. 

Things  were  looking  hopeful  for  the  Americans,  and  it  is 
said  that  Pearson  was  about  to  yield  when  the  master-at- 
arms,  a  gunner,  and  the  carpenter  of  the  Richard  suddenly 
ran  up  from  below  in  a  panic  and  bellowed,  "Surrender!" 
Jones  promptly  knocked  down  one  with  the  butt  of  his 
pistol  and  sent  the  other  two  scampering  down  the  hatch 
faster  than  they  had  come  up;  but  Pearson,  having  heard 
the  cry,  took  heart  and  shouted  to  Jones  to  know  if  he 
had  surrendered.  And  Jones  answered  with  the  immortal 
words,  "I  have  not  yet  begun  to  fight!" 

The  battle  roared  on;  from  the  Serapis  came  the  heavy 
thunder  of  her  big  guns,  and  from  the  Richard  the  sharp 
crackle  of  musketry.  Once  both  sides  had  to  stop  fighting 
at  the  same  moment  because  both  ships  were  on  fire. 
This  was  put  out  only  by  desperate  efforts  on  both  sides, 
and  then  the  din  of  battle  broke  out  anew.  And  all  the 
while  Paul  Jones  seemed  to  be  everywhere  on  the  shattered 

20 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

deck  of  the  Richard,  shouting  encouragement  here,  directing 
a  gun  there,  laughing  and  cheering,  inspiring  every  one 
with  his  unconquerable  courage. 

Suddenly  a  ship  loomed  up  in  the  moonlight.  It  was  the 
Alliance.  Exhausted,  powder-blackened  men  straightened 
up  to  draw  breath.  Surely  the  battle  was  over  now !  But 
to  the  horror  of  the  Americans,  the  dastardly  Landais 
fired  right  into  the  Richard.  A  great  cry  of  rage  went  up 
from  the  stricken  ship,  but  the  villain  coolly  sailed  off  again, 
having  done  all  the  damage  he  could  with  one  broadside. 
There  was  no  possibility  of  mistake,  for  the  full  moon  made 
the  difference  between  the  black  hull  of  the  Richard  and 
the  yellow  one  of  the  Serapis  plain  enough. 

Here  was  a  fresh  disaster,  but  it  was  quickly  followed  by 
a  worse.  The  treacherous  master-at-arms,  shouting  that 
the  Richard  was  sinking,  had  released  the  English  prisoners, 
and  they  suddenly  came  tumbling  up  in  a  mad  panic,  five 
hundred  of  them !  Instantly  Jones  sprang  to  the  hatch  and 
with  a  loaded  pistol  drove  them  back,  telling  them  at  the 
same  time  that  their  only  chance  of  life  lay  in  keeping  the 
Richard  afloat  by  working  the  pumps,  because  the  Serapis 
was  sinking.  Richard  Dale  was  right  at  his  captain's 
elbow  in  this  moment  of  peril,  and  he  held  the  prisoners 
to  the  pumps  for  the  rest  of  the  battle.  By  this  stroke 
Paul  Jones  turned  a  disaster  into  a  real  benefit,  for  as  the 
prisoners  bent  their  backs  to  the  pumps  the  gang  of  Amer 
icans  who  had  been  struggling  there  were  released  for 
fighting  up  on  deck,  where  they  were  sorely  needed. 

One  of  the  prisoners,  however,  had  succeeded  in  escaping 
to  the  Serapis,  and  there  he  encouraged  Pearson  to  keep  on 
fighting  by  describing  the  desperate  condition  of  the 
Richard.  For  a  few  minutes  the  English  redoubled  their 
fire.  But  by  this  time  the  American  sailors  had  climbed 
even  to  the  enemy's  rigging  and  had  cleared  the  upper 
deck  of  the  English  ship  of  almost  everybody  but  Captain 
Pearson  himself,  who  escaped  by  a  miracle.  One  of  them, 
sitting  astride  the  end  of  the  Richard's  mainyard,  was 

21 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

tossing  grenades  at  an  open  hatchway  of  the  Serapis.  At 
last  he  dropped  one  fairly,  and  it  disappeared  hissing  and 
smoking  down  the  hatch.  The  next  instant  there  was  a 
terrific  explosion.  The  grenade  had  touched  off  a  pile  of 
cartridges,  ripping  up  a  good  part  of  the  quarter-deck  and 
blowing  a  score  of  men  to  atoms. 

At  this  the  British  defense  broke  down.  But  suddenly 
the  Alliance  returned,  and  again  Landais  fired  on  the  help 
less  Richard — two  broadsides  this  time — killing  and  wound 
ing  many  of  her  crew.  At  this  point  several  officers  ad 
vised  Jones  to  give  up,  saying  there  was  no  use  trying  to 
fight  the  Serapis  and  the  Alliance  too.  Surrender?  Jones 
laughed  at  the  idea. 

Meanwhile,  some  of  the  shot  from  the  Alliance  had 
fallen  aboard  the  Serapis,  and  Pearson,  not  realizing 
Landais's  treachery  and  discouraged  at  the  prospect  of 
fighting  a  fresh  ship,  hauled  down  his  flag  with  his  own 
hands. 

The  surrender  took  place  at  ten-thirty.  Meanwhile,  the 
commander  of  the  Pallas,  shamed  into  bravery  by  Jones's 
example,  had  attacked  the  Countess  of  Scarborough  and 
taken  her  after  an  hour's  fight.  The  Vengeance  had  done 
nothing  but  look  on,  and  the  conduct  of  the  Alliance  we 
already  know. 

All  the  following  day  and  night  the  Richard  was  kept 
afloat  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  until  the  wounded 
and  the  prisoners  were  removed  to  the  Serapis.  On  the 
morning  of  the  twenty-fourth  the  battered  old  hulk  sank, 
carrying  down  with  her  the  flag  she  had  so  gallantly  de 
fended.  The  damage  to  the  Serapis  during  the  battle 
had  been  chiefly  in  the  slaughter  of  the  crew  by  musketry 
and  grape;  her  hull  had  never  been  struck  after  that  first 
broadside  which  silenced  the  Richard's  main  battery.  So 
it  did  not  take  much  repairing  to  get  the  captured  ship 
into  condition  to  square  away  for  the  Dutch  coast.  Jones 
skilfully  avoided  the  British  squadron  that  was  hunting  for 
him  and  arrived  safely  in  the  Texel.  Again  he  watched 

23 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

his  chance  and,  although  British  ships  were  waiting  for 
him,  he  dashed  through  the  Channel  and  arrived  safely  in 
the  shelter  of  a  French  port. 

For  this  brilliant  victory  over  the  Serapis  Paul  Jones  was 
knighted  by  the  King  of  France  and  presented  with  a 
sword,  and  Congress  gave  him  a  vote  of  thanks,  which 
was  about  all  that  Congress  could  give  in  those  days. 
Landais  was  dismissed  for  his  conduct,  and  would  have 
fared  worse  but  for  the  general  opinion  that  the  fellow  was 
more  than  half  insane.  However,  he  always  boasted  that 
it  was  he,  not  Jones,  who  was  the  real  hero  of  the 
battle. 

After  the  Revolution  Paul  Jones  had  a  brief  and  un 
happy  experience  in  the  Russian  navy.  He  died  in  Paris 
in  1792.  In  1905  his  ashes  were  brought  to  this  country 
and  they  lie  in  the  crypt  of  the  chapel  of  the  Naval  Academy 
at  Annapolis. 

Little  remains  to  be  said  about  the  Continental  navy, 
because  after  1779  there  was  practically  none  of  it  left. 
After  that  the  French  navy  came  to  the  rescue.  But  we 
must  remember  that,  tiny  as  it  was,  the  Continental  navy 
rendered  very  important  services  in  the  early  years  of  the 
war :  first,  by  capturing  supplies  for  the  army,  and,  secondly, 
by  keeping  open  the  line  of  communication  with  France, 
the  source  from  which  most  of  our  military  supplies  had  to 
come. 

The  more  we  read  about  Monsieur  Landais  the  blacker 
appear  his  cowardice,  jealousy,  and  treachery.  But  we 
must  not  let  our  feelings  about  that  particular  Frenchman 
blind  us  to  what  his  country  did  for  us  during  the  Revolu 
tionary  War.  True,  the  French  government  cared  little 
for  America  or  Americans,  but  the  fact  remains  that  as  a 
nation  we  owe  France  far  more  than  we  are  accustomed  to 
think.  We  are  used  to  the  idea  that  the  Revolution  was  a 
war  between  the  thirteen  colonies  and  Great  Britain,  and 
that  "we  beat  the  British."  But  the  truth  is  that  after 
the  battle  of  Saratoga  the  Revolution  developed  into  a 

23 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

European  war.  In  this  it  was  chiefly  the  French  who  "beat 
the  British,"  and  we  got  the  benefits. 

This  is  the  way  it  came  about.  In  1763,  at  the  end  of  a 
war  in  which  the  French  had  lost  everywhere,  the  French 
government  had  to  submit  to  a  treaty  of  peace  which 
every  patriotic  Frenchman  felt  was  an  insult  to  his  nation. 
Some  of  these  men  would  not  rest  till  they  had  got  revenge, 
and  in  the  growing  troubles  between  England  and  her 
American  colonies  they  saw  their  opportunity.  Two  of 
these  Frenchmen  really  did  more  to  bring  about  American 
independence  than  any  one  else  except  George  Washing 
ton  and  Benjamin  Franklin.  We  honor,  and  always  have 
honored,  the  memory  of  another  Frenchman,  Lafayette, 
because  he  came  personally  to  help  us  in  the  war.  He  was 
a  very  agreeable  and  warm-hearted  gentleman,  but  he 
never  really  did  anything.  Yet  these  other  two  com 
patriots  of  his  who  accomplished  so  much  for  us  are  as 
unknown  to  Americans  as  if  they  had  been  Zulu  chiefs. 
And  we  must  not  shut  our  eyes  to  their  services  simply 
because  we  know  that  they  were  moved  by  a  hatred  of 
England  rather  than  by  any  love  for  America. 

One  of  these  men  was  Beaumarchais,  a  very  clever  man, 
who  was  a  wit,  a  writer,  a  musician,  a  merchant,  a  dip 
lomat — whatever  he  did  he  did  well.  During  the  first  two 
years  of  the  war  this  man  poured  quantities  of  military 
supplies  into  America.  In  the  years  1776-77  he  shipped 
thirty  thousand  rifles  and  two  hundred  cannon,  together 
with  a  large  amount  of  equipments,  tents,  and  provisions, 
all  of  which  were  absolutely  necessary  to  Washington  in 
order  to  make  his  raw  volunteers  something  like  an  army. 
Besides  investing  his  own  money  Beaumarchais  handled 
a  secret  fund  contributed  by  France  and  Spain,  at  first 
amounting  to  two  million  francs  and  later  still  more.  This 
money  he  spent  with  great  skill  and  foresight. 

It  is  scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  the  skill,  courage,  and 
resourcefulness  of  this  man  Beaumarchais  kept  the  Revolu 
tionary  War  going  during  the  first  two  years  when  the 

24 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

Americans  had  to  stand  alone.  America  owed  more  to 
him  than  she  could  ever  repay,  but  years  afterward,  when 
he  and  his  daughter  applied  for  help  in  his  old  age,  the 
country  he  had  done  so  much  for  was  so  taken  up  with  its 
own  troubles  that  it  had  no  further  use  for  him,  and  he 
died  miserably  poor. 

The  other  Frenchman,  who  perhaps  did  even  more  for  us, 
was  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Vergennes.  His  work 
was  in  diplomacy.  He  had  been  watching  and  waiting  for 
a  chance  to  get  revenge  for  that  treaty  of  1763,  and  as 
soon  as  the  rebellion  broke  out  in  the  American  colonies 
he  began  quiet  talks  with  the  ministers  of  other  nations  to 
get  their  agreement  to  his  plan  of  making  another  war  on 
Great  Britain.  The  other  countries  of  Europe,  jealous  of 
England's  growing  position,  were  only  too  glad  to  see  her 
lose  those  rich  colonies  in  the  west.  Accordingly  France 
declared  war  against  England  in  1778,  Spain  followed  in 
1779,  and  Holland  in  1780. 

With  Spain,  Holland,  and  France  attacking  British 
possessions  and  British  commerce  from  Jamaica  to  Cal 
cutta,  it  was  clear  that  England  could  never  subdue  her 
rebellious  colonies  in  America.  This  war  alliance  with 
Spain  and  Holland,  which  had  been  so  craftily  engineered 
by  Vergennes,  proved  disastrous  to  England. 

Let  us  see  how  it  worked  out  in  America.  At  first  the 
English  fleets  enjoyed  full  sea-control.  After  1778  they 
had  to  reckon  with  the  French  in  their  operations  on  the 
American  coast,  and  later  with  the  Dutch  and  Spanish 
fleets  in  European  waters.  In  this  way  the  sea-power  that 
had  at  first  threatened  to  make  short  work  of  the  rebellion 
became  seriously  weakened. 

The  campaign  that  practically  ended  the  war  was,  as  we 
all  know,  the  capture  of  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown.  The 
most  important  part  of  this  story  we  hear  little  about.  It 
was  a  loose,  running  sea-fight  of  five  or  six  days  in  Sep 
tember,  1781,  between  the  French  fleet  under  De  Grasse 
and  a  British  fleet  under  Graves  off  Cape  Henry.  The 

25 


THE   STORY  OF  OUR  NAVY 

French  fleet  had  taken  a  position  in  Lynn  Haven  Bay  just 
inside  Cape  Henry,  in  order  to  control  the  entrance  to 
Chesapeake  Bay.  On  the  morning  of  September  $th  the 
British  squadron  under  Graves  stood  in  to  attack  the 
French.  De  Grasse  sailed  out  to  meet  the  enemy,  and  at 
four  in  the  afternoon  a  sharp  action  began  which  lasted  till 
sundown.  Both  sides  suffered  considerably;  and,  though 
the  fleets  continued  to  manceuver  within  sight  of  each  other 
for  five  days,  it  was  evident  that  neither  side  was  anxious 
to  force  the  fighting.  At  last  Graves  took  his  ships  north 
again,  leaving  De  Grasse  master  of  Chesapeake  Bay. 

As  far  as  actual  damage  to  ships  and  men  is  concerned, 
this  was  a  drawn  battle,  but  considered  in  regard  to  pur 
pose  and  results.it  was  a  decisive  victory  for  the  French. 
De  Grasse  had  succeeded  in  his  aim — namely,  to  keep  the 
British  fleet  from  making  a  juncture  with  Cornwallis. 

Meanwhile  Washington  was  making  his  famous  dash 
southward.  On  the  28th  of  September  the  allied  French 
and  American  army  moved  upon  the  English  army  en 
trenched  at  Yorktown  and  began  a  spirited  siege.  The 
allies  drew  their  lines  steadily  closer  and  poured  in  a  fire 
that  the  British  found  increasingly  hard  to  withstand. 
Finally,  as  Cornwallis  was  unable  to  retreat  or  to  get 
relief,  as  long  as  the  French  fleet  controlled  the  bay,  he  was 
forced  to  sue  for  terms  of  surrender.  The  capitulation 
took  place  on  the  igth  of  October,  1781,  and,  although  two 
more  years  dragged  by  before  the  treaty  of  peace  was 
actually  signed,  Yorktown  is  rightly  considered  as  the 
conclusion  of  the  war. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  colonists  during  the  Revolution 
had  the  greatest  difficulties  in  building  up  a  naval  force. 
With  their  ill-organized,  makeshift  vessels  the  Americans 
were  able  to  do  little  but  attack  the  transports  or  the 
commerce  of  the  enemy,  and  the  record  of  Paul  Jones  in 
capturing  two  British  men-of-war  was  a  brilliant  exception 
to  the  rule.  Fortunately,  when  our  ships  were  nearly  all 
taken  or  destroyed  in  the  unequal  contest  with  the  British 

26 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

navy,  the  French  fleets  arrived  to  challenge  British  con 
trol  of  the  sea.  Meanwhile,  however,  there  had  been 
plenty  of  experience  to  develop  veteran  sea-fighters  of 
proved  courage  and  ability,  and  therefore,  when  the  nation 
had  to  revive  the  navy  to  fight  the  French  in  the  West 
Indies — as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter — there  was  no 
lack  of  experienced  officers  to  place  in  command. 


Ill 

A   NAVAL   WAR   WITH   FRANCE 

Extinction  of  the  Revolutionary  navy  —  Building  of  new  navy  to 
protect  commerce  from  Algerian  pirates  —  Treaty  with  Algiers — 
Difficulties  with  England  and  France — Squadron  sent  to  West 
Indies — The  Baltimore  incident — The  Constellation  and  the  In- 
surgente — The  Constellation  and  the  Vengeance. 

APTER  the  capture  of  the  Serapis  the  best  command  in 
America  was  none  too  good  for  Paul  Jones,  and  on  his 
return  he  was  appointed  to  the  new  ship  of  the  line  America, 
which  was  then  being  built. 

As  it  happened,  peace  came  before  the  vessel  was  quite 
finished;  and  then,  out  of  gratitude  to  France,  Congress 
turned  her  over  as  a  present  to  the  King  of  France.  There 
were  at  that  time  three  other  men-of-war  left  in  the  Amer 
ican  navy — the  Alliance,  the  Deane,  and  the  Washington — 
but  they  were  all  sold  in  the  two  years  after  the  treaty  of 
peace,  so  that  by  1785  the  United  States  had  no  navy  at  all. 

The  country  was  so  burdened  with  its  war  debts  and 
other  troubles  in  the  years  between  the  close  of  the  Revolu 
tion  and  the  election  of  George  Washington  as  the  first 
President  that  a  navy  was  felt  to  be  an  unnecessary 
luxury.  Most  people  honestly  believed,  too,  that  the  very 
existence  of  a  navy  was  dangerous  to  the  liberties  of  a  free 
country,  and  for  years  many  prominent  Americans  always 
opposed  a  navy  on  this  principle. 

But  in  such  questions  facts  are  far  better  than  theories, 
and  it  was  not  long  before  the  need  of  a  navy  began  to  be 
felt.  The  people  of  the  Barbary  States,  living  along  the 

28 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

African  coast  of  the  Mediterranean,  had  for  centuries  been 
carrying  on  the  business  of  piracy.  Sometimes  the  Euro 
pean  nations  fought  them,  at  other  times  they  bribed  them 
to  hold  off,  but  these  pirates  always  remained  the  pest  of 
the  Mediterranean. 

In  1785  Spain  opened  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar  to  the 
Algerians,  and  their  corsairs  were  soon  roving  the  Atlantic. 
In  a  short  time  they  had  taken  two  American  ships  and  sold 
their  crews  into  slavery. 

Instead  of  despatching  a  squadron  with  loaded  guns  to 
treat  with  the  Dey  of  Algiers,  all  that  the  United  States 
could  do  was  to  send  an  envoy.  Naturally,  the  Dey 
thought  the  United  States  a  wholly  contemptible  little 
country  and  gave  our  envoy  nothing  but  insults  for  his 
pains.  At  this  time  England  was  " paying  tribute"  to  the 
Barbary  countries,  especially  Algiers,  but  the  policy  really 
amounted  to  hiring  them  to  prey  on  the  ships  of  rival 
nations.  In  1793  the  English  consul-general  at  Lisbon 
arranged  a  treaty  between  Portugal  and  Algiers  which 
opened  still  wider  the  road  for  the  pirates  into  the  North 
Atlantic.  During  the  next  thirty  days  the  freebooters 
captured  eleven  American  ships  and  imprisoned  all  their 
crews. 

This  was  too  much  to  stand,  and  in  the  spring  of  1794 
Congress  authorized  the  building  of  six  frigates  to  chastise 
the  Algerians.  The  law  made  it  very  clear  that  it  did  not 
mean  the  organization  of  a  permanent  navy,  because,  if 
in  the  mean  time  a  treaty  were  concluded  with  Algiers, 
work  on  these  frigates  was  to  stop.  Fortunately,  the 
design  of  these  frigates  was  left  to  the  ablest  ship-builder 
in  the  country,  Joshua  Humphreys.  Not  content  to  copy 
the  frigates  of  the  English  navy,  he  went  ahead  with  new 
ideas.  He  made  his  frigates  with  cleaner  lines  and  thicker 
sides,  he  gave  them  heavier  batteries  and  longer  and  thicker 
spars  than  could  be  found  in  any  frigate  of  the  royal  navy. 
These  "Yankee"  frigates  were  the  subject  of  endless  chaff 
from  British  naval  officers  up  to  the  time  of  the  War  of 
3  29 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

1812,  but  directly  after  that  war  England  built  frigates 
exactly  like  them. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  year  1795  the  Senate  ratified  a 
humiliating  treaty  with  Algiers,  by  which  the  United 
States  pledged  itself  to  pay  $21,600  every  year  in  ship 
supplies,  and  agreed  to  give  a  large  ransom  for  all  Americans 
then  in  captivity  besides.  The  cost  of  ratifying  that 
treaty  the  first  year,  including  the  ransom,  amounted  to 
over  a  million  dollars.  The  same  amount  of  money  put 
into  frigates  would  have  been  enough  to  dictate  an  honor 
able  peace  at  the  cannon's  mouth.  Fortunately,  three  of 
the  new  frigates  were  so  far  under  way  in  their  construction 
that  Congress  ordered  that  they  should  be  completed. 
In  1797  these  three  frigates  were  launched:  the  United 
States,  44  guns,  July  loth,  at  Philadelphia;  the  Constella 
tion,  36  guns,  September  7th,  at  Baltimore;  and  the 
Constitution,  44  guns,  September  2oth,  at  Boston.  These 
fine  old  ships,  each  famous  for  its  victories,  mark  the  real 
beginning  of  the  American  navy. 

Although  Congress  had  ordered  work  on  the  other  ships 
discontinued,  more  troubles  soon  arose  which  set  the 
hammers  ringing  on  them  again  with  all  speed.  Long 
before  our  quarrel  was  settled  with  Algiers  Congress  had 
worse  difficulties  on  its  hands.  England  and  France  were 
fighting  each  other,  and  war-vessels  of  each  side  took  and 
plundered  American  ships  with  scarcely  a  word  of  excuse. 
In  1795  Jay's  treaty  with  England  relieved  the  pressure 
from  that  country,  but  only  increased  the  enmity  of 
France.  French  cruisers  regarded  American  merchant 
men  as  lawful  plunder,  and  finally  French  privateers  had 
the  impudence  to  make  captures  in  American  harbors. 

The  country  was  stung  into  resistance.  During  the 
spring  of  1798  Congress  passed  several  acts  authorizing  a 
naval  force  not  only  to  protect  American  shipping  in  the 
West  Indies,  where  most  of  the  trouble  lay,  but  also  to 
attack  the  French  privateers  and  men-of-war.  On  April 
3oth  the  first  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  appointed. 

30 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Most  of  this  new  American  fleet  were  hastily  converted 
merchantmen,  for  the  other  three  frigates  were  not  finished 
in  time,  but  they  served  the  purpose  well.  Their  chief 
service  was  in  cleaning  out  the  nests  of  privateers — really 
pirates — in  dozens  of  little  harbors  in  the  West  Indies,  and 
the  smaller  and  lighter  merchant  vessel  could  go  where  a 
heavy  frigate  could  not. 

All  this  while  the  American  and  English  were  supposed 
to  be  working  hand-in-glove  against  France,  but  the  follow 
ing  incident  will  show  the  contemptuous  attitude  of  the 
English  toward  the  United  States  and  the  new-born 
American  navy.  In  November,  1798,  Captain  Phillips  in 
the  twenty-gun  sloop  Baltimore  was  accompanying  a  fleet 
of  American  merchantmen  from  Charleston  to  Havana. 
On  nearing  Havana  he  ran  into  a  British  squadron.  Know 
ing  the  way  English  captains  had  with  American  ships,  he 
signaled  his  convoy  to  scatter  and  make  port  as  fast  as  they 
could.  At  the  same  time  he  changed  his  course  to  meet 
the  British  squadron,  intending  to  divert  attention  from 
his  merchantmen. 

Captain  Phillips  was  invited  on  board  the  British  flagship, 
and  there  he  was  curtly  told  by  the  English  commodore 
that  he  was  going  to  impress  into  the  English  service 
every  American  on  the  Baltimore  who  did  not  have  "pro 
tection  papers."  Now,  "protection  papers"  were  not 
considered  necessary  on  men-of-war.  Phillips  protested 
vehemently,  but  he  was  helpless.  He  had  been  ordered 
to  avoid  any  hostile  act  toward  the  English  even  if  they 
were  seizing  an  American  ship,  and  he  lay  under  the  guns 
of  the  whole  fleet.  So  he  felt  that  he  had  to  submit; 
fifty-five  men  were  taken  off  the  American  ship,  though 
fifty  of  these  were  afterward  returned. 

When  Phillips  returned  to  the  United  States  and  re 
ported  the  affair  he  was  promptly  dismissed  from  the 
service  for  not  resisting.  And  yet  the  American  govern 
ment  itself  was  in  much  the  same  plight  as  poor  Phillips 
whom  it  had  dismissed,  because  it  did  not  dare  to  show 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

fight  for  the  insult  to  an  American  man-of-war,  and  meekly 
ate  humble  pie.  But  the  Baltimore  incident  was  one  of 
those  things  that  rankled  in  the  minds  of  Americans  and 
made  the  War  of  1812  unavoidable. 

Meanwhile,  the  fine  new  frigate  Constellation  was  bowling 
over  the  seas  looking  for  bigger  game  than  the  little  French 
corsairs.  Her  captain  was  Thomas  Truxtun,  a  bluff  old 
sea-dog  of  Revolutionary  days  and  a  born  fighter.  About 
noon  of  February  9,  1799,  when  the  Constellation  was  off 
one  of  the  Leeward  Islands,  the  lookout  reported  a  sail 
to  the  southland  Truxtun  put  about  in  chase.  Soon  she 
was  made  out  to  be  a  ship  very  much  like  the  Constellation. 
At  first  the  stranger  hoisted  American  colors,  but  when 
Truxtun  showed  the  private  signal  of  the  American  fleet 
there  was  no  answer.  Soon  he  was  delighted  to  see  the 
French  tricolor  go  up  in  place  of  the  Stars  and  Stripes. 
At  last  he  had  what  he'd  been  looking  for,  a  French 
frigate  for  a  square,  stand-up  fight. 

Truxtun  piled  on  all  the  canvas  the  Constellation  could 
stagger  under  for  fear  the  Frenchman  might  yet  get  away 
from  him,  and  the  good  ship  came  rushing  on,  looking  like 
a  great  white  cloud  and  tossing  sheets  of  foam  from  her 
bows.  Shortly  after  three  the  two  vessels  were  close 
enough  for  Truxtun  to  hail;  but,  getting  no  answer,  he  took 
a  position  across  the  stern  of  the  French  frigate  and  gave 
her  a  staggering  broadside.  But  she  had  lost  her  main- 
topmast  during  a  squall  that  afternoon,  and  when  she 
tried  to  manoeuver  to  lay  alongside  the  Constellation  the 
latter  ran  ahead  and  crossed  her  bows.  Truxtun  managed 
to  hold  an  advantageous  position  off  the  starboard  bow  of 
the  enemy  during  the  rest  of  the  fight. 

During  this  time  a  shot  struck  the  foretopmast  of  the 
Constellation.  The  blow  so  shattered  the  mast  that  under 
the  press  of  sail  it  was  carrying  it  threatened  to  go  crash 
ing  down.  Young  Midshipman  David  Porter,  famous  as 
captain  of  the  Essex  in  the  War  of  1812,  was  stationed  with 
some  men  in  the  foretop.  Seeing  the  danger,  he  hailed 

32 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR   NAVY 

the  deck,  but  the  thunder  of  the  broadsides  drowned  his 
voice.  Something  must  be  done,  and  done  at  once,  and  the 
youngster  was  equal  to  it.  He  promptly  climbed  aloft, 
though  greatly  exposed  to  the  musket  fire  of  the  enemy, 
and  coolly  cut  away  the  halyards  that  supported  the  huge 
foretopsail-yard,  which  then,  with  its  flapping  sail,  settled 
down  to  its  resting  -  place.  By  relieving  the  strain  on 
the  topmast  Porter  removed  the  danger  and  saved  the 
mast. 

In  an  hour  th3  battle  was  over.  The  French  frigate 
proved  to  be  the  36-gun  Insurgente,  Captain  Barreaut. 
Barreaut  had  put  up  a  brave  fight,  for  the  American 
broadside  was  heavier  than  his  by  about  one-third,  and  the 
unlucky  loss  of  his  maintopmast  had  given  the  Constellation 
a  great  advantage  in  maneuvering. 

As  soon  as  the  surrender  had  been  received  Lieut.  John 
Rodgers  and  Midshipman  David  Porter  were  sent  on 
board  the  prize  with  a  squad  of  eleven  men.  The  rest 
of  the  prize  crew  were  to  follow  later,  but  the  wind  had 
now  increased  to  a  gale,  and  it  was  found  impossible  to  put 
out  any  more  boats.  The  two  young  officers  found  them 
selves  in  a  perilous  situation.  Night  came  on  with  a  roar 
ing  sea.  The  masts  and  rigging  of  the  Insurgente  were 
so  badly  shattered  by  the  Constellation's  fire  that  it  was 
very  dangerous  to  try  to  make  any  sail  in  such  a  heavy 
wind.  The  decks  were  still  littered  with  fallen  spars,  dis 
mounted  guns,  and  the  bodies  of  the  dead,  and  one  hundred 
and  seventy- three  prisoners  had  to  be  kept  under  control. 
To  make  matters  worse,  the  hatch-coverings  had  been  flung 
overboard  before  the  surrender,  so  there  was  no  way 
of  battening  the  hatches  down  on  the  prisoners,  and  there 
were  no  irons  to  be  found.  But  Rodgers  was  a  big  fellow, 
and  by  putting  on  a  fierce  swagger  behind  a  loaded  pistol 
he  managed  to  rush  all  the  prisoners  into  the  lower  hold. 
Then  the  Americans  loaded  a  cannon  with  grape  and 
lashed  it  with  the  muzzle  pointing  down  the  hatch.  They 
also  hung  a  bag  of  cannon-balls  just  over  the  hatch  so  that 

33 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

a  single  stroke  of  a  cutlass  would  send  it  crashing  down  on 
any  one  who  tried  to  come  up. 

At  dawn,  after  a  sleepless  night,  Rodgers  and  Porter 
looked  anxiously  for  help  from  the  Constellation,  but  not  a 
stick  of  her  could  they  see.  The  ships  had  been  separated 
by  the  gale.  There  was  nothing  for  it  but  that  two  young 
and  inexperienced  officers  with  eleven  men  should  try  to 
bring  a  disabled  ship  to  port  in  spite  of  the  gale  and  the 
presence  of  one  hundred  and  seventy-three  prisoners 
watching  for  a  single  careless  instant  to  make  a  rush  and 
retake  the  ship.  Both  Rodgers  and  Porter  rose  high  in 
the  American  navy  later  on  and  became  famous,  but 
never  did  they  have  to  go  through  such  an  ordeal  again. 

For  two  nights  and  days  more  that  little  squad  stood 
uninterrupted  watch,  some  navigating  the  ship,  others 
watching  the  hatch,  with  loaded  muskets  and  pistols  piled 
about  ready  for  the  first  attempt  at  mutiny.  There  was 
no  sleep  for  anybody,  but  on  the  afternoon  of  the  third  day 
the  Insurgente  limped  into  the  harbor  of  St.  Kitts.  Their 
troubles  were  over  then,  for  in  the  very  same  harbor  lay  the 
Constellation,  with  Captain  Truxtun  anxiously  awaiting  their 
arrival. 

The  Insurgente  was  repaired  and  taken  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  but  the  following  year  she  was  lost  at 
sea  with  all  hands. 

The  work  of  the  navy  in  the  West  Indies  was  interrupted 
by  the  fact  that,  since  the  enlistments  had  been  only  for 
one  year,  all  the  ships  had  to  come  home  for  fresh  crews. 
But  the  French  privateers  did  not  gain  much  except  a  short 
breathing-space.  The  American  squadron  was  soon  on 
their  trail  again. 

On  the  morning  of  February  i,  1800,  Captain  Truxtun 
in  the  Constellation  was  again  in  the  neighborhood  of  the 
Leeward  Islands,  some  miles  to  the  south  of  the  place  where 
he  had  captured  the  Insurgente.  A  large  sail  was  reported, 
and  he  immediately  gave  chase.  There  was  only  a  little 
air  stirring  this  time,  and,  try  as  he  might  with  every 

34 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

stitch  of  canvas  set,  he  could  not  close  with  the  stranger 
till  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  following  day.  By 
this  time  she  was  made  out  to  be  a  large  French  frigate,  and 
without  waiting  to  hail  or  be  hailed  she  opened  fire  on  the 
Constellation  with  her  stern  guns. 

11  Don't  throw  away  a  single  charge  of  powder  and  shot!" 
cried  Truxtun,  as  he  saw  his  men  impatient  to  begin  firing. 
"Take  good  aim  and  fire  into  the  hull  of  the  enemy." 

For  a  few  minutes  the  Constellation  endured  the  enemy's 
fire  in  silence;  then  when  Truxtun  got  the  position  he 
wanted  he  shouted,  "Fire!"  and  the  American  broadside 
roared  in  reply.  From  eight  o'clock  till  one  the  battle 
went  on  with  the  greatest  fury,  the  two  ships  sailing  along 
together  before  a  fresh  wind,  wrapped  in  smoke,  and  the 
darkness  relieved  only  by  the  flare  of  the  guns  and  the 
dim  flicker  of  the  battle  lanterns.  As  Truxtun  had  com 
manded,  the  American  gunners  aimed  at  the  hull  of  the 
enemy — that  was  the  English  style  of  fighting.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Frenchmen  aimed,  as  was  their  custom,  to 
disable  the  rigging. 

At  one  o'clock  the  French  ship  ceased  firing  and  sheered 
off  as  if  trying  to  run  away.  Truxtun  immediately  trimmed 
sail  so  as  to  come  alongside  and  get  her  surrender,  when 
suddenly  his  mainmast  went  crashing  over  the  side. 
With  the  mast  were  lost  Midshipman  Jarvis  and  several 
men.  One  of  the  men  had  warned  him  that  the  mast  was 
badly  weakened  by  the  Frenchman's  shot,  but  Jarvis  had 
replied  that  he  could  not  leave  his  post  without  orders. 

The  French  ship  took  quick  advantage  of  the  accident  to 
the  Constellation  by  running  away  as  fast  as  she  could. 
It  turned  out  later  that  she  was  the  Vengeance,  a  much 
larger  frigate  than  the  Constellation.  Her  first  lieutenant 
said  afterward  that  several  times  during  the  battle  the 
Vengeance  struck  her  colors,  but  in  the  darkness  and 
smoke  the  fact  was  not  discovered  by  the  officers  of  the 
Constellation.  At  any  rate,  the  Vengeance  was  a  thoroughly 
beaten  ship.  She  lost  50  killed  and  no  wounded,  compared 

35 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

with  14  killed  and  25  wounded  on  the  Constellation,  and  her 
hull  was  badly  riddled.  The  escape  of  the  French  ship  was 
due  entirely  to  the  fall  of  the  Constellation's  mainmast. 
Although  Truxtun  did  not  succeed  in  taking  the  Vengeance 
as  a  prize,  the  trouncing  he  gave  her  is  a  finer  tribute  to  his 
ability  than  the  capture  of  the  Insurgente. 

These  two  victories  of  the  Constellation  were  the  only 
important  frigate  actions  of  the  war.  The  real  hard  work 
of  this  war — without  much  glory  to  it — fell  to  the  smaller 
vessels,  who  followed  the  French  corsairs  right  into  their 
lairs  among  the  many  islands  of  the  West  Indies.  There 
was  plenty  of  hard  fighting,  too.  One  little  schooner,  the 
Enterprise,  under  Lieut.  John  Shaw,  captured  six  privateers 
and  rescued  eleven  American  merchantmen.  The  Enter 
prise  became  still  more  famous  in  the  wars  that  followed. 
She  still  bears  the  record  of  being  in  more  ^fights  than  any 
other  ship  in  the  American  navy,  and  she  won  every  time 
she  fought. 

On  one  occasion  Lieut.  Isaac  Hull — later  famous  as  cap 
tain  of  the  Constitution — sailed  into  Puerto  Plata  (Santo 
Domingo),  which  was  a  favorite  resort  for  these  privateers. 
There,  in  broad  daylight,  he  landed,  made  a  dash  on  the 
fort,  coolly  spiked  all  the  guns  before  the  garrison  woke  up 
to  what  was  happening,  and  then  captured  one  of  the  most 
notorious  of  the  privateers  as  she  lay  at  anchor  under  the 
fort. 

Although  war  had  never  been  declared  against  France, 
fighting  went  on  for  two  years  and  a  half.  About  this  time 
Napoleon  became  the  real  ruler  of  France,  and,  foreseeing  a 
long  war  with  England,  he  did  not  want  to  be  annoyed  by 
another  war  with  America  at  the  same  time.  So  he  opened 
negotiations  for  a  treaty  of  peace  which  put  an  end  to  the 
campaign. 

Short  as  it  was,  the  war  was  of  the  greatest  benefit  to  the 
United  States.  By  cleaning  out  the  French  privateers  of 
the  West  Indies  the  American  navy  made  the  commerce 
of  the  United  States  in  those  waters  far  safer,  and  our 

36 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

export  trade  increased  enormously.  This  service,  com 
bined  with  the  brilliant  successes  in  battle,  gave  the  new 
born  navy  a  popularity  that  it  needed  very  much  in  those 
days  when  a  man-of-war  was  looked  upon  as  "a  ready  tool 
for  tyranny."  And  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  navy  it 
gave  the  most  practical  training  and  experience.  Many  of 
the  heroes  of  the  war  with  Tripoli  and  the  War  of  1812 — 
like  Decatur,  Porter,  Hull,  Perry — learned  how  to  sail  and 
fight  in  this  war  with  France.  At  this  time,  too,  the  Ameri 
can  officers  did  an  excellent  thing  by  adopting,  with  some 
modifications,  the  regulations  which  governed  the  greatest 
navy  in  the  world,  that  of  Great  Britain,  for  these  regu 
lations  gave  the  American  navy  the  right  start  in  the  fine 
English  ideals  of  duty  and  discipline  aboard  a  man-of-war. 


IV 

WAR   WITH   TRIPOLI 

Reduction  of  the  navy — Causes  of  war  with  Tripoli — Early  operations 
— Loss  of  the  Philadelphia — The  burning  of  the  Philadelphia — 
Gunboat  attacks — Intrepid  disaster — Eaton's  expedition — Con 
clusion  of  the  war — Commodore  Preble. 

ON  February  17,  1801,  Thomas  Jefferson  was  elected 
President  of  the  United  States.  When  the  news 
came  to  the  officers  of  the  navy  they  felt  very  gloomy, 
because  the  President-elect  belonged  to  the  Republican 
party — the  ancestor  of  the  Democratic  party  of  to-day — 
and  he,  as  well  as  that  party,  was  known  to  be  hostile  to 
any  standing  navy. 

"It's  all  over  with  us!"  growled  the  old  sea-dogs  over 
their  Madeira;  and  the  more  they  talked  about  it,  and  the 
more  Madeira  they  drank,  the  angrier  they  got.  Young 
and  old  throughout  the  service  banged  the  mess-tables 
with  their  fists  and  swore  that  the  country  was  going 
straight  to  the  dogs. 

But  even  while  Jefferson  was  being  .notified  of  his  election 
to  the  Presidency  the  Bey  of  Tripoli  was  making  it  very 
clear  to  him  that  the  country  could  not  possibly  get  along 
without  a  navy.  After  buying  a  peace  with  Algiers,  as 
described  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the  United  States  had 
to  bribe  the  other  Barbary  States  as  well.  These  were 
Morocco,  Tunis,  and  Tripoli.  The  Bey  of  Tripoli  took 
it  into  his  head  that  he  hadn't  driven  as  good  a  bargain  as 
some  of  the  others  when  he  ratified  his  treaty  with  the 
"United  States  in  1796.  He  became  more  and  more  insolent 

38 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

in  his  demands,  and  at  last,  in  February,  1801,  he  tore  up 
his  treaty  with  America  and  threatened  war. 

Soon  after  the  President  came  into  office  he  undertook 
reducing  the  navy  to  a  peace  basis,  as  was  expected.  But 
what  nobody  expected  was  the  fact  that  Jefferson  simply 
dropped  all  the  makeshift  vessels  that  had  been  hurriedly 
pressed  into  service  for  the  war  against  France  and  kept 
the  real  fighting  strength  of  the  navy  intact.  Not  even  a 
thoroughgoing  Federalist  President  could  have  done  much 
better  than  this  Republican,  with  all  his  hostility  to  a  navy ! 

It  was  well  that  he  did  so,  for  just  then  the  country 
needed  a  navy  very  badly  to  show  the  pirates  of  Tripoli 
that  there  was  some  spunk  in  America  and  to  protect  our 
merchantmen.  In  May,  1801,  the  Bey  of  Tripoli  ordered 
the  flagstaff  of  the  American  consulate  chopped  down, 
dismissed  the  consul,  and  bade  his  corsairs  capture  all  the 
Americans  they  could  find.  Fortunately,  the  trouble  with 
Tripoli  had  been  dragging  on  so  long  that  the  merchantmen 
had  been  well  warned  of  what  they  might  expect  in  the 
Mediterranean. 

Meanwhile,  the  United  States  government  had  been 
fitting  out  a  squadron  for  the  Mediterranean.  This  con 
sisted  of  the  frigates  President,  44  guns;  the  Philadelphia, 
36  guns;  and  the  Essex,  32  guns;  and  the  schooner  Enter 
prise,  12  guns.  The  squadron  was  commanded  by  Commo 
dore  Richard  Dale,  famous  as  Paul  Jones's  lieutenant  in 
the  great  fight  with  the  Serapis.  Dale  set  out  from  Hamp 
ton  Roads  and  learned  of  Tripoli's  declaration  of  war  only 
when  he  reached  Gibraltar. 

Not  long  after  the  arrival  of  the  American  fleet  in  the 
Mediterranean  the  little  Enterprise,  under  Lieutenant 
Sterrett,  came  off  handsomely  in  a  fight  with  a  Tripolitan 
corsair  called  the  Tripoli.  The  two  vessels  were  evenly 
matched,  but  the  action  was  very  one-sided,  thanks  to  the 
fine  seamanship  of  the  young  American  commander  and  the 
good  gunnery  of  his  crew.  At  the  end  of  three  hours  of 
fighting  the  Tripoli  had  lost  her  mizzenmast,  and  out  of  a 

39 


THE    STORY   OF  OUR    NAVY 

crew  of  eighty  twenty  were  killed  and  thirty  wounded. 
On  the  Enterprise  not  a  man  was  wounded. 

Unfortunately,  that  was  the  only  bright  spot  in  the 
story  of  a  whole  year  of  operations  against  Tripoli.  There 
was  a  blockade  that  grew  more  and  more  lax,  with  nothing 
accomplished,  and  at  the  end  of  the  year  all  the  ships  had 
to  go  back  to  the  United  States  on  account  of  the  fact 
that  the  enlistments  were  made  for  only  one  year.  Then 
another  squadron  was  sent  out  with  two-year  enlistments. 
This  was  offered  to  Commodore  Truxtun,  but  the  Navy 
Department  quarreled  with  him  over  a  foolish  point,  and 
Truxtun  resigned  just  when  a  man  of  his  sort  was  most 
needed.  Commodore  Morris,  who  was  sent  in  his  place, 
accomplished  so  little  that  at  the  end  of  the  second  year  of 
the  war  he  was  ordered  home  to  a  court-martial  and 
dismissed. 

In  short,  by  the  end  of  two  years  and  a  half  of  nominal 
warfare  the  Bey  of  Tripoli  had  become  more  insolent  than 
ever,  and  practically  nothing  had  been  done  to  assert  the 
dignity  of  the  United  States.  What  was  worse,  the  other 
Barbary  powers  were  threatening  trouble,  too.  Such  was 
the  situation  when  a  new  commodore  was  sent  to  the  scene 
of  operations.  This  was  Edward  Preble,  who,  like  his 
predecessors,  was  a  veteran  of  the  Revolution,  but  not 
well  known  to  his  brother  officers.  Most  of  the  naval 
officers  of  that  day  hailed  from  the  Southern  or  the  Middle 
states,  and  Preble  was  a  New  Hampshire  Yankee.  More 
over,  he  had  a  fierce  temper,  which  bad  health  did  not 
make  sweeter,  and  he  was  a  stern  disciplinarian.  He  growled 
that  he  was  given  "a  lot  of  school-boys"  for  officers,  be 
cause  all  of  his  ship  commanders  were  under  thirty.  But 
after  a  few  months  of  campaigning  together  the  doughty 
old  commodore  and  his  "school-boys"  had  not  only  re 
spect  for  one  another,  but  a  real  affection. 

The  squadron  that  Preble  commanded  had  one  important 
advantage  over  the  squadrons  sent  before;  it  contained 
besides  the  frigates  Constitution  and  Philadelphia  five 

40 


THE     FKiHT     BETWEEN     THE      "ENTERPRISE"     AND     THE     BARBARY 

CORSAIR    "TRIPOLI" 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

small  brigs  and  schooners.  There  were  four  new  ones — 
the  Nautilus,  the  Vixen,  the  Siren,  and  the  Argus — besides 
the  already  famous  little  Enterprise.  Previous  operations 
had  shown  that  the  frigates  were  too  heavy  to  move  among 
the  dangerous  shoals  around  Tripoli  and  were  unfit  to 
pursue  the  light-draught  corsairs  which  ran  the  blockade. 

Preble  stopped  at  Tangiers  to  read  the  riot  act  to  the 
governor  of  Morocco  for  permitting  one  of  his  vessels  to 
seize  an  American  brig.  Meanwhile,  he  sent  the  Phila 
delphia  and  the  Vixen  to  begin  at  once  the  blockade  of 
Tripoli.  About  two  weeks  afterward,  October  31,  1803,  the 
Philadelphia  was  working  her  way  back  to  her  station 
after  having  been  driven  off  by  one  of  the  heavy  gales  for 
which  that  coast  is  famous.  The  Vixen  had  gone  off  in 
chase  of  two  Tripolitan  corsairs  that  had  got  away.  About 
nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  Philadelphia  sighted  a 
vessel  making  for  the  harbor  of  Tripoli  and  promptly  gave 
chase.  For  some  time  the  American  frigate  held  on  in 
pursuit,  the  two  vessels  running  near  the  shore  and  heading 
westward  for  the  entrance  to  the  harbor. 

Those  were  the  days  before  there  were  charts  of  the 
African  coast;  and  Captain  Bainbridge,  knowing  the  dan 
ger  of  shoals,  kept  a  leadsman  in  the  eyes  of  che  ship, 
sounding  constantly.  It  was  soon  evident  that  the  corsair 
would  reach  port  in  safety,  and  the  cry  of  the  leadsman 
showed  that  the  water  was  shoaling  rapidly.  Accordingly, 
Bainbridge  braced  his  yards,  put  his  helm  over,  and  swung 
his  bow  directly  out  to  sea.  The  next  moment  the  frigate 
crashed  upon  a  reef  and  reeled  over  to  one  side.  In  looking 
for  deep  water  Bainbridge  had  driven  his  ship  squarely 
upon  a  hidden  reef  which  runs  for  several  miles  parallel 
to  the  coast. 

The  corsair  carried  the  news  of  the  disaster  to  the  city, 
and  soon  a  swarm  of  Tripolitan  gunboats  came  out,  opening 
fire  on  the  stranded  ship,  but  not  daring  to  come  to  close 
quarters.  The  list  of  the  vessel  made  it  impossible  to 
use  any  of  her  guns  effectively  on  the  enemy,  and  officers 

41 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

and  men  bent  all  their  energies  to  getting  the  ship  free. 
They  backed  the  sails,  threw  overboard  the  cannon,  except 
for  a  few  in  the  stern  to  be  used  against  the  enemy,  hove 
the  bow  anchors  over,  then  pumped  out  the  water  in  the 
hold,  and  as  a  last  resort  cut  away  the  foremast.  When 
all  this  failed  the  carpenter  was  sent  below  to  bore  holes 
in  the  frigate's  sides,  and  the  gunner  was  ordered  to  drench 
the  magazine.  Then  everything  else  was  destroyed  that 
could  possibly  be  of  any  use  to  the  Tripoli  tans. 

Meanwhile,  the  latter's  gunboats  were  sneaking  closer 
and  firing  heavily.  Fortunately,  they  directed  their  shot 
at  the  masts  of  the  Philadelphia;  otherwise  there  would 
have  been  much  bloodshed  on  the  helpless  ship.  At  last, 
after  four  hours  of  resistance,  when  Bainbridge  discovered 
that  he  could  not  bring  a  single  gun  to  bear  on  the  gun 
boats,  he  surrendered. 

The  Tripolitans  clambered  on  board  in  high  glee,  pillaged 
the  ship  of  everything — not  even  respecting  the  pockets 
of  the  officers — and  carried  off  the  prisoners  to  the  city. 
The  Bey  was  delighted,  as  he  had  every  reason  to  be. 
Here  were  three  hundred  prisoners  to  be  held  for  ransom; 
not  only  common  seamen,  but  officers,  who,  he  well  knew, 
would  have  powerful  friends  to  argue  for  peace  and  ransom 
on  any  terms  the  Bey  might  dictate.  The  next  day  he  sent 
his  men  to  see  what  they  could  do  toward  saving  the 
Philadelphia,  and  a  few  days  later,  helped  by  an  unusually 
high  tide,  they  succeeded  in  getting  her  off  the  rocks  unhurt. 
Having  plugged  the  holes  in  her  bottom,  they  dredged  up 
the  cannon,  and  in  a  short  time  anchored  the  Philadelphia 
in  the  harbor  of  Tripoli  as  good  as  new,  the  largest  vessel 
ever  owned  by  any  Barbary  potentate. 

The  Bey  thanked  Allah  and  stroked  his  beard  with  many 
a  chuckle.  These  Americans  had  come  in  their  ships  to 
humble  him,  and,  lo,  they  were  delivered  into  his  hands! 
For  Commodore  Preble  the  news  was  correspondingly 
discouraging.  Before  he  had  even  arrived  at  Tripoli  he 
had  lost  one  of  his  frigates  with  all  her  officers  and  men, 

42 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

Yet  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  hot-tempered  com 
modore,  knowing  well  how  distressed  Captain  Bainbridge 
must  be,  wrote  him  a  comforting  letter  in  which  there  was 
no  hint  of  blame  for  the  disaster.  (It  was  through  the 
kindness  of  the  Danish  consul,  Mr.  Nissen,  that  Bainbridge 
was  able  to  exchange  communications  with  Commodore 
Preble.)  And  it  may  be  added  that  Bainbridge 's  officers 
were  hardly  in  their  prison  quarters  when  they  drew  up  a 
memorial  assuring  their  unfortunate  captain  that,  in  their 
opinion,  he  was  blameless  in  every  particular  for  the  loss 
of  his  ship. 

Scarcely  had  the  news  of  the  Philadelphia  reached  the 
squadron  when  Preble  began  plans  for  destroying  her  at 
her  moorings.  Young  Stephen  Decatur,  commander  of  the 
Enterprise,  happened  to  be  on  hand  to  offer  himself  first 
for  the  proposed  expedition,  and  thereby  won  the  distinc 
tion.  Luckily  for  the  purpose,  the  Americans  had  captured 
a  Tripoli  tan  merchant  vessel,  the  Mastico.  The  success  of 
such  an  attempt  as  the  destruction  of  the  Philadelphia  de 
pended  on  its  being  a  complete  surprise,  and  of  course  the 
Mastico' s  Tripolitan  rig  would  not  excite  the  suspicion  that 
the  Enterprise  would  create.  So  it  was  decided  to  man  the 
Mastico — renamed  the  Intrepid — and  take  her  into  the 
harbor  of  Tripoli  in  disguise. 

When  Decatur  called  for  volunteers  from  his  ship  every 
body  on  board  stepped  forward.  From  these  he  selected 
sixty-two  men  and  five  officers.  Five  more  officers — all 
midshipmen — were  added  from  the  Constitution,  and  a 
Sicilian  pilot  named  Catalano.  The  brig  Siren  was  ordered 
to  accompany  the  Intrepid  in  order  to  stand  by  and  rescue 
the  crew  if  she  were  destroyed  before  accomplishing  her 
purpose.  The  Siren  was  given  this  share  in  the  expedition 
because  her  commander,  Lieutenant  Stewart,  had  offered 
to  cut  out  the  Philadelphia  himself  just  after  the  commodore 
had  promised  the  honor  to  Decatur. 

The  Intrepid  left  Syracuse — the  American  base  of  opera 
tions — for  Tripoli  February  3,  1804,  attended  by  the  Siren. 

43 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

They  arrived  before  the  city  a  week  later,  but  a  heavy  gale 
was  rising  which  made  the  attempt  impossible  that  night 
and  forced  the  two  little  vessels  out  to  sea.  They  tossed 
about  for  four  or  five  days,  laboring  to  keep  off  the  rocks  on 
the  treacherous  coast,  and  in  miserable  discomfort.  It 


THE    HARBOR   OF    TRIPOLI 

A — Position  of  the  Philadelphia  when  attacked  by  Decatur.  Dot-and-dash 
lines  represent  course  of  the  Intrepid  on  entering  and  leaving  the  harbor,  Feb 
ruary  16,  1804.  Heavy  dotted  lines  indicate  the  Philadelphia's  course  as  she 
drifted  after  being  fired.  B — Present  position  of  the  wreck  of  the  Philadelphia. 
X — Position  of  the  wreck  of  the  Intrepid  after  she  blew  up,  September  4,  1804, 
in  attempt  to  enter  the  harbor,  under  Captain  Somers,  as  a  bomb-vessel. 


turned  out  that  the  two  weeks'  provisions  were  bad,  so  that 
there  was  little  on  board  fit  to  eat.  The  accommodations 
were  very  cramped,  and  the  previous  occupants  of  the 

44 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

Intrepid  had  left  behind  them  swarms  of  vermin  which  had 
no  respect  for  birth  or  rank.  At  last  the  morning  of  the 
1 6th  brought  back  a  clear  sky  and  an  easy  sea,  and  the 
two  vessels  headed  once  more  for  Tripoli.  The  rig  of  the 
Siren  was  changed  as  much  as  possible  to  conceal  the  fact 
that  she  was  a  man-of-war,  and  she  remained  well  out  to 
sea  when  the  harbor  was  reached.  Under  the  light  wind 
the  Intrepid  headed  toward  the  city  boldly,  but  Decatur 
hung  drags  astern  to  keep  her  from  reaching  the  Philadelphia 
till  after  dark. 

As  the  wind  was  dropping  rapidly  Decatur  decided  that 
it  was  not  wise  to  wait  for  the  boats  from  the  Siren  to  join 
his  force,  as  was  the  original  plan.  One  boat's  crew  of  the 
Siren  had  already  come  aboard  and  remained  on  the  In 
trepid,  with  their  boat  trailing  astern. 

"The  fewer  the  number,  the  greater  the  honor!"  Decatur 
laughed  boyishly,  and  headed  directly  for  the  familiar  sides 
of  the  Philadelphia.  The  wind  had  dropped  so  much  now 
that  it  was  dark  while  the  Intrepid  was  still  two  miles 
distant.  Accordingly,  the  drags  were  taken  in  and  the 
vessel  slipped  gently  along  before  the  light  breeze.  Only 
six  or  eight  men  were  to  be  seen  on  the  deck  besides  her 
commander,  and  these  were  dressed  like  Maltese  sailors. 
All  the  rest  lay  concealed  in  the  shadows,  gripping  their 
cutlasses  and  impatient  to  hear  the  order,  "Board!" 

Decatur  had  given  the  order  for  absolute  silence,  and 
there  was  not  a  whisper.  A  pale  crescent  moon  hung  over 
the  city,  and  lights  began  to  gleam  from  the  white  walls  and 
twinkle  from  the  masts  of  the  shipping.  One  battery  was 
safely  passed  without  challenge.  Slowly  and  more  slowly 
crept  the  little  vessel  before  the  failing  breeze.  Would  it 
never  reach  the  frigate?  thought  the  anxious  figures  lying 
crouched  in  the  shadows. 

At  last  the  tense  silence  was  broken  by  a  hail  from  the 

Philadelphia.     There  was  an  eager  movement  among  the 

hidden  figures.     The  pilot,  Catalano,  answered  coolly  that 

his  ship  had  lost  her  anchors  in  the  gale — which  was  per- 

4  45 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

fectly  true — and  he  wanted  permission  to  tie  up  for  the 
night  to  the  Philadelphia's  cable.  Just  then  the  wind 
shifted  and  forced  the  Intrepid  away  from  the  frigate,  till 
she  lay  directly  under  her  broadside.  It  was  a  ticklish 
situation,  but  there  was  no  flurry  on  the  decks.  The 
sailors  in  Maltese  costume  manned  the  boat  that  swung 
astern,  took  the  end  of  a  hawser  and  rowed  to  meet  a  boat 
from  the  Philadelphia.  The  two  boats'  crews  joined  the 
rope  from  the  Intrepid  to  another  from  the  frigate  and 
rejoined  their  respective  ships  without  arousing  any  sus 
picion  on  the  part  of  the  Tripoli  tans.  Then  the  Amer 
icans  hauled  on  the  rope,  bringing  the  bow  of  the  Intrepid 
up  to  the  anchor-chain  of  the  frigate. 

Meanwhile  some  one  leaning  over  the  rail  of  the  Phila 
delphia  caught  sight  of  the  armed  men  lying  in  the  shadows 
on  the  Intrepid 's  deck. 

"Americano!   Americano!"  he  shouted. 

No  more  hiding  after  that!  The  entire  crew  sprang  to 
the  hawser  and  hauled  the  Intrepid  alongside  with  a  will. 
Then,  with  a  rush,  Decatur  and  his  men  swarmed  up  the 
sides  of  the  frigate,  expecting  a  bloody  hand-to-hand  con 
flict  on  her  decks.  But  panic  had  followed  the  surprise, 
and  the  Tripolitans  ran  in  all  directions.  Several  were 
killed,  but  the  rest  dived  over  the  side  and  swam  for  their 
lives. 

As  soon  as  the  ship  was  clear  the  various  details  hurried 
with  their  combustibles  to  the  different  parts  of  the  ship. 
Decatur  longed  to  try  to  bring  her  out  of  the  harbor,  but  he 
was  under  strict  orders  from  Preble  not  to  attempt  it.  The 
firing-squads  did  their  work  rapidly,  and  in  a  few  minutes 
the  frigate  was  ablaze  from  stem  to  stern.  In  fact,  the 
flames  spread  so  fast  that  several  men  had  difficulty  in 
getting  back  to  the  Intrepid.  In  less  than  twenty  minutes 
the  Americans  had  boarded  the  Philadelphia,  driven  off  her 
crew,  and  returned  to  their  ship. 

Now  came  the  greatest  danger  of  all,  for  the  blazing 
frigate  lighted  up  the  whole  harbor,  and  the  Tripolitan 

46 


THE    BURNING    OF    THE    FRIGATE    "PHILADELPHIA" 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

gunners  were  running  to  their  batteries.  As  the  wind  was 
still  light,  the  Americans  had  to  bend  to  the  sweeps,  and 
made  but  slow  progress.  Luckily,  the  Tripolitans  were 
either  too  much  excited  or  very  bad  gunners,  for,  although 
the  shot  from  one  hundred  guns  splashed  all  about  the  little 
vessel  for  half  an  hour,  not  once  was  the  Intrepid  hit  except 
for  a  random  shot  that  went  through  one  of  her  upper  sails. 
Soon  afterward  she  reached  the  entrance  of  the  harbor, 
where  she  was  met  by  the  boats  of  the  Siren.  There  the 
men  rested  on  their  oars  and  looked  back  until  a  thunder 
ous  explosion  marked  the  end  of  the  Philadelphia. 

The  expedition  had  been  completely  successful,  and  what 
seemed  at  first  a  desperate  undertaking  had  been  carried 
through  without  a  single  American's  being  hurt.  This 
brilliant  exploit  fired  the  enthusiasm  of  the  entire  fleet. 
Officers  and  men  were  ready  to  dare  anything  in  order  to 
measure  up  to  the  splendid  example  set  by  Decatur. 

All  that  winter  and  spring,  in  spite  of  tremendous  gales, 
Preble  kept  a  tight  blockade  on  the  harbor  of  Tripoli, 
leaving  two  vessels  to  scour  the  Mediterranean  for  any 
Tripolitan  corsair  that  might  still  be  at  large.  Finding 
that  he  needed  gunboats  of  a  still  shallower  draught,  he  bar 
gained  with  the  King  of  Sicily  for  six  flat-bottomed  gun 
boats  and  two  mortar-boats.  As  soon  as  this  force  was 
ready  and  the  weather  permitted  he  sent  them  in  for  an 
attack  on  the  Tripolitan  gunboats  at  close  quarters  (August 
13,  1804).  Under  cover  of  a  heavy  fire  from  the  mortars  and 
the  long  guns  of  the  Constitution  the  flotilla  of  six  gunboats 
went  into  the  harbor,  and  the  enemy  sallied  out  to  meet 
them.  Meanwhile  the  one  hundred  and  fifteen  guns  in  the 
defenses  of  the  city  opened  fire,  too,  in  answer  to  the 
Constitution,  but  fortunately  did  little  harm. 

The  Tripolitans  were  supposed  to  be  invincible  at  close 
quarters,  but  the  American  gunboats  attacked  at  once 
alongside,  and  officers  and  men  sprang  upon  the  enemy's 
decks  with  the  most  determined  gallantry.  In  this  hot 
scrimmage  all  the  "school-boy"  officers  distinguished 

47 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

themselves.  Unfortunately,  James  Decatur,  the  brother 
of  Stephen,  was  treacherously  shot  and  killed  by  the 
captain  of  a  Tripolitan  gunboat  which  had  just  surren 
dered  to  him.  His  brother  Stephen,  having  just  captured 
a  gunboat  after  a  hot  fight,  left  it  as  soon  as  he  heard  the 
news  and  dashed  after  another  which  he  believed  was  the 
one  that  had  caused  his  brother's  death.  He  led  his  men 
upon  her  deck,  and  after  a  desperate  hand-to-hand  struggle 
he  succeeded  in  killing  her  commander,  though  he  very 
nearly  lost  his  own  life. 

The  man  who  saved  him  in  this  scrimmage  was  a  young 
sailor  named  Reuben  James,  who  stuck  close  to  his  com 
mander's  side,  warding  off  the  attacks  made  on  Decatur 
from  behind.  When  his  right  arm  was  disabled  with 
simitar  cuts,  he  shifted  his  cutlass  to  the  left  and  fought 
on.  Soon  that  arm  was  useless,  too,  and  the  weapon 
dropped  from  his  hand.  At  that  moment  he  saw  a  Tripoli- 
tan  lift  his  simitar  to  deliver  a  blow  at  Decatur's  head  as 
he  lay  on  the  deck  locked  in  a  death-struggle  with  the  pirate 
captain.  As  both  of  Reuben's  arms  were  useless,  he 
deliberately  put  his  own  head  in  the  way  and  caught  the 
stroke  aimed  for  Decatur.  It  was  a  terrible  blow,  but, 
strange  to  say,  the  hard-headed  young  sailor  was  back  at 
his  post  in  three  weeks  and  lived  to  a  green  old  age.  A 
story  of  the  navy  must  deal  chiefly  with  the  officers,  because 
they  are  the  ones  in  command,  but  the  case  of  Reuben 
James  is  a  fine  example  of  the  fact  that  the  "jackies" 
were  just  as  devoted  and  fearless. 

At  another  point  in  the  line,  during  this  gunboat  attack, 
Lieutenant  Trippe  boarded  one  of  the  largest  of  the  enemy's 
boats,  followed  by  his  men,  but  his  own  vessel  swung  off, 
leaving  him  on  the  enemy's  deck  with  only  a  middy  and 
nine  men.  Against  these  eleven  Americans  were  thirty- 
six  Tripolitans,  but  what  the  boarding  party  lacked  in 
numbers  they  made  up  in  dash.  In  a  few  minutes  they  had 
the  deck  cleared  and  the  Tripolitan  colors  down,  but  at  the 
end  of  that  time  Trippe  bore  eleven  simitar  wounds,  some 

48 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

of  them  very  severe.  No  wonder  Preble  was  Droud  of  his 
school-boys ! 

At  the  end  of  the  fight  three  of  the  enemy's  boats  were 
sunk,  three  were  captured,  and  the  rest  had  retreated 
behind  the  rocks.  Never  again  did  they  venture  out  to 
meet  the  American  gunboats. 

Another  young  lieutenant  who  bore  himself  gallantly  in 
this  affair  was  Richard  Somers,  the  chum  of  Decatur. 
With  his  single  boat  he  had  attacked  five  of  the  Tripolitan 
vessels  and  driven  them  to  shelter.  But  he  was  burning  to 
distinguish  himself  by  an  exploit  like  Decatur's,  and  when 
Commodore  Preble  selected  him  to  take  charge  of  another 
perilous  enterprise  against  the  enemy  Somers  was  over 
joyed.  Briefly,  the  plan  was  this,  to  fit  up  the  Intrepid  as 
a  floating  mine,  sail  her  in  with  only  a  handful  of  men, 
and,  after  bringing  her  into  the  midst  of  the  enemy's  ship 
ping,  to  set  off  the  fuses.  The  Americans  were  to  escape 
in  two  swift  rowboats. 

It  was  a  desperate  scheme,  far  more  so  than  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  Philadelphia,  but  every  man  in  the  fleet  envied 
Somers  the  distinction  of  attempting  it.  At  last  all  was 
ready,  and  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  evening,  September  4, 
1804,  the  Intrepid  once  more  sailed  alone  toward  the  harbor 
entrance.  Besides  Somers  there  were  Midshipmen  Wads- 
worth — an  uncle  of  the  poet  Longfellow — and  Israels,  with 
a  crew  of  ten  seamen.  The  story  is  that  Israels  hid  himself 
on  board  at  the  last  minute  in  order  to  be  in  the  affair. 

Meanwhile  the  Argus,  Vixen,  and  Nautilus  stood  by  out 
side  the  harbor  to  attend  to  picking  up  the  survivors  after 
the  explosion.  As  before,  the  success  of  the  little  vessel 
depended  on  surprising  the  enemy.  Would  the  Tripolitans 
be  deceived  again  by  the  same  ship  ?  The  anxious  watchers 
on  the  decks  of  the  three  sloops  saw  the  Intrepid  disappear 
in  the  evening  mist.  Suddenly,  to  their  dismay,  they 
heard  the  booming  of  cannon.  Evidently  the  guns  of  the 
forts  had  opened  fire  on  her  as  soon  as  she  entered  the  har 
bor.  There  followed  several  minutes  of  intense  anxiety 

49 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 


and  suspense.    Suddenly  the  darkness  was  torn  by  a  great 
shaft  of  light,  followed  by  a  tremendous  explosion. 

The  three  ships  closed  in,  and  all  night  long  their  boats' 
crews  rowed  back  and  forth  in  the  harbor  entrance,  search 
ing,  shouting,  but  in  vain.  Somers  had  declared  that 
sooner  than  allow  all  the  powder  on  the  Intrepid  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  Tripolitans  he  would  blow  her  up 
himself,  and  it  was  the  belief  in  the  fleet  that,  being  sur 
rounded  by  gunboats,  he  had  deliberately  blown  up  the 
magazine  rather  than  surrender.  Others  have  thought 
that,  since  the  explosion  came  too  soon  to  do  the  Tripolitans 
any  harm,  it  was  caused  by  a  hot  shot  from  the  batteries. 
At  any  rate,  the  navy  lost  some  val 
uable  lives  and  gained  nothing  ex 
cept  the  dare-anything  ideal  of  cour 
age  which  these  men  represent. 

Meanwhile,  Preble  had  repeat 
ed  several  times  his  bombardments 
and  gunboat  attacks,  and  kept,  month 
in,  month  out,  a  relentless  blockade 
on  Tripoli.  All  this  made  the  Bey 
very  uneasy.  For  a  long  while  he 
had  not  a  single  ship  at  sea,  and  the 
rain  of  cannon-balls  and  bombshells 
in  the  streets  drove  him  from  his 
palace  to  a  safer  place  outside  the 
city.  So  he  came  down  off  his  high 
horse  and  began  talking  about  peace 
in  a  far  more  modest  fashion  than 
ever  before. 

Unfortunately,  Commodore  Sam 
uel  Barron  was  sent  out  to  super 
sede  the  energetic  Preble,  arriving  on  the  scene  shortly 
after  the  Intrepid  disaster.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
tried  to  explain  to  Preble  that  this  could  not  be  helped, 
because  Barron  was  superior  to  Preble  in  rank.  But  to  be 
superseded  just  when  he  was  putting  the  screws  on  the 

50 


UNIFORM   OF   A   CAPTAIN, 
TRIPOLITAN    WAR 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

Bey  of  Tripoli  was  a  bit  of  news  that  hurt  Preble  and  made 
his  officers  indignant.  Samuel  Barron  had  given  a  good 
account  of  himself  as  a  midshipman  in  the  Revolutionary 
War,  but  his  previous  record  in  the  Tripolitan  war  had  not 
been  brilliant,  and  he  was  now  failing  in  health  of  body  and 
mind.  Although  the  force  Barron  had  now  under  his 
command  was  far  larger  than  the  one  Preble  had  worked 
with,  the  navy  accomplished  nothing  more  under  either 
Barron  or  Rodgers,  who  soon  succeeded  him  in  command. 
When  Preble  went  home  the  naval  glory  of  the  Tripolitan 
war  went  with  him. 

Unfortunately,  the  end  of  the  war  came  in  a  way  not 
wholly  creditable  to  the  navy.  There  was  a  peppery  old 
consul  at  Tunis  named  Eaton,  who  had  been  very  sharp  in 
his  criticism  of  the  dilatory  tactics  of  several  officers  of 
the  navy  during  the  early  years  of  the  war  and  won  their 
hearty  dislike.  As  he  had  fought  well  in  the  Revolutionary 
army,  he  managed  to  interest  the  government  in  a  scheme 
he  had  for  collecting  a  band  of  adventurers  and  attacking 
Tripoli  by  land.  The  plan  sounds  crazy  enough,  but, 
strange  to  say,  he  put  it  through.  He  started  from  Cairo 
with  a  horde  of  Arabs  who  joined  him  in  the  hope  of  plunder, 
and  fairly  drove  them  across  the  desert.  He  went  through 
all  sorts  of  hardships  and  dangers,  but  by  sheer  force  of  his 
iron  will  he  compelled  his  mutinous  army  to  follow  him 
to  the  city  of  Derne  on  the  frontiers  of  Tripoli.  This  he 
attacked  and  captured,  leading  the  final  charge  in  person. 

The  way  now  lay  open  to  the  city  of  Tripoli  itself,  and 
the  Bey's  knees  were  quaking.  Suddenly  peace  was  con 
cluded  by  our  consul-general  to  the  Barbary  States,  To 
bias  Lear,  acting  with  the  commodore  of  the  fleet,  John 
Rodgers.  Lear,  as  well  as  many  of  the  naval  officers, 
disliked  Eaton,  and  probably  hated  to  see  him  carry  off  the 
glory  of  ending  the  war  by  a  brilliant  capture  of  Tripoli 
itself.  The  naval  men,  too,  felt  great  sympathy  for 
Bainbridge  and  the  other  captives  from  the  Philadelphia, 
and,  fearing  that  the  Bey  might  take  the  notion  to  massacre 

51 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

them,  were  glad  to  agree  to  almost  anything.  So  Lear 
and  Rodgers  consented  to  pay  sixty  thousand  dollars  for 
ransoming  the  prisoners  of  the  Philadelphia,  and  hastily 
signed  the  treaty.  The  chief  comfort  in  that  affair  was 
that  the  terms  of  the  treaty  relieved  the  United  States 
from  paying  any  further  tribute  in  the  future.  The  con 
clusion  of  peace  took  place  June  10,  1805. 

The  war  had  lasted  four  years  and,  except  when  Preble 
was  in  charge,  had  dragged  dismally.  But  it  accomplished 
its  object,  for  it  marked  the  first  determined  effort  to  shake 
off  the  yoke  of  the  Barbary  pirates.  The  greatest  credit 
belongs  to  Commodore  Preble.  He  did  nothing  spectacu 
lar  himself,  but  he  did  far  more.  He  introduced  strict 
discipline  into  a  navy  that  needed  it  badly,  and  yet  he 
was  as  careful  of  the  reputations  and  success  of  his  officers 
and  men  as  of  his  own.  Although  he  had  the  smallest 
force  to  work  with,  he  accomplished  more  than  all  the  other 
squadrons  put  together.  There  had  been  no  lack  of 
individual  bravery  before,  but  Preble  gave  his  officers  to 
understand  that  bravery  was  only  the  first  of  an  officer's 
virtues.  He  gave  them  newer  and  sterner  ideals  in 
obedience  and  efficiency. 


V 

THE    BEGINNING    OF    THE    WAR    OP    l8l2 

Causes  of  the  war — The  Leopard  affair — Comparison  of  navies — The 
chase  of  the  Constitution — The  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere. 

IN  1793  England  began  to  fight  France,  and  with  only 
an  occasional  truce  the  war  went  on  until  Napoleon's 
army  was  routed  at  Waterloo  in  1815.  In  other  words, 
while  we  were  fighting  the  French  in  the  West  Indies 
and  the  Tripolitans  in  the  Mediterranean,  England  was  in 
a  long  death-grapple  with  Napoleon.  In  this  struggle 
England's  chief  defense  was  her  fleet.  It  was  necessary  to 
the  nation's  existence  to  keep  command  of  the  sea,  but 
this  fleet,  in  order  to  control  the  sea  and  blockade  the 
enemy's  coast,  had  to  be  enormous. 

At  one  time  during  this  war  England  spent  four-fifths 
of  her  whole  income  on  her  navy.  All  those  hundreds  of 
ships  needed  many  thousands  of  men  to  man  them;  and, 
as  the  life  was  one  of  cruel  treatment  and  great  hardships, 
men  were  not  easy  to  get.  Some  were  tempted  to  enlist  by 
free  drinks  and  a  large  bounty,  but  more  were  sent  to  the 
ships  to  save  the  country  the  expense  of  keeping  them  in 
jail,  and  many  others  were  kidnapped  in  the  streets  and 
taverns  of  a  seaport  town  by  press-gangs  from  the  ships. 
But  in  spite  of  everything  the  fleet  never  had  enough  men. 
Yet  men  must  be  found.  So  the  captains  of  the  British 
men-of-war  very  soon  got  the  habit  of  holding  up  English 
merchant  ships  and  taking  off  all  their  crew  but  a  mere 
handful  necessary  to  work  the  vessel  into  the  nearest  port. 
Next  they  overhauled  American  merchantmen  and  took 

53 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

off  every  one  who  had  been  born  in  the  British  Isles.  From 
that  it  was  an  easy  step  to  take  any  able-bodied  seaman, 
no  matter  where  he  was  born. 

This  was  the  practice  known  as  "impressment,"  or 
"pressing."  Many  an  American  sailor  was  taken  against 
his  will  into  the  British  navy,  to  a  life  of  slavery  from 
which  he  could  escape  only  by  desertion.  Our  govern 
ment  protested,  but  it  might  as  well  have  begged  the  sun 
not  to  rise.  We  have  already  seen  how  a  British  com 
modore  impressed  five  Americans  from  the  Baltimore,  but 
the  following  incident  shows  an  arrogance  that  was  far 
worse. 

In  1805  Great  Britain  began  a  policy  of  telling  us  that 
any  American  ship  carrying  goods  bound  to  a  French  port 
was  liable  to  seizure.  Again  President  Jefferson  "pro 
tested."  Then,  in  order  to  enforce  the  English  decrees, 
ships  of  war  were  actually  sent  to  blockade  several  American 
ports.  There  was  some  more  "protesting"  done.  In  fact, 
during  those  days  President  Jefferson  and  his  Secretary 
of  State  had  splendid  practice  in  protesting. 

One  night  in  February,  1807,  five  of  the  crew  of  these 
English  blockading-ships  in  Chesapeake  Bay  deserted  and 
enlisted  in  the  American  36-gun  frigate  Chesapeake.  Later 
five  more  deserted  from  another  British  ship  and  went 
to  the  Chesapeake.  The  British  minister  demanded  that 
they  should  be  given  up,  but  after  an  investigation  he  was 
informed  that  they  were  all  Americans  and  would  not  be 
surrendered.  At  this  the  British  admiral  on  the  station 
ordered  all  his  ships  to  stop  the  Chesapeake  at  sea  and 
search  her  for  deserters. 

As  the  Chesapeake  left  Hampton  Roads  June  22,  1807, 
the  British  ship  Leopard,  50  guns,  followed  her  to  sea. 
As  soon  as  the  two  ships  were  on  the  high  sea  the  Britisher 
signaled  the  American  to  receive  a  boat.  Capt.  James 
Barren  of  the  Chesapeake  hove  to,  thinking  that  probably 
the  captain  of  the  Leopard  wanted  to  send  despatches  to 
Europe.  To  his  astonishment,  the  lieutenant  of  the 

54 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

Leopard  coolly  read  him  the  English  admiral's  order  and 
announced  that  Barren  must  give  up  the  deserters.  Natu 
rally,  Barren  refused.  Shortly  after  the  English  lieutenant 
had  returned  to  the  Leopard  the  latter  opened  fire,  first 
with  a  shot  and  then  with  a  full  broadside. 

Now  it  happened  that  the  decks  of  the  Chesapeake  were 
piled  high  with  all  sorts  of  gear,  from  cables  to  chicken- 
coops,  all  of  which  her  commander  expected  to  stow  during 
the  first  day  or  two  at  sea.  It  might  be  added  that  many 
a  man-of-war  has  gone  to  sea  in  that  condition  before  and 
since  because  of  orders  from  Washington  to  sail  on  a 
certain  date. 

Barron  was  not  wholly  to  blame,  but  it  seems  that  he 
rather  lost  his  head  in  the  crisis  and  stood  irresolute  and 
inactive  after  sending  the  lieutenant  off  the  ship.  He  did 
nothing  to  get  ready,  and  when  the  British  shot  began  to 
crash  into  the  sides  of  the  Chesapeake  it  was  found  that  the 
powder-horns  were  empty,  nobody  knew  where  the  slow 
matches  were,  or  the  rammers,  either,  and  most  of  the  guns 
hadn't  even  been  mounted. 

But  a  brave  young  lieutenant,  William  H.  Allen,  who  had 
begged  his  captain  in  vain  to  prepare  for  battle  with  all 
possible  speed,  swore  that  the  flag  should  not  be  struck 
without  one  gun  being  fired  in  its  defense.  Running  to  the 
galley,  he  picked  out  a  live  coal  and,  tossing  it  in  his 
blistering  hands,  he  ran  back  to  one  gun  that  stood  loaded 
and  ready.  The  coal  was  laid  to  the  touch-hole  and  one 
gun  boomed  in  reply  to  the  English  broadsides.  By  this 
time  twenty-one  shots  had  hulled  the  Chesapeake.  Her 
foremast  and  mainmast  had  both  been  shot  away,  three 
men  had  been  killed  and  eighteen  wounded.  Then  Barron 
hauled  down  his  flag. 

The  Leopard  sent  another  boat  party  aboard  and  it  was 
found  that  only  one  of  the  deserters  was  in  the  Chesapeake' 's 
crew,  for  the  rest  had  run  away  before  the  ship  sailed. 
But  just  to  rub  the  insult  in  more  deeply,  the  English 
officer  seized  three  others  of  the  Chesapeake's  crew — all 

55 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Americans — and  carried  them  off  to  the  Leopard.  Then 
the  British  ship  sailed  off,  leaving  her  almost  helpless 
victim  to  limp  back  into  Chesapeake  Bay. 

Was  there  ever  such  an  insult  to  a  nation?  The  country 
rang  with  indignation — and  Jefferson  protested  again! 
Poor  Barron  was  court-martialed  and  suspended  for  five 
years  without  pay.  Four  years  after  the  Leopard  affair 
the  British  government  made  a  lame  sort  of  apology  and 
returned  two  of  the  impressed  sailors.  Of  the  others  one 
had  died  and  the  other  poor  wretch  had  been  hanged  at 
the  yard-arm  for  deserting. 

Strange  to  say,  all  this  took  place  while  Napoleon  was 
doing  even  more  damage  to  us  than  the  English.  As  soon 
as  the  British  government  forbade  American  ships  to  go 
to  any  French  port  Napoleon  answered  back  by  saying 
that  no  American  ship  could  go  to  an  English  port.  In 
those  days  we  were  very  largely  a  commercial  nation,  and 
between  Napoleon  and  England  our  commerce  was  being 
rapidly  squeezed  to  death.  Then,  to  make  matters  worse, 
Jefferson  and  his  Congress  laid  "embargoes"  on  our  own 
trade  to  spite  England  and  France.  That  is,  they  would 
not  allow  any  American  ships  to  leave  port  at  all.  This 
was  like  a  man  burning  his  barn  down  in  the  hope  that  the 
sparks  might  worry  his  neighbor.  The  embargoes  did  not 
hurt  either  England  or  France,  but  they  did  hurt  our  own 
country  very  seriously,  and  they  made  the  New-Englanders, 
who  were  largely  dependent  on  commerce,  so  bitter  toward 
the  Administration  that  they  were  disloyal  in  the  war 
that  followed. 

These  restrictions  on  our  own  trade  gave  Napoleon  an 
excuse,  and  he  coolly  seized  ten  million  dollars'  worth  of 
American  ships  and  cargoes  that  lay  in  French  harbors. 
This  was  a  more  wholesale  piece  of  robbery  than  the 
British  had  done,  and  we  might  well  have  gone  to  war  with 
France,  except  that  the  British  by  the  attack  on  the 
Chesapeake  and  their  blockades  on  our  own  coast  had  done 
more  to  hurt  our  national  pride.  And  there  was  that 

56 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

insolent  practice  of  impressment  going  on  all  the  time, 
which  rankled  sorely. 

The  President  who  followed  Jefferson — James  Madison — 
was  of  the  same  party  and  equally  slow  to  act.  He  took  up 
"protesting"  after  Jefferson  finished,  as  if  nobody  had 
ever  tried  it  before.  By  that  time  the  British  officials 
would  laugh  when  the  American  minister  called  with 
another  long  envelope.  But  in  1811  there  were  some  fiery 
Westerners  in  Congress  who  demanded  war  with  Great 
Britain,  not  only  on  account  of  her  arrogant  decrees  and 
her  practice  of  impressing  American  sailors,  but  because 
they  believed  that  some  terrible  Indian  massacres  on  the 
frontier  had  been  secretly  instigated  by  the  British  gov 
ernment.  Now  we  know  that  this  idea  was  wrong,  but 
at  that  time  it  was  passionately  believed  in  Ohio  and 
Kentucky;  and  there  still  remained  the  hard  facts  that 
England  had  captured  under  her  decrees  nine  hundred 
American  vessels  and  impressed  four  thousand  men. 

So  finally  the  Administration  stopped  wabbling  and 
"protesting"  and  declared  war  on  June  19,  1812.  Great 
Britain  did  not  want  war,  and  at  the  last  minute  repealed 
her  most  objectionable  decrees,  but  it  was  too  late.  It 
would  have  been  far  better  for  the  United  States  to  declare 
war  immediately  after  the  Leopard  incident  in  1807,  for  at 
that  time  Napoleon  seemed  invincible  and  England  would 
probably  have  yielded  on  almost  every  point  to  avoid 
having  an  extra  war  on  her  hands.  In  the  summer  of  1812 
it  was  clear  that  Napoleon's  sun  was  setting,  and  his 
abdication  in  1814  left  Great  Britain  free,  if  she  chose, 
to  fling  her  enormous  navy  and  her  veteran  army  against 
the  United  States. 

For  a  long  while  it  had  been  clear  that  we  should  soon 
have  to  fight  either  France  or  England,  and,  naturally,  we 
should  suppose  that  the  government  had  been  making 
rapid  preparations  for  the  coming  struggle.  But  the  fact  is 
that  nothing  was  done  at  all.  There  were  no  repairs  on  our 
tiny  coast  defenses,  our  army  was  small  and  untrained,  our 

57 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

militia  was  laughable,  and  when,  shortly  before  the  war, 
a  congressional  committee  urged  that  twelve  ships  of  the 
line  and  twenty  frigates  be  built  to  protect  our  coasts, 
Congress  voted  it  down  because  "a  large  navy  is  dangerous 
to  the  liberties  of  a  free  people." 

When  war  was  declared  we  had  only  sixteen  fighting- 
ships.  Besides  these  were  257  gunboats,  contemptuously 
called  "Jeffs"  by  the  naval  men  because  they  were  the  idea 
of  Jefferson.  Instead  of  spending  a  naval  appropriation  on 
building  one  or  two  new  frigates  he  put  the  money  into  these 
ridiculous  little  gunboats,  because  his  idea  was  that  one  shot 
beneath  the  water-line  might  be  enough  to  sink  a  whole  frig 
ate,  while  it  would  take  257  shots  to  sink  all  of  these  gun 
boats.  But  when  it  came  to  using  these  "  Jeffs"  in  battle 
it  was  found  that  the  flimsy  little  tubs  would  hardly  stand 
the  kick  of  their  own  guns,  and  after  one  disastrous  trial 
they  were  found  only  fit  to  break  up  into  kindling-wood. 

In  our  little  fleet  we  had  not  a  single  ship  of  the  line,  but 
our  three  44-gun  frigates  were  the  best  of  their  class  in  the 
world.  And  our  officers  had  been  raised  to  a  high  point  of 
efficiency  by  the  campaigns  against  the  French  and  the 
Tripolitans.  Opposed  to  our  pygmy  force  Great  Britain 
had  seven  times  as  large  a  fleet  already  on  the  Atlantic 
coast,  and  when  Napoleon  fell  in  1814  she  had  available 
her  whole  navy  of  219  ships  of  the  line  and  296  frigates,  not 
to  mention  the  many  sloops  of  war. 

The  disproportion  was  so  great  that  it  was  almost 
decided  to  keep  the  American  ships  of  war  tied  up  close 
in  our  ports  and  not  let  them  risk  fighting  at  sea.  At  the 
same  time  every  American  officer  and  enlisted  man  was 
anxious  to  prove  his  mettle  in  a  square  fight.  The  officers 
had  borne  too  much  ridicule  from  English  officers  in  regard 
to  American  ships,  which  they  called  "a  bunch  of  pine 
boards  with  a  striped  piece  of  bunting."  Many  of  the 
jackies  had  been  impressed  by  the  British  and  bore  on  their 
backs  long  red  scars  left  by  the  cat-o'-nine-tails ;  they  had 
something  more  than  ridicule  to  pay  back. 

53 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  16,  1812,  Capt.  Isaac  Hull,  on 
the  Constitution,  was  off  Barnegat  on  the  way  to  New 
York  to  join  Commodore  Rodgers'  squadron.  He  discov 
ered  four  ships  at  a  great  distance  to  the  northwest,  and  a 
single  ship  to  the  northeast.  He  made  for  her,  but  the 
wind  was  so  light  that  he  did  not  get  within  hailing-distance 
till  nearly  midnight.  The  stranger  was  evidently  a  frigate, 
and  at  first  Hull  believed  her  to  be  a  part  of  Rodgers' 
squadron.  But  when  his  signals  were  unanswered  he  sus 
pected  her  to  be  an  enemy.  As  his  crew  was  green  and 
undisciplined,  he  lay  to  till  morning,  for  there  would  be 
less  danger  of  confusion  in  fighting  by  daylight.  Further 
more,  he  was  suspicious  of  the  other  four  ships,  whose 
character  he  could  not  make  out.  All  hands  lay  at  quar 
ters,  and  next  morning  Hull  discovered  not  only  the 
frigate  of  the  night  before,  but  a  ship  of  the  line,  three 
more  frigates,  a  brig  and  a  schooner,  all  flying  the  British 
ensign  and  all  bearing  down  on  the  Constitution.  Luckily, 
the  nearest  frigate,  instead  of  opening  fire,  wasted  ten 
minutes  in  tacking  and  coming  around  again  in  a  stupid 
fashion  that  gave  the  American  frigate  a  little  start. 

Then  began  a  famous  chase.  At  sunrise  a  dead  calm  fell, 
and,  except  for  intervals  of  breeze,  the  calm  held  all  day. 
Hull  drenched  his  sails  with  water  the  better  to  catch  the 
wind,  put  out  all  his  boats  to  tow,  and  then,  as  they  were 
near  enough  shore  for  sounding,  he  bent  all  his  hawsers 
together,  making  a  line  nearly  a  mile  long,  and  sent  out 
anchors  ahead  of  the  ship.  The  crew  hauled  first  on  one 
and  then  on  another,  thus  warping  the  ship  along.  The 
English  imitated  every  manceuver.  Sometimes  British 
.shot  splashed  around  and  even  beyond  the  Constitution, 
but  every  now  and  then  a  lucky  puff  of  wind  would  swell  the 
flapping  sails  and  just  carry  her  out  of  reach.  The  chase 
continued  in  this  way  for  two  days  and  nights  of  almost 
incessant  labor  for  officers  and  men.  Toward  the  close  of 
the  second  day  a  squall  came  up.  Hull  immediately  furled 
all  sail,  as  if  anticipating  a  tremendous  blow,  and  the 

59 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

English  captains  hastily  followed  his  example ;  but  scarcely 
had  the  curtain  of  rain  shut  down  when  Hull  loosed  his  sail 
again,  and  when  the  squall  cleared  away  he  had  gained  so 
much  on  his  pursuers  that  dawn  of  the  following  day 
showed  them  hopelessly  astern  of  him,  and  they  soon  gave 
up  the  chase. 

Commodore  Broke  of  the  English  squadron  had  been  so 
sure  of  taking  the  Constitution  that  he  had  told  off  a  prize 
crew  for  her.  Hull's  unexpected  escape  is  one  of  the  most 
skilful  feats  in  the  records  of  our  navy.  He  missed  no 
possible  advantage  and,  though  alternately  towing,  kedging, 
and  sailing,  he  never  lost  a  boat  or  a  minute  in  swing 
ing  a  boat  on  board.  The  English  in  their  eagerness 
had  cut  many  of  their  boats  adrift  and  spent  two  or 
three  days  afterward  cruising  about  to  pick  them  up 
again. 

The  nearness  of  Broke's  squadron  to  New  York  made  it 
impossible  for  Hull  to  obey  his  original  orders,  and  accord 
ingly  he  made  for  Boston.  Having  replenished  his  supplies 
there  and  learned  that  there  were  no  orders  for  him  from 
Rodgers,  Hull  coolly  slipped  out  to  sea  with  all  possible 
speed  on  August  2d.  He  explained  that  he  went  to  sea 
without  orders  because  he  was  afraid  of  being  blockaded 
in  Boston  by  the  enemy's  squadron.  What  he  probably 
feared  still  more  was  that  the  timid  authorities  in  Wash 
ington  would  order  him  not  to  stir  for  fear  of  being  cap 
tured.  As  it  turned  out,  just  such  orders  arrived  for  him 
the  day  after  he  got  away.  In  doing  this  Hull  risked  his 
commission  and  even  his  life,  but  he  staked  them  both  for 
the  sake  of  proving  the  efficiency  of  the  service  to  which  he 
belonged. 

After  an  uneventful  cruise  in  the  neighborhood  of  Halifax 
he  turned  south,  and  about  noon  on  August  19,  1812,  he 
sighted  a  large  frigate  which,  as  he  had  good  reason  to 
expect,  flew  English  colors.  This  was  just  the  chance  he 
had  been  aching  for.  Evidently  the  English  captain  was 
glad  to  fight,  too,  for,  as  Hull  had  the  wind  behind  him,  the 

60 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

Britisher  deliberately  waited  for  him  to  come  up  till  he  was 
within  three  miles'  distance. 

The  British  frigate  was  the  Guerriere,  Captain  Dacres, 
oddly  enough  an  old  acquaintance  of  Hull's,  with  whom, 
the  story  goes,  he  had  bet  a  hat  the  year  before  on  the 
outcome  of  a  possible  duel  between  the  Guerriere  and  an 
American  ship  like  the  Constitution.  We  shall  soon  find 
out  who  won  the  hat. 

Dacres  saw  that  if  the  Constitution  continued  on  her 
course  she  would  run  under  the  stern  of  the  Guerriere  and 
rake  her,  so  he  manceuvered  to  avoid  this  and  to  get  the 
American  under  his  broadside.  He  opened  fire  when 
within  range,  but  Hull  fired  only  occasionally,  swinging  the 
ship  to  match  every  movement  of  the  enemy  and  all  the 
while  edging  up  astern  of  him.  This  went  on  for  three- 
quarters  of  an  hour;  then  Dacres,  seeing  he  could  not 
catch  the  Constitution  at  any  disadvantage,  allowed  her  to 
come  to  close  quarters.  Hull  then  overhauled  the  Guer 
riere  from  astern,  receiving  the  fire  of  her  stern-chasers  in 
silence,  but  ordering  his  guns  double-shotted  for  close 
quarters. 

It  was  about  six  in  the  evening  when  he  swung  alongside 
at  ''half-pistol-shot"  distance,  and  as  soon  as  each  gun 
came  within  range  it  poured  its  round  shot  and  grape 
with  smashing  effect.  As  fast  as  possible  the  guns  were 
reloaded  and  fired  again.  In  ten  minutes  the  Guerriere 's 
mizzenmast  toppled  over,  smashing  a  great  hole  in  her 
stern,  and  with  all  its  tangle  of  sail  and  spars  acting  as  a 
drag  against  which  the  rudder  was  helpless. 

"Huzza,  my  boys!"  shouted  Hull.  "We've  made  a  brig 
of  her!" 

They  had  done  more  than  that,  they  had  made  a  wreck 
of  her,  for  the  Guerriere  now  lay  with  her  nose  up  in  the 
wind.  Hull  promptly  crossed  her  bows  and  delivered 
raking  broadsides  which  did  terrible  execution  at  that 
close  range.  Then  the  Guerriere  lunged  her  bowsprit 
across  the  deck  of  the  Constitution,  and  each  side  thought 

62 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

of  boarding,  but  the  heavy  sea  made  it  impossible.  At 
this  point  several  were  killed  and  wounded  on  both  sides  by 
musketry,  including  Captain  Dacres,  who  was  wounded 
in  the  back. 

In  breaking  loose  again  the  Guerriere  struck  her  bowsprit 
on  the  rail  of  the  Constitution;  the  blow  slackened  the 
forestay  of  the  foremast,  and,  as  most  of  the  shrouds  had 
already  been  shot  away,  down  crashed  the  foremast.  The 
jerk  started  the  weakened  mainmast,  too,  and  that,  with  a 
great  splintering  crack,  toppled  overboard  as  well. 

As  the  Constitution  drew  up  across  her  bows  to  rake 
again  the  Guerriere  fired  a  gun  to  leeward  in  token  of  sur 
render.  By  this  time  she  had  not  a  mast  left,  most  of  her 
batteries  were  blanketed  under  fallen  spars  and  sails,  and 
she  wallowed  helplessly  in  the  heavy  seas.  A  sail  on  the 
horizon  suggested  another  enemy;  and  Hull,  seeing  that 
the  Guerriere  had  no  more  fight  left  in  her,  drew  off  to 
repair  damages  to  his  rigging.  The  strange  sail  soon  dis 
appeared,  and  a  half-hour  was  enough  to  make  all  necessary 
repairs.  The  Constitution  then  returned  to  the  Guerriere 
and  took  her  surrender. 

As  Captain  Dacres  climbed  up  the  side  of  the  American 
frigate  Hull  went  to  meet  him  and  gave  his  hand  to  his  old 
acquaintance. 

"Dacres,"  he  said,  "give  me  your  hand.  I  know  you're 
hurt." 

And  the  story  goes  that  when  Dacres  took  off  his  sword 
to  give  it  up  Hull  laughed  as  an  old  friend  might : 

"Not  your  sword,  Dacres,  but  I'll  trouble  you  for  your 
hat!" 

The  look  of  astonishment  on  Dacres's  face  changed  to  a 
wry  smile  as  he  remembered  that  bet  of  the  year  before. 
Hull  immediately  sent  over  a  surgeon's  mate  to  help  the 
English  surgeon  and  his  staff  in  caring  for  the  wounded 
Englishmen.  Later,  before  destroying  the  Guerriere,  he 
asked  Dacres  if  there  was  still  anything  on  board  that  he 
would  like  to  save. 

63 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

"Yes,"  he  replied;  "my  mother's  Bible,  which  I  have 
carried  with  me  for  years." 

At  that  Hull  promptly  sent  an  officer  to  get  it.  This 
little  courtesy  seemed  to  bind  the  two  men  in  a  lasting 
personal  friendship,  for  Dacres  was  a  brave  and  generous 
enemy.  He  took  special  pains  in  his  report  to  the  Admiralty 
of  the  loss  of  the  Guerriere  to  mention  in  warm  terms  Hull's 
consideration  for  the  prisoners,  especially  the  wounded. 
Twenty-five  years  later,  when  Dacres  was  an  admiral  and 
Hull  was  commodore  of  an  American  squadron,  the  two 
met  again  in  Rome.  There  these  old-time  enemies  were 
seen  walking  arm  in  arm,  and  Dacres  showed  Hull  every 
courtesy  in  his  power. 

The  day  after  the  battle  Hull  had  tried  to  tow  the 
Guerriere,  but  she  was  leaking  so  badly  that  there  was  no 
chance  of  saving  her,  so  he  set  fire  to  her  and  blew  her  up. 
Ten  days  later,  August  3oth,  the  Constitution  sailed  proudly 
into  Boston  harbor,  with  guns  booming  and  flags  fluttering 
from  every  mast.  When  the  news  was  told  Boston  went 
wild,  and  as  the  echoes  of  the  victory  spread  bells  rang  and 
the  people  cheered  everywhere  throughout  the  land. 

So  far  everything  else  had  gone  wrong.  Instead  of  a 
glorious  invasion  of  Canada  the  American  army  had  been 
beaten  back  at  every  point  and  British  regulars  were  on 
American  soil.  Then,  to  crown  the  miserable  story, 
General  Hull — an  uncle  of  Isaac  Hull — had,  in  the  very  week 
of  the  Constitution's  victory,  surrendered  our  most  im 
portant  outpost  of  Detroit  to  a  far  inferior  force.  Every 
despatch  had  told  a  story  of  failure  and  disaster. 

All  this  time  nobody  had  expected  that  the  little  navy 
could  do  anything  against  the  Mistress  of  the  Seas,  and 
when  Hull  brought  the  news  of  beating  a  British  frigate  in 
a  stand-up  fight  the  news  was  almost  too  good  to  be  be 
lieved.  It  was  the  first  cheery  news  since  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  and  people  went  wild  with  enthusiasm.  Per 
haps  we  did  some  silly  boasting,  too,  but  that  was  only 
natural.  A  very  popular  ballad  was  composed  about  the 

64 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

capture  of  the  Guerriere  which  has  this  for  its  opening  and 
most  modest  stanza: 

It  ofttimes  has  been  told  that  British  seamen  bold 
Could  flog  the  tars  of  France  so  neat  and  handy,  oh! 

But  they  never  met  their  match  till  the  Yankees  did  they  catch. 
Oh,  the  Yankee  boy  for  fighting  is  a  dandy,  oh! 

There  was  an  important  side  to  this  hullabaloo  over 
the  victory.  The  Constitution  was  a  Boston  ship,  and  her 
victory  set  ablaze  a  feeling  of  patriotism  in  Boston.  That 
was  very  much  needed,  because  Boston  was  the  heart  of 
New  England,  and  the  section  was  bitterly  opposed  to  a 
war  against  Great  Britain,  or,  rather,  to  anything  done  by 
a  Republican  Administration. 

To  the  English  the  loss  of  a  frigate  was  a  trifle,  but  the 
fact  that  it  had  been  captured  by  one  of  these  despised 
Yankee  frigates  was  a  bitter  pill  indeed,  and  the  London 
papers  took  it  very  hard.  When  we  compare  the  arma 
ment  of  the  two  ships  we  see  at  once  that,  with  equally 
brave  men  and  skilful  captains  on  both  sides,  the  Consti 
tution  ought  to  have  won,  for  her  strength  was  as  three 
to  the  Guerriere' s  two.  But  there  was  a  far  greater  dif 
ference  between  the  vessels  when  the  short  duel  was  over. 
The  Guerriere  had  78  killed  and  wounded  to  the  Constitu 
tion's  14,  and,  while  the  former  was  so  battered  that  she 
could  not  be  even  towed  to  port,  the  Constitution  after  a 
half-hour's  repairs  on  her  rigging  was  as  fit  as  ever.  For 
years  the  English  had  been  accustomed  to  fighting  and 
beating  much  bigger  vessels  than  their  own,  and  they  be 
lieved  that  any  British  ship  was  fit  to  beat  an  adversary 
of  almost  twice  its  size. 

It  is  interesting  to  note,  too,  that  Captain  Dacres,  a  few 
days  before  meeting  the  Constitution,  had  sent  the  following 
message  to  Commodore  Rodgers  in  New  York: 

Captain  Dacres,  Commander  of  his  British  Majesty's  frigate 
Guerriere,  of  44  guns,  presents  his  compliments  to  Commodore 

65 


THE   STORY  OF  OUR   NAVY 

Rodgers  of  the  frigate  President,  and  will  be  very  happy  to  meet 
him,  or  any  other  American  frigate  of  equal  force  to  the  President, 
off  Sandy  Hook,  for  the  purpose  of  having  a  few  minutes'  tete-a- 
tete. 

So  when  the  Constitution — a  sister  ship  of  the  President — 
came  along,  Captain  Dacres  got  exactly  what  he  had  asked 
for,  but  not  exactly  what  he  had  expected. 


VI 


THE  CAPTURES  OF  THE  "  FROLIC,"  THE  "MACEDONIAN,"  AND 
THE  "JAVA" 

The  Wasp  and  the  Frolic — The  United  States  and  the  Macedonian — 
The  Constitution  and  the  Java. 

THE  first  duel  of  the  war  was  between  frigates,  the 
second  was  between  sloops.  In  the  frigate  actions 
we  must  make  allowance  for  the  superiority  of  the  44-gun 
frigate  designed  by  Humphreys  to  any  frigates  in  the 
British  navy  in  both  size  and  guns.  But  there  was  little 
or  no  difference  in  the  design  of  the  sloops,  which  were 
built  on  English  models;  and  in  the  sloop  actions  of  1812 
we  usually  find  vessels  as  evenly  matched  as  is  possible  in 
the  chances  of  war. 

On  October  18,  1812,  Master-Commandant  Jacob  Jones, 
commanding  the  sloop  of  war  Wasp,  sighted  a  British 
sloop  of  war  which  proved  to  be  the  Frolic,  commanded  by 
Captain  Whinyates.  The  two  vessels  were  about  five 
hundred  miles  due  east  from  the  Chesapeake  Capes.  A 
few  days  before  there  had  been  a  violent  gale  which  did 
some  damage  to  the  rigging  of  both  vessels,  and  there 
was  still  a  heavy  sea  running  when  they  fought  each  other. 
The  Frolic  was  escorting  two  merchantmen,  and  when 
Whinyates  saw  the  American  ship  heading  for  him  he 
signaled  the  convoy  to  run  away  while  he  waited  the  attack. 

On  account  of  the  rough  seas  neither  side  tried  firing  till 
the  vessels  were  within  fifty  yards  of  each  other,  and  they 
ran  alongside  with  little  attempt  at  manceuvering.  Mean 
while  they  blazed  away  at  each  other  with  cannon  and 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

musketry.  The  Wasp's  spars  and  sails  were  soon  badly 
cut  up.  Crack!  Suddenly  her  maintopmast  fell  over  into 
the  fore  rigging  and  made  nearly  all  the  head-sails  useless. 
Jones  looked  anxiously  at  the  Frolic,  which  seemed  to  be 
as  fresh  as  ever.  And  yet  his  lads  knew  how  to  aim  a 
gun — he  had  seen  to  that. 

As  the  two  drew  closer  the  Frolic's  foreyards  became  dis 
abled  by  the  American  fire,  and  she  swung  awkwardly  into 
position  with  her  bow  toward  the  Wasp.  Jones  made  the 
most  of  this  by  catching  the  Frolic's  bowsprit  between  his 
own  main  and  mizzen  masts,  and  then  pouring  in  a  broad 
side  of  grape-shot  that  swept  the  Frolic's  deck  fore  and  aft. 
The  two  ships  were  so  close  that  the  American  ramrods 
were  pushed  against  the  bows  of  the  Frolic.  Jones  was  just 
giving  an  order  for  another  raking  broadside,  but  the  ardor 
of  his  men  could  not  be  restrained.  Seaman  Jack  Lang, 
who  had  once  been  impressed  into  the  British  navy,  leaping 
on  top  of  his  gun,  caught  the  lurching  bowsprit  of  the  enemy, 
clambered  up,  and  was  soon  making  his  way,  with  cutlass 
in  hand  and  blood  in  his  eye,  to  the  deck  of  the  Frolic. 
Nobody  could  let  Jack  board  the  enemy  all  by  himself,  and 
at  the  next  favorable  swing  of  the  ship  Lieutenant  Biddle 
with  a  party  of  boarders  climbed  up  and  was  soon  on  the 
forecastle  of  the  Frolic. 

There  the  Americans  were  shocked  by  a  horrible  spec 
tacle.  The  deck  was  strewn  with  the  dead  and  dying.  As 
Biddle  picked  his  way  along  the  bloody  deck  he  found  only 
four  men  on  their  feet — the  quartermaster,  still  clutching 
the  wheel,  and  Captain  Whinyates  and  two  other  officers, 
all  wounded.  The  officers  dropped  their  swords  in  surrender, 
and  Biddle  with  his  own  hands  lowered  the  British  ensign. 

Scarcely  had  the  Americans  taken  possession  when  the 
masts  of  the  Frolic  went  down  close  to  the  deck.  On  in 
vestigating  her  condition  the  Americans  found,  in  the  words 
of  Captain  Whinyates  himself,  that  out  of  one  hundred 
and  ten  men  "not  twenty  were  left  unhurt."  Every  officer 
was  either  killed  or  wounded. 

68 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

On  the  American  side  there  had  been  serious  damage 
to  the  rigging,  but  there  were  only  five  killed  and  five 
wounded,  a  total  of  ten  to  the  enemy's  ninety.  The  ex 
planation  of  the  difference  is  that  the  Americans  had  fired 
on  the  downward  roll  of  the  ship  and  hulled  the  Frolic  or 
cut  her  masts  near  the  level  of  the  deck,  the  English  had 
fired  on  the  upward  roll  and  wounded  only  the  upper  rigging 
of  the  Wasp. 

Probably  no  other  ship  in  a  duel  like  this  ever  suffered 
such  an  enormous  loss  of  life  in  proportion  to  her  original 
crew;  and,  as  her  masts  went  overboard  soon  after  her  sur 
render,  the  ship  itself  was  nothing  but  a  hulk.  The  Wasp 
and  the  Frolic  were  very  evenly  matched,  the  Frolic  having 
a  slight  advantage  in  guns  and  the  Wasp  a  slightly  larger 
crew.  The  result  was  clearly  due  to  the  better  gunnery  of 
the  Americans. 

The  British  Admiralty  were  so  mortified  by  the  facts 
as  they  came  out  in  the  testimony  that  poor  Whinyates 
after  his  court-martial  never  got  another  command,  and 
yet  he  had  fought  bravely  and  stubbornly,  and  the  injuries 
he  had  done  to  the  Wasp's  rigging  resulted  finally  in  her 
capture.  While  Jones  was  busily  trying  to  repair  his  in 
juries  aloft  a  British  ship  of  the  line  hove  in  sight,  picked 
up  both  antagonists,  and  took  them  to  Jamaica. 

Meanwhile  the  United  States,  44  guns,  under  Capt. 
Stephen  Decatur,  had  gone  to  sea  with  Commodore 
Rodgers'  squadron  early  in  October,  1812.  He  left  the 
squadron  three  days  later,  and  on  the  25th  of  the  month, 
while  cruising  near  the  Canary  Islands,  he  sighted  a  large 
sail  twelve  miles  away.  It  was  the  38-gun  frigate  Mace 
donian,  Captain  Garden,  who  was  looking  for  the  32-gun 
frigate  Essex  which  he  had  heard  was  somewhere  in  that 
neighborhood.  So  he  made  all  speed  to  come  up  with  the 
United  States,  and  the  impetuous  Decatur  was  no  less 
anxious  to  fight. 

When  Dacres  fought  the  Constitution  he  had  generously 
sent  the  impressed  Americans  on  the  Guerriere  down  into 

69 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

the  hold,  although  he  was  short  of  men.  There  were  seven 
impressed  seamen  on  the  Macedonian,  and  when  they 
recognized  the  Stars  and  Strips  on  the  United  States  one  of 
them,  Jack  Cand,  asked  the  captain  that  they  might  be 
regarded  as  prisoners  of  war.  Garden,  with  an  oath,  or 
dered  him  back  to  his  gun. 

"You  make  that  request  again,"  he  threatened,  "and 
I'll  shoot  you  on  the  spot!" 

Poor  Jack  was  soon  killed  by  a  24-pound  shot  from  his 
own  countrymen. 

Meanwhile  the  swift  Macedonian  was  rushing  toward  her 
enemy.  If  she  held  her  course  she  would  pass  under  the 
stern  of  the  American  frigate  and  come  immediately  into 
close  quarters.  In  so  doing  Garden  would  give  up  the 
"weather  gage" — that  is,  the  position  to  windward  of  the 
enemy.  In  those  days  British  captains  thought  it  a  great 
advantage  to  hold  the  windward  position,  so  Garden  turned 
on  a  course  nearly  parallel  with  the  United  States,  but 
keeping  at  a  considerable  distance.  He  still  believed  the 
American  ship  to  be  the  Essex,  and,  knowing  that  the 
Essex  was  weak  in  long  guns,  he  thought  it  would  be  easy 
to  stay  out  of  range  of  her  carronades  and  shoot  her  up. 
But  he  had  an  unpleasant  surprise.  As  soon  as  the  two 
ships  were  within  long  range  a  24-pound  shot  cut  away  the 
Macedonian's  mizzentopmast,  which  fell  into  the  rigging 
of  the  mainmast.  Soon  afterward  the  shots  came  crashing 
into  the  bulwarks  and  hull  of  the  Macedonian,  sending 
deadly  splinters  flying  across  the  decks.  While  the  two 
ships  fought  at  long  range  Decatur  kept  sailing  a  little  way 
ahead  and  then  swinging  his  ship  around  to  pour  her  full 
broadside  on  the  Macedonian. 

Garden  soon  realized  that  the  United  States  had  the 
better  of  him  at  long  range  and  headed  toward  the  Ameri 
can  in  order  to  come  to  close  quarters.  In  doing  this  he 
exposed  his  bows  to  a  diagonal  fire  from  the  United  States, 
which  Decatur  was  quick  to  take  advantage  of.  In  their 
position  of  sailing  bows-on  toward  their  enemy  the  English 

70 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

had  only  a  few  guns  that  could  bear,  while  the  Americans 
with  their  full  broadside  poured  into  the  Macedonian  a 
storm  of  iron  that  swept  her  decks  and  dismounted  all  her 
carronades  on  the  starboard  side. 

After  half  to  three-quarters  of  an  hour  of  this  destructive 
work  Decatur  allowed  his  enemy  to  come  to  close  quarters. 
But,  as  Garden's  carronades  were  all  dismounted  on  the  side 
exposed  to  the  American  fire,  and  as  the  carronades  of  the 
United  States  were  now  thundering  away  with  their  big, 
smashing  shot,  the  Macedonian  was  worse  off  at  close 
quarters  than  before.  Soon  her  topmasts  were  gone,  and 
her  mizzenmast  followed,  so  that  she  rolled  the  muzzles 
of  her  guns  under  water  with  every  wave. 

There  was  only  a  forlorn  chance  left  for  the  Englishmen — 
namely,  to  take  the  United  States  by  boarding,  and  the 
helm  was  put  hard  aport  in  order  to  foul  the  American 
frigate.  Just  then  a  shot  sent  the  big  foreyard  of  the 
Macedonian  swinging  round,  and  the  ship  pointed  into 
the  wind. 

Seeing  that  his  enemy  was  done  for,  Decatur,  like  Hull, 
sailed  off  a  short  distance  to  repair  his  rigging.  At  this 
manceuver  the  British  sailors,  who  had  certainly  been 
fighting  as  bravely  as  men  could,  broke  into  a  loud  cheer, 
for  they  supposed  that  the  Americans  had  sighted  another 
man-of-war  and  were  running  away.  But  in  a  few  minutes 
the  United  States  returned  as  fresh  as  ever  and  took  up  a 
raking  position  under  the  Macedonian's  stern.  There  was 
a  hasty  council  of  war  among  the  English  officers.  Lieu 
tenant  Hope,  the  fiery  first  lieutenant,  though  twice 
wounded  during  the  battle,  pleaded  that  the  Macedonian 
sink  first  but  never  surrender.  More  practical  heads  pre 
vailed,  and  the  ensign  of  England  came  flapping  down  to  the 
deck. 

"Sir,"  said  Decatur,  when  Garden  offered  his  sword,  "I 
cannot  receive  the  sword  of  a  man  who  has  so  bravely  de 
fended  his  ship!" 

It  is  true  Garden  had  defended  it  bravely;  but,  as  Preble 

71 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

had  taught,  bravery  is  only  the  first  of  a  commander's 
qualities.  Brains  and  skill  are  quite  as  necessary,  and 
Garden  had  not  shown  either.  Hull,  in  his  fight  with  the 
Guerriere,  and  Garden,  in  his  with  the  United  States,  were 
in  the  same  relative  positions.  Each  was  to  windward,  and 
each  came  down  to  attack  a  waiting  enemy.  Hull  never 
allowed  the  Guerriere  to  get  in  a  raking  broadside,  though 
she  tried  often.  He  manoeuvered  so  that  he  came  to 
close  quarters  from  astern,  where  only  a  few  of  the  ene 
my's  guns  could  reach  him  before  he  closed.  So  when  the 
Constitution  surged  alongside  at  close  quarters  she  had 
scarcely  an  injury. 

Garden  had  tried  to  come  up  to  close  quarters,  too,  but 
instead  of  manceuvering  to  avoid  being  raked  he  came  almost 
bows-on,  exposed  to  a  terrible  fire  from  the  entire  American 
broadside  and  unable  to  reply  to  any  effect.  Before  the 
Macedonian  could  come  to  close  quarters  she  was  so  badly 
shattered  that  she  was  already  a  beaten  ship.  All  the 
while  Decatur  showed  excellent  judgment  in  handling 
his  ship,  so  that  he  made  the  most  of  Garden's  blun 
ders. 

Like  Hull  and  Dacres,  Decatur  and  Garden  had  known 
each  other  before  the  war,  and,  oddly  enough,  just  as 
Dacres  had  bet  a  hat  with  Hull  on  the  superiority  of  the 
British  frigates,  Garden  and  Decatur  had  had  a  warm 
argument  on  the  comparative  value  of  British  i8-pounders 
and  the  American  24-pounders.  The  battle  settled  this 
difference  of  opinion,  too. 

The  comparative  strength  of  the  two  ships  was  about  the 
same  as  in  the  case  of  the  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere — 
that  is,  three  to  two.  But  the  difference  in  damage  in 
flicted  was  about  nine  to  one.  The  British  loss  in  killed 
and  wounded  was  104  to  the  American  12.  In  this  case, 
where  a  good  deal  of  the  shooting  was  at  long  range,  the 
Americans  again  showed  great  superiority  in  gunnery. 
After  the  surrender  Decatur  patched  up  the  Macedonian, 
and  the  two  ships  got  back  safely  to  New  York.  The 

72 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

captured  frigate  served  under  the  Stars  and  Stripes  for 
many  years  afterward. 

After  Hull  returned  victorious  in  the  Constitution  he 
gave  up  the  command  of  her,  of  his  own  accord,  in  order 
that  Captain  Bainbridge  might  have  a  chance.  This  was 
a  generous  act,  for  after  taking  the  Guerriere  Hull  could 
have  stayed  as  long  as  he  liked  on  the  Constitution.  The 
fine  unselfishness  of  it  adds  to  our  respect  for  the  man  who 
is  considered  the  ablest  single-ship  captain  of  the  War  of 
1812.  Bainbridge  must  have  appreciated  the  act,  too,  for  it 
gave  him  a  chance  to  clear  his  name  of  all  the  disasters  that 
had  clouded  it  during  his  naval  career.  In  the  French  war 
his  little  vessel  had  been  the  only  one  captured  by  the 
French.  In  1800  he  had  been  forced  to  the  humiliation  of 
taking  his  ship  on  an  errand  for  the  Bey  of  Algiers,  and  in 
1803  he  had  been  captain  of  the  Philadelphia  when  she  went 
aground  off  Tripoli.  Sailors  are  famous  for  their  super 
stitions,  and  the  crew  of  "Old  Ironsides"  felt  that  he  was 
an  "unlucky"  captain.  They  were  very  much  discontented 
at  the  idea  of  giving  up  their  beloved  Hull  for  Bainbridge, 
and  after  the  Constitution  put  to  sea  under  the  new  captain 
he  was  forced  to  discipline  the  crew  severely. 

Captain  Bainbridge  had  with  him  the  sloop  Hornet, 
and  expected  the  Essex  to  join  him  later,  but,  as  we  shall 
see,  the  Essex  never  caught  up  with  him.  The  Constitution 
and  the  Hornet  went  south  to  Bahia,  Brazil.  There  in 
the  harbor  they  found  a  British  sloop  of  war,  the  Bonne 
Citoyenne,  with  a  large  amount  of  money  on  board.  For  a 
while  the  two  American  ships  kept  her  blockaded.  Then 
Lawrence,  the  commander  of  the  Hornet,  sent  a  challenge 
to  the  English  captain  to  come  out  and  fight,  with  a  pledge 
from  Bainbridge  that  he  would  not  interfere.  The  English 
man  responded  that  he  did  not  trust  Bainbridge  to  keep  his 
hands  off.  At  this  Bainbridge  sailed  off,  hoping  in  that 
way  to  tempt  the  British  sloop  of  war  to  come  out. 

Three  days  later,  on  the  morning  of  the  2gth  of  December, 
1812,  Bainbridge  sighted  two  sails,  These  turned  out  to 

73 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

be  the  British  frigate  Java,  Captain  Lambert,  in  company 
with  an  American  prize.  As  soon  as  Lambert  sighted  the 
Constitution  he  ordered  his  prize  to  run  to  Bahia,  while  he 
headed  for  the  strange  frigate.  Bainbridge,  seeing  that  the 
Englishman  was  ready  to  fight,  headed  southeast  in  order 
to  get  to  a  safe  distance  from  neutral  water.  The  Java 
came  rushing  on  with  all  speed,  and  at  about  one-thirty 
the  Constitution  turned  about  and  headed  for  her  enemy. 
Then  began  a  contest  in  seamanship  between  the  rival  cap 
tains.  The  Java  manceuvered  to  get  a  raking  position,  and 
the  Constitution  swung  from  one  side  to  the  other  to  avoid 
the  danger.  In  this  contest  the  Java  had  the  better  of  it 
because  she  was  the  speedier  of  the  two.  The  Java,  like 
the  Guerriere,  was  originally  a  French  ship.  The  fastest 
ships  in  the  British  navy  were  those  that  the  English  had 
taken  from  the  French.  (Frenchmen  in  those  days  built 
ships  far  better  than  they  fought  them.)  Besides,  Captain 
Lambert  was  an  expert  seaman  and  took  great  pride  in  the 
art  of  handling  a  ship.  So  Bainbridge  had  his  hands  full 
in  keeping  the  Java  from  gaining  a  raking  position. 

As  soon  as  the  ships  were  within  reach  of  each  other 
their  broadsides  began  booming,  with  an  occasional  sputter 
of  musketry.  Early  in  the  battle  a  musket-ball  struck 
Bainbridge  in  the  hip.  At  two-thirty  a  round  shot  smashed 
the  Constitution's  wheel  and  drove  a  copper  bolt  deep  into 
his  thigh,  but  in  spite  of  these  painful  wounds  he  refused 
to  leave  the  deck.  The  loss  of  his  wheel  made  the  situation 
serious,  because  after  that  the  rudder  had  to  be  swung  by 
relieving  tackles,  two  decks  below,  and  every  time  the 
course  was  altered  Bainbridge  had  to  send  some  one  scam 
pering  below  to  pass  the  order. 

With  his  wheel  gone  Bainbridge  saw  that  there  was  only 
one  thing  left  to  do,  and  that  was  to  close  with  his  enemy, 
no  matter  what  it  cost.  As  the  Constitution  swung  up  the 
Java  shot  past  under  her  stern,  and  everybody  expected 
the  dreaded  raking  broadside,  but  for  some  reason — 
perhaps  the  guns  were  not  loaded  just  then — the  Java 

74 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

fired  only  one  little  p-pounder.  Round  the  ships  swung 
again;  once  more  the  nimble  Java  crossed  the  wake  of  the 
Constitution,  but  at  too  great  a  distance  to  harm  her. 
Again  Bainbridge  headed  for  her,  and  at  this  moment  the 
Java  lost  her  jib-boom  with  the  sails  on  it,  and  the  sudden 
loss  of  head-sail  made  her  come  up  into  the  wind.  Bain- 
bridge  made  the  most  of  his  chance  by  swinging  his  ship 
about  and  raking  the  Java  with  terrible  effect  at  close 
quarters. 

This  was  a  staggering  blow,  and  Lambert  tried  to  settle 
things  by  boarding  the  American  frigate.  But  just  as  he 
was  laying  the  Java  alongside,  down  came  her  foremast. 
At  that  the  unlucky  Java  ran  the  stump  of  her  bowsprit 
into  the  mizzen  rigging  of  the  Constitution  in  a  position 
that  gave  the  Americans  a  chance  to  pour  in  another 
dreadful  raking  fire  at  close  quarters. 

From  this  time  the  Java  was  done  for,  although  her 
brave  defenders  kept  up  a  heroic  fight.  The  Constitution 
circled  about  her  and  poured  in  a  fire  that  riddled  her  and 
cut  away  every  stick  but  her  mainmast,  and  that  went 
overboard  a  few  minutes  before  the  surrender.  At  the 
same  time  the  American  marines  were  busy  with  their 
muskets.  It  was  a  bullet  from  the  maintop  of  the  Con- 
stitution  that  gave  Captain  Lambert  his  mortal  wound  soon 
after  the  two  ships  fouled. 

Shortly  after  four  the  shattered  Java  lay  a  complete 
wreck,  rolling  heavily  in  the  trough  of  the  seas,  with  her 
batteries  silent.  As  there  was  no  flag  flying,  Bainbridge 
decided  that  she  had  surrendered,  so  he  sailed  off  for  an 
hour  to  splice  his  badly  cut  rigging.  On  his  return  he 
found  that  the  British  frigate  had  hoisted  her  colors  again, 
but  as  the  Constitution  forged  across  her  bows,  ready  for 
another  raking  broadside,  the  flag  was  pulled  down  in  a 
hurry. 

The  Constitution  had  the  same  advantage  in  strength 
over  the  Java  that  she  had  had  over  the  Guerriere,  but  again 
there  was  no  comparison  in  the  damage  done.  The  Java 

75 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

was  so  shattered  that  Bainbridge  had  to  blow  her  up,  while 
the  Constitution  was  perfectly  fit  for  a  long  cruise  back  to 
the  United  States.  As  for  killed  and  wounded,  British  ac 
counts  of  the  Java  vary  all  the  way  from  124  to  230.  The 
Constitution's  total  loss  was  34. 

The  Constitution  put  into  Bahia  again,  and  Bainbridge, 
though  in  great  pain  from  his  wounds,  had  himself  carried 
before  the  dying  Lambert  in  order  to  return  the  English 
man's  sword  and  to  say  how  earnestly  he  hoped  that 
Lambert  might  recover.  It  is  pleasant  to  read  that  our 
victorious  commanders  distinguished  themselves  by  their 
chivalry  as  well  as  their  courage  and  skill.  Among  the 
prisoners  taken  from  the  Java  was  General  Hyslop,  who  was 
on  board  with  a  detachment  of  troops.  The  general  was 
so  much  impressed  by  Bainbridge's  courtesy  that  he  not 
only  wrote  him  his  thanks  after  leaving  the  ship,  but 
later  sent  him  a  gold-mounted  sword. 

For  Captain  Bainbridge,  with  all  his  hard-luck  record, 
this  victory  meant  everything.  It  cleared  his  name  and 
proved  his  worth.  In  fact,  the  enemy's  ship  in  this  case 
was  handled  much  more  cleverly  than  the  Guerriere,  the 
Frolic,  or  the  Macedonian,  for  Lambert  was  a  splendid 
seaman.  Where  he  failed  was  in  gunnery.  He  belonged 
to  that  large  class  of  English  captains  of  those  days  who 
had  no  use  for  target  practice.  As  the  battle  went  on 
the  Java's  shooting  grew  wilder,  while  that  of  the  Consti 
tution  grew  more  and  more  deadly.  During  the  six  weeks 
Lambert  had  commanded  the  Java  only  once  had  he  held 
gun  drill,  and  that  was  with  blank  cartridges. 

In  all  the  wild  hurrahs  over  the  continued  victories  of 
the  little  American  navy  Americans  began  to  talk  as  if 
there  were  some  magic  stuff  in  our  sailors  which  made 
them  braver  and  better  than  any  men  in  the  world — no 
tably  the  English.  (At  that  time  our  army  was  getting 
so  badly  whipped  along  the  Canadian  line  that  it  was  very 
comforting  to  be  able  to  boast  about  our  navy.)  The 
truth  of  the  matter  was  that  the  British  navy  had  been 

76 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

so  long  accustomed  to  beating  the  French — even  at  great 
odds — that  the  officers  had  grown  over-confident  and  care 
less.  Even  Lord  Nelson  had  pooh-poohed  the  idea  of  gun 
practice.  "Get  so  close  that  you  can't  miss!"  was  his 
advice.  Accordingly  we  find  the  crews  of  British  ships 
untrained  in  gun-fire,  while  the  men  on  our  American 
frigates  and  sloops  were  drilled  and  trained  to  shoot  straight. 
As  between  straight  shooting  and  wild  shooting,  no  matter 
how  brave  the  men  may  be,  there  can  be  only  one  result. 
We  have  seen  that  result  in  the  captures  of  the  Guerriere, 
the  Frolic,  the  Macedonian,  and  the  Java. 

6 


VII 

JAMES    LAWRENCE 

The  Hornet  and  the  Peacock — The  Chesapeake  and  the  Shannon — 
Reasons  for  the  defeat. 

IN  the  last  chapter  we  left  the  i8-gun  sloop  of  war 
Hornet,  Master-Commandant  James  Lawrence,  vainly 
challenging  the  Bonne  Citoyenne  to  come  out  of  the  harbor 
of  Bahia  and  fight.  Not  long  afterward  a  British  ship  of 
the  line  came  in,  and  the  little  Hornet  had  to  take  to  her 
heels.  Lawrence  then  sailed  along  the  coast  to  British 
Guiana,  which  was  a  popular  hunting-ground  for  American 
privateers,  and  on  his  way  he  captured  an  armed  brig  with 
a  cargo  of  coffee  and  tea  and  the  sum  of  $23,000  in  coin 
on  board. 

On  February  24,  1813,  when  off  the  mouth  of  the  Deme- 
rara  River,  Lawrence  sighted  a  British  sloop  of  war  and 
in  making  for  her  was  pleased  to  see  that  her  commander 
was  just  as  ready  to  fight  as  he  was.  The  English  sloop 
was  the  Peacock,  Captain  Peake.  She  was  a  sister  ship  of 
the  Frolic;  but,  as  she  had  recently  changed  her  34-pound 
carronades  for  24*8,  her  broadside  was  lighter  than  that 
of  the  Frolic.  The  fight  between  these  two  may  be  said 
to  have  lasted  scarcely  one  round.  Hardly  had  they  begun 
fighting  when  Lawrence  caught  his  enemy  at  a  disadvan 
tage  by  a  quick  manceuver  and  held  a  deadly  position  close 
under  his  stern,  pouring  in  a  heavy  fire.  In  eleven  minutes 
from  the  first  shot  down  came  the  British  colors  and  up 
went  a  signal  of  distress. 

When  Lieutenant  Shubrick  of  the  Hornet  went  aboard 

78 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

he  found  the  captain  of  the  Peacock  killed  and  the  ship 
settling  fast.  Then  Lieutenant  Connor,  with  a  force  of 
American  sailors,  was  sent  aboard  to  try  to  keep  the  little 
vessel  afloat  till  the  prisoners  could  be  transferred.  They 
threw  the  cannon  overboard,  plugged  holes,  pumped,  and 
baled,  but  the  Peacock  settled  lower  and  lower  till  suddenly 
she  dived  under,  carrying  with  her  nine  English  and  three 
American  sailors.  The  sad  story  about  these  American 
tars  is  that  they  were  rummaging  below  for  some  of  the 
Peacock's  rum,  which  they  could  not  bear  to  see  wasted. 

In  this  duel  the  Hornet  had  an  advantage  in  men  and 
weight  of  shot,  but  there  was  the  same  old  story  of  wretched 
shooting  against  accurate  shooting.  The  Peacock  had  lost 
five  killed  and  thirty-three  wounded,  \vhile  the  Hornet  had 
one  killed  and  four  wrounded.  Two  of  the  latter  were  hurt, 
not  by  the  enemy's  fire,  but  by  an  explosion  of  a  cartridge 
on  their  own  ship.  The  Peacock  was  so  badly  shattered 
in  eleven  minutes  that  she  could  not  be  kept  afloat  long 
enough  to  get  all  the  prisoners  off,  while  the  Hornet  had  only 
a  few  injuries  in  her  rigging,  which  were  soon  patched  up. 

There  were  three  impressed  Americans  on  the  Peacock 
who  had  been  refused  permission  to  go  below  as  prisoners. 
Like  Garden,  Captain  Peake  threatened  to  shoot  them. 
One  of  these  men  was  killed.  Another  by  a  strange  chance 
turned  out  to  be  a  relative  of  Lawrence's  wife. 

All  the  while  the  fight  was  going  on  the  British  sloop 
Espiegle,  of  the  Hornet  class,  was  lying  at  anchor  in 
neutral  water  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  in  plain  view. 
When  the  business  with  the  Peacock  was  done  Lawrence 
hastily  spliced  his  rigging,  to  be  ready  for  another  set-to. 
To  his  astonishment,  the  Espiegle  did  not  stir,  and  after 
waiting  around  invitingly  with  no  result  Lawrence  trimmed 
his  sails  and  went  homeward. 

By  this  time  the  Hornet  was  crowded  with  prisoners 
whose  cramped  quarters  were  naturally  very  uncomfortable, 
but  Lawrence's  care  for  the  English  wounded  and  the 
consideration  he  showed  his  prisoners  were  so  fine  that  as 

79 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

soon  as  the  Englishmen  arrived  in  the  United  States  they 
published  a  letter  expressing  their  gratitude  to  their 
chivalrous  enemy.  The  seamen  themselves  caught  their 
captain's  spirit  and  made  up  from  their  own  supplies 
an  outfit  for  the  British  sailors,  who  had  lost  all  they  had 
by  the  sudden  end  of  the  Peacock. 

On  the  24th  of  March,  1813,  Lawrence  arrived  safely  at 
New  York  and  discharged  his  prisoners.  During  his  cruise 
of  145  days  he  had  captured  four  rich  merchantmen  and 
destroyed  a  man-of-war  of  his  own  rate  in  brilliant  style. 
There  was  not  another  officer,  even  in  those  days  of  rapid 
successes,  who  could  quite  match  this  record  of  Lawrence's 
in  the  Hornet.  When  he  arrived  in  New  York  there  were 
grand  dinners  and  jollifications  in  his  honor,  and  he  became 
the  popular  toast.  And,  what  was  better  still,  he  was  so 
beloved  in  the  navy  that  there  was  not  one  of  his  less 
fortunate  brother  officers  who  was  not  delighted  at  the 
success  of  "Jim"  Lawrence. 

He  asked  to  be  allowed  to  keep  the  command  of  the 
Hornet,  but,  as  he  had  recently  been  promoted  to  the  rank 
of  captain,  the  Department  slated  him  for  a  frigate.  Law 
rence  then  hoped  for  the  Constitution,  but  they  gave  him  the 
Chesapeake,  then  refitting  in  Boston. 

Late  in  May  Lawrence  took  command  of  her,  with  orders 
to  get  to  sea  as  soon  as  he  could  and,  heading  north,  to 
destroy  the  British  fisheries  on  the  Grand  Banks.  On 
going  aboard  he  reported  to  Washington  that  he  found  his 
ship  ready  for  sea  except  for  some  men  and  a  few  supplies. 
Ten  days  later,  May  3oth,  he  left  the  wharf  and  moored 
out  in  the  roads — to  get  "shaken  down,"  as  he  called  it,  for 
a  few  days  before  trying  to  run  the  blockade. 

Meanwhile  there  had  been  since  April  two  English 
frigates  blockading  the  port.  At  first,  in  order  to  en 
courage  the  well-known  disloyalty  of  the  New  England 
States  toward  Madison  and  the  war,  the  English  had  left 
the  New  England  coast  free.  But  early  in  1813  the 
British  government  decided  to  blockade  the  New  England 

80 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

coast  as  well.  Two  other  American  frigates  had  run  the 
blockade  of  Boston  harbor  in  a  fog,  just  before  Lawrence 
arrived.  This  left  the  Constitution,  undergoing  repairs  in 
the  navy-yard,  and  the  Chesapeake,  which  was  almost  ready 
for  sea. 

The  morning  of  June  ist  showed  that  instead  of  two 
frigates  blockading  the  harbor  there  was  only  one,  the 
Shannon,  Captain  Broke.  This  was  the  Captain  Broke 
who  had  seen  the  Constitution  escape  from  his  squadron 
in  that  long  chase  off  the  Jersey  coast.  As  soon  as  Law 
rence  heard  that  there  was  only  one  ship  on  blockade 
he  hurried  on  board  to  go  out  and  fight.  Had  he  known 
that  that  very  morning  Broke  was  writing  a  challenge  to 
him  to  come  out  to  a  single-ship  duel,  "wherever  it  is  most 
convenient  to  you,"  he  might  perhaps  have  taken  a  little 
more  time  for  his  preparations.  Broke  sent  the  challenge 
ashore  by  a  discharged  prisoner,  but  the  message  never 
reached  Lawrence. 

Here  was  the  one  chance  he  had  been  hoping  for.  The 
memory  of  the  Bonne  Citoyenne  and  the  Espiegle,  and  the 
scornful  things  he  had  said  about  their  commanders,  made 
it  impossible  for  him  to  sit  tamely  in  Boston  Roads  with  a 
solitary  English  ship  the  size  of  the  Chesapeake  coolly 
sailing  back  and  forth  at  the  very  mouth  of  the  harbor. 

But  the  Chesapeake  was  not  in  the  best  shape  for  battle. 
Next  to  the  captain  the  first  lieutenant  is  the  most  im 
portant  man  on  a  ship.  The  Chesapeake' s  "first  luff"  was 
in  the  hospital  ashore,  dying  of  pneumonia.  Two  other 
officers  were  on  leave,  and  to  fill  these  vacancies  Lieutenant 
Ludlow,  only  twenty-one  years  old,  was  made  first  lieuten 
ant,  and  two  midshipmen  were  moved  up  as  acting  lieu 
tenants.  Of  course  the  crew  was  unorganized,  officers  and 
men  did  not  know  one  another  at  all  and  were  unfamiliar 
with  their  duties. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Shannon  was  manned  by  as 
finely  disciplined  a  crew  as  could  be  found  in  the  British 
navy.  Her  captain  had  been  with  that  ship's  company  on 

81 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

the  Shannon  for  seven  years,  and  made  it  "a  crack  ship." 
Strange  to  say,  his  hobby  was  gunnery,  and  most  of  his 
brother  officers  used  to  laugh  at  him  as  a  crank,  But  he 
let  them  laugh.  The  Shannon  was  his  ship,  and  he  deter 
mined  to  carry  out  his  ideas.  So  at  his  own  expense  he 
fitted  out  his  guns  with  the  best  sights  known  in  that  day. 
Behind  each  gun  he  cut  an  arc  of  a  circle  in  the  deck,  with 
the  degrees  marked  plainly,  so  that  something  like  an  ac 
curate  angle  could  be  made  in  aiming.  Twice  a  day,  ex 
cept  on  Saturdays  and  Sundays,  he  had  gun  drill,  usually 
including  practice  in  firing  at  a  floating  cask  four  or  five 
hundred  yards  away. 

When  Broke  had  preached  gunnery  to  his  brother  officers 
they  had  pooh-poohed  at  him  and  repeated  what  Nelson 
had  said  about  sights;  but  when  one  ship  after  another 
surrendered  to  the  Americans  during  that  first  year  of  the 
war  Broke  knew  well  enough  what  the  trouble  was,  and 
longed  for  a  chance  to  show  the  difference  between  the  firing 
of  the  Shannon  and  that  of  the  Guerriere,  the  Macedonian, 
and  the  Java. 

Probably  all  that  Lawrence  knew  about  his  opponent  was 
that  it  was  a  British  frigate,  in  size  like  his  own,  offering 
battle,  and  to  this  young  and  impetuous  commander  that 
was  enough.  Just  before  tripping  his  anchor  he  mustered 
his  crew  and  made  them  a  brief  speech.  At  the  end  two 
sailors  stepped  forward  and  asked  for  prize  money  that  had 
been  due  them  for  a  long  while  and  which  naturally  they 
wanted  to  their  credit  before  going  into  action.  This 
incident  was  the  foundation  for  the  story  afterward  of  the 
"mutinous  temper"  of  the  crew.  Lawrence  went  below, 
ordered  the  purser  to  make  out  the  checks  for  the  money, 
and  then  wrote  to  his  wife  and  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
In  the  letter  to  the  Secretary  he  expressly  says  that  his 
men  were  in  "fine  spirits."  Having  sent  these  letters 
ashore,  he  unmoored  and  made  sail  directly  for  the  waiting 
Shannon. 

Captain  Broke,  seeing  that  Lawrence  needed  no  chal- 

82 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

lenge  to  make  him  fight,  turned  about  and  headed  to  sea 
to  lead  his  antagonist  out  to  where  there  was  plenty  of 
sailing-room.  Then  he  shortened  sail  and  waited  for  the 
Chesapeake.  In  doing  this  he  gave  Lawrence  the  choice  of 
any  style  of  attack,  and,  as  the  Chesapeake  came  on,  the 
American  commander  had  a  tempting  chance  to  take  a 
raking  position  under  the  stern  of  the  Shannon.  Broke 
expected  this  manceuver  and  ordered  his  men  to  lie  down 
to  avoid  the  storm  of  iron  shot  and  splinters  that  would 
sweep  the  length  of  the  deck.  But,  to  his  astonishment, 
Lawrence  threw  away  the  advantage,  as  if  disdaining  to  use 
it,  and  instead  rounded  up  to  run  close  alongside.  It  was 
nearly  six  o'clock  in  the  evening  when  the  Chesapeake's 
bows  forged  past  the  stern  of  the  Shannon  and  the  British 
gunners  opened  fire.  They  struck  first.  Just  as  soon  as  a 
gun  could  be  trained  on  the  American  frigate  it  was  fired, 
then  loaded  with  all  speed  and  fired  again.  The  effect  of 
this  accurately  aimed  fire  was  terrible  at  a  distance  of 
fifty  yards,  yet  the  American  seamen  stood  to  their  guns 
bravely,  and  for  five  or  six  minutes  the  two  frigates  sailed 
almost  parallel  courses,  pounding  each  other  furiously  with 
their  broadsides. 

In  his  eagerness  to  close  with  his  enemy  Lawrence  had 
allowed  his  ship  to  run  up  with  considerable  headway, 
while  the  Shannon  had  been  hove  to  awaiting  him.  Be 
sides  this,  the  Chesapeake  lay  to  windward  and  in  passing 
the  Shannon  took  the  wind  from  the  latter's  sails.  The 
result  was  that  the  Chesapeake  forged  past  the  Shannon, 
and  Lawrence  tried  to  "luff  her"  in  order  to  check  her 
headway.  Just  at  this  crucial  moment  several  disasters 
happened  all  at  once.  The  two  men  on  whom  the  manceu- 
vering  depended  most  were  shot  down,  Captain  Lawrence 
was  wounded,  and  his  sailing-master  was  killed.  Then  a 
shot  brought  down  the  foreyard  with  its  sail,  the  wheel  was 
broken,  and  sheets  fore  and  aft  were  carried  away,  leaving 
their  sails  flapping  idly.  In  consequence  the  unlucky  ship 
came  up  helplessly  into  the  wind  with  her  stern  exposed 

83 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 


to  the  full  broadside  of  her  enemy,  only  seventy  yards 

away. 

Broke  took  quick  advantage  of  this  position  by  pouring 

into   the   Chesapeake  a   terrible   diagonal   fire,    while   she 

drifted  slowly,  stern  foremost,  right  upon  the  British  guns. 
Lawrence,  seeing  that  the  two  ships 
were  going  to  foul,  gave  the  order  to 
call  "boarders  away."  But  there  was 
confusion  in  getting  the  order  because  the 
negro  bugler  was  so  paralyzed  with  terror 
that  he  had  hidden  himself,  and  the  or 
der  had  to  be  shouted  from  man  to  man. 
Just  before  the  two  ships  fouled  Lawrence 
was  wounded  again,  this  time  mortally. 
The  American  boarders  gathered,  cutlass 
and  pike  in  hand,  but  they  looked  round 
in  vain  for  leaders.  At  that  moment 
Lawrence  was  being  carried  below,  and 
every  other  officer  on  the  spar-deck  had 
received  his  death-wound  except  a  few 
midshipmen — mere  boys — most  of  whom 
were  in  the  tops. 

The  second  lieutenant  was  off  at  the 

UNItUKM   (Jb    A  .  i       p     *  *   • 

SAILOR,  WAR  OF  1 8 12  opposite  end  of  the  ship  on  the  deck  be 
low,  with  not  the  faintest  idea  of  what 
was  going  on  above.  The  acting  third  lieutenant,  Mid 
shipman  Cox,  had  responded  to  the  call  for  boarders  by 
leading  his  gun-crews  on  deck.  But  just  as  he  reached  the 
deck  he  saw  his  beloved  commander  fall  mortally  wounded. 
Lawrence  was  not  merely  the  captain  to  young  Cox ;  he  was 
a  friend  and  idol.  The  young  man  impulsively  stopped  in 
his  tracks  to  help  pick  up  his  captain  and  carry  him  to  the 
deck  below.  But  as  he  ran  up  again  he  found  the  hatch 
already  battened  down  by  the  boarders  of  the  enemy. 

Meanwhile  the  American  boarding  party,  thus  left 
without  leaders,  were  being  cut  down  by  a  terrible  raking 
fire  at  close  quarters.  It  is  small  wonder  that  they  soon 

84 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 


44= 


became  demoralized  and  ran  below.  The  marines  had  lost 
their  captain,  but  they  were  rallied  by  their  sergeant,  and 
made  a  defense  which  the  marine  corps  may  still  boast  of 
to-day.  Out  of  a  company  of  forty-four  they  lost  twelve 
killed  and  twenty  wounded  before  the  survivors  were 
finally  swept  away  by  the  rush  of  the  Shannon. 

In  the  British  navy  a  captain  is  not  supposed  to  lead  a 
boarding  party  from  his  ship  unless  things  are  pretty 
desperate.  Whatever  Broke  may  have  thought  of  the 
condition  of  his  own  ship,  the  fact  remains  that  he  was 
among  the  first  to  leap  to  the  quarter-deck  of  the  Chesa 
peake.  Not  long  after  the  British  had  seized  the  quarter 
deck  there  came  a  golden  opportunity  for  the  Americans  to 
rally  and  save  the  day,  if 
they  had  had  a  single  offi 
cer  to  direct  them.  Dur 
ing  the  confusion  the  Ches 
apeake  had  fallen  off.  enough 
to  catch  the  wind  and  surge 
ahead.  This  broke  the  lash 
ings  that  bound  the  two 
ships  together,  and  Broke 
and  his  men  found  them 
selves  separated  from  their 
ship.  About  this  time  Sec 
ond-Lieutenant  Budd  had 
rallied  some  defenders  on 
the  forecastle  and  was  fight 
ing  desperately,  but  he  was 
twice  severely  wounded  and 
finally  was  thrown  to  the 
gun -deck  unconscious.  In 
this  fighting  Captain  Broke 
himself  received  a  terrible  cutlass-stroke  on  the  head  that 
very  nearly  cost  him  his  life  and  made  him  an  invalid  for 
the  rest  of  his  days. 

After  Budd  was  wounded  there  was  no  more  resistance. 

85 


UNIFORM    OF    A   CAPTAIN, 
WAR    OF  I8l2 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 


The  first  lieutenant  of  the  Shannon,  in  his  eagerness  to  show 
that  the  Chesapeake  was  captured,  hauled  down  her  flag  and 
put  on  English  colors.  But  in  his  nervous  haste  he  attached 
the  British  ensign  under  instead  of  over  the  Stars  and 
Stripes.  At  this  a  gun  -  crew  on  the 
Shannon,  thinking  that  the  Americans 
must  have  retaken  the  ship,  fired  their 
gun,  killing  the  blundering  lieutenant 
and  four  or  five  of  his  men.  That 
was  the  last  shot  of  the  battle. 

In  all  this  story  so  much  happened 
that  it  is  hard  to  realize  that  from  the 
first  shot  to  the  last  it  was  only  fifteen 
minutes.  The  British  swarmed  over 
the  captured  ship  and,  unfortunately, 
their  conduct  showed  nothing  of  Cap 
tain  Lawrence's  generous  spirit  toward 
a  beaten  foe.  After  all  resistance  had 
ceased  an  English  lieutenant  directed 
his  men  to  fire  at  the  Americans  in  the 
rigging  as  if  they  were  shooting  at 
squirrels  in  a  tree;  and  after  the  pris 
oners  were  on  board  the  Shannon  there 
was  small  consideration  shown  them  or 
their  personal  property.  We  may  be  sure  nothing  of  the 
sort  would  have  happened  if  the  " brave  Broke"  had  been 
in  command,  but  he  lay  unconscious  in  his  cabin,  and 
his  ship  was  in  the  hands  of  young  subordinates. 

Poor  Lawrence  lingered  in  great  agony  for  four  days 
afterward,  crying  out  in  his  delirium,  "Don't  give  up  the 
ship!"  which,  with  "I  haven't  yet  begun  to  fight!"  are  the 
favorite  watchwords  of  our  American  navy.  Lawrence's 
treatment  of  the  prisoners  from  the  Peacock  had  won  him 
the  kindliest  feelings  among  the  English,  and  the  news  of 
his  death  brought  a  genuine  regret  to  his  enemy.  He  was 
buried  in  Halifax  with  all  the  honors  that  could  have  been 
given  to  an  Englishman  of  his  rank,  and  British  officers 

86 


UNIFORM  OF  A 
MARINE,  WAR  OF  1812 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

walked  bareheaded  beside  the  coffin  to  pay  their  dead 
enemy  the  respect  they  felt  for  him. 

When  news  reached  the  House  of  Commons  that  the 
Shannon  had  taken  the  Chesapeake  the  whole  House  burst 
into  cheers,  and  tremendous  enthusiasm  followed  in  the 
English  newspapers.  A  year  before,  the  capture  of  an 
enemy's  frigate  by  an  English  frigate  of  the  same  rating 
would  scarcely  have  been  noticed,  for  it  was  always  hap 
pening  with  French  ships,  and  the  hullabaloo  over  the  cap 
ture  of  the  Chesapeake  was  a  fine  tribute  to  the  new  respect 
Englishmen  had  for  our  ships.  Broke  became  the  nation's 
toast,  and  a  popular  ballad  was  sung  about  "brave  Broke" 
for  years.  Boys  who  have  read  Tom  Brown  at  Rugby  will 
remember  that  the  Rugby  boys  shouted  it  a  whole  genera 
tion  after  the  battle. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  the  news  came  as  a 
sudden  and  terrible  shock.  After  all  the  brilliant  vic 
tories  of  the  preceding  year  Americans  had  come  to  think 
themselves  able  to  ''whip  anybody"  on  the  seas.  National 
pride  had  been  feeding  on  naval  victories  so  long  that  the 
news  of  the  Shannon  s  capture  of  the  Chesapeake  in  fifteen 
minutes  was  a  very  bitter  pill. 

When  anything  happens  that  people  do  not  like  or  that 
hurts  their  pride  they  always  get  relief  by  finding  somebody 
to  blame.  It  was  lucky  for  poor  Lawrence's  name  that  he 
did  not  live  to  face  a  court-martial.  As  it  was,  the  blame 
was  all  shoved  upon  Acting-Lieutenant  Cox.  In  his  court- 
martial  he  had  to  face  an  array  of  thirteen  charges  to  begin 
with,  but  everything  fell  to  pieces  except  these  facts — he 
had  stopped  to  pick  up  Lawrence  and  help  him  down  the 
ladder  to  the  gun-deck.  The  poor  boy  did  not  know  it,  but 
at  that  moment  he  was  the  only  officer  left  on  the  spar-deck. 
When  he  found  that  he  could  not  get  back  up  the  same 
ladder,  he  ran  forward  only  to  find  the  panic-stricken  crew 
tumbling  down  from  above  in  a  rush  which  he  could  not 
stop.  Back  he  went  to  his  gun  and  fired  it,  the  last  shot 
in  the  defense  of  the  Chesapeake.  It  was  a  mistake  in 

87 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

judgment  to  stop  to  help  Lawrence  at  that  moment,  but  not 
a  very  blameworthy  one  under  the  circumstances.  For  that 
the  lad  was  expelled  from  the  navy  with  all  the  blame  of 
the  loss  of  the  ship  on  his  shoulders.  To  show  the  fine 
stuff  Cox  was  made  of,  when  expelled  from  the  navy  he 
shouldered  a  musket  and  fought  as  a  volunteer  soldien 
through  the  rest  of  the  war. 

We  were  not  satisfied  with  a  scapegoat,  either;  we  had 
to  find  some  other  comforting  reasons  for  the  defeat. 
Sailormen  explained  it  by  saying  that  the  Chesapeake  was 
an  "unlucky"  ship — there  was  that  miserable  Leopard  af 
fair  six  years  before — and  nothing  could  have  saved  her  in 
battle,  anyway.  Other  people  began  to  hunt  for  more 
probable  excuses  to  explain  the  defeat,  and  where  they 
could  not  find  them  they  made  them  up.  So,  right  down  to 
our  time  Americans  have  been  brought  up  on  a  patriotic 
fairy  tale  explaining  the  loss  of  the  Chesapeake.  According 
to  this,  her  crew  were  both  drunk  and  mutinous  and  com 
posed  of  landlubbers,  or  "cowardly  Portuguese,"  who  re 
fused  to  fight.  All  this  nonsense  has  been  thoroughly 
exploded. 

The  truth  is  that  the  Shannon  was  a  better  ship  than  the 
Chesapeake  for  the  same  reason  that  veterans  are  better 
than  recruits,  but  the  American  crew — and  they  were 
Americans — burst  into  cheers  when  they  went  into  action 
and  fought  like  tigers  during  those  terrible  minutes  when 
the  Chesapeake  was  a  cloud  of  flying  splinters  from  the 
enemy's  fire  and  men  were  dropping  everywhere.  And  we 
must  remember  in  those  five  or  six  minutes  when  the  two 
ships  were  running  parallel  the  Shannon  lost  more  in  killed 
and  wounded  than  the  Guerriere  or  the  Macedonian  had  at 
the  time  they  surrendered.  Luck  played  an  important 
part  in  those  ship  duels  at  close  quarters,  and  the  Chesapeake 
had  the  worst  possible  luck  in  losing  practically  all  her 
officers,  her  wheel,  and  her  head-sails  almost  at  the  same 
instant.  Yet  much  of  that  luck  may  be  laid  to  the  accuracy 
of  Broke's  trained  gun-crews,  after  all. 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Some  think  that  Lawrence  was  very  headstrong  to  rush 
to  sea  when  he  did,  but  we  must  remember  that  it  was  his 
business  to  get  to  sea,  and  another  day  might  have  brought 
back  that  other  British  frigate,  which  would  have  made 
escape  impossible.  Where  he  did  make  a  mistake  was  in 
throwing  away  the  chance  to  rake  the  Shannon  when  he 
had  it  in  his  grasp.  That  kind  of  generosity  in  battle  may 
be  "magnificent,"  as  the  French  officer  said  of  the  charge 
of  the  Light  Brigade,  "but  it  is  not  war." 

However,  we  must  not  leave  the  brave  Lawrence  with  a 
word  of  criticism.  With  his  warm  heart  and  his  high 
ideals  of  chivalry  he  is  perhaps  the  knightliest,  the  most 
lovable  of  the  naval  heroes  of  1812. 


VIII 

LAKE    ERIE    AND   THE    CRUISE    OF   THE    "  ESSEX " 

Campaign  on  the  Great  Lakes — Building  a  fleet  on  Lake  Erie — 
Battle  of  Lake  Erie — Career  of  the  Essex — Midshipman  Farragut 
— Effect  of  commerce-destroying  on  the  war. 

A  GLANCE  at  the  map  will  show  how  important  the 
l\.  Great  Lakes  should  have  been  to  us  in  attacking 
England  on  her  weak  side — namely,  Canada.  But  here,  as 
everywhere  else,  no  preparations  had  been  made  even  toward 
the  end  of  the  negotiations,  when  everybody  knew  that  war 
with  England  could  not  be  avoided.  Consequently,  after 
the  bad  blunders  of  the  army  in  the  summer  of  1812  we 
soon  found  ourselves  in  the  position  where  Canada  ought  to 
have  been.  The  surrender  of  Detroit  and  Mackinac  (at 
the  upper  end  of  Lake  Huron)  left  all  our  Northwest  in  the 
control  of  the  British,  Canadians,  and  their  Indian  friends, 
and  there  was  hardly  anything  to  hinder  an  army  from 
invading  New  England,  New  York,  or  Pennsylvania. 

At  this  disgraceful  and  dangerous  state  of  things  the 
government  finally  woke  up  to  the  importance  of  the 
Lakes.  So  they  sent  Captain  Isaac  Chauncey  to  take 
command  of  Lakes  Ontario  and  Erie.  That  is,  he  was  to 
build  a  fleet  there  to  regain  control  of  those  lakes.  As  soon 
as  Chauncey  arrived  he  sent  Lieutenant  Elliot  to  Black 
Rock  (near  Buffalo)  to  begin  a  naval  base  on  Lake  Erie, 
while  he  himself  took  charge  of  Lake  Ontario. 

Captain  Chauncey's  work  on  Lake  Ontario  we  can  sum 
up  very  easily  by  saying  that  for  the  rest  of  the  war  he  and 
his  British  rival,  Captain  Yeo,  played  a  kind  of  seesaw. 

90 


STATES   AND    TERRITORIES   IN    THE    SOUTH    AND    WEST — l8l2 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

No  decisive  action  was  fought,  because  as  soon  as  one 
commander  had  more  ships  than  the  other  the  latter  would 
draw  to  cover  until  he  had  built  some  more.  Then  he 
would  sally  out  on  the  lake,  and  the  other  fellow  would 
hide. 

The  story  of  Lake  Erie  is  very  different.  In  the  first 
place,  young  Elliot  made  a  splendid  beginning  by  a  bold 
night  attack  in  open  boats  against  two  British  armed  brigs 
that  had  anchored  in  fancied  security  near  the  British  Fort 
Erie,  on  the  Canadian  shore.  Elliot  captured  one  and 
compelled  the  destruction  of  the  other  to  prevent  its 
capture.  But  the  British  still  had  a  much  larger  vessel, 
the  Detroit,  which  controlled  the  lake,  besides  others  in  the 
process  of  construction. 

That  winter  Master-Commandant  Oliver  Hazard  Perry 
was  ordered  to  take  command  at  Lake  Erie  and  construct 
a  navy  which  should  regain  the  lake  for  the  United  States. 
It  was  a  new  and  hard  task  for  a  young  officer  used  to  the 
swaying  deck  of  a  frigate,  the  salt-spray,  and  the  jolly 
friendships  of  the  wardroom  mess.  The  neighborhood  of 
Lake  Erie  in  those  days  was  a  wilderness,  and  he  was  to 
plunge  into  that  wilderness  and  build  out  of  the  tall  pines  a 
fleet  that  should  drive  away  an  enemy  already  in  control  of 
the  lake!  Perhaps  an  officer  who  had  not  known  Preble's 
stiff  training  in  the  Tripolitan  war  would  have  laughed  at 
such  orders,  but  Perry  had  been  one  of  those  "school-boys." 

Even  his  fine  courage  must  have  been  dampened  when  in 
March,  1813,  he  arrived  with  his  little  band  at  Sackett's 
Harbor,  on  Lake  Ontario,  drenched  to  the  skin  with  an  icy 
March  rain  and  a  long  tramp  through  slushy  snow  as  he 
hurried  to  defend  the  little  outpost  against  a  threatened 
attack.  From  there  he  went  to  Buffalo,  and  thence  over 
the  ice  to  Presque  Isle,  now  Erie,  at  that  time  a  handful  of 
cabins  with  a  little  tavern.  Here  he  determined  to  establish 
his  naval  base,  for  a  sailing-master  and  shipwright,  with  a 
gang  of  workmen,  had  been  at  work  on  several  vessels,  some 
of  which  were  nearly  ready  for  launching.  The  largest 

92 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

were  two  brigs,  no  feet  in  length,  the  Niagara  and  the 
Lawrence.  The  latter  name  was  given  by  special  order  of 
the  Navy  Department  on  receipt  of  the  news  of  Captain 
Lawrence's  death. 

The  British  at  their  base,  Maiden,  were  also  building  to 
increase  their  naval  force,  so  there  was  no  time  for  seasoning 
the  timber.  Many  a  tree  that  stood  in  the  forest  at  sunrise 
found  itself  bolted  to  the  sides  of  a  vessel  before  sunset. 
Besides  superintending  the  building  of  his  flotilla  Perry 
had  to  be  on  the  watch  against  any  sudden  attack  that  might 
destroy  everything.  And  as  the  work  went  on  he  found  the 
difficulties  piling  up.  He  had  to  have  rigging,  sails,  cannon, 
powder,  and  men  for  his  vessels  after  he  had  built  them,  and 
all  these  were  desperately  hard  to  get  where  he  lay,  with  a 
trackless  forest  behind  and  an  enemy  on  the  lake  in  front. 
Most  of  his  mechanics  and  sailors  had  to  be  brought  several 
hundred  miles  from  New  York,  and  for  crews  he  had  to 
depend  largely  on  raw  militia,  negroes,  half-breeds,  Indians 
— anything  he  could  find  on  two  legs.  And  time  and  time 
again  the  men  fell  sick  of  the  "lake  fever"  by  the  scores. 
When  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie  was  fought  over  a  hundred 
of  the  Americans  lay  sick  with  the  malady  ashore. 

In  April  the  English  were  forced  to  abandon  Fort  Erie 
on  the  Niagara  River,  and  Perry  instantly  jumped  at  the 
chance  of  getting  the  little  flotilla  that  Elliot  had  collected 
away  from  Black  Rock  to  Presque  Isle.  These  vessels,  the 
Caledonia — the  captured  brig — three  schooners,  purchased 
by  Elliot,  and  a  little  sloop,  were  painfully  warped  up 
against  the  stiff  current  of  the  Niagara  River  by  oxen  on 
shore.  After  that  they  had  to  beat  against  head-winds  on 
the  lake  till  finally  they  just  managed  to  reach  Presque 
Isle  before  the  British  could  intercept  them. 

This  was  early  in  July,  and  by  that  time  the  British 
commander  on  Lake  Erie,  Captain  Barclay,  had  his  fleet  all 
ready.  Although  he  had  just  missed  capturing  the  flotilla 
on  its  way  from  Black  Rock,  he  settled  down  to  blockade 
Perry  at  Presque  Isle.  The  American  commander  now  faced 
7  93 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

a  new  difficulty.  After  at  last  getting  enough  men  for  his 
ships  he  found  that  he  could  not  get  his  ships  out  on  the 
lake  because  the  water  had  dropped  so  much  during  the 
early  summer  that  the  two  largest  vessels  could  not  be  taken 
over  the  bar.  So  Perry  had  to  sit  helpless  for  several  weeks 
and  see  the  British  flag  mocking  him  from  the  squadron 
lying  out  of  gun-shot  on  the  other  side  of  the  bar. 

But  blockading  is  dull  business,  and  when  Barclay  saw 
no  sign  of  the  Americans  making  any  effort  to  get  over  the 
bar  he  sailed  away,  on  August  2d,  to  accept,  it  is  said,  an 
invitation  to  dinner  on  the  opposite  shore  of  the  lake.  This 
was  his  fatal  blunder,  for  the  minute  he  was  out  of  sight 
Perry  and  all  his  men  worked  with  feverish  energy  for 
two  days  and  nights  to  get  the  two  brigs  out  on  the  lake. 
First  they  removed  and  beached  all  their  guns.  Still  the 
brigs  were  much  too  deep  in  the  water.  Next  they  sank  two 
large  scows  to  the  water's  edge  alongside  each  brig,  fastened 
in  such  a  way  that  when  the  water  was  pumped  out  of  them 
they  lifted  the  ship.  As  the  first  trial  did  not  raise  them 
enough,  the  work  had  to  be  done  all  over  again.  At  last, 
after  the  greatest  difficulty,  the  brigs  were  eased  over  the 
bar  into  deep  water.  On  the  morning  of  the  fifth,  as  the 
Lawrence  slipped  into  the  outer  lake,  up  came  Barclay's 
squadron,  again  just  too  late.  vSeeing  then  that  Perry  had 
his  force  on  the  lake,  Barclay  went  back  to  his  base  at 
Maiden,  because  he  had  left  there  his  largest  ship,  the 
Detroit,  at  that  time  undergoing  repairs. 

Perry  followed  him  up  and  kept  a  blockade  on  him  so  that 
he  could  not  get  supplies,  all  of  which  had  to  come  by 
water.  Barclay  needed  a  good  deal  of  equipment  for  his 
flotilla,  but  the  blockade  soon  made  it  necessary  for  the 
English  to  fight  or  starve.  So  at  sunrise,  September  10, 
1813,  the  Americans  saw  the  white  gleam  of  the  British 
sails  coming  out  on  the  lake,  and  Perry  hastened  to  meet 
them.  As  he  well  knew,  on  the  outcome  of  that  day's  fight 
ing  hung  not  only  the  control  of  Lake  Erie,  but  the  fate  of 
our  Northwestern  territory. 

94 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Both  commanders  arranged  their  battle-line  with  the  larg 
est  ships  in  the  center,  and  Perry  intended  that  each  of  his 
larger  vessels  should  fight  a  British  ship  of  the  same  size. 
With  two  little  schooners  just  ahead  of  him  he  bore  down 
in  the  Lawrence  to  engage  the  Detroit,  the  British  flag-ship. 
Behind  the  Lawrence  came  the  Caledonia,  the  Niagara,  and 
the  rest  of  the  schooners  and  sloops,  all  in  a  long  line.  Un 
luckily,  the  wind  dropped  as  Perry  bore  down.  The  slow 
little  Caledonia  kept  all  the  rest  so  far  back  that  when  the 
fighting  began  there  was  already  a  wide  gap  between  her 
and  the  Lawrence.  Then,  when  the  Lawrence  came  to  closer 
quarters,  she  was  left  still  farther  from  the  rest  of  the 
American  line.  All  the  while  at  her  masthead  flew  a  blue 
flag,  bearing  the  words  of  the  dying  Lawrence,  "Don't 
give  up  the  ship";  but  it  soon  looked  as  if  the  Lawrence 
would  follow  the  fate  of  the  Chesapeake.  With  all  the  rest 
of  the  line  out  of  effective  shooting-distance,  the  Lawrence 
and  the  two  schooners  had  to  stand  the  combined  broad 
sides  of  practically  the  whole  British  squadron. 

Hoping  every  moment  to  see  the  rest  of  his  ships  closing 
up  to  help  him,  Perry  continued  the  unequal  fight  with  won 
derful  courage  for  two  hours  and  forty-five  minutes.  At 
the  end  of  that  time  the  Lawrence  was  a  wreck  and  the 
slaughter  on  her  decks  had  been  frightful.  Perry  and  his 
thirteen-year-old  brother  James  were  among  the  handful 
left  who  were  not  wounded  or  killed,  but  their  escape  was 
a  miracle,  because  their  clothing  was  torn  by  bullets  and 
splinters. 

The  longed-for  breeze  at  last  came  rippling  over  the 
water.  As  the  Lawrence  was  drifting  out  of  the  fight  Perry 
with  his  own  hands  fired  one  last  gun  at  the  enemy.  Then, 
leaving  a  lieutenant  in  charge,  and  taking  his  commodore's 
pennant  over  his  arm,  he  got  into  a  boat  with  his  brother 
and  four  seamen  and  rowed  for  the  Niagara.  The  latter 
was  now  forging  past  the  Caledonia  in  order  to  get  into  ac 
tion.  This  famous  passage  in  an  open  boat  was  made  pos 
sible  only  by  the  heavy  curtain  of  powder-smoke  that  lay 

95 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

over  the  water,  for  the  little  gig  was  not  discovered  by  the 
enemy  till  it  was  almost  alongside  the  Niagara.  Perry  at 
once  raised  his  pennant  over  the  Niagara  and  sent  her  com 
mander,  Lieutenant  Elliot,  to  hurry  up  the  vessels  in  the 
rear. 

Up  to  this  time  the  day  had  gone  disastrously  for  Perry, 
but  now  he  sailed  the  Niagara  directly  toward  the  group  of 
British  ships,  and  the  Caledonia,  with  the  smaller  vessels, 
followed  the  example  of  the  Niagara.  These  were  all  fresh 
ships,  and  the  effect  of  their  sudden  attack  was  tremendous. 
To  make  things  worse  for  the  English,  their  two  largest 
ships  in  trying  to  manceuver  fouled  and  lay  in  such  a 
position  that  Perry  was  able  to  rake  them  both  at  close 
quarters.  He  then  rounded  up  alongside  and  shot  across 
their  decks.  Meanwhile,  his  opposite  broadside  riddled  the 
smaller  English  vessels  clustered  on  the  other  side  of  him. 

The  heroic  defense  of  the  Lawrence  and  the  two  schooners 
had  not  been  for  nothing,  because  it  had  injured  the  enemy 
so  much  that  they  were  unable  to  stand  up  against  this 
sudden  attack  of  fresh  ships  at  close  quarters.  In  a  few 
moments  all  the  British  colors  were  down  and  the  battle 
was  over. 

In  justice  to  the  brave  men  who  had  fought  and  died 
against  great  odds  during  those  bloody  hours  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  battle,  Perry  rowed  back  to  the  shattered  Law 
rence  and  there  received  the  English  captains  as  they  came 
to  surrender  their  swords.  Then,  writing  in  pencil  on  the 
back  of  an  old  letter,  the  victorious  young  commander  sent 
the  famous  despatch  to  General  Harrison,  "We  have  met 
the  enemy  and  they  are  ours — two  ships,  two  brigs,  one 
schooner,  and  one  sloop." 

The  results  of  this  battle  were  of  great  importance,  for 
all  that  area — Detroit  and  Michigan  territory — which  had 
been  lost  in  the  summer  of  1812  by  the  army  was  thus  won 
back  by  the  navy  in  a  single  day.  For  this  Perry  deserves 
high  honor;  but  we  must  remember  that  the  victory  was 
not  due  to  any  superior  bravery  or  marksmanship  of  the 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Americans,  or  to  any  genius  in  tactics,  for  Perry's  method 
of  attack  was,  in  fact,  very  poor.  Perry's  fleet  was  much 
stronger  than  Barclay's  and  ought  to  have  won,  anyhow. 
Perry's  greatness  lay  in  his  magnificent  energy  in  building 
out  of  green  timber  a  fleet  that  was  superior  to  that  of  the 
British.  He  really  won  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie  during  those 
discouraging  days  at  Presque  Isle  when  he  was  working  in 
the  face  of  an  enemy,  in  spite  of  sickness,  hardships,  and  a 
hundred  discouragements,  to  build,  equip,  and  man  a 
stronger  fleet  than  that  of  the  enemy.  That  kind  of  thing 
does  not  play  to  the  galleries  like  crossing  the  line  of  fire 
in  an  open  boat,  but  it  counts  far  more. 

We  must  now  go  back  to  the  time  when  Captain  Bain- 
bridge  sailed  off  with  the  Constitution  and  the  Hornet  on 
that  southern  cruise  which  ended  with  the  captures  of  the 
Java  and  the  Peacock.  The  little  3  2 -gun  frigate  Essex  was 
under  orders  to  join  Bainbridge,  but,  as  she  was  delayed 
in  getting  ready,  she  was  ordered  to  follow,  while  the 
other  two  vessels  went  on  ahead. 

On  board  the  Essex  at  that  time  was  a  little  midshipman 
named  David  Farragut;  and,  as  we  shall  have  a  good  deal 
to  say  about  him  later  on  as  a  man,  it  will  be  interesting 
to  know  something  about  him  as  a  boy.  So  we  shall  follow 
the  career  of  the  Essex  with  an  eye  on  Midshipman  Far 
ragut,  and  begin  by  going  back  to  the  very  outset  of  his 
naval  career. 

Captain  David  Porter  had  noticed  the  little  fellow  while 
visiting  his  parents  in  Louisiana,  and  liked  him  so  well 
that  he  offered  to  make  him  his  adopted  son  and  start  him 
in  the  navy  in  his  own  ship,  the  Essex.  The  offer  was 
accepted,  and  the  year  1811  found  young  David,  at  the 
advanced  age  of  nine  years,  standing  very  stiff  and  solemn 
in  a  cocked  hat  and  tailed  coat  with  a  dirk  by  his  side, 
holding  up  his  right  hand  and  promising,  in  a  little  piping 
voice,  to  "defend  the  United  States  against  all  their 
enemies,  foreign  and  domestic."  After  that  David  was 

97 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

"David"  no  more.  He  was  "Mr."  Farragut;  and  Captain 
Porter,  who  had  been  so  jolly  and  kind,  was  no  longer 
"uncle,"  but  "Captain."  Then  the  little  fellow  began  to 
learn  what  man-of-war  discipline  meant,  and  if  there  were 
homesick  moments  down  in  that  stuffy  cockpit  of  the  Essex, 
where  the  middies  swung  their  hammocks  and  where  the  big 
boys  bullied  the  little  ones,  David  said  nothing  about  it. 

Not  long  after  the  war  began  the  Essex  captured  the 
English  sloop  Alert  (August  13,  1812).  As  she  had  taken 
several  merchantmen  besides,  there  were  many  prisoners 
on  board — so  many  that  it  would  have  been  almost  inhu 
man  to  keep  them  cooped  up  under  a  hatch.  So  Captain 
Porter  allowed  them  a  good  deal  of  liberty  on  deck. 

One  night  David  awoke  and  saw  a  man  bending  over 
him,  holding  a  pistol.  He  recognized  the  fellow  as  one  of 
the  British  sailors  from  the  Alert  and  realized  with  a  sudden 
thumping  of  his  heart  that  there  was  mutiny  afoot.  He 
kept  perfectly  still,  shut  his  eyes,  and,  to  his  relief,  the 
prisoner  moved  away.  The  boy  did  not  know  how  far  the 
ship  was  already  swarming  with  armed  mutineers,  but  he 
did  know  that  Captain  Porter  must  be  told.  Just  as  soon 
as  the  man  left,  David  slipped  noiselessly  to  the  deck, 
scampered  up  the  ladder,  and  burst  full  tilt  into  the  cap 
tain's  cabin  without  so  much  as  a  knock. 

Captain  Porter  wasted  precious  little  time  after  hearing 
David's  story.  "Fire!  Fire!"  he  shouted,  and  the  ship's 
bell  began  clanging  the  alarm.  As  fire-drill  was  nothing 
unusual  at  any  time  of  night  on  board  the  Essex,  the  men 
came  tumbling  up,  each  with  his  blanket  and  cutlass.  At 
this  sudden  appearance  of  the  crew  armed  with  cutlasses 
the  mutineers  were  taken  by  surprise.  They  were  quickly 
discovered  and  put  in  irons.  Captain  Porter  then  found 
out  that  some  of  the  Englishmen  had  managed  to  break 
into  an  arms-chest  and  in  that  way  supplied  themselves  with 
arms  and  ammunition.  As  the  prisoners  far  outnumbered 
the  crew,  it  was  a  narrow  escape  for  Captain  Porter  and 
his  ship.  In  fact,  if  it  had  not  been  for  David  Farragut's 

98 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

quick  work  there  would  be  no  more  story  of  the  Essex  to 
tell. 

Two  days  after  Bainbridge  set  out  on  his  cruise  Porter 
made  sail  after  him  (October  28,  1812),  but  his  vessel  was 
slow,  the  others  had  a  start  of  him,  and  he  missed  them  at 
one  meeting-place  after  another.  At  last  he  had  no  idea 
at  all  where  Bainbridge  was.  His  provisions  were  getting 
short,  and  the  expected  arrival  of  a  British  squadron  would 
at  best  have  kept  him  blockaded  in  a  Brazilian  port.  So 
he  had  to  choose  between  going  home  without  having  done 
anything  and  making  a  cruise  against  the  enemy's  commerce, 
relying  on  the  captured  ships  for  supplies.  The  latter  and 
more  adventurous  plan  was  adopted,  much  to  the  delight 
of  everybody,  most  of  all  ''Mr."  Farragut.  So  the  Essex 
cruised  down  the  coast  of  South  America,  battled  for  three 
weeks  against  the  storms  of  Cape  Horn,  and  finally  slipped 
into  port  at  Valparaiso,  Chile,  in  March,  1813. 

Chile  was  then  in  rebellion  against  Spain,  and  was  the 
only  colony  Porter  could  rely  on  to  let  him  have  fresh 
water  and  provisions.  Spain  was  at  that  time  allied  with 
England  in  the  Napoleonic  war,  and  the  other  Spanish 
colonies  of  South  America  would  have  given  the  Essex  a 
very  frowning  reception.  For  example,  Peru  went  so  far 
as  to  send  out  privateers  to  catch  American  whalers  on 
their  homeward  voyage. 

From  Valparaiso  the  Essex  began  her  operations.  First 
she  recaptured  some  American  ships  from  the  Peruvians, 
and  then  in  a  business-like  fashion  went  after  every  English 
ship  in  the  south  Pacific.  Before  she  finished  she  had  them 
all,  except  a  few  that  had  managed  to  get  shelter  in  a 
friendly  harbor. 

With  such  a  flock  of  prizes  as  he  had  on  hand,  Captain 
Porter  had  to  draw  on  even  his  midshipmen  as  prize- 
masters,  and  one  day  David  Farragut  was  ordered  to  com 
mand  the  Barclay,  one  of  the  recaptured  American  ships. 
Porter  also  put  aboard  a  prize-crew  from  the  Essex,  and 
the  Barclay's  original  captain  to  help  David  navigate  her. 

99 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

It  was  to  be  a  long  trip  from  Tumbez  in  Ecuador,  where 
Porter  had  landed  his  prisoners,  all  the  way  south  to  Val 
paraiso.  The  appointment  of  little  David  as  captain  of  a 
ship  must  have  raised  many  a  laugh,  for  he  was  not  quite 
twelve  years  old,  and  rather  small  for  that ! 

David  was  still  asleep  when  early  the  next  morning  the 
signal  flew  from  the  Essex  to  make  sail.  His  quartermaster 
came  to  his  cabin  and  woke  him. 

"You'd  better  go  on  deck,  sir.  I'm  afraid  there'll  be 
trouble." 

When  the  young  captain  got  on  deck  he  found  the  other 
ships  well  on  their  way  to  sea,  but  not  an  anchor-chain  of 
the  Barclay  had  been  started.  The  old  skipper  stood  on  the 
quarter-deck  looking  very  surly  indeed;  moreover,  he 
stood  six  feet  four. 

"Captain  Randall,"  said  David,  bravely,  looking  up  into 
the  face  of  the  big  man,  "order  all  sail  and  follow  the  fleet!" 

"You  monkey,"  sneered  the  other.  "You'd  give  me 
orders,  would  you?" 

"Captain  Porter's  orders,"  retorted  David. 

"Well,  this  is  my  ship,  and  I'll  take  her  to  New  Zealand," 
was  the  response.  Meanwhile  the  crew  had  edged  forward 
to  hear  this  curious  quarrel  between  the  big  skipper  and 
the  little  middy. 

David's  voice  shook,  but  he  had  no  idea  of  yielding. 
"Then  I'll  give  the  orders  myself.  Men" — he  turned  to 
the  crew — "up  anchor,  and  be  lively  about  it." 

"Ay,  ay,  sir,"  the  loyal  quartermaster  responded;  and 
the  crew,  tickled  at  the  little  middy's  spunk,  went  to  the 
capstan  with  a  will.  When  David  went  on  piping  orders  to 
make  sail,  the  astonished  skipper  roared  that  he'd  shoot 
the  first  man  who  touched  a  rope,  and  went  stamping  down 
to  the  cabin  for  pistols. 

David  called  to  his  faithful  quartermaster,  and  after  a 
few  words  with  him  shouted  down  the  ladder,  "Mr.  Ran 
dall,  you're  under  arrest!  If  you  come  up  on  deck  you'll 
go  overboard!" 

100 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

The  skipper  saw  a  group  of  muscular  tars  gathered  at  the 
head  of  the  ladder  and  wisely  decided  to  stay  below. 
After  that  there  was  no  doubt  that  Midshipman  Farragut 
was  the  real  captain  of  that  ship,  and  he  sailed  her  down  to 
Valparaiso  like  an  old  salt. 

When  Porter  had  captured  everything  within  reach  he 
decided  to  go  westward  to  the  Marquesas  Islands,  where  he 
could  overhaul  the  Essex  without  being  disturbed.  He 
had  heard  of  three  British  ships  being  sent  after  him  and 
wanted  to  wind  up  his  cruise  by  capturing  one  of  them. 
There  at  the  islands  there  were  novel  adventures  for  young 
Farragut,  swimming  in  the  surf,  catching  great  sea-turtles 
on  the  beach,  and  exploring  the  woods  with  the  native  boys. 
Then,  after  the  work  on  the  Essex  was  finished,  it  was 
"anchors  aweigh,"  with  bows  pointing  again  toward 
Valparaiso.  There  the  Essex  arrived  with  her  tender,  a 
captured  ship  renamed  the  Essex  Junior,  on  February  3, 
1814.  By  this  time  Porter  had  rescued  the  American 
whaling  industry,  which  was  in  danger  of  being  destroyed, 
and  turned  the  tables  on  the  enemy  by  annihilating  all 
British  commerce  in  the  south  Pacific,  a  damage  estimated 
at  two  and  a  half  million  dollars.  What  Porter  wanted  now 
was  an  English  frigate  like  the  Essex  for  a  stand-up  fight. 

Five  days  after  the  Essex  entered  the  harbor  of  Val 
paraiso  two  British  ships  came  in,  the  frigate  Phcebe  and  the 
sloop  Cherub.  The  Phcebe  at  once  attempted  a  surprise 
attack  on  the  Essex,  although  both  ships  were  in  a  neutral 
harbor.  But  as  the  Englishman  surged  close  alongside 
the  Essex  he  suddenly  discovered  that  Porter  had  his  men 
ready  at  the  guns,  so  he  promptly  eased  off  with  an  excuse. 
Then  followed  a  stubborn  blockade.  Porter  challenged  the 
captain  of  the  Phcebe  to  a  single-ship  duel,  but  the  English 
man  refused.  Finally,  during  a  gale,  March  28,  1814, 
Porter  tried  to  get  to  sea  past  the  two  ships.  He -had  almost 
succeeded  when  a  squall  carried  away  the  maintopmast,  and 
he  turned  back  to  a  little  harbor  on  the  coast  in  order  to 
regain  neutral  water  while  he  repaired  damages. 

101 


THE    STQRY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

The  rest  is  a  sad  story.  The  English,  seeing  that  the 
Essex  was  badly  disabled,  and  caring  not  a  fig  for  neutrality, 
bore  down  and  attacked  the  Essex  as  she  lay  at  anchor. 
After  suffering  a  good  deal  from  a  too-close  encounter  the 
two  British  ships  took  positions  at  a  distance,  out  of  reach 
of  the  Essex's  carronades,  and  shot  into  her  as  at  a  target. 
During  this  part  of  the  battle  the  Essex  could  not  bring  a 
single  gun  to  reply. 

The  slaughter  among  the  Americans  was  horrible.  Yet, 
while  the  least  chance  remained  for  getting  his  ship  once 
more  into  close  action,  Porter  would  not  surrender.  But  it 
was  useless.  After  losing  in  dead,  wounded,  and  missing 
more  than  any  other  American  ship  during  the  war — a 
frightful  total  of  155 — Porter  surrendered. 

The  Essex  might  have  been  taken,  anyway,  for  the  com 
bined  force  of  the  two  British  ships  was  very  much  superior, 
but  the  reason  that  the  enemy  could  pound  the  Essex  at 
leisure  was  because  the  latter  had  a  main-deck  armament 
of  nothing  but  carronades,  the  short-range  guns.  Why  this 
great  blunder  was  made  no  one  knows.  When  Captain 
Porter  protested  against  the  carronade  armament  long  be 
fore,  and  asked  for  long  guns,  the  authorities  at  Washing 
ton  had  stubbornly  denied  his  request  without  deigning  to 
give  a  reason.  This  fact  was  the  chief  cause  of  the  frightful 
slaughter  and  the  loss  of  the  ship.  During  all  the  terrible 
battle-scenes  on  the  Essex  David  Farragut  was  coolly 
running  errands  for  the  captain,  carrying  orders  here,  get 
ting  primers  there,  helping  a  wounded  man  elsewhere. 
Once  he  was  hurled  to  the  foot  of  the  ladder  and  knocked 
senseless  by  the  body  of  a  man  mangled  by  a  shot.  David 
recovered  his  senses,  picked  himself  up,  and  went  on  with 
his  errand  as  if  he  had  been  a  veteran  of  a  score  of  battles. 

Then,  when  after  the  surrender  the  boy  stood  downcast 
among  the  British  midshipmen  on  the  Phoebe,  the  story  is 
that  he  saw  one  enter  with  his  own  pet  pig. 

"That's  mine!"   he  exclaimed. 

" Fight  for  it,  then!"  said  the  others.  They  formed  a 

102 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

ring,  and  David  and  the  new-comer  pitched  in  with  their 
fists.  It  is  not  necessary  to  add,  perhaps,  that  David  kept 
the  pig. 

Even  with  these  few  glimpses  that  we  have  taken  into  his 
life  in  the  Essex  days  it  is  easy  to  see  in  Farragut  the 
middy  of  the  war  of  1812,  a  promise  of  the  superb  qualities 
of  Farragut  the  admiral  of  the  war  of  '61.  And  no  better 
training-school  for  these  qualities  could  have  been  found 
than  in  the  little  old  Essex  under  Captain  Porter. 

Commerce-destroying  is  not  a  very  glorious  kind  of  war — 
it  preys  on  defenceless  ships — but  it  was  just  the  kind  of 
warfare  that  did  the  most  for  our  cause  in  1812.  The  loss 
of  a  frigate  like  the  Guerriere  only  stung  England's  pride 
into  more  fighting.  In  fact,  she  would  hardly  have  missed 
a  score  of  frigates  from  her  great  navy.  But  when  the 
Essex,  the  little  sloops  of  war,  and  the  privateers  ravaged 
English  commerce,  that  touched  John  Bull  on  the  pocket- 
book  and  made  him  roar  for  peace.  So,  although  Porter 
was  unable  to  capture  a  frigate  as  he  had  hoped,  still  he  had 
accomplished  much  more  toward  bringing  about  a  peace 
favorable  to  America  than  if  he  had  taken  half  a  dozen. 


IX 

LAKE  CHAMPLAIN  AND  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

Battle  of  Lake  Champlain — Credit  due  Macdonough — Effect  of  the 
battle  on  conclusion  of  peace — Work  of  sloops  and  privateers  in 
War  of  1812 — Defense  of  the  General  Armstrong — Reasons  for 
naval  successes  in  the  war. 

WE  come  now  to  the  most  important  battle  of  the 
War  of  1 8 1 2 .  In  spite  of  its  importance  most  Amer 
icans  know  less  about  it  than  about  half  a  dozen  other 
battles  of  the  war,  and  they  know  still  less  about  the 
fine  young  fellow  who  won  the  victory. 

In  the  previous  chapter  we  noted  the  importance  of 
Lakes  Ontario  and  Erie.  We  saw  how  splendidly  Perry 
Settled  matters  on  Lake  Erie,  and  how  Chauncey,  to  the 
end  of  the  war,  only  played  a  drawn  game  with  his  British 
opponent  on  Lake  Ontario.  There  was  another  and  at  the 
time  still  more  important  waterway,  Lake  Champlain. 
If  you  look  at  the  map  of  this  region  you  will  see  that  the 
lake,  with  the  Richelieu  River  on  the  north  and  Lake 
George  and  the  Hudson  on  the  south,  makes  an  almost 
continuous  waterway  between  New  York  and  Montreal. 

The  British  had  realized  its  importance  during  the 
Revolutionary  War,  and  in  1812  it  should  have  been  the 
first  line  of  attack  for  the  Americans  in  their  invasion  of 
Canada.  But  our  blundering  government  wasted  its  small 
army  in  several  disastrous  expeditions  farther  west  and  let 
slip  the  best  opportunity  of  all. 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  we  had  two  little  sloops  on  the 
lake,  carrying  ten  carronades  each.  In  June,  1813,  while 

104 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 


chasing  an  English  gunboat, 
they  got  caught  by  a  swift 
current  in  the  narrows  near 
Isle  aux  Noix  and,  being  drawn 
under  the  guns  of  a  British 
fort,  were  captured.  This  gave 
the  British  immediate  control 
of  Lake  Champlain. 

Master-Commandant  Thom 
as  Macdonough,  who  during 
the  Tripolitan  war  had  helped 
Decatur  burn  the  Philadelphia, 
was  then  in  charge  of  naval 
affairs  on  the  lake.  After  the 
loss  of  the  two  sloops  he  be 
gan  work  on  some  vessels  in 
Otter  Creek  in  order  to  recover 
control  of  the  lake.  A  sample 
of  the  speed  with  which  these 
vessels  were.built  is  the  schoon 
er  Eagle,  which  took  the  water 
just  nineteen  days  after  her 
keel  was  laid.  The  rest  of  the 
flotilla  consisted  of  the  ship 
Saratoga,  the  schooner  Ticon- 
deroga,  and  the  sloop  Preble, 
and  several  galleys.  While  the 
work  was  in  progress  the  Brit 
ish  came  down  the  lake  in 
their  gunboats  and  attacked, 
but  Macdonough,  getting  wind 
of  their  intentions,  landed  his 
guns  and  made  such  a  strong 
battery  of  them  that  he  beat 
the  English  off. 

After  this  Macdonough  was 
able  to  finish  his  vessels  un- 


MAP  OF  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN 
REGION 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

disturbed,  but  meanwhile  the  English  had  been  greatly 
increasing  their  naval  force.  The  ease  with  which  naval 
supplies  could  reach  them  from  Montreal  was  a  great  help 
to  them,  and  certain  unpatriotic  farmers  in  Vermont 
cheerfully  supplied  all  the  timber  and  food-stuffs  that  the 
English  wanted. 

The  British  authorities,  realizing  their  great  opportunity 
on  Lake  Champlain,  made  up  their  minds  to  strike  at  this 
point  the  decisive  blow  of  the  war.  At  Plattsburg  were 
about  three  thousand  Americans,  consisting  of  two  thousand 
militia  and  nearly  one  thousand  invalided  soldiers.  To 
sweep  away  this  small  force  Sir  George  Prevost,  the  Gov 
ernor-General  of  Canada,  was  to  bring  an  army  of  about 
twelve  thousand  of  Wellington's  veterans  down  the  western 
shore  of  Lake  Champlain.  At  the  same  time  the  English 
naval  force  under  Captain  Downie,  a  splendid  officer  of 
fighting  experience,  was  to  clear  the  lake  of  Macdonough's 
flotilla.  When  that  was  done  there  would  be  nothing  to 
prevent  the  English  from  taking  a  pleasure  trip  down  the 
Hudson  to  New  York.  It  looked  easy.  The  English 
found  many  of  the  New-Englanders  very  friendly,  and 
they  heard  with  satisfaction  that  the  Governor  of  Ver 
mont  had  flatly  refused  to  obey  the  President's  command 
to  call  out  the  militia  for  the  nation's  defense. 

By  the  end  of  August,  1814,  Prevost  had  crossed  the 
border  with  an  army  of  over  eleven  thousand  men  to  move 
on  Plattsburg.  To  oppose  him,  Macomb,  the  American 
general,  had  a  force  amounting  by  this  time  to  2,500,  in 
cluding  1,500  regulars  and  the  rest  composed  of  volunteers 
and  militia.  In  the  mean  time  Macdonough  had  moved 
his  squadron  to  Plattsburg  Bay  for  a  final  stand.  For 
some  reason  Prevost  did  not  want  to  attack  Plattsburg 
until  he  was  sure  that  Captain  Downie  was  fighting  Mac 
donough's  force  at  the  same  time.  He  kept  nagging 
Downie  with  orders  to  get  under  way  till  the  latter  sailed 
down  the  lake  to  give  battle  before  his  preparations  were 
quite  completed.  Then,  instead  of  a  triumphant  assault 

106 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

on  Plattsburg,  Prevost  was  checked  by  a  spirited  resist 
ance  from  the  Americans  intrenched  on  the  slopes  above 
the  Saranac  River.  He  should  have  made  the  attack  four 
days  earlier,  instead  of  idling  in  the  woods  waiting  for 
Downie.  As  it  turned  out,  the  small  force  of  Americans 
succeeded  in  keeping  Prevost  in  check,  thus  protecting 
Macdonough's  rear  till  the  battle  on  the  lake  was  over. 
There  have  been  several  occasions  when  the  stupidity  of 
a  British  commander  has  been  most  valuable  to  the  Amer 
ican  cause,  and  this  is  one  of  them. 

Meanwhile  Macdonough  had  made  his  preparations.  He 
knew  that  his  force  was  inferior  to  Downie's,  particularly 
in  long  guns.  Out  on  the  lake  the  British  flag-ship  Con- 
fiance,  with  her  long  guns,  could  have  beaten  Macdonough's 
entire  force  single-handed.  So  the  American  commander 
drew  up  his  line  in  the  harbor  before  the  town  of  Platts 
burg,  placing  his  ships  between  Cumberland  Head  and 
Crab  Island  in  such  a  way  that  the  shoals  at  each  end  of 
the  line  would  prevent  the  British  from  turning  his  flanks. 
At  the  same  time  this  formation  compelled  Captain  Downie 
to  begin  his  attack  in  a  head-on  position  and  to  form  his 
line  of  battle  under  fire.  Then  Macdonough  saw  to  it  that 
there  was  enough  room  astern  of  each  ship  so  that  if  the 
guns  on  the  exposed  side  were  dismounted  each  vessel 
could  trip  her  bow-anchors  and  swing  around  to  present  a 
fresh  broadside.  And  to  be  prepared  in  case  the  rigging 
was  too  badly  shattered,  or  the  wind  dropped  too  much  to 
turn  a  vessel  by  sail,  Macdonough  put  "springs"  on  his 
anchor-cables.  These  springs  were  hawsers  made  fast  to 
the  bow- cables  underwater,  and  leading  back  to  the  stern. 
By  slipping  the  bow-cable  and  hauling  on  the  spring  a  crew 
could  "wind"  a  ship  right  around  by  bringing  the  stern  to 
the  place  where  the  bow  had  been.  In  short,  Macdonough 
provided  for  everything  in  advance  just  as  far  as  a  man 
could  and  made  the  best  possible  arrangement  of  his 
inferior  force. 

The  American  line  from  northeast  to  southwest  was  as 

107 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

follows:  the  schooner  Eagle,  the  flag-ship  Saratoga,  the 
schooner  Ticonderoga,  and  the  little  sloop  Preble.  Forty 
yards  to  the  rear  lay  the  ten  American  galleys,  which  were 
large  rowboats  with  a  little  howitzer  in  the  bow.  When  all 
was  ready  Macdonough,  who  was  as  devout  as  he  was 
brave,  mustered  the  crew  of  the  Saratoga  for  prayers. 

As  the  British  squadron  came  down  before  the  wind 
Downie  saw  across  Cumberland  Head  exactly  how  Mac 
donough  had  arranged  his  ships  and  quickly  formed  his 
plan.  The  Confiance,  flag-ship,  was  to  fire  a  broadside  at 
the  Eagle — at  the  northerly  end — and  then  anchor  across  the 
bow  of  the  Saratoga  in  a  raking  position.  The  brig  Linnet 
and  the  sloop  Chub  were  to  engage  the  Eagle,  while  the 
sloop  Finch  and  a  dozen  galleys  were  to  attack  the  Ticon 
deroga  and  the  Preble  at  the  southerly  end.  It  was  a 
splendid  plan,  but  it  had  to  reckon  with  the  American 
broadsides  first,  as  Macdonough  had  intended. 

The  Confiance  rounded  Cumberland  Head  with  flags 
flying  and  crews  cheering.  But  as  she  turned  her  bows  to 
the  American  line  she  got  a  hot  reception.  Just  before  the 
firing  of  the  first  shot  a  rooster  on  the  Eagle  suddenly  flew 
to  a  gun,  flapped  his  wings,  and  gave  a  lusty  crow.  At  this 
the  Americans  cheered  mightily,  for  it  was  a  sign  of  victory. 

Macdonough  aimed  the  first  gun  fired  on  the  Saratoga, 
and  the  shot  struck  the  British  flag-ship  near  the  hawse- 
pipe,  flew  the  whole  length  of  her  deck,  killing  and  wound 
ing  several  men  in  its  path,  and  shattered  the  wheel. 
Soon  her  two  port-bow  anchors  were  shot  away,  and  this 
loss,  combined  with  the  baffling  head  wind,  forced  Downie 
to  give  up  his  idea  of  anchoring  in  a  raking  position. 
Instead  he  had  to  be  content  with  mooring  about  five  hun 
dred  yards  to  the  east  of  the  Saratoga. 

All  this  while  Downie  had  not  fired  a  shot.  But  as  soon 
as  he  had  anchored — about  nine  o'clock — he  poured  in  a 
deadly  broadside  that  killed  or  wounded  one-fifth  of  the 
Saratoga's  men.  And  then  the  battle  was  on  in  bitter 
earnest.  About  fifteen  minutes  afterward  a  shot  struck 

T08 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

a  gun  on  the  Confiance  just  as  Downie  was  in  the  act  of 
sighting  it  and  killed  him  almost  instantly.  From  that 
time  the  fight  was  continued  with  great  spirit  by  Lieutenant 
Robertson,  the  second  in  command.  At  the  northern  end 
of  the  line  the  Eagle  was  being  attacked  by  the  Chub  and 
the  Linnet.  A  well-directed  broadside  from  the  Eagle 


PLATTSBURGH   BAY,  LAKE   CHAMPLAIN 
Position  of  the  ships  at  the  close  of  the  battle. 

killed  or  wounded  nearly  half  the  crew  of  the  Chub  and 
smashed  the  rigging  so  badly  that  she  drifted  helplessly 
toward  the  Saratoga.  She  promptly  surrendered,  and  a 
young  midshipman  named  Charles  Platt  carried  her  to  the 
rear.  This  youngster  deserves  to  be  remembered.  Every 
body  knows  that  Perry  went  in  a  boat  through  the  line  of 
8  I09 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

fire  to  the  Niagara  once  in  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie,  but  few 
know  that  Midshipman  Platt  carried  orders  from  Mac- 
donough  in  an  open  boat  through  a  much  hotter  line  of 
fire  three  times  in  the  battle  of  Lake  Champlain. 

Although  the  little  Chub  had  been  quickly  disposed  of, 
the  schooner  Linnet  got  a  very  favorable  position  off  the 
starboard  bow  of  the  Eagle,  where  the  latter  could  bring 
few  guns  to  bear,  and  poured  in  a  deadly  fire.  Finding 
that  he  was  in  a  bad  place  and  his  springs  all  shot  away, 
Lieutenant  Henley,  of  the  Eagle,  made  sail  and  dropped 
down  to  a  position  astern  of  the  Saratoga  where  he  could 
pour  a  diagonal  fire  into  the  Confiance.  But  this  gave  the 
Linnet  a  chance  to  get  a  raking  position  on  the  Saratoga, 
and  the  American  flag-ship  was  soon  in  a  desperate  con 
dition,  being  caught  between  two  fires.  Most  of  the  guns 
on  the  side  toward  the  enemy  had  been  dismounted,  and 
there  had  been  many  killed  and  wounded.  Macdonough 
himself  fought  with  the  superb  gallantry  of  a  Paul  Jones. 
Twice  he  was  hurled  across  the  deck  by  huge  splinters, 
once  a  piece  of  the  spanker-boom  fell  on  him  and  knocked 
him  senseless.  Once  again  he  was  thrown  unconscious  and 
bleeding  to  the  deck.  Fortunately,  he  recovered  himself 
every  time,  and  was  back  at  his  guns  with  a  laugh  and  a 
shout  of  encouragement. 

Soon  a  shot  from  the  Linnet  dismounted  the  last  effective 
carronade  on  the  Saratoga's  starboard  side  and  sent  it 
bumping  down  the  hatch.  Here  was  the  crisis  of  the  battle. 

At  the  southern  end  of  the  line  the  English  sloop  Finch 
had  gone  ashore  in  a  battered  condition  on  Crab  Island 
and  surrendered  to  some  of  the  invalided  soldiers  who  had 
mounted  a  little  six-pounder  there.  The  American  sloop 
Preble  had  been  so  hotly  pressed  by  the  English  galleys 
that  she  had  been  driven  to  the  rear.  That  left  the  schooner 
Ticonderoga  fighting  with  might  and  main  against  the 
galleys,  which  she  finally  succeeded  in  driving  away. 

But,  as  everybody  knew,  the  day  depended  on  whether 
the  Saratoga  or  the  Confiance  could  hold  out  the  longer. 

no 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

Now,  with  the  Saratoga's  fire  silenced,  there  was  fear  in 
the  American  line  that  the  flag-ship  was  going  to  surrender 
and  that  the  day  was  lost. 

True,  not  a  gun  could  be  fired  on  the  Saratoga's  starboard 
side,  and  the  wind  had  died  down,  besides,  but  this  was 
just  the  situation  Macdonough  had  provided  for  by  his 
"springs."  He  called  away  his  men  to  the  capstan,  and 
in  spite  of  a  merciless  fire  the  men  slowly  hauled  the  ship 
clear  round  till  her  bow  pointed  south  instead  of  north  and  a 
fresh  broadside  faced  the  enemy.  With  a  cheer  of  fresh 
hope  the  crew  sprang  to  their  guns  and  fired  a  double- 
shotted  broadside.  This  unexpected  fire  was  more  than 
the  Confiance  could  stand.  Since  most  of  her  guns  on  the 
engaged  side  were  now  useless,  too,  Lieutenant  Robertson 
had  tried  to  imitate  Macdonough's  manceuver.  But  the 
anchors  he  needed  were  gone,  there  was  not  enough  wind 
for  his  sails,  and  he  succeeded  only  in  swinging  his  bow 
directly  toward  the  Saratoga.  There  the  Confiance  hung 
while  the  Saratoga  raked  her.  There  was  nothing  for  Lieu 
tenant  Robertson  to  do  but  surrender.  After  the  flag  of 
the  Confiance  went  down,  Macdonough  hauled  on  his 
springs  again  and  brought  his  broadside  to  bear  on  the 
Linnet,  which,  after  a  defense  of  fifteen  minutes,  surren 
dered,  too.  At  that  moment  the  Ticonderoga  was  just  driv 
ing  the  galleys  to  the  open  lake.  The  American  galleys 
had  tried  to  help  in  the  battle,  but  they  proved  too  small 
and  light  to  be  of  any  use. 

The  British  galleys  got  away  because  there  was  not  a 
vessel  in  the  American  squadron  in  condition  to  make  sail 
after  them,  but  the  main  part  of  the  fleet  fell  into  Macdon 
ough's  hands.  The  victorious  young  commander  then  sent 
this  modest  report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy:  "The 
Almighty  has  been  pleased  to  grant  us  a  signal  victory  on 
Lake  Champlain,  with  the  capture  of  one  frigate,  one  brig, 
and  two  sloops  of  war  of  the  enemy." 

Without  taking  away  any  of  the  glory  that  belongs  to  the 
other  brave  fellows  who  fought  on  the  American  side,  it  is 

in 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

not  too  much  to  say  that  the  credit  of  this  victory  against 
a  superior  force  belongs,  first  and  last,  to  Macdonough  him 
self.  The  victory  was  due  to  his  skill  in  choosing  his  position 
and  to  his  shrewd  forethought  in  providing  for  exactly 
what  occurred.  It  was  those  " springs"  on  his  cable  that 
turned  defeat  into  victory.  This  combination  of  brains 
with  the  finest  kind  of  courage  places  Thomas  Macdonough 
at  the  very  top  in  our  list  of  the  heroes  of  1812. 

Let  us  see  what  the  results  were.  As  soon  as  Prevost 
heard  what  had  happened  he  took  to  his  heels  and  retreated 
to  Canada.  In  fact,  he  was  in  such  a  hurry  that  he  left 
behind  most  of  his  stores  and  ammunition  for  the  Ameri 
cans! 

Still  more  important  was  the  result  on  the  peace  nego 
tiations  then  going  on  in  Ghent,  Belgium.  The  English 
commissioners  had  been  standing  out  for  the  surrender  of 
a  part  of  the  American  territory — large  slices  of  northern 
New  York  and  Maine,  and  a  broad  tract  in  the  northwest 
to  be  made  into  an  Indian  country  under  British  govern 
ment.  But  after  the  news  of  Champlain  the  English  agents 
gave  up  this  demand  and  yielded  to  the  American  position 
that  the  boundary  lines  should  be  just  as  they  had  been 
before  the  war.  The  capture  of  Downie's  fleet,  together 
with  the  retreat  of  Prevost,  proved  to  be  the  decisive  action 
of  the  war.  Of  course,  on  account  of  the  slow  means  of 
communication,  fighting  went  on  many  weeks  after  the 
treaty  was  signed  in  Ghent,  on  December  24,  1814.  But 
nothing  that  happened  afterward  made  any  difference  with 
the  terms  of  peace. 

Oddly  enough,  the  treaty  made  no  mention  of  impress 
ment,  the  chief  reason  of  the  war.  On  this  point  the  English 
commissioners  refused  to  yield,  but  it  was  a  matter  that 
took  care  of  itself.  When  Napoleon  was  done  for  there 
was  no  need  for  such  a  gigantic  navy,  and,  therefore,  no 
reason  for  impressing  sailors  into  the  fleet. 

Except  for  this  point  the  Americans  gained  a  great  diplo 
matic  victory  in  that  treaty.  Although  we  do  not  like  to 

112 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

admit  the  fact,  in  1814  we  were  a  pretty  badly  beaten 
nation.  All  our  military  expeditions  had  been  failures, 
Washington  had  been  sacked  and  burned,  and  a  good  deal 
of  our  territory  was  occupied  by  the  British.  Though  our 
little  navy  had  made  a  brilliant  name  for  itself,  the  Atlantic 
coast  was  so  tightly  blockaded  in  1814  that  those  of  our 
frigates  which  had  not  been  captured  were  unable  to  get  to 
sea.  On  the  other  hand,  the  peace  in  Europe  left  England 
free  with  a  splendid  army  and  her  great  navy  to  do  about 
as  she  liked  with  us.  Why,  then,  was  she  willing  to  sign 
a  treaty  of  peace  so  favorable  to  the  United  States? 

These  were  two  main  reasons.  First,  although  the  great 
struggle  with  Napoleon  was  over,  the  other  nations,  espe 
cially  Austria,  felt  jealous  of  the  great  power  and  influence 
England  had  won  in  ending  that'  war.  Every  one  expected 
a  new  European  war  to  break  out  at  any  moment,  and  the 
British  government  did  not  want  to  be  hampered  by  a 
war  in  America.  Secondly,  although  the  blockade  kept 
our  frigates  idle  in  the  harbors  of  our  coast,  yet  the  smaller 
sloops,  and  especially  the  swift-sailing  privateers,  were  able 
to  run  the  blockade  without  much  trouble,  and  these  ves 
sels,  coupled  with  the  Essex,  harried  the  commerce  of  Eng 
land  till  the  rates  of  insurance  on  ships  got  so  high  that  it 
did  not  pay  to  send  a  cargo  out.  So  the  merchants  of  Lon 
don  demanded  peace. 

Nor  were  these  sloops  and  privateers  engaged  only  in 
capturing  merchantmen.  We  have  already  spoken  of  the 
victories  of  the  Wasp  and  the  Hornet  against  British  sloops 
of  their  own  class.  There  were  six  other  duels  between 
sloops  of  war,  and  out  of  the  total  of  eight  seven  were 
victories  for  the  Americans. 

Of  the  privateers  some  were  so  brilliantly  handled  that 
they  deserve  special  mention.  There  was  the  little  Comet, 
of  Baltimore,  which  fought,  one  moonlight  night  off  the 
coast  of  Brazil,  an  action  as  gallant  as  any  in  the  war. 
Captain  Boyle  of  the  Comet  attacked  three  armed  merchant 
men,  convoyed  by  a  Portuguese  sloop  of  war,  the  four 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

ships  mounting  a  total  of  fifty-four  guns  to  his  fourteen. 
But  he  handled  his  ship  and  guns  so  cleverly  that  when  the 
firing  ceased  the  Portuguese  sloop  of  war  and  two  of  the 
merchantmen  were  hurrying  back  to  neutral  water,  badly 
hurt,  while  the  third  fell  a  prize  to  the  Comet. 

Another  and  more  famous  exploit  occurred  in  the  fall 
of  1814.  Nowadays  many  of  the  steamers  plying  between 
New  York  and  the  Mediterranean  ports  pass  through  a 
certain  channel  in  the  Azores.  On  one  side  rises  the  graceful 


TYPICAL    PRIVATEER    OF    WAR   OF    1 8 12 

"Topsail  schooner,"  mounting  carronades,  and  a  "long  Tom" 
amidships  on  a  swivel 


cone  of  Mount  Pico,  and  on  the  other  lies  the  little  town 
of  Horta  on  the  island  of  Fayal.  Few  Americans  who  look 
over  a  liner's  rail  at  this  little  whitewashed  city  with  its 
comical  old  fort  realize  that  within  a  few  rods  of  that  fort 
a  wonderful  battle  was  fought  by  American  sailors,  and 
that  there  on  the  bottom  still  lies  the  hull  of  the  most 
famous  privateer  in  our  history. 

On  September  26,  1814,  the  privateer  General  Armstrong, 
Captain  Reid,  arrived  at  Horta  to  put  fresh  water  aboard. 

114 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

She  had  scarcely  dropped  anchor  when  a  large  British 
squadron  under  Commodore  Lloyd  came  in.  As  soon  as  it 
was  known  that  the  little  vessel  was  an  American  privateer 
the  ships  anchored  in  such  positions  as  to  make  it  impossible 
for  her  to  escape  to  sea.  Of  course  the  port  was  neutral  and 
the  British  had  no  right  to  attack,  but  Captain  Reid  was 
pretty  sure  that  they  would,  and  made  his  plans  accord 
ingly.  He  moved  his  vessel  as  close  as  he  could  under  the 
guns  of  the  fort  and  asked  the  Portuguese  governor  for 
protection.  But  the  governor  was  mortally  afraid  of 
offending  the  English  and  did  nothing  more  than  make  a 
feeble  protest. 

At  midnight  the  English  attempted  a  surprise  attack  in 
a  few  boats,  but  they  were  beaten  back  with  heavy  losses. 
Angered  by  this  unexpected  repulse,  Commodore  Lloyd 
made  another  boat  attack,  using  all  the  boats  in  the 
squadron  and  sending  about  four  hundred  men.  There 
were  only  ninety  in  the  privateer,  but  they  had  the  advan 
tage  of  position.  They  rigged  boarding  nettings  along  the 
sides  of  the  vessel  and  loaded  and  collected  arms.  Then 
began  a  desperate  hand-to-hand  fight.  The  British  swarmed 
over  the  sides  of  the  privateer,  but  were  obliged  to  hack 
through  the  boarding  nettings  before  they  could  reach  the 
deck,  and  were  meanwhile  exposed  to  the  pike,  pistol,  and 
cutlass  of  the  defenders,  who  fought,  as  an  English  eye 
witness  described  it,  "with  the  ferocity  of  savages." 

After  an  hour  of  the  fiercest  struggle  the  English  were 
repulsed  with  great  slaughter.  According  to  some  accounts 
upward  of  two  hundred  were  killed  or  wounded.  Strange 
to  say,  the  American  loss  was  only  two  killed  and  seven 
wounded.  Infuriated  by  this  severe  and  bloody  defeat, 
Lloyd  determined  to  open  his  broadsides  on  the  Armstrong, 
regardless  of  what  the  shots  might  do  to  the  houses  of 
the  town.  A  brig  advanced  to  the  attack,  but  the  Arm 
strong's  well-directed  fire  beat  her  off. 

Captain  Reid  realized,  however,  that  he  could  not  hope 
to  fight  the  whole  squadron,  so  he  quickly  removed  his  dead 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

and  wounded  to  shore.  Then,  aiming  his  "long  Tom" 
down  the  hatch,  he  shot  a  hole  through  the  ship's  bottom. 
In  order  to  make  sure  that  the  British  should  not  have 
her,  he  set  the  Armstrong  on  fire  as  well.  Finally,  with  his 
flag  on  his  arm,  he  rowed  ashore,  leaving  only  a  blazing, 
sinking  ship  for  the  enemy  to  board.  No  naval  officer 
could  have  given  a  better  account  of  himself  than  this 
privateersman,  and  his  gallantry  was  fittingly  rewarded 
after  the  war  by  a  captain's  commission  in  the  navy. 

Captain  Reid  did  not  know  it  at  the  time,  but  Lloyd's 
squadron  was  a  part  of  the  expedition  against  New  Orleans. 
The  Armstrong's  crew  had  killed  and  wounded  so  many 
officers  and  men  that  the  squadron  was  delayed  an  entire 
week  at  Horta.  One  of  the  ships  had  to  be  sent  back  to 
England,  loaded  with  the  wounded.  The  rest  of  the  ships 
and  transports  at  Jamaica  had  to  wait  a  week  for  Lloyd's 
squadron,  too,  so  that  the  attack  on  New  Orleans  was 
delayed  just  about  seven  days.  As  Andrew  Jackson  came 
on  the  scene  only  three  days  before  the  English  arrived,  it 
is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  stubborn  defense  of  the 
little  privateer  made  possible  the  victory  of  New  Orleans. 

In  looking  over  the  course  of  the  War  of  1812  we  notice 
the  contrast  between  our  naval  successes  and  our  military 
failures.  The  reason  of  this  is  simply  that  the  army  had 
been  allowed  to  fall  into  decay,  with  old  and  inefficient 
officers  and  only  a  small  body  of  regular  soldiers.  There  had 
been  no  trial  by  fire  to  burn  out  the  poor  material  among 
the  officers  and  temper  the  efficiency  of  the  men.  What 
was  worse,  most  of  the  armies  of  1812  consisted  of  raw 
militia,  fresh  from  the  farm,  who  had  to  face  veteran  sol 
diers  of  the  Napoleonic  war. 

The  navy,  on  the  other  hand,  had  been  through  two 
campaigns,  one  against  France,  the  other  against  Tripoli, 
and  Preble  had  brought  it  up  to  a  high  ideal  of  duty  and 
efficiency.  While  it  was  insignificant  in  size,  it  was  never 
theless  a  veteran  navy  and  keyed  up  to  the  highest  pitch. 
Every  one  of  our  heroes  of  the  War  of  1 8 1 2  had  been  through 

116 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

fire  at  Tripoli,  and  many  had  smelt  powder  in  the  French 
war  as  well. 

The  War  of  1812  had  a  good  effect  on  the  nation  at  large 
in  that  it  inspired  a  new  feeling  of  patriotism.  Disgust 
at  the  selfish  and  disloyal  conduct  of  many  of  the  New- 
Englanders  during  the  war  resulted  in  a  larger  patriotism, 
even  in  New  England  itself.  The  feeling  that  the  United 
States  was  a  nation,  not  a  bundle  of  jealous  states,  was 
strengthened  by  the  common  danger  of  the  war,  its  vic 
tories,  and  even  its  defeats. 


X 

l8l2   TO   THE    CIVIL   WAR 

Campaign  against  Algiers — Suppressing  the  pirates  in  the  Gulf 
and  the  Caribbean — Qualla  Battoo — Opening  Japan — Political 
corruption  in  the  navy — Founding  of  the  Naval  Academy. 

IT  is  hard  for  us  to  understand  now  why  the  American 
people  were  willing  to  pay  tribute  to  Algiers  after 
they  had  settled  the  question  with  Tripoli,  but  the  fact 
remains  that  between  1797  and  1815  we  were  sending 
every  year  tribute  of  naval  supplies  to  the  Bey  of  Algiers. 

In  1812  that  potentate  received  a  special  envoy  from 
England,  bearing  presents  and  messages  of  friendship  from 
the  Prince  Regent.  This  encouraged  the  old  pirate  to  make 
trouble  for  the  Americans  again,  especially  as  the  United 
States  was  soon  deep  in  a  war  with  Great  Britain.  So  he 
hustled  our  consul  out  of  the  country  and  sent  his  corsairs 
abroad  to  catch  American  ships.  Fortunately,  on  account 
of  the  impending  war  with  England,  there  were  few  Amer 
ican  merchantmen  in  the  Mediterranean,  but  the  Algerians 
managed  to  catch  one,  the  little  brig  Edwin,  and  sold  her 
crew  into  slavery. 

During  the  war  we  had  no  time  to  attend  to  these 
pirates,  but  as  soon  as  peace  was  made  with  England  Con 
gress  declared  war  on  Algiers,  and  ordered  two  squad 
rons  to  proceed  thither  and  get  satisfaction.  Bainbridge 
commanded  one  and  Decatur  the  other.  The  latter  got 
to  sea  first,  May  20,  1815,  and  he  went  about  his  business 
with  his  usual  dash  and  thoroughness. 

He  was  scarcely  in  the  Mediterranean  before  he  caught 

118 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

a  44-gun  frigate,  the  largest  ship  in  the  Algerian  navy,  with 
the  admiral  on  board.  The  Algerian  admiral  was  killed 
during  the  brief  action  before  the  frigate  surrendered. 
Then,  on  arriving  at  Algiers,  Decatur  sent  the  terms  of  his 
treaty  to  the  Bey  and  said  that  if  they  were  not  accepted 
at  once  he  would  sink  every  Algerian  ship  that  tried  to 
enter  the  harbor.  Just  as  one  of  the  Algerian  cruisers 
appeared  the  Bey  sent  off  a  boat  in  hot  haste,  agreeing  to 
the  terms  of  peace.  The  chief  points  in  Decatur's  treaty 
provided  for  the  immediate  release  of  all  Americans  in 
slavery,  the  payment  of  $10,000  for  the  Edwin,  and  an 
end  to  all  tribute-paying  for  the  future. 

After  settling  with  Algiers  in  this  straight-from-the- 
shoulder  fashion  Decatur  paid  a  visit  to  Tunis  and  Tripoli, 
both  of  which  had  allowed  British  men-of-war  to  recapture 
American  prizes  in  their  harbors.  From  Tunis  he  squeezed 
$46,000 — which  he  estimated  to  be  what  the  prizes  were 
worth — and  from  Algiers  $25,000,  with  the  liberation  of 
ten  Christian  slaves  besides.  Two  of  these  were  Danes, 
whom  he  selected  out  of  gratitude  to  the  Danish  consul, 
Nissen,  who  had  been  so  kind  to  the  American  prisoners 
during  the  Tripoli  tan  war. 

Captain  Bainbridge,  with  his  usual  bad  luck,  arrived 
on  the  scene  only  in  time  to  find  that  Decatur  had  finished 
the  whole  business. 

The  Bey  of  Algiers  was  so  mortified  over  his  humiliation, 
and  so  angry  because  the  English  had  not  helped  him,  that 
he  became  very  insolent  toward  them.  As  it  did  not  pay 
the  British  government  any  longer  to  make  presents  to  these 
pirates,  the  following  year  it  sent  to  Algiers  a  large  fleet 
which  chastised  the  Bey  very  severely.  After  that  there 
were  no  more  Christian  slaves  and  piracy  in  the  Medi 
terranean. 

In  the  chapter  on  the  French  war  we  saw  that  most  of 
the  French  privateers  in  the  Caribbean  were  really  pirates. 
After  1815  French,  Spanish,  and  some  American  privateers 
went  right  on  with  their  business,  which  they  liked  too 

119 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

well  to  give  up  just  because  peace  had  been  declared.  If 
you  study  a  large  map  of  the  West  Indies  you  will  see  that 
the  Caribbean  is  naturally  a  paradise  for  buccaneers.  The 
famous  sea-rovers  of  the  seventeenth  century  always 
made  their  headquarters  there  because,  in  the  first  place, 
it  was  the  cross-roads  of  the  Atlantic,  and,  in  the  second 
place,  there  are  so  many  little  islands  where  a  pirate  ship 
could  retreat  for  hiding.  After  1815  things  became  so 
bad  in  the  Gulf  and  the  Caribbean  that  hardly  a  merchant 
ship  passed  through  without  at  least  a  brush  with  one  of 
these  buccaneers.  When  the  United  States  tried  to  deal 
with  the  problem  it  turned  out  that  many  of  the  pirates 
carried  a  letter  of  marque  issued  by  Venezuela,  which  was 
then  in  open  revolt  against  Spain.  Of  course,  this  letter  of 
marque  was  a  farce,  and  in  1819  Oliver  H.  Perry  was  sent 
on  a  mission  to  Venezuela  to  straighten  out  the  difficulty. 
Unfortunately,  the  "hero  of  Erie"  fell  ill  of  yellow  fever  and 
died,  and  the  expedition  had  no  result. 

In  1821-22  Captain  Biddle,  the  lieutenant  of  the 
Wasp  in  her  famous  duel  with  the  Frolic,  took  a  small 
squadron  into  the  West  Indies  and  made  a  good  beginning 
against  the  pirates.  In  1823  Captain  Porter  was  sent 
with  another  squadron,  and,  as  in  the  Essex  days,  David 
Farragut  went  along  too. 

It  was  a  hard  and  dangerous  service.  The  pirates  had 
to  be  hunted  right  to  their  island  caves  because  most  of 
them  ran  to  hide  as  soon  as  they  heard  of  Porter's  coming. 
A  greater  danger  than  pirate  bullets  was  yellow  fever, 
which  cost  the  squadron  many  good  officers  and  men. 
Once  the  entire  squadron  had  to  go  north  to  break  up  the 
epidemic,  and  for  a  time  Porter  himself  lay  at  the  point  of 
death. 

But  nothing  short  of  death  could  stop  him,  and  he 
went  at  his  difficult  task  till  it  was  done.  By  the  close 
of  1824  there  was  not  a  black  flag  to  be  found  in  that  whole 
region.  Captain  Porter  is  best  known  for  his  Essex  cruise, 
but  the  service  he  performed  in  rooting  out  and  destroying 

120 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

the  piracy  of  the  Gulf  and  Caribbean  was  many  times 
more  difficult  and  dangerous. 

Another  expedition  against  pirates  took  place  in  1831. 
This  time  it  was  concerned  with  the  Malays  of  Qualla 
Battoo,  a  town  on  the  northwestern  coast  of  Sumatra. 

The  Friendship,  a  little  Yankee  merchantman,  was 
treacherously  seized  by  the  natives,  who  killed  the  mate 
and  several  of  her  crew.  To  teach  these  Malay  cut 
throats  a  lesson  for  the  benefit  of  our  many  merchantmen  in 
these  waters,  the  government  sent  the  44 -gun  frigate 
Potomac  to  the  scene.  The  Malays  retired  to  their  forts 
in  the  jungle  village,  and  officers  and  men  from  the  Potomac 
landed  under  cover  of  darkness  and  attacked  and  cap 
tured  one  stronghold  after  another  with  splendid  gallantry. 
The  Malays  fought  with  the  most  desperate  courage,  for 
they  preferred  death  to  surrender.  The  following  day 
Captain  Downes  of  the  Potomac  took  his  frigate  up  the 
river  and  opened  his  broadsides  on  an  army  of  Malays  that 
had  collected  at  the  rear  of  the  town.  The  roar  of  those 
long  3  2 -pounders  terrified  the  natives  into  the  most  abject 
submission.  Yet  it  required  another  bombardment  the 
following  year  by  another  American  frigate  to  put  a 
stop  to  the  murderous  tactics  of  these  natives.  There 
after  the  Americans  had  little  further  concern  with  pi 
rates. 

American  naval  officers  found  themselves  again  in  the 
Gulf  at  the  time  of  the  Mexican  War.  But  this  war 
was  almost  wholly  a  military  one,  and  the  duties  of  the 
navy  were  chiefly  to  blockade  Mexican  ports,  with  an 
occasional  brush  with  the  enemy  on  shore.  During  the 
latter  part  of  the  campaign  Captain  Matthew  C.  Perry 
had  charge  of  the  naval  operations  before  Vera  Cruz. 
Matthew  was  a  younger  brother  of  the  famous  Oliver,  and 
had  made  a  name  for  himself  in  Biddle's  expedition  against 
the  pirates  by  capturing  five  pirate  craft  with  his  little 
sloop,  the  Shark,  and  helping  in  the  capture  of  a  sixth. 
But  Matthew  Perry's  fame  rests  on  a  peaceful  rather  than 

121 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

a  warlike  exploit — namely,  the  opening  of  Japan  to  the 
civilized  world. 

In  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century  Christian  mission 
aries  had  found  a  cordial  welcome  in  Japan.  But  as  more 
Christians  arrived,  belonging  to  unfriendly  sects  and 
nations,  they  began  to  squabble  with  one  another  in  a 
very  un-Christian  spirit.  At  first  this  only  amused  the 
Japanese,  but  when  they  discovered  that  the  Portuguese 
and  the  native  Christians  were  joined  in  a  plot  to  overthrow 
the  government  they  rose  in  their  wrath  and  banished  the 
foreigners,  bag  and  baggage.  Thereafter  for  two  hundred 
and  fifty  years  no  foreigner  was  permitted  in  Japan,  except 
that  the  Dutch  were  allowed  a  few  trading  privileges  at 
Nagasaki. 

When  the  Mexican  War  brought  us  California  the  ques 
tion  of  trading  with  the  East  became  important.  There 
were  already  many  American  whalers  in  the  Japanese 
Sea,  and  it  was  a  great  hardship  for  them  to  be  shut  out  of 
all  Japanese  ports  when  in  stress  of  storm  or  in  need  of 
fresh  water.  Further,  wherever  an  American  ship  was 
wrecked  on  a  Japanese  coast  the  survivors  were  promptly 
led  to  prison,  where  they  stayed  indefinitely. 

Another  very  important  reason  for  opening  Japan  was 
that  we  had  in  those  days  a  large  "clipper"  ship  trade 
with  China,  and  Japan  lay  most  conveniently  on  the 
trade  route.  Steamers  were  beginning  to  cross  the  Pacific, 
too,  and  Japan  had  tempting  deposits  of  coal.  For  a  long 
while  England,  Russia,  France,  and  Portugal  had  tried  to 
get  trading  privileges  with  Japan,  but  they  had  all  failed. 

In  1849  the  sloop  of  war  Preble,  under  Commander 
Glynn,  went  to  Nagasaki  and  rescued  some  shipwrecked 
American  sailors  who  were  in  prison  for  the  crime  of  being 
foreigners.  On  his  return  he  reported  that  the  Japanese 
had  heard  of  America's  easy  victory  over  Mexico  and  were 
much  impressed.  So  he  thought  that  the  time  was  ripe 
for  the  United  States  to  succeed  in  Japan  where  the  other 
nations  had  failed.  Acting  on  this  suggestion,  the  gov- 

122 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

ernment  organized  an  expedition  and  gave  the  command 
of  it  to  Commodore  Matthew  C.  Perry.  While  the  squad 
ron  was  being  fitted  out  Perry  made  a  careful  study  of 
all  the  books  on  Japan  that  could  be  found,  and,  as  the 
Dutch  had  the  only  existing  charts  of  Japanese  waters, 
the  government  had  to  buy  a  set  from  them.  The  thrifty 
Dutchmen,  by  the  way,  insisted  on  the  tidy  sum  of  thirty 
thousand  dollars  as  the  price. 

The  expedition  left  Norfolk  in  the  fall  of  1852  and 
arrived  in  Yedo  Bay  in  July,  1853.  The  appearance  of  the 
two  steam -frigates  Susquehanna  and  Mississippi  towing 
the  sailing  -  sloops  of  war  Saratoga  and  Plymouth  up  the 
bay  created  a  sensation  among  the  natives,  who  had  never 
before  seen  a  steamship.  Their  boats  clustered  around 
the  strange  ships,  but  Perry  not  only  refused  to  permit  any 
one  to  come  on  board,  but  drove  the  boats  away.  He  had 
decided  that  the  best  way  to  impress  the  Orientals  was  to 
outdo  them  in  dignity  and  exclusiveness,  and  he  refused 
to  show  himself  or  obey  the  orders  of  the  Japanese  that 
he  move  south  to  Nagasaki.  Perry  declared  that  he  would 
deliver  the  President's  letter  there  at  Uraga,  where  he  was, 
or  more  directly  up  the  bay  to  the  nation's  capital,  Yedo 
(Tokio) .  He  hinted  at  using  force,  too ;  and,  as  the  Japanese 
saw  no  way  of  stopping  these  armed  steamships,  they  finally 
agreed  to  receive  the  President's  letter  at  Uraga. 

Accordingly,  on  July  i4th  three  hundred  officers  and 
men  were  landed,  amid  the  booming  of  guns,  and  marched 
in  a  stately  procession  to  the  reception-house  built  for  the 
occasion,  where  the  Japanese  princes  were  waiting.  The 
letter  and  the  credentials  from  the  President,  written  on 
vellum  and  incased  in  rosewood  boxes  ornamented  with 
gold,  were  given  to  the  princes  amid  perfect  silence.  Then, 
after  telling  them,  through  the  interpreter,  that  he  would 
return  in  the  spring  for  an  answer,  Perry  took  his  leave. 

The  American  squadron  wintered  at  Hongkong,  but 
Perry  heard  rumors  of  the  strange  activity  of  French  and 
Russian  ships  in  the  vicinity;  and,  fearing  that  they  might 

123 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR   NAVY 

get  ahead  of  him,  he  returned  to  Japan  in  February,  1854. 
This  time  he  anchored  within  twenty  miles  of  Yedo.  The 
Japanese  told  him  to  return  to  Uraga  to  transact  business, 
but  Perry's  answer  was  to  move  on  till  he  came  within 
sight  of  Ycdo  itself,  the  sacred  city.  After  this  the  Jap 
anese  agreed  that  the  negotiations  should  be  opened  at 
Yokahama,  about  opposite  where  the  squadron  lay,  and 
the  palaver  began. 

Three  weeks  of  talk  followed;  but,  while  the  Japanese 
officials  said  they  wanted  friendship  with  America,  for  a 
long  while  they  would  grant  nothing.  After  some  delay 
Perry  decided  to  try  what  gifts  would  do.  The  Americans 
had  brought  along  a  curious  lot  of  odds  and  ends  as  presents 
to  impress  the  Japanese  people.  There  were  farming- tools, 
clocks,  telegraph  instruments,  three  life-boats,  and  a  minia 
ture  railway.  The  last  made  a  great  hit.  The  cab  of  the 
engine  was  about  big  enough  for  a  six-year-old  child  to  crawl 
into,  and  the  cars  were  in  the  same  proportion.  The  train 
was  made  to  whirl  around  a  circular  track  at  the  rate  of 
twenty  miles  an  hour,  and  the  dignified  Japanese  officials 
got  astride  of  the  roofs  of  the  cars  and  made  acnerry-go- 
round  of  the  train.  It  must  have  been  hard  for  the 
Americans  to  keep  their  faces  straight  as  they  saw  these 
stately  officials  whirling  aldng,  with  their  feet  sticking  out 
in  front,  their  robes  flying  in  the  wind,  hanging  on  for  dear 
life,  but  grinning  like  Cheshire  cats  with  the  fun  of  the  ride. 
When  Sunday  came  around  Perry  mystified  the  Japanese 
by  his  solemn  observance  of  "Lord's  Day"  and  the  sound 
of  the  "Doxology"  as  roared  out  across  the  water  by  lusty 
American  tars.  Shortly  afterward  seventy  Japanese  were 
entertained  on  board  one  of  the  ships,  and,  as  usual,  the 
Christian  foreigner  brought  the  white  man's  rum  as  well  as 
his  religion.  The  Japanese  officials  were  soon  made  very 
happy  and  very  noisy  under  the  influence  of  huge  quanti 
ties  of  champagne,  punch,  and  Madeira. 

Finally  the  Japanese  yielded.  On  March  31,  1854, 
Commodore  Perry  and  the  four  Japanese  representatives 

124 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

of  the  Mikado  signed  a  treaty  written  in  three  languages — 
English,  Dutch,  and  Chinese.  The  terms  of  this  treaty 
provided  for  help  and  protection  for  shipwrecked  American 
sailors,  permission  for  ships  in  distress  to  enter  any  Japanese 
harbor,  and  the  opening  of  the  ports  Simoda  and  Hakodadi, 
where  the  Americans  could  get  wood,  coal,  and  water  and 
trade  with  the  Japanese.  Further  privileges  were  added  by 
the  treaties  of  1857  and  1858. 

The  Americans  did  not  enjoy  their  special  advantage  long, 
for  that  very  year  England  and,  later,  Russia  and  Holland, 
obtained  equal  privileges.  But  the  honor  of  opening  to 
the  world  the  "Hermit  Nation"  could  not  be  taken  away 
from  the  American  commodore. 

There  were  reasons  for  Perry's  success  more  effective 
than  his  steamships,  his  solemn  pomp,  his  miniature  rail 
way,  or  his  champagne.  At  that  time  the  Japanese 
government  was  threatened  with  revolution,  and  it  felt 
unable  to  bring  a  united  resistance  against  any  outside 
force  whatever.  Of  this  Perry  knew  nothing  at  the  time. 

In  the  second  place,  there  was  a  Japanese  who,  as  a  lad 
of  fifteen,  had  been  rescued  from  shipwreck  by  a  New 
England  skipper.  The  latter  carried  the  boy  back  to 
Massachusetts  and  gave  him  a  good  education  at  his  own 
expense.  In  1849  the  exile  returned  to  Japan,  where  at 
first  he  was  imprisoned  as  a  foreigner  and  got  his  release 
only  after  translating  Bowditch's  Navigator  into  Japanese. 

This  young  man  wrote  the  reply  in  English  to  Perry's 
letter,  and  during  the  negotiations  he  was  kept  hidden 
within  hearing  of  the  American  officers,  to  discover  from 
their  conversation  what  their  real  intentions  were  toward 
Japan.  His  assurances  that  the  Americans  were  genuinely 
friendly  and  honorable  in  their  purpose  did  more  than 
anything  else  to  persuade  the  Japanese  government  to 
grant  a  treaty. 

The  year  1858,  when  the  final  treaty  with  Japan  was 
ratified,  brings  us  very  close  to  the  Civil  War.  At  this 
point  let  us  look  back  and  see  how  the  navy  had  fared  dur- 

126 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

ing  the  years  of  peace.  In  the  early  days  we  saw  that 
Congressmen  used  to  make  speeches  against  the  navy  on 
account  of  its  " dangerous  menace  to  liberty."  Just  before 
war  broke  out  with  England  in  1812  a  Congressman  actually 
got  up  and  made  a  motion  that  the  navy  be  abolished. 

After  that  war  the  politicians  changed  their  tune.  The 
navy  had  become  very  popular  through  its  victories,  and 
the  country  would  not  hear  of  doing  away  with  it.  But, 
unfortunately,  it  was  discovered  that  the  navy  could  be 
used  in  the  game  of  politics,  and  it  is  a  sad  day  for  any 
branch  of  the  government  when  it  becomes  a  grab-bag  for 
politicians. 

Of  course,  commissions  in  the  navy  had  always  been  a 
matter  of  a  politician's  favor,  but  now  ''graft"  set  its  dirty 
fingers  on  the  ships  as  well.  Whenever  a  Congressman  of  the 
party  in  power  needed  to  make  himself  popular  with  the 
voters  in  his  home  port  he  would  work  till  he  got  an 
appropriation  for  building  or  repairing  a  ship  there.  Then 
the  contract  would  be  turned  over  to  another  grafter, 
and  the  money  would  be  nearly  all  wasted. 

The  frigates  built  by  Humphreys  in  1797  were  the  best 
of  their  class  in  the  world;  but  the  ships  built  after  the 
War  of  1812  were  perhaps  the  worst.  One  commodore 
reported  that  in  his  squadron  he  had  scarcely  a  single  ship 
that  could  make  over  five  knots  an  hour!  Some  ships 
dragged  along  for  years  in  the  building,  and  then,  after  a 
fortune  had  been  wasted  on  them,  they  proved  to  be 
worthless.  Such  a  ship  was  the  frigate  Santee,  which  was 
thirty-six  years  getting  built.  Every  time  a  fresh  appro 
priation  was  made  for  her  the  workmen  had  to  take  out 
much  of  the  old  work  because  the  timbers  had  rotted  from 
exposure.  Then  at  the  end  it  was  found  that  she  was 
top-heavy  and  not  fit  for  anything  but  transport  duty. 
And  yet  in  those  days  we  built  the  fastest  and  finest  mer 
chant  ships  in  the  world! 

A  worse  abuse  was  the  matter  of  "repairs."  Ships  would 
be  ordered  to  a  navy-yard  at  the  request  of  a  politician, 

127 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 


and  then  a  bill  of  repairs  would  be  paid  by  Uncle  Sam 
which  was  often  considerably  more  than  the  cost  of  building 
a  new  ship.  The  sloop  St.  Louis,  which  cost  $75,000  to 
build,  was  ''repaired"  once  in  this  fashion,  and  the  bill 
was  nearly  $120,000.  The  little  Shark, 
which  cost  $9,000,  was  repaired  for  the 
moderate  sum  of  $27,000.  The  frigate 
United  States,  after  having  $80,000  spent 
on  her  in  repairs,  had  scarcely  gone  to 
sea  when  the  carpenter  found  the  tim 
bers  so  rotten  that  she  had  to  turn  about 
and  retire  to  New  York,  where  she  was 
condemned.  Some  ships  sent  in  a  big 
bill  for  "repairs"  before  they  were  even 
launched ! 

With  the  officers  matters  were  not 
much  better.  There  was  no  grade  in  the 
navy  above  captain,  though  a  captain  in 
command  of  a  squadron  was  called  a 
"commodore"  by  courtesy.  The  result 
was  a  large  number  of  captains,  with 
very  slow  promotion  for  the  officers  be 
low.  These  captains  were  allowed  abso 
lute  power,  and  very  little  was  asked  of 
them  except  to  keep  their  ships  off  the 
rocks.  They  bullied  and  insulted  the  younger  officers  and 
did  exactly  as  they  liked.  Many  of  them  were  in  liquor 
during  the  greater  part  of  a  cruise,  and  courts-martial  had 
no  terrors  for  a  man  of  captain  rank. 

There  are  many  amusing  instances  of  the  power  of 
these  fierce  old  martinets.  In  the  thirties  it  was  the  fashion 
to  wear  long  and  luxuriant  whiskers,  and  young  men  spent 
loving  hours  curling,  oiling,  and  perfuming  these  manly 
charms.  A  stern  old  commodore,  who  did  not  like  the 
hairy  style,  issued  the  following  cruel  order  as  soon  as  he 
took  command,  "All  officers  in  this  squadron  will  shave 
off  their  whiskers  at  once."  And  they  had  to  obey! 

128 


CAPTAIN   OF    THE 

FIFTIES  IN  FULL 

DRESS 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 


Another  captain  was  on  duty  off  the  coast  of  Africa, 
watching  for  slavers,  when  the  rumor  came  that  war  was 
likely  to  break  out  with  Spain  over  Cuba.  Thinking  that 
there  would  be  a  fine  chance  for  prize-money  in  Cuban 
waters,  he  sailed  back  across  the  Atlantic,  only  to  find  that 
there  was  no  war  at  all.  Of  course  he  had  to  be  court- 
martialed  for  leaving  his  station  without  orders.  The  court 
found  him  guilty  and  sentenced  him  to  "present  this 
court  with  a  bottle  of  good  whisky." 

At  the  opposite  end  of  the  line  the  case  was  even  worse 
with  the  midshipmen.  There  was  practically  no  education 
for  them,  so  that  when  they  became  captains  they  were 
almost  as  ignorant  as  the  enlisted  men.  There  was  such 
slow  promotion  that  in  the  forties  young 
men  were  still  midshipmen  at  twenty-five, 
an  age  when  Stephen  Decatur  was  captain 
of  a  frigate.  It  got  to  be  a  habit,  too,  to 
treat  the  navy  as  a  sort  of  reform-school, 
and  boys  were  given  commissions  as  mid 
shipmen  because  they  made  too  much  trou 
ble  at  home. 

A  good  case  of  this  sort  was  Midshipman 
Philip  Spencer,  the  son  of  the  Secretary  of 
War.  He  had  been  dismissed  from  college, 
and  had  already  been  ousted  from  the  navy 
for  his  "  disgraceful  and  scandalous  con 
duct,"  but  his  father's  influence  put  him 
back  again.  At  last  he  was  caught  plotting 
to  kill  all  the  officers  of  the  brig  he  was 
serving  on  and  turn  pirate.  He  finally 
confessed  his  guilt,  and  with  two  other  con 
spirators  from  the  crew  was  hanged  at  the  MIDSHIPMAN  OF 
yard-arm.  This  occurred  in  1842.  THE  FIFTIES  IN 

The    execution    of    a    midshipman,    the       FULL  DRESS 
son  of   a   powerful  politician,  aroused  the 
greatest  excitement  throughout  the    country  and  helped 
a  project  that  had  been  urged  for  a  long  while — namely, 

129 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 


the  formation  of  a  naval  school.  The  country  began 
to  feel  that  it  wanted  some  one  better  than  a  mere 
scapegrace  to  wear  its  uniform.  The  growing  importance 
of  steam  meant  that  a  new  science  had  to  be  mas 
tered  by  naval  officers  which 
could  not  be  picked  up,  like 
seamanship,  by  a  few  cruises. 
Gunnery  was  getting  to  be 
more  of  a  science,  too,  and 
both  these  things  demanded 
careful  study  at  a  profession 
al  school.  In  March,  1845, 
George  Bancroft,  the  histo 
rian,  accepted  the  position  of 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  with  the 
understanding  that  he  might 
go  ahead  with  the  founding 
of  a  naval  school.  The  old- 
timers  sneered  at  the  idea  of 
"teaching  sailors  ashore,"  but 
Bancroft  went  about  his  work 
with  great  tact  and  succeeded 
in  making  a  start  in  a  little 
army  post  at  Annapolis.  It 

was  a  small  beginning,  but  there  were  some  splendid  teach 
ers  selected  for  the  work,  and  the  school  quickly  won  the 
favor  of  the  entire  navy.  The  birth  of  the  Naval  Academy 
attracted  little  notice  at  the  time,  but  in  its  influence  on 
the  service  it  was  really  the  most  important  event  between 
1815  and  1861. 


MIDSHIPMAN    OF    THE    FIFTIES 
IN    SERVICE    DRESS 


XI 

THE    BEGINNING    OF    THE    CIVIL    WAR,    THE    IRONCLADS 

Three  lines  of  operation  for  the  Union  navy — Capture  of  Port  Royal 
— Surrender  of  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard — Changes  in  ships  since 
1812;  steam,  guns,  armor — Ironclads — Construction  of  the  Merri- 
mac — Destruction  of  Union  ships  in  Hampton  Roads — The  Monitor 
— Battle  between  ironclads. 

FOR  many  years  North  and  South  had  been  growing 
apart  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  During  this  time  the 
South  had  won  all  the  battles  on  the  question  in  Congress; 
but  some  of  them,  like  the  fugitive-slave  law,  had  been 
costly  victories  because  they  had  awakened  a  strong  anti- 
slavery  sentiment  in  the  North.  Toward  the  last  there 
was  much  talk  about  the  "constitutionality  of  secession" 
and  "the  rights  of  sovereign  states,"  but  at  the  bottom  of  it 
all  lay  the  institution  of  slavery.  On  this  subject  both 
sections  developed  an  intense  spirit  in  the  course  of  one 
generation.  In  the  North  about  1820  there  was  little  or 
no  abolition  sentiment,  but  by  1855  it  was  uppermost. 
In  the  South  about  1820  there  were  many  who  were  op 
posed  to  slavery,  and  there  were  even  societies  in  the  South 
for  freeing  the  slaves,  but  by  1855  Southerners  were  united 
not  only  in  defending  slavery  as  a  "God-given  institution," 
but  also  in  demanding  that  it  be  extended  and  strengthened 
by  act  of  Congress.  Then,  when  the  new  Republican  party 
won  the  election  of  1860  on  a  platform  that  opposed  the 
further  extension  of  slavery,  the  "fire-eaters"  of  the 
slavery  party  determined  to  get  out  of  the  Union.  The 
North  did  not  want  war  or  disunion,  and  for  the  sake  of 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

peace  tried  all  sorts  of  ways  to  meet  the  cotton  states  half 
way,  but  it  failed.  As  the  North  yielded  the  South  only 
became  more  pugnacious,  and  on  December  20,  1860,  South 
Carolina  led  the  way  by  seceding  from  the  Union. 

In  1832  Andrew  Jackson  had  stamped  out  the  spark  of 
secession  in  that  state  by  sending  the  Constitution  to 
Charleston  with  loaded  guns.  Another  Democrat  was  Pres 
ident  in  1860,  but  a  man  of  a  very  different  sort.  His 
lifelong  friends  and  many  of  his  Cabinet  were  of  the 
secession  party  and,  though  a  Union  man  himself,  he  did 
not  know  what  to  do.  So  he  did  nothing  at  all.  Six 
other  states  followed  the  example  of  South  Carolina 
undisturbed,  and  when  Lincoln  became  President  he  had 
to  face  the  greatest  crisis  in  the  history  of  the  country. 
A  large  part  of  the  South  had  already  formed  a  separate 
government,  and  four  other  slave  states  needed  only 
Lincoln's  call  to  arms,  after  the  firing  on  Sumter,  to  join 
the  Confederacy. 

In  the  previous  chapter  we  noted  the  slimy  trail  of  the 
politician  through  the  history  of  the  navy  between  1815  and 
1 86 1.  When  the  Civil  War  began  there  were  in  service 
forty-two  vessels  of  all  sizes  from  a  tug  to  a  ship  of  the 
line — but  only  twenty-three  of  these  were  propelled  by 
steam  and  fit  to  be  considered.  Of  the  "Home  Squadron" 
only  four  were  in  American  waters.  The  rest  were  scat 
tered  everywhere.  This  fact  was  partly  due  to  the  thought- 
fulness  of  Mr.  Toucey,  President  Buchanan's  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  who,  though  a  native  of  Connecticut,  was  a 
strong  secessionist,  and  did  not  want  the  Southern  states  to 
be  embarrassed  by  United  States  war- vessels.  One-fifth  of 
all  the  naval  officers  immediately  resigned  and  joined  the 
Confederacy,  but  those  who  commanded  ships  in  foreign 
waters  brought  them  back  to  the  federal  government,  as 
a  point  of  honor,  before  they  resigned. 

As  soon  as  war  began  the  Navy  Department  made  plans 
for  a  naval  campaign,  and  shipyards  and  foundries  were  set 
to  working  day  and  night.  The  work  of  the  navy  was 

132 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

divided  into  three  general  plans:  first,  to  blockade  the 
Southern  coast;  secondly,  to  open  the  Mississippi  and 
capture  Confederate  ports;  thirdly,  to  hunt  down  Con 
federate  cruisers  and  privateers. 

The  first  of  these,  the  blockade,  would  have  been  hard 
for  a  navy  many  times  the  size  of  the  Union  fleet  in  1861, 
for  the  coast  line  to  be  guarded  was  3,549  miles  long.  But 
after  getting  control  of  the  Potomac  the  government  began 
stringing  out  the  ships  down  the  coast,  and  adding  to  them 
as  fast  as  possible.  At  first  the  blockade  was  a  good  deal  of 
a  joke  to  the  Confederates,  but  in  three  years  it  had  grown 
so  powerful  that  blockade-running  became  very  dangerous, 
and  in  the  end,  as  we  shall  sec,  the  blockade  crushed  the 
Confederacy. 

A  good  stroke  at  the  beginning  was  the  capture  of  Port 
Royal,  South  Carolina,  by  Captain  DuPont.  This  was  the 
finest  harbor  on  the  Southern  coast.  Besides  his  vessels 
of  war  DuPont  took  with  him  army  transports  with  nearly 
thirteen  thousand  troops  under  General  Sherman.  Off 
Hatteras  the  expedition  was  struck  by  a  violent  gale.  Two 
of  the  transports  were  sunk,  and  the  men  were  rescued 
only  with  the  greatest  difficulty.  Another  vessel  had  to 
throw  all  her  cannon  overboard  to  keep  from  sinking. 

On  November  4,  1861,  DuPont  arrived  with  his  storm- 
beaten  squadron  off  Port  Royal.  He  had  to  spend  some 
time  in  getting  the  channel  surveyed  and  marked,  for  the 
Confederates  had  removed  the  buoys.  In  fact,  the  Con 
federate  government  had  known  all  about  the  intended 
attack  on  Port  Royal  before  most  of  the  officers  in  the 
Union  fleet.  This  was  true  of  most  of  the  Union  plans, 
for  throughout  the  war  there  were  some  very  bad  leaks 
leading  from  Washington  to  Richmond. 

At  eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  November  7th  DuPont 
got  under  way  in  two  columns  to  attack  the  Confederate 
fortifications.  These  were  two  strong  forts  on  opposite 
sides  of  the  bay,  about  two  and  a  half  miles  apart,  Fort 
Beauregard  on  Bay  Point  to  the  north  and  Fort  Walker 

133 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 


on  Hilton  Head  to  the  south.  DuPont  decided  not  to  use 
the  troops  at  all  because  many  of  the  boats  needed  for  land 
ing  them  had  been  carried  away  by  the  gale. 

The  previous  afternoon  DuPont  had  called  his  captains 
together  on  the  W abash  and  explained  his  plan.  This  was 
very  skilfully  thought  out,  and  the  fleet  carried  it  through 
like  a  well-oiled  machine.  The  flag-ship  W  abash  led  the 
way  at  the  head  of  a  column  of  ten  steamships,  about 

midway  between  the  two 
forts.  On  his  right  steamed 
a  parallel  line  of  five  gun 
boats.  As  soon  as  the  Union 
ships  came  within  range  they 
received  and  returned  the  fire 
of  both  forts.  Steadily  the 
main  line  steamed  on  for 
about  two  and  a  half  miles 
into  the  harbor,  then  the  Wa- 
bash  turned  to  the  south  and 
led  the  line  slowly  back,  about 
eight  hundred  yards  distant 
from  Fort  Walker.  The  gun 
boats  protected  this  turning 
movement  from  a  little  Con 
federate  flotilla  of  four  gun 
boats,  which  they  drove  up  a 

creek.  Again  the  Wabash  swung  round  and  passed  between 
the  forts,  returning  as  before,  only  this  second  time  coming 
to  within  six  hundred  yards  of  Fort  Walker.  By  the  time 
DuPont  was  ready  for  another  ''circle  of  fire"  the  Confed 
erate  forts  were  silent  and  deserted. 

The  victory  had  been  surprisingly  easy.  The  Union 
losses  in  the  whole  fleet  were  only  eight  killed  and  twenty- 
three  wounded,  and  hardly  a  single  ship  was  seriously 
hurt.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Confederate  fortifications 
had  been  torn  to  pieces.  The  credit  is  due  to  Captain 
DuPont  for  his  plan  of  attack.  In  the  first  place,  he  made 

134 


CAPTURE  OF  PORT  ROYAL  FORTS 


1 ! 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

his  ships  a  moving  rather  than  a  standing  target ;  secondly, 
he  shifted  his  distance  each  time  round  so  that  the  gunners 
of  the  fort  had  to  find  the  range  all  over  again ;  thirdly,  he 
got  at  the  forts  from  inside  the  harbor,  where  the  Con 
federates  had  not  expected  an  attack.  The  forts  were 
very  weak  on  this  side,  and  the  cross-fire  that  DuPont's 
line  of  battle  kept  up  from  the  land  side  and  the  front  at 
the  same  time  was  too  much  for  the  gunners  of  the  forts  to 
stand. 

This  victory  was  of  great  value  because  it  gave  the 
blockading  fleet  a  good  base  to  work  from,  right  in  the 
heart  of  the  Confederacy. 

Most  of  the  heavy  guns  the  Confederates  had  mounted 
at  Port  Royal  had  come  from  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard. 
The  capture  of  that  yard  was  the  greatest  disaster  the 
navy  suffered  in  the  war,  and  it  was  due  to  the  blunders 
of  some  well-meaning  but  incompetent  naval  officers.  At 
the  time  Virginia  was  on  the  point  of  secession  the  com 
mandant,  Commodore  McCauley,  did  not  know  whether 
to  send  the  ships  out  of  the  yard  or  not.  He  changed  his 
mind  several  times.  Then  toward  the  last  he  scuttled 
four  vessels,  including  the  new  steam-frigate  Merrimac. 
At  that  time  Commodore  Paulding  was  coming  with  a 
thousand  soldiers  to  protect  the  yard,  and  against  the  tri 
fling  force  the  Confederates  had  mustered  Paulding  could 
easily  have  done  so.  But  he  got  panicky,  too,  and  he  had 
scarcely  arrived  when  he  began  trying  to  destroy  every 
thing  in  the  yard  preparatory  to  running  off  and  leav 
ing  it. 

But  little  was  really  destroyed.  As  soon  as  the  frightened 
officers  were  gone  with  their  forces  the  Confederates  rushed 
into  the  yard  and  saved  almost  everything  of  value.  By 
this  stupid  performance  of  McCauley  and  Paulding  the 
Union  lost  ten  ships,  besides  one  that  was  half  built,  and 
nearly  3,000  cannon,  300  of  them  being  heavy  guns  of  the 
most  modern  type,  the  "  Dahlgrens."  The  capture  of  these 
guns  was  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the  Confederacy, 

136 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

for  the  Southerners  had  no  gun-factories  and  it  would  have 
taken  some  time  to  import  cannon  from  Europe. 

At  the  Pensacola  Navy  Yard  in  Florida  another  spineless 
officer  had  surrendered  without  a  blow,  so  that  the  Con 
federacy  got  a  good  many  cannon  from  there,  too. 

One  of  the  vessels  scuttled  and  set  on  fire  at  Norfolk  was 
the  Merrimac.  The  Confederates  had  tried  to  buy  an  iron 
clad  ship,  but,  failing  in  this,  decided  to  raise  the  Merrimac 
and  use  her  for  the  purpose.  At  this  point  let  us  stop  a 
moment  to  consider  how  ships  had  developed  since  the 
War  of  1812. 

The  great  change,  of  course,  was  steam.  But  there  was 
so  much  dislike  among  the  older  officers  to  the  "kettle- 
boiling"  type  of  ship  that  steam  made  slow  headway. 
This  seems  strange  when  we  remember  that  our  navy 
was  the  first  to  build  a  steamship,  the  Fulton,  launched  as 
early  as  1814.  A  real  objection  to  steam  was  the  fact  that 
the  big  side-wheels  of  the  earlier  steamers  could  be  so 
easily  smashed  by  cannon-shot.  But  after  Ericsson  had 
invented  the  screw-propeller,  which  lay  safe  under  water,  the 
far-sighted  officers  saw  that  there  was  no  further  use  for 
the  sailing-ship.  The  United  States  navy  had  the  first 
screw-propeller  man-of-war,  too,  the  Princeton,  launched  in 
1843 ;  and  the  newer  ships  like  the  Merrimac,  the  Hartford, 
and  the  Wabash  were  built  with  screw-propellers.  Yet  even 
then  steam  was  not  trusted  to  act  alone,  and  these  steamers 
were  all  rigged  with  a  complete  outfit  of  sails.  And  more 
than  half  of  the  American  fleet  still  depended  on  sails 
entirely. 

Another  and  newer  idea  was  armor.  Cannon  had  been 
very  much  improved  since  1815,  especially  with  the  inven 
tion  of  the  rifled  gun;  and  naval  men,  the  world  over, 
began  looking  about  for  some  means  of  protecting  a  ship 
against  these  heavy  guns.  During  the  Crimean  War  in 
1855  the  French  sent  three  floating  batteries  to  attack  a 
fort.  These  batteries  were  coated  with  four  inches  of  iron, 
and,  though  they  got  a  fearful  pounding  from  the  fort, 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

they  were  not  hurt  at  all.  This  fact  aroused  much  interest; 
but,  while  naval  constructors  were  talking  about  the  use 
of  armor  in  1860,  as  yet  there  was  no  ironclad  in  the  Amer 
ican  navy. 

As  soon  as  the  war  broke  out  the  Confederates  organized 
a  board  to  draw  up  plans  for  an  armored  ship,  and  the 
capture  of  the  Norfolk  Yard  gave  them  the  material  they 
needed.  The  Merrimac  was  raised  and  put  in  dry  dock. 


THE    STEAM-FRIGATE    "  MERRIMAC  "    IN    i860 

Her  hull  was  sound,  for  she  had  sunk  before  the  flames 
had  got  very  far.  Then  the  Confederates  went  to  work 
transferring  her  into  a  ship  the  like  of  which  had  never  been 
seen  before.  A  casemate  was  built  on  her  deck  with  slanting 
sides  and  covered  on  the  top  with  an  iron  grating.  These 
sides  had  a  thickness  of  twenty-two  inches  of  timber  over 
laid  with  four  inches  of  iron.  The  ends  of  the  deck,  not  cov 
ered  by  the  casemate,  were  supposed  to  be  under  water,  and 
propeller  and  rudder  were  shielded  by  a  heavy  ''fan-tail." 
In  the  bow  was  a  heavy  cast-iron  beak  for  ramming.  Ten 
guns  were  mounted  on  her,  two  of  them  rifled  pivot-guns, 
one  at  each  end.  The  reconstructed  Merrimac  was  renamed 
the  Virginia;  but,  as  she  is  far  better  known  by  her  olcj 
name,  we  shall  stick  to  that. 

138 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

About  noon  of  March  8,  1862,  she  steamed  down  the 
Elizabeth  River  with  some  of  the  men  still  putting  the 
finishing  touches  to  her.  The  Norfolk  people  thought  that 
she  was  simply  going  to  make  a  short  trial  spin  to  turn 
over  her  engines.  But  two  small  gunboats  joined  her,  and 
she  steamed  out  of  the  river  directly  toward  the  two 
Union  ships  near  the  opposite  shore  of  Hampton  Roads,  off 
Newport  News.  These  were  the  sloop  Cumberland,  of 
twenty-four  guns,  and  the  frigate  Congress,  of  fifty.  The 
two  ships  hurriedly  cleared  for  action  on  the  appearance 
of  the  strange  monster  steaming  toward  them,  flying  the 
Stars  and  Bars.  The  Union  officers  had  heard  of  the  build 
ing  of  an  ironclad  in  Norfolk,  but  they  had  not  expected 
anything  like  this.  It  looked  more  like  a  floating  barn 
than  a  ship. 

On  she  came  slowly,  for  she  was  very  heavy  and  her 
engines  had  been  condemned  as  worn  out  the  year  before. 
The  men  of  the  Cumberland  and  the  Congress  had  plenty 
of  time  to  make  ready  for  battle,  but,  as  there  was  not  a 
breath  of  air  stirring,  neither  of  these  old  sailing-ships  could 
move  an  inch. 

The  Union  guns  opened  fire  on  the  Merrimac  when  she 
was  three-quarters  of  a  mile  distant.  The  heavy  shot 
struck  their  target  fairly,  but  bounced  off  the  sloping 
casemate  like  so  many  peas.  The  Merrimac  did  not  reply 
till  she  came  within  close  range.  Then  a  shell  from  her 
forward  pivot-gun  killed  or  wounded  every  man  in  the 
after  pivot-gun  crew  of  the  Cumberland.  A  moment  later 
she  poured  into  the  Congress  her  starboard  broadside,  which 
ripped  through  the  wooden  sides  of  the  old  frigate  as  if 
they  had  been  paper. 

Leaving  the  Congress  for  the  moment,  the  Merrimac 
rammed  the  Cumberland,  smashing  a  great  hole  beneath 
the  water-line.  As  the  Merrimac  backed  away  her  ram 
broke  off.  All  this  time  the  Union  guns  were  pounding 
harmless  broadsides  at  the  ironclad,  and  the  Confederate 
gunners  were  answering  with  terrible  effect. 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 


The  captain  of  the  Cumberland  was  absent  on  a  court  of 
inquiry,  but  the  vessel  was  nobly  defended  by  Lieutenant 
Morris.  After  the  ramming  the  Cumberland  began  to 
settle  rapidly,  but  Morris  stuck  to  his  guns.  As  the  men 
were  driven  by  the  water  from  the  lower  decks,  they  helped 
to  fight  the  guns  on  the  spar-deck,  and  they  did  not  stop 
firing  till  the  water  was  lapping  about  these  guns  as  well, 
and  that  was  three-quarters  of  an  hour  after  the  Merrimac 
had  rammed.  Then  the  Cumberland  reeled  and  sank,  but 
as  she  settled  on  the  shallow  bottom  her  masts  stood  out 
of  water;  and  when  her  captain  came  galloping  back  from 
Fortress  Monroe  at  the  sound  of  the  firing  he  found  his 

ship  done  for,  but 
he  saw  the  old  flag 
still  flying  from  her 
masthead. 

Not  a  shot  from 
the  Cumberlandhad 
penetrated  the  ar 
mor  of  the  Merri 
mac.  But  the  fir 
ing  had  not  been 
wholly  wasted,  for 
the  Merrimac 's 
smoke  -  stack  had 
been  badly  riddled 
and  the  muzzles  of 
two  of  her  guns 
were  smashed  by 
solid  shot.  The 
ramming,  too,  had 
cost  the  Merrimac 

her  beak,  twisted  her  bow,  and  made  a  leak  that  gave  her 
trouble  afterward. 

Having  settled  the  Cumberland,  the  Merrimac  turned 
slowly — she  was  hopelessly  clumsy — and  headed  for  the 
Congress.  The  commander  of  the  Merrimac  was  Captain 

140 


HAMPTON    ROADS 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

Buchanan,  who  had  been  the  first  superintendent  at  the 
Naval  Academy,  and  previous  to  the  war  had  been  com 
mandant  of  the  Washington  Navy  Yard.  He  was  a 
Marylander,  and  the  tragic  way  in  which  the  families 
of  the  border  states  were  divided  by  the  war  is  shown  by  the 
fact  that  as  Buchanan  turned  his  great  guns  on  the  Congress 
he  knew  that  on  her  decks  stood  his  favorite  brother. 

To  avoid  being  rammed  the  commander  of  the  Congress 
made  sail,  and  with  the  help  of  a  tug  ran  in  under  the 
Union  batteries  of  Newport  News.  But  the  frigate  soon 
went  aground  and  stuck.  The  Merrimac  then  chose  an 
easy  raking  position  and  riddled  her  without  mercy,  while 
the  Congress  had  only  two  stern  guns  that  could  be  used 
against  the  Merrimac.  Soon  both  were  disabled,  leaving 
the  frigate  perfectly  helpless. 

Meanwhile,  the  rest  of  the  Union  squadron — two  steam 
ships  and  a  frigate — had  left  their  anchorage  off  Fortress 
Monroe  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  Cumberland  and 
the  Congress.  All  these  ran  aground  before  they  could 
reach  the  scene.  The  commander  of  the  Congress,  Lieut. 
Joseph  Smith,  had  been  killed  early  in  the  action,  and  when 
Lieutenant  Prendergast,  the  second  in  command,  saw  that 
the  other  Union  vessels  were  powerless  to  help  him,  he 
hauled  down  his  flag. 

But  when  one  of  the  small  gunooats  came  alongside  to 
take  off  the  prisoners  she  met  such  a  hot  fire  from  the  shore 
batteries  that  she  had  to  retreat.  Captain  Buchanan  was 
very  indignant,  because  he  thought  that  some  of  the 
firing  came  from  the  surrendered  Congress,  and,  snatching 
a  musket  from  one  of  his  men,  he  climbed  out  on  the 
casemate  to  fire  at  what  he  called  the  "treacherous  Yan 
kees."  A  sharp-shooter  from  the  battery  promptly  put  a 
bullet  through  Buchanan's  thigh-bone,  and  he  had  to  yield 
the  command  of  the  Merrimac  to  his  lieutenant,  Catesby 
Jones. 

Finding  that  they  could  not  take  possession  of  the  Con 
gress,  the  Confederates  set  fire  to  her  with  red-hot  shot. 
10  141 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

The  old  frigate  continued  to  burn  far  into  the  night,  and 
finally  blew  up.  About  half  past  six  the  tide  had  dropped 
so  much  that  the  pilots  of  the  Merrimac  insisted  that  unless 
the  ironclad  returned  to  deep  water  she  would  stick  in  the 
mud  all  night.  So,  leaving  the  other  helpless  Union  ships  to 
be  destroyed  the  next  morning,  the  victorious  Merrimac 
steamed  back  to  Se well's  Point  to  anchor  for  the  night. 

It  had  been  an  overwhelming  victory  for  the  South,  and 
the  news  spread  like  wildfire  in  all  direction.  The  Mer 
rimac  had  destroyed  two  wooden  ships  and  in  turn  had 
scarcely  a  dent  in  her  armor.  In  contrast  to  the  terrible 
loss  of  life  on  the  Union  ships  the  Confederates  had  lost 
only  two  killed.  Nothing  but  the  dropping  of  the  tide  had 
saved  the  rest  of  the  Union  fleet  from  destruction  that 
evening,  and  their  doom  was  only  postponed  till  the  next 
morning.  The  South,  on  hearing  the  news  of  the  day's 
fighting,  believed  that  nothing  could  stop  the  Merrimac 
from  going  up  the  Potomac  and  shelling  Washington  and 
then  breaking  the  Union  blockade.  Joyous  Confederate 
newspapers  prophesied  that  the  Merrimac  would  end  the 
war  at  once.  Not  only  would  she  have  Washington  help 
less  under  her  guns,  but  she  would  put  New  York  under 
ransom  as  well.  Then  all  Europe  would  recognize  the 
independence  of  the  Confederacy.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
with  her  weak  engines  the  Merrimac  could  not  have  lasted 
half  an  hour  in  an  ordinary  seaway,  but  nobody  realized 
that  at  the  time. 

All  these  predictions  were  gloomily  believed  by  the 
friends  of  the  Union,  too.  The  next  morning,  when  a 
Cabinet  meeting  was  hurriedly  called  in  Washington,  no 
one  had  a  single  hopeful  word.  The  cause  of  the  North 
seemed  doomed  by  the  sudden  appearance  of  this  invincible 
ironclad. 

But  that  very  night  a  still  stranger-looking  ship  might 
have  been  seen  by  the  glare  of  the  blazing  Congress.  It 
was  Ericsson's  Monitor,  which  had  come  on  the  scene  in  the 
nick  of  time,  like  the  hero  of  a  melodrama.  This  queer 

142 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

craft,  though  so  different  from  the  Merrimac,  was  quite  as 
ingenious  and  novel.  Her  inventor,  John  Ericsson,  had 
designed  her  for  the  shallow  rivers  and  bays  of  the  Southern 
states.  She  drew  only  ten  and  one-half  feet,  her  armored 
deck  was  only  two  feet  above  the  water-line,  offering  no 
target  to  the  enemy,  and  her  revolving-turret  gave  her  the 
power  of  firing  in  any  direction  without  turning  the  ship 
itself.  This  iron  turret  was  nine  feet  in  height,  twenty 
feet  in  diameter,  and  eight  inches  thick.  Two  eleven- 
inch  guns,  pointing  in  the  same  direction,  formed  her 
armament.  This  design  had  been  submitted  to  the  French 
by  Ericsson  some  time  before,  but  they  had  rejected  it. 
And  we  must  take  off  our  hats  to  the  Union  officers  who 
risked  their  reputations  by  approving  it,  because  the  Navy 
Department  was  flooded  with  all  sorts  of  protests  from 
naval  experts  against  building  any  such  "  crazy  con 
traption." 

The  Monitor  was  a  marvelous  invention,  and  well  de 
signed  for  rivers  and  harbors,  but  she  was  not  a  sea-going 
vessel  at  all.  In  the  trip  from  Greenpoint,  Long  Island, 
where  she  had  been  built,  the  little  craft  very  nearly 
foundered.  The  chief  trouble  was  that  in  a  heavy  sea  the 
waves  poured  right  down  smoke-stack  and  blowers,  and 
the  deck -hatches,  being  under  water  practically  all  the 
time,  leaked  badly. 

Lieut.  J.  L.  Worden,  her  commander,  and  every  man  of 
his  crew  had  to  work  their  hardest  all  of  two  days  and  a 
night  to  keep  their  ship  afloat  during  the  storm  they  ran 
into  off  the  coast.  The  following  day  they  reached  Chesa 
peake  Bay,  and  arrived  at  Fortress  Monroe  shortly  after 
the  Merrimac  had  left  the  Roads.  Worden  had  orders  to 
report  at  Washington,  but  after  that  day's  disasters  the 
captain  of  the  Roanoke,  who  was  senior  officer  present,  or 
dered  Worden  to  remain  in  Hampton  Roads  to  protect  the 
wooden  ships  against  the  Merrimac. 

The  officers  and  crew  of  the  Monitor  were  worn  out  with 
their  struggle  against  the  storm,  and  they  had  had  no  sleep 

143 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

the  night  before,  but  for  the  greater  part  of  the  night 
of  the  eighth  they  worked  like  beavers  preparing  their  ves 
sel  for  battle. 

Early  Sunday  morning,  March  9,  1862,  the  Merrimac 
steamed  out  again  into  the  Roads  to  finish  her  work  of 
destruction.  When  still  a  mile  away  she  put  a  shell  into 
the  stranded  Minnesota,  but  before  the  second  shot  could 
be  fired,  out  stepped  the  "cheese-box  on  a  raft "  to  challenge 
the  iron  giant  to  battle. 

The  combat  that  followed  was  one  of  the  strangest  in 
naval  history.  The  two  vessels  passed  and  repassed  each 
other,  the  Merrimac  firing  often,  the  Monitor  replying  only 
every  seven  or  eight  minutes.  The  Confederates  used 
shells,  and  the  Union  gunners  replied  with  solid  shot,  but 
neither  could  penetrate  the  armor  of  the  other. 

Once  the  Monitor  tried  to  disable  the  propeller  of  the 
Merrimac  by  ramming,  although  she  was  not  well  adapted 
for  ramming  because  of  an  anchor-well  in  her  bow.  The 
Monitor  missed  her  aim  by  a  few  feet,  and  the  Merrimac 
tried  to  ram,  but  the  more  nimble  Monitor  received  only 
a  glancing  blow.  This  collision  opened  up  the  leak  in 
the  Merrimac' s  bow,  which  had  only  temporarily  been 
patched  up,  and  gave  trouble  for  the  remainder  of  the  fight. 
Just  as  the  two  ships  came  together  the  Monitor  slammed 
a  solid  i8o-pound  shot  into  the  Merrimac,  which  bent  in 
the  iron  and  timber  and  very  nearly  penetrated  the  case 
mate.  Then  the  two  ships  swung  apart  and  continued 
their  harmless  bombardment  of  each  other. 

After  two  hours  of  battle  the  Monitor's  ammunition  gave 
out,  and  she  had  to  retreat  to  shallow  water  for  the  process 
of  getting  the  shot  up  into  the  turret  from  below.  As  this 
took  fifteen  minutes,  the  Merrimac  began  firing  on  the 
Minnesota.  But  before  the  Merrimac  had  fired  a  third  shell 
the  Monitor  was  back  in  the  ring  again,  and  the  pounding 
of  heavy  shot  against  armored  sides  went  on  as  before. 

Both  ships  had  their  troubles.  The  Merrimac  drew 
twenty-two  feet  of  w^ter  and  was  in  constant  danger  of 

144 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

going  aground.  Her  smoke-stack  had  been  so  badly  dam 
aged  that  she  could  scarcely  keep  any  steam  up,  and  the 
engines  were  bad  to  begin  with.  The  Monitor  had  trouble 
starting  her  turret  and  more  trouble  in  stopping  it,  so  after 
a  few  trials  the  men  fired  their  guns  "on  the  fly."  All  the 
view  the  gunners  had  of  their  enemy  was  through  the  nar 
row  opening  in  the  turret  around  the  muzzle  of  the  gun, 
so  they  simply  pulled  the  lanyard  when  the  dark  casemate 
loomed  through  the  smoke.  One  of  the  worries  of  Lieuten 
ant  Greene,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  turret,  was  that  ho 
might  fire  by  mistake  into  the  Monitor's  own  pilot-house. 
At  the  suggestion  of  the  Monitor's  chief  engineer  all  subse 
quent  vessels  of  this  type  were  built  with  the  pilot-house 
on  top  of  the  turret. 

About  eleven-thirty  Lieutenant  Jones  of  the  Merrimac 
turned  his  guns  on  the  Monitor's  pilot-house  instead  of  the 
turret,  and  a  shell  struck  it  fair,  partly  lifting  the  iron 
roof  and  for  the  time  blinding  Worden,  who  was  peering 
through  the  sight-hole  at  that  moment.  He  gave  the 
order  to  sheer  off,  for  he  was  afraid  the  pilot-house  had 
been  wrecked,  and  the  Monitor  retired  for  fifteen  or  twenty 
minutes  to  shallow  water.  But  after  taking  a  survey  of 
damages  Lieutenant  Greene,  who  was  now  in  command, 
saw  that  the  Monitor  had  received  no  serious  wound. 
Accordingly  he  headed  the  Monitor  again  toward  the  Con 
federate  ram  and  fired  a  few  shots  as  a  challenge  to  renew 
the  battle. 

But  the  Merrimac  was  steaming  back  to  Norfolk  and 
would  not  turn.  The  next  day  Lieutenant  Jones  was  bit 
terly  criticized  by  the  Southern  papers  for  leaving  the  field 
to  the  Monitor,  but  he  explained  that  the  leak  in  his  bow 
was  causing  much  trouble,  and  the  pilots  had  informed  him 
that  unless  he  returned  to  Norfolk  then  he  would  have 
to  spend  the  night  in  the  Roads  on  account  of  the  dropping 
tide. 

So  far  as  any  harm  they  did  to  each  other  is  concerned 
the  Monitor  and  Merrimac  affair  was  a  drawn  battle,  but 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

in  its  results  it  was  an  important  victory  for  the  Union. 
The  Monitor  had  saved  from  destruction  three  Union 
ships,  she  had  prevented  the  Merrimac  from  attacking 
Washington  or  breaking  the  blockade,  and  she  had  re 
stored  hope  and  confidence  in  the  Union  cause.  In  other 
ways  it  was  one  of  the  most  important  battles  in  naval 
history;  for,  taken  in  connection  with  the  Merrimac 's  easy 
victory  of  the  day  before,  it  showed  that  the  wooden  ships 
of  the  old  navies  were  of  no  further  use  and  the  navy  of 
the  future  would  have  to  be  ironclad. 

The  Merrimac  came  out  twice  into  Hampton  Roads 
afterward,  but  did  not  attack  the  Union  fleet.  Her  com 
mander  had  formed  plans  for  destroying  the  Monitor  with 
solid  shot,  but  the  presence  of  each  was  so  important  to 
North  and  South  that  both  vessels  were  held  in  leash  by 
their  governments,  and  there  was  no  second  fight  between 
them.  When  Norfolk  had  to  be  abandoned  the  following 
May,  the  Merrimac  was  burned  at  her  moorings  because  she 
had  no  way  of  escape.  In  December  of  the  same  year  the 
Monitor  went  to  sea  and  again  ran  into  a  storm.  This 
time  she  went  down,  so  both  these  famous  ships  had  very 
brief  lives.  But  the  two  types  lasted  throughout  the  war. 
The  Confederacy  built  "rams"  like  the  Merrimac,  and 
the  Union  built  "monitors."  In  this  ship-building  race 
the  North  had  a  great  advantage  in  ship-yards,  engine- 
works,  rolling-mills,  and  skilled  workmen.  The  South  had 
practically  none  of  these  things,  because  of  its  dependence 
on  slave  labor.  Thus  the  very  cause  the  South  was  fighting 
for  proved  its  greatest  weakness  in  naval  warfare. 


XII 

THE    UPPER   MISSISSIPPI 

Construction  of  the  gunboats — Services  of  Foote — Capture  of  Fort 
Henry — Attack  on  Fort  Donelson — Island  No.  10 — Running  past 
the  batteries — Union  successes  in  the  West. 

IN  this  chapter  we  turn  to  the  second  line  of  operations 
for  the  Union  navy — the  opening  of  the  Mississippi. 
Both  sides  realized  the  importance  of  this  "Father  of 
Waters"  in  the  great  struggle.  If  the  Confederates  could 
keep  the  Mississippi  in  their  hands  they  would  have  the 
commerce  of  the  Northern  central  states  in  their  power, 
they  could  carry  on  a  campaign  against  these  states  by 
the  same  waterway,  and  they  could  get  all  the  food-supplies 
needed  by  the  Confederate  armies  from  the  states  of  Arkan 
sas,  Texas,  and  Louisiana,  which  were  practically  untouched 
by  the  war. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  North  could  get  control  of  the 
river  it  would  split  the  Confederacy  in  two,  cut  off  those 
supplies  from  the  Western  states,  and  by  means  of  all  the 
rivers  that  flow  into  the  Mississippi  could  send  gunboats 
right  into  the  heart  of  Arkansas,  Tennessee,  Alabama, 
Mississippi,  and  Louisiana. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Confederates  worked 
hard  to  fortify  the  river  and  some  of  its  tributaries.  They 
selected  the  best  places  for  defense  and  built  strong  forts 
from  Columbus,  Kentucky,  down  to  New  Orleans.  The 
most  powerful  of  these  was  at  Vicksburg. 

In  order  to  capture  such  forts,  or  even  get  past  them, 
the  Union  needed  a  fleet  of  ironclad  gunboats  drawing 

H7 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

little  water,  but  carrying  heavy  guns.  James  B.  Eads,  the 
famous  engineer,  designed  a  type  to  meet  these  require 
ments,  and  in  August,  1861,  the  government  gave  him  the 
contract  to  build  seven  of  them.  So  these  river  ironclads 
were  being  built  in  the  West  at  the  same  time  that  the 
hammers  were  ringing  on  the  Monitor  and  the  Merrimac 
in  the  East,  and  were  finished  some  months  sooner.  These 
river  gunboats  were  ready  for  duty  in  January,  1862. 

In  size  and  armament  they  were  all  alike.  They  were 
flat-bottomed  boats,  175  feet  long,  drawing  six  feet  of  water, 
and  carrying  thirteen  guns.  They  had  a  casemate  with 
the  forward  end  protected  by  twenty-four  inches  of  oak 
covered  by  two  and  a  half  inches  of  iron.  The  engines 


U.  S.  GUNBOAT   "LEXINGTON,"  A    WOODEN   RIVER-BOAT   MADE   OVER 
FOR   FIGHTING 


were  shielded  by  two  and  a  half  inches  of  iron  alone.  The 
lack  of  armor  was  the  chief  weakness  of  these  boats,  espe 
cially  about  the  pilot-house,  but  more  would  have  meant  a 
deeper  draught.  Just  forward  of  the  stern  was  a  paddle- 
wheel,  which  was  protected  by  the  casemate.  Besides 
these  seven  gunboats  was  a  big  snag-boat,  the  Benton,  which 
was  made  into  an  ironclad,  too,  and  was  larger  and  more 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

powerful  than  the  rest.     These  eight  vessels  formed  the 
main  strength  of  the  "river-fleet." 

A  great  deal  of  the  credit  of  building  these  gunboats 
belongs  to  Capt.  Andrew  H.  Foote,  who  was  detailed 
to  superintend  the  work.  This  was  a  good  deal  like  sending 


THE   "  BENTON,"   THE   MOST   POWERFUL    OF   THE    UNION   GUNBOATS 

Oliver  Perry  to  Lake  Erie  in  the  War  of  1812,  for  Foote  was 
a  "blue- water"  sailor,  and  river  work  was  not  much  to  his 
taste.  Where  Perry  had  troubles  in  lack  of  supplies  Foote 
was  annoyed  by  the  frequent  meddling  of  army  officers. 
The  river-fleet  was  put  under  the  War  Department,  and 
wise  brigadier-generals  who  didn't  know  one  end  of  a  boat 
from  another  wanted  to  show  Foote  just  how  these  boats 
ought  to  be  made.  And  sometimes,  even  in  St.  Louis, 
Captain  Foote  found  himself  short  of  materials  that  he 
needed.  At  other  times  he  had  difficulty  in  getting  the 
money  that  the  government  owed  for  the  work  already 
done.  There  always  was  a  good  deal  of  "red  tape"  to  be 
untangled  at  every  step,  but  Foote  went  ahead  in  spite 
of  everything  and  got  his  fleet  ready.  This  work  he  rightly 
considered  the  most  important  of  his  career,  but,  like 

149 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

Perry's  building  a  flotilla  on  Lake  Erie,  it  was  too  dull  and 
prosaic  to  win  the  popular  admiration  it  deserved. 

As  soon  as  his  boats  were  ready  Foote  made  his  base 
at  Cairo,  Illinois,  an  important  place  for  the  Union  to  hold, 
on  account  of  its  position.  It  is  at  the  junction  of  the  Mis 
sissippi  and  the  Ohio,  at  the  point  where  Illinois,  Missouri, 
and  Kentucky  meet.  Previous  to  this  time,  on  the  very 
day  of  DuPont's  victory  at  Port  Royal,  three  other  unar- 
mored  river-boats,  which  had  been  bought  and  made  over 
for  fighting  purposes,  did  good  service  in  saving  Grant's 
army  from  capture  at  Belmont. 

With  his  river-fleet  Captain  Foote  now  planned  to  attack 
Forts  Henry  and  Donelson.  The  Confederate  works  at 
Columbus,  Kentucky,  were  very  strong,  but  Henry  and 
Donelson  were  not  nearly  so  powerful.  By  capturing  these 
two  the  Union  forces  could  get  in  the  rear  of  Columbus, 
and  that  would  mean  that  the  Confederates  would  have 
to  surrender  or  leave.  On  February  2,  1862,  Foote  took  four 
of  his  armored  fleet  and  the  three  wooden  gunboats  to 
make  the  attack  on  Fort  Henry.  At  the  same  time  Grant's 
army  came  up  the  river  and  landed  a  few  miles  from  the 
fort  in  order  to  march  around  to  the  rear  while  the  fleet 
attacked  the  front. 

The  boats  had  to  go  up  the  Tennessee  slowly  on  account 
of  the  torpedoes  that  had  to  be  fished  out  of  the  channel. 
About  noon  on  February  6th,  as  according  to  the  plan 
arranged  with  Grant,  Foote  steamed  slowly  toward  the 
batteries,  with  his  four  armored  gunboats  in  front  and  the 
three  wooden  ones  in  the  rear.  By  advancing  bows  on, 
Foote  kept  the  strongest  part  of  his  boats  toward  the  enemy, 
and  at  the  same  time  he  was  forcing  the  Confederates 
to  shift  their  range  with  every  shot.  A  hot  battle  followed, 
and  as  the  Union  fleet  came  to  close  quarters  both  sides  hit 
each  other  hard  and  often.  A  single  shot  from  the  fort 
ripped  through  the  casemate  of  the  gunboat  Essex — 
named  after  the  old  Essex  and  commanded  by  a  son  of 
Commodore  Porter.  The  shot  flew  back,  exploded  the 


MAP  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI  RIVER,  CAIRO  TO  THE  GULF  OF  MEXICO 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

boiler,  and  left  the  boat  a  drifting  wreck.  Foote's  own 
boat,  the  Cincinnati,  had  her  casemate  penetrated,  too. 
In  fact,  she  was  very  roughly  handled  from  smoke-stack  to 
water-line,  but  was  not  disabled. 

Meanwhile  the  Union  fire  had  plowed  the  Confederate 
earthworks  and  dismounted  several  of  the  guns.  About 
an  hour  and  a  quarter  after  the  first  shot  the  Confederate 
flag  came  down.  Grant's  army  had  been  so  delayed  by 
swollen  streams  and  boggy  roads  that  it  arrived  only 
in  time  to  take  charge  of  the  prisoners,  though  the  main 
force  escaped  before  Grant  arrived.  The  captured  work 
was  fittingly  renamed  Fort  Foote. 

After  this  success  the  three  wooden  gunboats  went  on 
up  the  Tennessee  River  and  caused  the  destruction  of  many 
military  stores  and  took  as  a  prize  a  large  steamer  which  was 
being  rebuilt  as  a  gunboat. 

These  boats  returned  in  time  to  join  the  attack  on  Fort 
Donelson,  which  lay  twelve  miles  to  the  east  on  the  Cum 
berland  River.  Here  the  Confederates  had  collected  an 
army  of  18,000  men,  including  those  who  had  escaped 
from  Fort  Henry.  Fort  Donelson  was  built  on  a  high  bluff 
on  the  west  bank  of  the  river,  and  was  stronger  than  Fort 
Henry.  There  were  powerful  batteries  near  the  water-level, 
and  still  heavier  guns  on  the  edge  of  the  bluff.  When  Foote 
advanced  to  the  attack,  on  February  14,  1862,  with  four 
armored  and  two  wooden  gunboats,  he  soon  found  that 
he  had  "caught  a  Tartar."  His  guns  could  not  be  elevated 
enough  to  answer  the  batteries  on  the  bluff,  and  all  the 
advantage  gained  by  the  sloping  casemate  on  his  boats 
was  lost  because  the  plunging  shot  from  the  cannon  on 
the  bluff  took  the  slope  at  right  angles.  Instead  of  bounc 
ing  off  the  casemate  the  heavy  projectiles  went  through. 
The  Union  gunboats  stuck  to  the  attack  bravely,  but  one 
after  another  was  disabled,  and  went  drifting  out  of  action 
till  at  last,  after  an  hour  and  a  half,  all  six  were  in  retreat. 
Two  days  later  the  fort  surrendered  to  General  Grant. 

The  plan  of  making  the  Confederates  move  out  of  Colum- 

152 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

bus  by  capturing  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  succeeded. 
The  Confederates,  however,  managed  to  slip  away  with  all 
their  supplies,  and  rallied  their  forces  at  the  next  line  of 
the  river  strongholds — at  Island  No.  10.  This  was  so 
named  because  it  was  the  tenth  island  south  of  Cairo. 
It  was  fifty-five  miles  from  Cairo  and  near  the  Missouri 
shore,  just  about  on  the  line  separating  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee. 

In  spite  of  its  size  and  dignity  the  "Father  of  Waters" 
has  always  had  such  freakish  and  unreliable  ways  that  it 
is  no  wonder  that  the  Indians  looked  on  it  with  superstition. 
On  a  map  the  Mississippi  between  Cairo  and  New  Orleans 
wriggles  so  much  that  it  looks  as  if  it  had  a  fit  of  the  malarial 
"shivers"  for  which  the  valley  is  famous.  As  the  crow 
flies,  it  is  only  four  hundred  and  eighty  miles  from  Cairo  to 
the  Gulf,  but  as  the  river  winds  it  is  eleven  hundred  miles ! 
One  of  the  queerest  of  these  snaky  turns  was  in  the  neigh 
borhood  of  Island  No.  10.  As  you  can  see  by  the  diagram, 
the  river  took  a  notion  to  go  northwest,  then  changed  its 
mind  and  turned  southward.  Next  it  seemed  to  prefer  to 
go  back  toward  Canada,  and  went  due  north  for  a  while. 
It  had  not  gone  more  than  a  few  miles  in  that  direction  when 
it  turned  about  face  again  and  decided  that  the  Gulf  was 
the  best  place,  after  all.  In  twelve  miles  of  flow  the  Mis 
sissippi  gained  here  only  three  miles  to  the  south.  In  the 
middle  bend  lay  Island  No.  10,  two  miles  long  and  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile  wide.  To-day  the  course  of  the  river  is 
very  different,  and  the  island  has  long  since  been  washed 
away. 

The  Confederates  had  fortified  this  island  because  it 
was  well  fitted  for  defense.  It  was  protected  on  the  east 
by  the  impassable  swamps  of  Reelfoot  Lake,  and  on  the 
shore  opposite  the  island,  to  the  south,  lay  six  protected 
batteries.  The  channel  to  the  north  of  the  island  was  choked 
by  a  line  of  sunken  hulks,  so  that  any  vessel  that  passed 
the  point  by  the  south  channel  would  have  to  run  the 
gauntlet  of  the  four  island  batteries  on  one  side  and  the 

T53 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

six  shore  batteries  on  the  other.  Besides  these  there  was  a 
large  floating  battery  of  ten  nine-inch  guns  moored  near 
the  middle  of  the  island. 

The  weakness  of  the  Confederate  defense  at  Island  No. 
10  was  that  all  their  supplies  had  to  come  from  the  south, 
chiefly  by  river,  and  if  that  line  were  cut  off  they  would 
be  helpless.  To  this  end  General  Pope  occupied  New 
Madrid,  on  the  upper  bend,  and  planted  artillery  to  keep 
Confederate  gunboats  from  coming  up.  What  he  needed 
now  was  the  protection  of  Union  gunboats  so  that  he  could 
get  troops  across  the  river  into  Tennessee  and  strike  the 
defenses  of  the  island  in  the  rear. 

The  Confederate  defenses  were  too  powerful  for  a  gun 
boat  fleet  of  three  times  the  size  of  Foote's  squadron  to 
make  a  direct  attack,  as  they  had  done  at  Forts  Henry 
and  Donelson.  And  in  those  bombardments  on  the  Ten 
nessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers,  if  a  Union  vessel  were 
disabled  she  would  drift  out  of  action  away  from  the  enemy. 
Here,  if  a  boat  lost  control  of  her  steering-gear  or  of  her 
engines,  she  would  be  carried  down  by  the  current  directly 
into  the  hands  of  the  Confederates.  So  Foote  contented 
himself  with  a  long-distance  bombardment  (March  16  and 
17,  1862)  aided  by  mortars,  but  he  was  unable  to  do  much1 
harm  to  the  Confederate  works. 

Meanwhile  General  Pope  had  been  digging  a  canal  from 
the  Mississippi  to  a  stream  that  entered  the  river  near 
New  Madrid.  His  idea  was  to  avoid  going  past  the  island  by 
cutting  off  the  loop.  By  April  4th  he  had  the  canal  ready 
and  floated  the  lighter  transports  loaded  with  troops  across 
and  around  to  New  Madrid,  but  the  gunboats  drew  too 
much  water  to  follow.  He  had  now  all  the  troops  he  needed, 
but  still  no  gunboat. 

About  two  weeks  before,  Foote  had  called  a  council  of 
war  to  talk  over  the  possibility  of  running  past  the  island 
with  some  of  the  gunboats,  but  all  the  officers,  with  the 
exception  of  Commander  Walke,  of  the  Carondelet,  voted 
against  the  idea.  Yet  every  day  the  necessity  of  getting 

154 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

a  boat  down  there  grew  plainer,  and  on  the  3oth  of  March 
Foote  told  Walke  to  "go  ahead  and  get  ready." 

While  Walke  was  busy  preparing  the  Carondelet  for  her 
dangerous  run,  fifty  men  from  the  army  made  a  brilliant 


Army  of  GenLPope 

.  _<A  A  &A  AA/V-A  AM  A  A 
.  A  A  £  *  AA  6AAA 


MAP    OF    ISLAND    NUMBER    IO 


capture  of  the  nearest  Confederate  battery  on  the  shore. 
They  spiked  all  the  guns  and  got  back  without  losing  a 
man.  Three  days  later  a  lucky  shot  cut  the  cable  of  the 
floating  battery  and  the  swift  current  carried  it  down- 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

stream  three  miles  before  the  Confederates  could  moor  it 
again.  That,  too,  was  a  big  obstacle  removed. 

Still,  many  officers,  naval  and  military,  wagged  their 
heads  solemnly  as  they  saw  Walke  at  work  on  his  gunboat, 
and  prophesied  that  the  Carondelet  could  not  live  three  min 
utes  under  a  cross-fire  from  those  heavy  guns.  ''Nothing 
but  suicide,"  they  said,  "and  throwing  away  a  good 
gunboat  at  that." 

On  April  4th — the  day  Pope  took  the  army  over  the  canal 
to  New  Madrid — Walke  reported  to  Foote  that  everything 
was  ready  for  the  dash.  Walke  had  done  everything  he 
could  think  of  to  protect  the  vessel  against  the  fire  of  heavy 
guns.  Engine-room  and  boiler  he  had  barricaded  with 
heavy  timbers  and  loose  iron.  Round  the  parts  that  had 
no  armor  at  all  he  piled  bales  of  hay,  more  timbers,  and 
heavy  chains.  The  upper  decks  he  covered  with  wood, 
coal,  cables,  and  chains — almost  anything  that  would 
deaden  the  blow  of  a  solid  shot.  Round  the  pilot-house,  that 
most  vulnerable  part  of  these  boats,  he  wound  hawsers 
and  cables  to  the  thickness  of  about  eighteen  inches.  To 
the  stern  was  lashed  a  coal-barge  to  protect  the  wheel  and 
the  magazines. 

About  ten  o'clock  that  night,  when  Walke  got  under  way, 
the  weather  came  to  his  help  by  rolling  up  a  black  thunder 
storm.  The  Carondelet  slipped  out  into  the  current  with 
lights  covered  and  running  silently.  For  the  first  half- 
mile  she  ran  without  discovery.  Suddenly,  as  ill  luck 
would  have  it,  just  as  she  came  under  the  guns  of  the 
first  battery,  her  flues  caught  fire  and  blazed.  Boom! 
Zi-i-ip !  A  gun  and  a  rocket  in  the  second  fort  gave  warning 
that  a  Union  gunboat  was  trying  to  run  the  gauntlet. 

Now  that  Walke  was  discovered,  there  was  nothing  to 
do  but  crowd  on  the  steam,  and  he  sent  the  Carondelet 
rocking  and  careering  down-stream  through  the  darkness 
at  a  dangerous  rate.  Meanwhile  the  thunder-storm  burst 
with  torrents  of  rain  and  tremendous  thunder  and  lightning. 
Going  as  she  was  at  this  full  speed  down  the  swift  current, 

156 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

the  Carondelet  proved  hard  to  keep  on  her  course  on  account 
of  the  coal-barge  astern,  which  slewed  the  gunboat  time 
and  again  out  of  the  channel.  Once,  luckily,  a  flash  of 
lightning  showed  the  pilot  that  she  was  heading  for  a  shoal 
right  under  a  Confederate  battery. 

"Hard  aport!"  he  yelled,  and  the  Carondelet  swung  over, 
bumped,  and  slid  into  deep  water  again.  It  was  a  wildly 
exciting  trip.  The  Confederates  were  soon  firing  on  the 
gunboat  with  musket  and  cannon,  and  to  the  tremendous 
thunder-claps  were  added  the  roar  of  heavy  guns  and  bang 
of  bursting  shells.  But  in  the  excitement  and  darkness 
the  Confederates  were  unable  to  hit  her  at  all !  As  Walke 
had  expected  a  very  severe  fire,  he  kept  all  his  men  under 
cover  except  the  two  heroic  leadsmen,  who  had  to  stay  in 
the  bow,  and  his  chief  pilot  and  himself,  who  kept  the  deck. 
Fortunately,  not  one  of  the  four  suffered  anything  worse 
than  a  drenching. 

For  half  an  hour  more  the  Carondelet  rushed  by  the  boom 
ing  guns  on  the  Tennessee  shore,  all  firing  at  her  as  fast  as 
they  could  be  loaded.  Still  she  was  not  hit.  Then  she 
had  the  floating  battery  to  run  past,  but  that  proved 
no  more  dangerous  than  the  rest,  and  about  midnight  she 
arrived  at  New  Madrid,  welcomed  by  the  loud  hurrahs  of 
the  Union  soldiers.  The  Carondelet  had  run  past  six  forts 
and  over  fifty  guns.  Instead  of  being  sunk  by  their  fire, 
she  had  not  been  hurt  in  the  least.  It  was  a  very  brilliant 
exploit  in  the  face  of  all  the  belief,  Union  and  Confederate, 
that  no  vessel  could  possibly  get  past.  To  show  that  it  was 
not  mere  luck,  two  nights  later  the  Pittsburg  repeated  the 
run  of  the  Carondelet. 

After  that  Island  No.  10  was  done  for.  The  Union  army 
crossed  to  the  Tennessee  shore  and  found  that  the  greater 
part  of  the  Confederates  had  already  abandoned  the  works, 
leaving  only  one  hundred  men,  who  surrendered  to  Foote. 
But  Pope,  knowing  what  line  of  retreat  the  Confederates 
would  have  to  take,  went  after  them  and  bagged  the 
whole  army.  Meanwhile  the  two  wooden  boats,  Tyler  and 

11  157 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

Lexington,  were  helping  the  army  on  the  Tennessee  River 
and  saved  the  day  for  Grant  in  the  famous  battle  of  Shiloh 
by  checking  the  Confederate  advance  on  the  weakened 
left  wing. 

After  Island  No.  10  had  surrendered  Foote  took  his 
gunboats  down-river  eighty  miles  to  Fort  Pillow  without 
meeting  any  more  opposition  from  the  Confederates.  On 
May  gth  Foote  was  relieved  of  the  command  by  Capt. 
C.  H.  Davis,  and  went  North  for  a  well-earned  furlough. 
In  the  attack  on  Donelson  he  had  received  a  wound  which 
gave  him  much  suffering  and  finally  led  to  his  death  the 
following  year. 

After  Davis  took  charge  the  gunboats  went  on  bom 
barding  Fort  Pillow.  The  work  had  to  be  done  at  this  time 
by  the  navy  alone,  for  General  Halleck  had  suddenly 
ordered  away  Pope's  army  just  at  the  moment  when  Pillow 
could  have  been  surrounded  and  forced  to  surrender,  with 
all  her  defenders.  General  Halleck  was  one  of  those 
Union  generals  whose  salary  the  Confederacy  could  well 
have  afforded  to  pay.  However,  the  gunboats  kept  pound 
ing  away,  and  on  June  4th  the  Confederates  deserted  the 
fort. 

During  this  bombardment  on  May  loth  the  Confederate 
rams  had  made  a  dash  on  the  Cincinnati,  Only  four  of  the 
Union  boats  got  into  the  fray,  on  account  of  some  blunder 
about  signals,  and  before  the  Confederates  returned  they 
had  rammed  two  of  the  gunboats  so  badly  that  they  had 
to  be  run  aground  to  save  them  from  sinking.  The  day 
after  Fort  Pillow  surrendered  the  Union  squadron  went 
down-river,  hot  on  getting  revenge.  They  caught  the  Con 
federate  rams  near  Memphis  and  completely  routed  them. 
Four  out  of  the  eight  were  sunk;  the  other  four  took  to 
their  heels,  but  only  one  was  allowed  to  escape.  The  Union 
gunboats  suffered  very  little. 

The  chief  trouble  with  this  Confederate  flotilla  was  that 
it  was  not  well  organized ;  each  boat  was  under  a  river-cap 
tain  who  wanted  to  run  it  to  please  himself  and  refused  to 

158 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

take  orders  from  any  Confederate  officer,  naval  or  military. 
So  they  acted  in  a  hit-or-miss  fashion,  which  turned  out  to 
be  chiefly  "miss."  We  shall  see  in  the  following  chapter 
the  same  trouble  spoiling  the  effectiveness  of  the  Confed 
erate  naval  force  at  New  Orleans. 

After  the  rout  of  the  Confederate  rams  the  city  of  Mem 
phis  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Union.  This  left  the  Mis 
sissippi  open  all  the  way  to  the  greatest  stronghold  of  all— 
Vicksburg.  And  as  Farragut  by  this  time  had  entered 
the  river  at  New  Orleans  and  steamed  north  past  Vicks 
burg,  the  Northern  and  Southern  divisions  of  the  Missis 
sippi  campaign  grasped  hands  at  a  point  just  above  Vicks 
burg.  Of  Farragut's  great  part  in  opening  the  mouth  of 
the  river  we  shall  speak  in  the  next  chapter. 

In  this  combined  naval  and  military  campaign  on  the 
upper  Mississippi  we  find  the  army  and  the  navy  working 
together,  as  Foote  said,  "like  the  two  blades  of  a  pair  of 
shears."  Steadily  the  Union  forces  hammered  down  one 
stronghold  after  another,  with  every  step  penetrating  far 
ther  into  the  Confederacy. 

The  success  of  these  operations  looms  big  when  compared 
with  the  indecisive  work  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in 
the  East.  But  we  must  remember  that  one  great  advantage 
which  Foote  and  Grant  enjoyed  was  in  being  a  long  way 
from  Washington.  They  were  not  being  meddled  with  all 
the  time,  as  was  poor  General  McClellan.  The  Virginia 
campaign  was  at  the  very  doors  of  Washington,  and  every 
Congressman,  every  post-office  clerk,  every  newspaper  cor 
respondent,  knew  exactly  what  was  the  matter  with  the 
Union  operations,  and  they  were  anxious  to  explain  just 
what  McClellan  ought  to  do.  These  amateur  war  experts 
bombarded  the  War  Department  and  the  President  with 
their  wisdom,  and  even  Lincoln  himself  interfered  with  his 
long-suffering  general  far  too  much.  When  Grant  became 
chief  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  Lincoln  had  learned  his 
mistake  and  called  "hands  off"  to  the  meddlers. 

The  success  of  the  army  and  the  navy  in  the  West  went 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

far  to  keep  up  the  sagging  hopes  of  the  North  during  thai, 
discouraging  year  of  1862  when  everything  in  the  East 
seemed  to  go  wrong.  One  great  plan  of  campaign  had  suc 
ceeded,  anyway;  and,  though  Vicksburg  had  not  fallen, 
the  Mississippi  was  patrolled  from  Cairo  to  New  Orleans 
by  Union  forces. 


XIII 

THE    LOWER   MISSISSIPPI 

Career  of  David  G.  Farragut — Southerners  on  Union  side — Passing 
the  New  Orleans  forts — Importance  of  the  capture  of  New  Orleans. 

TO  begin  the  story  of  the  operations  on  the  lower 
Mississippi  we  must  go  back  to  David  Farragut. 
The  year  1862  was  nearly  a  half-century  after  that  March 
day  in  a  Chilean  harbor  when  we  saw  the  little  middy 
Farragut  running  across  the  blood-stained  decks  of  the 
Essex  with  a  bundle  of  primers  under  his  jacket.  Between 
that  time  and  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War  he  had  found 
small  chance  to  make  a  name  for  himself.  He  served  well 
in  the  campaign  against  the  pirates  in  the  twenties,  but 
it  was  a  thankless  kind  of  work,  with  far  more  hardship 
than  glory.  When  the  Mexican  War  took  the  fleet  to 
Vera  Cruz,  Farragut  came  forward  with  plans  to  reduce 
the  Mexican  fort  there  by  bombardment  or  by  an  assault. 
He  backed  his  suggestion  by  a  carefully  prepared  set  of 
observations  and  soundings  that  he  had  made  twenty  years 
before  when  the  French  fleet  was  attacking  the  place.  At 
that  time  he  had  gone  about  measuring  the  depth  of  pene 
tration  of  every  shell  in  the  masonry  and  ticketed  the  infor 
mation  away,  with  the  idea  that  some  day  the  facts  would 
be  useful  to  his  country.  But  neither  the  Department 
nor  Commodore  Matthew  Perry  cared  to  be  advised  by  any 
subordinate,  and  when  Farragut  was  at  last  given  a  little 
vessel  to  command  Perry  sent  him  off  to  blockade  Tuxpan, 
where  the  only  possible  way  a  commander  could  distinguish 
himself  was  to  die  of  yellow-fever.  This  Farragut  almost 
succeeded  in  doing. 

161 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

In  the  War  of  1812  we  saw  the  brilliant  promise  of  the 
fearless  and  resourceful  little  midshipman  Farragut,  and 
yet  the  long  years  of  peace  after  that  war  had  given  him  no 
chance  to  show  his  real  worth.  In  1861  he  was  sixty  years 
old — an  age  which  to-day  finds  an  officer  on  the  verge 
of  retirement — and  still  he  was  wholly  unknown. 

Farragut  was  born  in  Tennessee,  and  during  the  forty 
years  before  1861  he  had  made  Norfolk,  Virginia,  his  home; 
so  that  in  all  his  ties  of  birth,  kin,  and  friendships  he  was  a 
Southerner;  but  there  seems  to  have  been  no  question 
in  his  mind  about  where  his  sword  belonged,  and  when 
Virginia  seceded  he  left  Norfolk  and  asked  for  active  duty 
under  the  flag  he  had  sworn  to  serve. 

That  was  a  trying  time  for  many  Southern  officers — like 
General  Lee,  for  example — who  were  opposed  to  secession, 
but  who  felt  that  their  duty  lay  with  their  state  when  it 
joined  the  Confederacy.  We  have  never  done  full  justice 
to  those  who,  in  spite  of  everything,  remained  loyal  to  the 
Union.  By  that  act  such  men  cut  themselves  off  from 
friends,  family,  and  home.  Coming  from  states  in  the 
Confederacy,  these  men  had  no  political  friends  to  help 
them  and  no  local  newspapers  to  shout  their  praise.  Yet 
this  class  of  Union  officers  furnished  some  of  the  best 
ability  displayed  on  the  Union  side.  Farragut  had  no 
equal.  Another  Union  officer  from  Virginia  was  that 
splendid  soldier  General  Thomas,  "the  Rock  of  Chicka- 
mauga,"  whose  achievements  historians  have  been  slow  to 
appreciate.  Others,  and  younger  men,  not  in  such  high 
places  of  command  sacrificed  just  as  much,  but  came  in  for 
little  or  no  recognition.  From  the  rank  of  captain  to  mid 
shipman  there  was  many  a  Southern  man  in  the  Union 
navy  whose  loyalty  was  not  shaken  by  the  fact  that  his 
father,  uncles,  and  brothers  were  all  on  the  other  side. 

At  first,  in  the  confusion  following  the  resignation  of  so 
many  officers  who  "went  South,"  the  Navy  Department 
hesitated  to  give  any  command  to  a  Southerner.  But 
Farragut's  prompt  action  in  leaving  Norfolk  at  the  time 

162 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Virginia  seceded,  and  his  immediate  request  for  active  duty, 
had  made  an  impression  on  Gustavus  Fox,  the  able  Assistant 
Secretary  of  the  Navy.  So  in  December,  1861,  when  the 
Department  planned  an  expedition  to  capture  New  Orleans 
and  open  the  lower  Mississippi,  Fox  picked  Farragut  as  the 
man  to  carry  it  out. 

Meanwhile,  Farragut  had  been  kept  at  the  dull  duty  of 
weeding  out  the  decrepit  old  officers  who  clogged  the  navy 
list  at  the  top.  Of  course,  this  had  to  be  done  by  somebody, 
but  Farragut  was  aching  for  active  work.  When  he  was 
called  to  Washington  and  informed  that  he  was  to  command 
the  expedition  he  was  overjoyed.  The  Confederates  were 
sure  that  no  fleet  whatever  could  get  by  their  forts  below 
New  Orleans,  and  expected  all  Union  attacks  to  come  from 
up-river.  Many  Union  advisers,  too,  said  that  it  was 
impossible  to  enter  the  river  from  the  Gulf  with  wooden 
ships,  but  Farragut  answered  that  it  could  be  done,  and  he 
was  eager  to  prove  it. 

Accordingly,  a  fleet  was  collected,  consisting  of  seven 
screw  sloops  of  war,  one  side-wheeler,  and  nine  gunboats, 
besides  a  mortar  flotilla.  These  ships  arrived  off  the 
Mississippi  delta  toward  the  end  of  February,  1862.  Then 
followed  two  months  of  tedious  preparation.  The  heavy 
steamers  had  to  be  slowly  worried  and  dragged  over  the 
mud  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  in  order  to  get  them  into 
deep  water  above  the  bar.  It  took  two  weeks  to  perform 
this  operation  for  the  Pensacola  alone.  By  April  yth 
Farragut  had  his  ships  inside  the  bar  and  was  ready  to 
move  upon  the  enemy. 

From  the  first  the  Southerners  had  known  of  the  in 
tended  attack  on  New  Orleans,  and  these  two  months  of 
hauling  and  tugging,  besides,  had  given  them  plenty  of 
time  to  develop  a  powerful  defense.  But,  in  spite  of  re 
peated  warnings  and  urgent  requests  to  Richmond  for 
means  of  defense,  the  authorities  were  slow  in  making  any 
preparations.  They  replied  that  the  forts  below  New 
Orleans  could  not  be  passed,  and  calmly  repeated  that 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 


Union  forces  would  probably  come  from  the  North  rather 
than  from  the  Gulf,  anyway.  And  yet  New  Orleans  was 
the  largest  city  in  the  South  at  that  time,  and  in  a  position 
of  great  strategic  importance.  The  careless  attitude  of  the 
Richmond  government,  especially  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  Mr.  Mallory,  made  those  officers  who  understood  the 
situation — like  the  gallant  young  Beverly  Kennon — boil 
over  with  indignation. 

The  two  forts  in  which  the  Confederates  had  the  utmost 
faith  were  situated  eighty  miles  below  New  Orleans. 
Fort  St.  Philip,  with  forty-two  guns,  was  on  the  east  bank 
of  the  river;  and  Fort  Jackson,  with  fifty-eight  guns,  was 
lower  down  on  the  west  bank.  While  the  latter  was 


THE   MISSISSIPPI    BELOW   NEW   ORLEANS 
164 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

stronger,  the  former  had  a  better  position,  because,  being 
on  a  bend  of  the  river,  its  guns  could  rake  an  approaching 
line  of  ships.  But  in  the  case  of  ships  and  forts  it  is  not  so 
much  the  number  of  guns  as  the  quality  of  them,  and  the 
quality  of  "the  man  behind  the  gun."  Many  of  these 
cannon  were  old-fashioned  24-pounders  which  had  no 
business  to  be  in  a  defense  of  such  importance  as  this,  and 
the  garrison  seems  to  have  been  not  very  well  trained  or 
disciplined,  for  a  mutiny  broke  out  the  day  Farragut 
reached  New  Orleans. 

One  of  the  Union  admiral's  famous  sayings  was,  "The 
best  protection  against  an  enemy's  fire  is  a  well-sustained 
fire  from  your  own  guns."  To  that  end  he  put  as  many 
cannon  on  his  ships  as  they  could  stand.  The  Hartford, 
his  famous  flag-ship,  was  called  a  "screw  sloop  of  war." 
Under  Farragut  she  carried  twenty-two  nine-inch  Dahl- 
grens,  about  twice  as  many  as  several  other  cruisers  of  her 
rating. 

In  passing  these  forts  Farragut  had  a  problem  much  more 
difficult  than  that  of  DuPont  at  Port  Royal.  The  latter  had 
a  wide  channel  for  his  "circle  of  fire,"  and  he  could  shift 
his  range  at  will.  Here  the  Union  fleet  had  to  go  through 
a  narrow  river-channel,  of  which  the  Confederates  had 
the  range  long  beforehand,  and  one  fort,  at  least,  could 
pour  in  a  raking  fire.  When  we  stop  to  think  that  all 
these  ships  were  wooden  and  that  naval  expert  opinion  was 
largely  of  the  opinion  that  they  would  all  be  sunk  in  the 
channel,  we  can  realize  that  Farragut  had  some  iron  in  his 
backbone. 

Nor  was  he  a  reckless,  slap-dash  kind  of  fighter.  He 
realized  the  dangers  as  well  as  anybody.  But  he  felt  that 
it  was  his  business  to  overcome  those  dangers  just  so  far  as 
human  foresight  could.  After  the  mortar  flotilla  had 
bombarded  the  forts  for  three  days  without  doing  a 
particle  of  damage — Farragut  had  little  use  for  mortars — 
he  decided  to  go  ahead  with  his  steamships.  The  Con 
federates  had  drawn  a  barrier  across  the  river  consisting 

165 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

of  sunken  schooners  chained  together  and  great  booms  of 
logs.  He  sent  two  gunboats  to  clear  a  passageway,  and 
made  the  mortars  of  real  use  by  keeping  so  many  shells 
dropping  on  the  forts  that  their  fire  was  lessened  and  so 
did  not  stop  the  work  of  the  men  on  the  gunboats.  For 
these  it  was  a  tough  problem  to  chop  away  an  opening 
under  fire,  and  once  one  of  the  gunboats  went  aground. 
But  they  stuck  to  it  like  heroes,  and  before  they  retired 
they  had  opened  a  space  wide  enough  for  the  largest  ves 
sel  to  pass  through. 

The  next  step  was  to  make  the  ships  ready  for  run 
ning  the  gauntlet  of  the  two  forts  and  to  meet  the  rams 
above  the  forts.  Terrifying  accounts  of  these  rams  had 
come  out  to  the  fleet,  and  nobody  knew  just  what  to  expect 
after  reading  the  accounts  about  the  Merrimac  only  a  few 
weeks  before. 

Farragut  spent  two  days  in  making  sure  that  his  ships 
were  prepared  for  the  run.  Each  was  loaded  down  at  the 
bow  a  few  inches  so  that  if  she  ran  into  the  mud  she  would 
keep  pointing  up-stream.  The  ships  were  all  wooden, 
but  there  were  ways  of  protecting  even  a  wooden  ship 
against  cannon  fire.  Farragut  ordered  the  heavy  sheet- 
anchor  cables  fastened  alongside  in  such  a  way  as  to  make 
a  sort  of  "chain  armor"  for  the  engines  and  boilers.  And 
to  protect  these  parts  from  raking  shot — forward  and  aft — 
bags  of  coal  and  sand  were  piled  in  heaps  in  stern  and  bow. 
To  make  sure  that  everything  was  just  right  he  made  an 
inspection  of  every  ship  in  the  line  on  the  afternoon  before 
the  attack. 

After  a  careful  survey  of  the  forts  Farragut  had  deter 
mined  on  a  night  advance.  At  two  o'clock  on  the  morning 
of  April  24,  1862,  two  red  lights  from  the  Hartford  gave  the 
signal  to  get  under  way.  There  was  some  delay  in  pulling 
up  anchors,  so  that  it  was  three-thirty  when  the  Union 
line  steamed  through  the  darkness  for  the  opening  in  the 
barrier.  The  fleet  had  been  divided  into  first,  second,  and 
third  divisions.  After  getting  through  the  barrier  the  first 

167 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

division  was  to  hold  to  the  right  and  engage  Fort  St. 
Philip.  The  second  division,  led  by  Farragut  in  the 
Hartford,  was  to  follow,  swing  a  little  to  the  left  and  attack 
Fort  Jackson.  Farragut  had  intended  at  first  to  run  the 
two  divisions  side  by  side,  but  there  was  so  much  danger 
of  confusion,  if  not  collision,  in  getting  through  the  barrier 
that  he  changed  his  plan.  A  third  division,  consisting 
chiefly  of  gunboats,  was  to  bring  up  the  rear. 

The  black  line  of  ships  steamed  slowly  through  the 
barrier,  but  not  a  shot  came  from  the  forts  till  the  leading 
ship  of  the  first  division,  the  Cayuga,  was  just  about  abreast 
of  Fort  St.  Philip.  Then  the  pitch  darkness  was  torn  by 
the  flashes  of  artillery,  and  the  Confederates  opened  fire  on 
her  with  a  vengeance.  The  Cayuga  was  too  light  to  with 
stand  a  bombardment  or  reply  to  it ;  her  business  was  to  run 
by  as  fast  as  she  could  before  she  was  sunk.  So  she  rippled 
up-stream  with  the  sparks  pouring  out  of  her  smoke-stack. 

The  next  in  the  line  was  the  heavy  Pensacola  with  twenty- 
three  big  guns.  She  slowed  up  and  gave  the  fort  the 
benefit  of  her  broadside,  and  several  times  she  stopped  her 
engines  to  continue  her  set-to  with  the  fort.  The  idea  was 
that  the  heavy  ships  of  this  class  would  take  the  heat 
of  the  Confederate  fire  and,  if  possible,  silence  their  guns  for 
the  benefit  of  the  weaker  vessels  in  the  rear  of  the  line. 

But  the  stopping  of  the  Pensacola  left  the  Cayuga  tear 
ing  up-stream  all  by  herself.  Suddenly  her  captain  realized, 
as  he  peered  astern  through  the  darkness  and  the  smoke, 
that  there  was  not  another  Union  ship  in  sight.  His  first 
thought  was  that  they  must  all  have  been  sunk  by  the  forts. 
And  as  he  looked  forward  he  counted  eleven  Confederate 
rams  and  gunboats  looming  out  of  the  darkness  and  head 
ing  straight  for  him.  No  wonder  that  Lieutenant  Perkins, 
who  was  acting  as  pilot,  wrote  afterward,  "It  seemed  as 
if  we  were  gone,  sure." 

But  some  well-directed  shots  drove  off  or  disabled  the 
nearest  Confederate  ships.  The  famous  ram  Manassas,  of 
which  alarming  reports  had  been  spread,  suddenly  appeared 

168 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

alongside  and  tried  to  ram  the  Cayuga's  stern.  So  wretched 
were  the  ironclad's  engines  that  she  missed  entirely.  So 
she  slipped  astern  and  drifted  down  the  stream  to  try  again 
on  some  other  ship. 

Just  then  some  Union  gunboats  came  up,  and  for  a  few 
minutes  there  was  a  wild  time.  In  the  pitch-darkness  and 
smoke  and  the  confusion  of  vessels  no  one  could  tell  friend 
from  foe.  Suddenly  the  Union  gunboat  Varuna  fired  a 
broadside  by  mistake  into  the  Cayuga,  and  there  were 
shouts  and  frantic  signals  amid  a  grand  uproar  of  banging 
guns  and  bursting  shells.  But  in  about  twenty  minutes 
things  straightened  out,  and  the  weak  Confederate  flotilla 
were  all  scattered  and  sunk  except  the  Gov.  Moore.  This 
was  one  of  the  gunboats  that  had  attacked  the  Cayuga 
but  had  been  driven  off  by  her  heavier  guns.  The  com 
mander  of  the  Gov.  Moore,  Lieut.  Beverly  Kennon,  realizing 
that  he  could  do  nothing  against  ships  like  the  Cayuga,  went 
in  chase  of  the  Varuna,  which  had  gone  on  up  the  river. 
Kennon  raised  signal-lanterns  like  those  he  had  noticed  on 
the  Union  ships,  and  he  was  not  recognized  as  an  enemy  till 
he  was  close  astern.  Then  he  pumped  two  huge  shells  into 
the  Varuna,  and  as  she  swung  about  to  meet  her  opponent 
Kennon  rammed  her,  firing  another  shell  through  his  own 
bow  into  her.  Shortly  afterward  another  gunboat,  the 
Stonewall  Jackson,  rammed  her,  too,  and  she  headed  for  the 
bank,  filling  rapidly,  and  settled  in  shallow  water.  But  as 
she  settled  she  still  used  her  guns  on  the  Gov.  Moore;  and, 
as  the  latter  had  been  badly  hurt  by  the  fire  of  the  Cayuga 
as  well,  she  soon  dropped  out  of  the  fight  and  surrendered. 
The  Gov.  Moore  had  been  handled  with  great  gallantry  and 
skill — Kennon  had  been  in  the  navy  before  the  war — and 
was  the  only  Confederate  vessel  in  this  battle  that  deserves 
such  praise.  After  the  Gov.  Moore  had  surrendered  there 
was  little  resistance  left.  But  before  Kennon  surrendered 
he  had  done  more  than  both  forts — he  had  sunk  one  of  the 
enemy's  fleet. 

These  Confederate  rams  and  gunboats  had  no  organiza- 

169 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

tion.  Some  belonged  to  the  state  of  Louisiana  and  some  to 
the  Confederacy,  and  some  just  "acted  on  their  own  hook." 
As  an  example  of  the  way  authority  was  mixed  up,  Kennon 
was  a  lieutenant  in  the  Confederate  navy,  but  his  vessel 
belonged  to  the  navy  of  Louisiana. 

Let  us  turn  back  to  see  how  the  second  division  fared. 
About  half  an  hour  after  the  Cayuga  drew  the  fire  of  Fort  St. 
Philip  the  Hartford  led  the  way  for  the  second  line  and 
played  her  bow-guns  on  Fort  Jackson.  By  this  time  the 
darkness  was  made  worse  by  the  stifling  clouds  of  powder- 
smoke.  A  dull  glare  was  made  out  just  ahead  of  the  Hart 
ford,  and  the  next  minute  a  blazing  fire  raft  came  down 
directly  upon  the  flag-ship. 

Round  spun  the  wheel  to  avoid  this  dangerous  and  un 
expected  enemy,  but  the  jerk  of  the  helm  only  laid  the  bow 
of  the  Hartford  in  the  mud  near  Fort  St.  Philip.  At  that 
moment  it  was  discovered  that  the  raft  was  not  drifting,  but 
being  shoved  down  upon  the  Hartford  by  a  Confederate  tug. 
In  another  moment  there  was  the  hot  breath  of  flames,  and 
the  fire  leaped  on  the  sides  of  the  ship  and  went  crackling 
and  roaring  up  the  tarred  rigging.  Here  was  a  crisis 
indeed.  The  flag-ship  was  aground  under  the  enemy's 
forts  and  afire  at  the  same  time.  But  as  the  officers  and 
men  looked  at  their  leader  they  saw  him  as  cool  and  self- 
possessed  as  if  he  were  arriving  in  a  home  port  and  giving 
orders  to  anchor.  His  quick  commands  snapped  out  with 
decision  but  without  excitement,  and  there  was  no  hint  of 
panic  in  his  well-disciplined  crew.  While  the  guns  drove 
off  the  tug  and  answered  the  redoubled  fire  of  the  forts 
a  section  of  the  crew  soon  had  the  hose  playing  on  the 
blazing  sides  and  shrouds.  Meanwhile  the  screw  was 
churning  a  reverse  under  full  pressure,  and  after  some 
nerve-racking  suspense  it  finally  pulled  the  Hartford's 
nose  off  the  mud.  Then  she  steamed  serenely  up  the 
river  without  further  trouble. 

Next  in  line  to  the  Hartford  was  the  Brooklyn.  The 
smoke  and  darkness  were  so  thick  that  she  immediately 

170 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

lost  sight  of  the  flag-ship  and  was  steering  blindly,  without 
even  a  lantern  to  guide  her.  The  result  was  that  the 
Brooklyn  missed  the  opening  and  soon  found  herself 
bumping  on  one  of  the  sunken  hulks  in  the  barrier.  She 
got  badly  fouled  in  the  wreckage  and  swung  across  stream, 
with  her  bow  touching  the  mud  on  the  east  bank.  While 
she  lay  in  this  disagreeable  position  she  got  a  very  hot  fire 
from  Fort  St.  Philip. 

At  last,  after  all  kinds  of  difficulty,  she,  too,  was  pulled 
loose  and  headed  up-stream  again.  At  that  moment  the 
ram  Manassas  suddenly  appeared  alongside.  The  latter 
was  going  so  slowly  that  she  was  able  to  give  only  a  gentle 
bump  to  the  Union  ship,  and  the  chains  alongside  pre 
vented  any  serious  damage.  After  this  the  career  of  the 
Brooklyn  was  concerned  chiefly  with  destroying  the  Con 
federate  gunboats  and  pouring  in  such  a  tremendous  fire 
on  Fort  St.  Philip  that  it  was  silenced  for  several 
minutes. 

Although  the  Confederates  were  driven  to  cover  by  the 
heavy  broadsides  of  the  big  steam-sloops  like  the  Hartford, 
the  Pensacola,  and  the  Brooklyn,  they  opened  fire  again 
when  these  ships  were  past.  So  they  succeeded  in  keeping 
the  third  division,  composed  chiefly  of  light  gunboats, 
from  getting  by.  But  Farragut  had  thirteen  vessels  past 
the  forts,  and  with  these  he  advanced  to  New  Orleans  the 
following  day. 

Panic  seized  the  city  when  news  came  that  the  "Yankee  " 
ships  had  actually  gone  by  those  forts.  And  as  the  Union 
fleet  steamed  up  the  river  Farragut  had  his  hands  full  to 
keep  clear  of  the  ships  and  steamers  loaded  with  the 
precious  cotton,  but  burning  like  bonfires,  that  came 
drifting  down  from  the  city. 

The  fleet  was  soon  anchored  at  New  Orleans,  and  Farra 
gut  sent  Captain  Bailey  ashore  to  get  the  formal  surrender 
of  the  city.  Captain  Bailey  was  accompanied  by  Lieu 
tenant  Perkins  of  the  Cayuga,  and  these  two  officers  had 
an  experience  to  try  their  nerve.  As  they  marched  up  the 

171 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

streets  to  the  City  Hall  they  were  surrounded  by  a  cursing, 
yelling  mob,  who  brandished  fists,  clubs,  and  pistols  in  the 
faces  of  the  two  "men  in  blue."  "Kill  'em!  Kill  'em!" 
shouted  the  crowd;  but  Captain  Bailey  and  his  aide,  very 
stiff  and  erect,  looking  neither  to  the  right  nor  the  left, 
marched  calmly  and  steadily  to  the  City  Hall  and  delivered 
Farragut's  message  to  the  mayor.  A  Confederate  eye 
witness  described  the  incident  afterward  as  "one  of  the 
bravest  deeds  I  ever  saw  done." 

After  a  good  deal  of  delay  the  flag  of  Louisiana  came 
down,  and  the  Stars  and  Stripes  took  its  place.  On  the 
2gth  news  came  that  the  two  forts  had  surrendered.  From 
New  Orleans  Farragut  moved  north  to  Vicksburg.  This 
was  according  to  the  orders  of  the  Department,  and 
Farragut  obeyed  like  a  true  sailor.  But  he  knew  and  said 
that  nothing  could  be  gained  simply  by  bombarding  and 
passing  Vicksburg  with  his  fleet  as  long  as  the  Confederates 
kept  their  communications  open  in  the  rear.  Meanwhile, 
the  Union  fleet  suffered  far  more  from  the  snags  in  the 
river  and  the  malaria  in  the  swamps  than  from  the  bullets 
of  the  enemy. 

At  last  the  Department  realized  that  Farragut  was  right 
about  Vicksburg,  and  ordered  him  back  to  New  Orleans. 
In  the  fall  of  1862  David  D.  Porter,  a  son  of  the  old  com 
modore,  and  a  foster  brother  of  Farragut,  was  given  com 
mand  of  the  upper  Mississippi  squadron  and  did  splendid 
work.  When  Grant  settled  down  to  the  famous  siege  of 
Vicksburg  he  had  invaluable  help  from  Porter's  fleet,  as  he 
gratefully  acknowledged.  With  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg 
to  Grant  .on  July  4,  1863,  fell  the  last  important  stronghold 
of  the  river.  In  the  autumn  of  1863  the  Union  forces  had 
the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries  completely  in  their  grip. 

Thereafter  all  help  from  the  Western  states  of  the 
Confederacy  was  cut  off  from  the  armies  in  the  East.  In 
fact,  the  Mississippi  squadron  was  really  a  part  of  the 
blockade  which  every  month  was  drawing  more  tightly 
around  the  Confederacy. 

172 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

At  the  very  time  Farragut  was  inspecting  his  fleet  for 
the  attack  on  the  forts  defending  New  Orleans,  Emperor 
Napoleon  III.  was  urging  England  to  join  France  in  break 
ing  the  blockade  in  order  to  recognize  the  Confederacy 
and  get  cotton.  Englishmen  and  Frenchmen  of  wealth 
and  influence  had  bought  up  a  large  number  of  Con 
federate  bonds,  and,  naturally,  they  were  anxious  to  have 
their  governments  do  something  to  make  sure  that  those 
bonds  were  a  good  investment. 

But  after  the  story  of  the  Monitor's  fight  in  Hampton 
Roads  the  French  and  English  governments  suddenly 
realized  that  they  had  practically  nothing  in  their  navies 
that  could  fight  her — or  the  sister  monitors  that  the  Union 
navy-yards  were  turning  out  as  fast  as  men  could  work. 
And  the  capture  of  the  largest  cotton  port  in  the  Con 
federacy  took  away  the  excuse  that  Europe  must  have  a 
port  in  which  to  buy  cotton.  Uncle  Sam  was  perfectly 
willing  to  "swap"  cotton  for  European  goods  as  long  as  it 
was  his  cotton;  so  after  April,  1862,  Confederate  hopes 
of  intervention  grew  steadily  fainter. 

12 


XIV 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MOBILE  BAY 

Importance  of  Mobile  —  Its  defenses  —  The  Tennessee  —  Passing  the 
forts—  Loss  of  the  Tecumseh  —  Conduct  of  the  Brooklyn  —  Farragut's 
manoeuver  —  Attack  of  the  Tennessee  —  Friendly  reunion  between 
enemies  —  Honors  for  Farragut. 


A^TER  getting  control  of  the  Mississippi  the  Union 
Navy  Department  turned  its  attention  toward  cap 
turing  Confederate  strongholds  on  the  Gulf  and  Atlantic 
coasts.  If  there  had  been  an  efficient  fleet  in  home  waters 
at  the  outbreak  of  secession,  and  some  other  man  in  the 
White  House  than  Buchanan,  every  one  of  these  places 
that  cost  so  much  in  blood  and  treasure  afterward  might 
have  been  seized  with  scarcely  a  blow.  Even  as  it  was,  if 
Farragut  had  been  allowed,  as  he  wished,  to  take  his  fleet 
against  Mobile  in  1862  instead  of  making  a  useless  demon 
stration  before  Vicksburg,  he  would  not  have  had  the  grim 
experience  which  came  so  near  being  a  Union  disaster. 

The  fall  of  Port  Royal  and  New  Orleans  awoke  the 
South  to  the  need  of  stouter  forts,  better  guns,  more 
torpedoes,  and  ironclads.  So  the  defenses  of  Mobile  Bay, 
which  Farragut  could  easily  have  captured  in  1862,  had 
been  by  1864  so  strengthened  that  the  problem  was  many 
times  more  difficult.  In  the  summer  of  1863  Farragut 
turned  over  the  command  of  the  whole  Mississippi  squad 
ron  above  New  Orleans  to  Porter  and  went  north  for  a 
much-needed  rest.  Also,  his  heavy  steam-sloops  were  in 
such  a  condition  that  they  needed  a  thorough  overhauling 
before  beginning  a  new  campaign.  The  following  January 

174 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Farragut  and  his  ships  were  both  back  again  with  the 
blockading  squadron  in  the  Gulf. 

After  examining  the  defenses  of  Mobile  Farragut  wrote 
the  Department,  saying  that  ironclads  were  absolutely 
necessary,  and  asking  for  some  of  the  monitors  that  were 
with  the  blockaders  off  Charleston.  Instead,  the  authori 
ties  kept  him  waiting  till  the  following  August  before  send 
ing  him  four  monitors  from  elsewhere.  Meanwhile  the  Con 
federates  made  good  use  of  this  long  delay  by  strengthening 
the  defenses  of  the  bay  still  further.  When  at  last  the  mon 
itors  arrived  Farragut  went  right  ahead  with  his  attack. 

After  the  fall  of  New  Orleans  Mobile  became  the  chief 
port  through  which  the  Confederates  could  get  their  cotton 
out  and  their  supplies  in.  Railroad  lines  ran  into  Mobile, 
and  two  large  rivers  emptied  into  the  bay  as  well,  so  that 
military  supplies  brought  to  Mobile  could  be  quickly 
shipped  to  those  points  in  the  Confederacy  where  they 
were  most  needed.  And  in  spite  of  all  the  blockading- 
ships  could  do,  time  and  again  the  daring  little  blockade- 
runners  would  dart  past  them,  carrying  on  the  trade  that 
was  so  necessary  to  the  South. 

Mobile  Bay  is  thirty  miles  long,  but  in  those  days  it  was 
for  the  most  part  too  shallow  for  steamers  of  heavy  draught. 
Only  one  narrow  channel  was  deep  enough  to  admit  vessels 
like  the  Hartford,  and  that  led  directly  under  the  strongest 
of  the  Confederate  defenses,  Fort  Morgan.  There  were 
two  other  works — Fort  Powell,  at  the  western  mouth  of  the 
bay,  and  Fort  Gaines,  on  an  island  about  midway  between — • 
but  these  two  had  no  share  in  the  battle.  Fort  Morgan, 
which  guarded  the  ship  entrance,  was,  for  those  days,  a 
very  strong  fortification,  having  three  tiers  of  cannon. 
Its  brick  wall  was  nearly  five  feet  thick  and  in  addition  the 
whole  front  was  protected  by  great  heaps  of  sand-bags. 
At  that  time  it  was  commanded  by  Gen.  R.  L.  Page. 

Besides  the  fort  the  Confederates  had  a  squadron  con 
sisting  of  the  ram  Tennessee  and  three  gunboats.  To  get 
a  naval  force  together  in  Mobile  Bay  the  Confederate  Navy 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

Department  sent  Admiral  Buchanan,  of  Merrimac  fame, 
and  gathered  the  best  engineers  in  Dixie  to  help  him. 
Several  gunboats  were  soon  building,  but  the  hopes  of  the 
Confederates  were  pinned  to  the  Tennessee.  All  these 
vessels  were  built  at  Selma,  one  hundred  and  fifty  miles 
up  the  Alabama  River,  at  that  time  the  largest  navy-yard 
controlled  by  the  South. 

The  Tennessee  was  practically  an  improved  Merrimac. 
Her  casemate  was  not  so  long  as  that  of  the  Merrimac, 
and  she  mounted  six  guns  instead  of  ten;  but  the  armor 
— with  a  thickness  of  twenty-five  inches  of  wood  and 
five  to  six  inches  of  iron — was  even  more  solid,  and 
she  drew  only  thirteen  feet  of  water  instead  of  the  Mer 
rimac' s  twenty-two.  Further,  as  a  protection  from  ram 
ming,  her  casemate  sloped  two  feet  under  water  and  then 
bent  again  at  the  same  angle,  joining  the  hull  about  seven 
feet  under  water.  The  same  "knuckle"  effect  was  carried 
fore  and  aft,  too,  and  in  the  bow — with  its  iron  plating 
— made  a  beak  that  would  not  break  off. 

When  she  was  launched  the  Confederates  said  proudly 
that  she  was  the  "most  powerful  ship  afloat,"  and  that  was 
no  idle  boast.  There  were  only  two  drawbacks,  one — the 
usual  one  with  all  Confederate  rams — the  engines  were  too 
light  to  drive  such  a  heavy  craft;  the  other,  that  the 
steering-chains  were  left  exposed  on  deck. 

Buchanan's  work  in  building  the  Tennessee  was  much  like 
Oliver  H.  Perry's  with  the  Lawrence  or  the  Niagara.  Both 
were  built  from  standing  timber,  and  the  Tennessee  had  to 
be  raised  five  feet  in  order  to  float  her  over  the  Dog  River 
bar.  Buchanan  did  not  have  an  enemy  hovering  close  at 
hand,  as  Perry  did,  but  he  had  his  troubles.  To  raise  the 
ram,  floats  had  to  be  constructed.  These  cost  immense 
labor,  because  the  very  boards  had  to  be  sawed  out  from 
green  logs ;  and  when  one  set  had  been  finished  the  boards 
took  fire  and  burned  up,  so  that  the  whole  slow  labor  had 
to  be  done  all  over  again.  Meanwhile  the  Southern 
newspaper  men,  who  could  not  realize  one-tenth  of  all 

176 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

this  trouble,  were  saying  disagreeable  things  about  Bu 
chanan. 

At  last  the  ram  was  afloat  in  Mobile  Bay,  and  on  May 
1 8th  Buchanan  took  her  down  for  a  surprise  attack  on  the 
blockading-ships.  After  dark  she  was  towed  down  by  two 
steamers  to  a  point  in  the  channel  where  there  was  supposed 
to  be  enough  water  for  her,  but  when  the  floats  were  taken 
away  it  was  found  that  the  tide  had  dropped  so  low  that  the 
ram  was  stuck  in  the  mud.  Before  she  could  be  floated 
it  was  broad  daylight,  and  all  hope  of  a  surprise  was  gone. 
So  Buchanan  took  his  ram  under  the  shelter  of  Fort  Mor 
gan  and  waited  there,  drilling  his  raw  crew  at  the  guns. 

In  addition  to  the  squadron  and  the  forts  the  Con 
federates  had  planted  obstructions  across  the  flats  to  pre 
vent  any  boats  of  shallow  draught  crossing  in  the  space 
between  the  forts.  In  the  ship-channel  itself  they  planted  a 
double  row  of  torpedoes,  stretching  from  the  western  side 
of  the  channel  to  a  point  within  three  hundred  feet  of  the 
water-battery  under  Fort  Morgan.  The  end  of  the  tor 
pedo  line  was  marked  by  a  red  buoy,  and  the  remainder 
of  the  channel  was  left  open  for  the  blockade-runners. 

As  before,  Farragut  made  the  most  careful  preparations 
to  protect  his  fleet  for  the  attack.  As  a  large  number  of 
his  ships  were  light  gunboats,  he  planned  his  advance  to 
shelter  them  as  much  as  possible.  To  do  this  he  had  his 
ships  steam  in  pairs,  on  the  right — the  side  toward  the  fort 
— a  heavy  sloop  of  war,  on  the  left  one  of  the  gunboats 
lashed  alongside.  Besides  protecting  the  thin  sides  of  the 
gunboats  this  formation  made  it  possible  for  one  ship  with 
a  disabled  engine  to  keep  on  with  the  help  of  the  other. 
All  these  ships  were  protected,  as  in  the  New  Orleans  fight, 
with  chains  and  bags  of  sand. 

Farragut  wanted  a  flood-tide  and  a  westerly  wind  to 
roll  the  battle-smoke  back  upon  the  fort.  On  August  4th 
the  last  of  two  of  the  expected  monitors  arrived.  At 
five-thirty  the  next  morning,  when  Farragut  saw  that  both 
conditions — flood-tide  and  wind — were  just  as  he  wanted 

177 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

them,  he  said  quietly  to  his  fleet  captain,  "Well,  Drayton, 
we  might  as  well  get  under  way." 

At  the  head  of  the  column  was  the  Brooklyn,  with  the 
Octorara  lashed  alongside,  and  next  came  the  Hartford 
with  the  Metacomet.  Farragut  had  wanted  to  lead  the 
column  with  the  Hartford,  but  the  other  officers,  knowing 
that  all  the  fire  would  be  concentrated  on  the  flag-ship, 
persuaded  him  to  come  second.  Afterward  he  had  bitter 
reason  to  regret  his  change  of  plan. 

As  Fort  Morgan  was  able  to  rake  the  approaching  ships 
before  they  could  use  their  broadsides,  Farragut  sent  the  four 
monitors  ahead  to  engage  the  fort  and  cover  the  advance 
of  the  fleet.  Two  of  these  monitors  were  of  the  later  pat 
tern,  with  two  turrets,  but  all  four  were  clumsy  and  always 
made  slow  headway. 

Meanwhile  the  roll  of  drums  from  the  fort,  calling  the 
defenders  to  their  guns,  showed  that  the  Confederates 
were  not  to  be  taken  by  surprise.  At  the  same  time  the 
Tennessee  slipped  out  from  the  shadow  of  the  fort  and  lay 
athwart  the  channel  in  such  a  position  that  her  guns  could 
rake  the  advancing  line  of  ships.  The  three  gunboats  took 
similar  positions,  so  that  all  the  broadsides  of  the  Con 
federate  squadron  as  well  as  the  guns  of  the  fort  were  con 
centrated  on  the  narrow  channel  through  which  the  Union 
fleet  had  to  pass,  bows  on. 

Commander  T.  A.  M.  Craven  was  leading  the  line  of 
monitors  with  the  Tecumseh.  For  nearly  half  an  hour  the 
advancing  ships  had  to  bear  a  cruel  fire,  unable  to  reply 
except  with  the  bow-chasers  of  the  leading  pair  of  ships 
and  such  of  the  monitors'  guns  as  would  bear.  As  the 
larger  ships  caught  up  with  the  slow  line  of  monitors  it 
was  not  long  before  the  Brooklyn  and  the  Hartford  were 
both  thundering  full  broadsides  at  the  fort  and  clearing  the 
men  out  of  the  water-batteries.  Farragut  had  told  Craven 
that  he  wanted  the  Tecumseh  to  engage  the  Tennessee,  and 
Craven  steered  eagerly  for  the  big  ironclad.  He  had  been 
ordered  to  keep  to  the  eastward  of  the  red  buoy  on  account 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

of  the  double  line  of  torpedoes.  What  followed  no  one  can 
be  perfectly  sure  of,  because  the  accounts  differ.  Farragut 
said  that  the  monitor  swerved  to  the  west  of  the  buoy. 
But  Confederate  eye-witnesses  said  that  she  kept  well  to 
the  east  of  the  buoy,  and  one  hesitates  to  think  that  Craven 
disobeyed  a  clear  order  when  there  was  no  necessity  for 
doing  so.  It  is  quite  possible  that  a  torpedo  got  adrift  in 
the  channel.  At  any  rate,  while  Farragut,  from  the  rigging 
of  the  Hartford,  was  watching  with  satisfaction  the  effect 
of  his  grape  and  shrapnel  on  the  Confederate  batteries, 
suddenly  everything  went  wrong.  A  smothered  boom  drew 
his  eye  to  the  Tecumseh.  A  great  jet  of  water  shot  up,  fell 
back  with  a  splash,  and  the  monitor  heeled  over'  and  went 
down.  In  two  minutes  there  was  only  a  whirling  eddy 
where  the  Tecumseh  had  been.  Out  of  135  men  113  were 
lost,  including  her  brave  captain. 

Commander  Craven  had  had  an  enviable  record.  The 
Queen  of  Spain,  for  instance,  had  presented  him  a  gold 
medal  for  his  gallantry  in  rescuing  the  crew  of  a  Spanish 
ship.  But  the  last  act  of  his  life  stamps  the  man.  At 
the  moment  of  the  explosion  Craven  and  his  pilot  instinc 
tively  rushed  for  the  ladder  of  the  pilot-house,  the  only 
means  of  escape,  and  there  was  just  one  chance.  As  they 
met  at  the  foot  of  the  ladder  Craven  stepped  back.  "  After 
you,  pilot,"  he  said,  quietly,  but  as  the  pilot  gained  the  air 
the  monitor  sank  under  his  feet. 

Farragut  immediately  ordered  Jouett,  who  commanded 
the  Metacomet,  to  put  out  a  boat  to  rescue  the  survivors,  and 
a  young  ensign  with  a  boat's  crew  rowed  through  that 
storm  of  bursting  shells  and  coolly  picked  up  the  men  who 
were  struggling  in  the  water.  A  Confederate  gunner 
trained  his  piece  on  the  boat.  "Don't  fire  on  him!"  cried 
General  Page.  "He's  saving  drowning  men!"  And  the 
ensign  returned  to  his  ship  unhurt. 

Captain  Alden  of  the  Brooklyn,  who  was  leading  the  line, 
had  seen  the  Tecumseh  go  down,  and  suddenly  became 
panic-stricken.  His  lookout  told  him  that  there  were 

179 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

torpedo-buoys  almost  under  his  bows.  What  they  saw 
was  a  number  of  empty  shell-boxes  floating  about  the 
channel  where  they  had  been  dropped  overboard  from  the 
gunboats.  But  Alden  was  so  sure  that  they  were  torpedo- 
buoys  that  he  backed  his  engines  and  stopped. 

"Go  forward!"  signaled  Farragut,  realizing  that  a  fresh 
disaster  would  soon  occur  if  the  Brooklyn  did  not  go  on 
ahead,  but  she  still  hung  motionless  right  in  the  channel. 
Meanwhile  the  other  ships  were  steaming  up,  the  other 
monitors  were  also  in  the  channel,  and  the  whole  column 
in  a  few  minutes  would  have  been  a  mass  of  collisions,  all 
on  account  of  Captain  Alden's  fright.  The  Brooklyn,  with 
the  Octorara,  now  swung  athwart  the  channel,  suffering  a 
terrible  raking  fire  from  Fort  Morgan  herself  and  making  it 
impossible  for  a  single  Union  vessel  to  get  by  her.  The  con 
fusion  was  getting  worse  with  every  tick  of  the  watch. 
The  Confederates,  seeing  the  plight  of  the  Union  fleet,  re 
doubled  their  fire. 

"Go  ahead!"  signaled  Farragut  again.  It  was,  as  he 
said  afterward,  the  supreme  moment  of  his  life.  All  his 
plans  seemed  wrecked,  and  his  ships  lay  in  confusion  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Confederates.  So  he  breathed  a  prayer  for 
help,  and  he  felt  that  the  answer  was  "Go  on."  The 
Brooklyn  still  lay  like  a  log  across  the  channel,  making  it 
impossible  to  pass  her  to  the  right.  There  was  only  one 
other  way — to  cross  to  the  left.  But  to  go  that  way 
meant  to  run  across  that  deadly  line  of  torpedoes — and 
there  was  the  fate  of  the  Tecumseh. 

Better  lose  the  Hartford  and  the  Metacomet  than  the 
whole  fleet.  Farragut  gave  the  order,  and  the  two  ships 
turned  short  around  and  steamed  for  Mobile  Bay,  clearing 
the  Brooklyn  to  the  left. 

"Torpedoes  ahead!"  came  the  warning  cry  from  the 
Brooklyn. 

' '  Damn  the^torpedoes !"  shouted  Farragut.  ' '  Four  bells ! 
Captain  Drayton,  go  ahead!  Jouett,  full  speed!" 

The  men  on  board  those  ships  would  have  gone  anywhere 

180 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

with  Farragut,  but  they  caught  their  breath  when  the  cut 
waters  went  foaming  across  the  torpedo  line.  Hadn't  they 
just  seen  the  Tecumseh  go  down?  The  two  vessels  surged 
along  at  full  speed,  the  engines  thumping  till  the  decks 
quivered,  and  it  is  no  disgrace  to  anybody  if  there  were 
some  hearts  thumping,  too.  In  another  minute  the  ships 
were  safe  in  the  bay. 

Afterward  men  below  decks  on  both  ships  swore  that 
they  heard  the  torpedoes  bump  on  the  sides  and  even  the 
snap  of  the  primers.  Probably  the  torpedoes  had  been 
carelessly  made  and  had  become  useless  after  some  time 
in  the  water.  At  any  rate,  no  more  exploded,  and  Farra- 
gut's  daring  manceuver  saved  the  day  for  the  Union. 

The  tangled  line  straightened  out,  the  Richmond  and 
the  Port  Royal,  the  next  pair  of  ships  astern  of  the  Hart 
ford,  followed  the  latter  across  the  torpedo  line,  and  the 
whole  fleet  steamed  ahead.  But  during  those  moments 
of  confusion  the  Union  forces  suffered  heavily  from  the 
cross-fire.  Shells  from  the  Tennessee  and  the  gunboats 
plunged  into  the  bows  of  the  ships,  sweeping  away  whole 
gun-crews  at  a  time,  while  from  the  right  came  the  deadly 
fire  of  Fort  Morgan  at  close  range.  In  fact,  the  ships  were 
so  near  the  fort  that,  in  a  lull  of  the  firing,  the  Union  men 
could  hear  the  Confederate  officers  giving  orders  to  their 
men.  It  is  hard  to  understand  why  none  of  the  wooden 
vessels  were  sunk  under  the  terrific  pounding,  but  they 
had  received  few  injuries  near  the  water-line.  Although 
there  had  been  a  good  many  killed  and  wounded,  especially 
on  the  Brooklyn  and  the  Hartford,  the  only  one  of  the  ships 
badly  hurt  in  passing  the  fort  was  the  Oneida,  which  was 
disabled  by  a  shot  that  went  through  her  boilers.  Here  the 
wisdom  of  Farragut's  plan  was  shown,  because,  though  the 
Oneida  was  helpless,  the  gunboat  Galena,  which  was  lashed 
to  her  port  side,  carried  her  safely  past. 

Buchanan  now  attempted  to  repeat  the  story  of  the  Cum 
berland.  As  the  Hartford  came  forging  up  the  channel  he 
tried  to  ram  her.  but  the  Tennessee  was  clumsy  and  slow, 

181 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

and  a  twist  of  the  Hartford's  wheel  was  all  that  was  neces 
sary  to  avoid  her  beak.  The  Tennessee  went  on  trying 
vainly  to  ram  the  others,  but  Buchanan  found  that  to  hit 
a  vessel  under  full  steam  was  a  very  different  thing  from 
running  into  a  motionless  sailing-ship.  As  the  dreaded 
ram  went  down  the  approaching  line,  the  Hartford  kept 
on  into  the  bay  till  she  could  swing  around  safely.  Then 
she  turned  her  broadsides  on  the  three  gunboats  that  had 
done  her  so  much  harm  and  drove  them  away.  One  was 
nearly  sunk,  another  was  chased  and  captured  by  the 
Metacomet. 

Soon  all  the  Union  ships  were  in  the  upper  bay,  and  the 
order  was  given  to  anchor.  Breakfast  was  prepared  and 
the  decks  cleaned  of  their  blood-stains.  The  Tennessee  had 
retired  to  the  shelter  of  Fort  Morgan;  and  Farragut,  as  he 
saw  her  there,  began  planning  to  attack  her  with  his 
monitors  by  night.  He  judged  that  in  the  darkness  the 
gunners  of  Fort  Morgan  would  hesitate  to  fire,  because  they 
would  not  be  able  to  distinguish  friend  from  foe. 

Scarcely  had  he  settled  on  this  plan  when  he  saw  the 
Tennessee  deliberately  leave  her  berth  and  head  for  the 
Union  fleet. 

"Old  Buck's  coming  out!"  was  shouted  from  ship  to 
ship,  and  in  a  hurry  the  mess-gear  was  stowed  and  the  gun 
crews  formed  to  give  "old  Buck"  the  fight  he  was  evidently 
looking  for.  It  makes  anybody's  blood  tingle  with  admira 
tion  at  the  thought  of  that  solitary  Tennessee  sallying  out 
to  fight  the  entire  fleet.  But  it  was  another  one  of  those 
things  that  are  "magnificent,  but  not  war."  By  so  doing 
Buchanan  threw  away  every  advantage  he  had.  His  guns 
were  of  longer  range  than  most  of  those  in  the  Union  fleet, 
and,  lying  snug  under  the  shelter  of  the  fort,  or  out  in  the 
shallows  where  the  Union  ships  could  not  follow,  he  could 
have  given  Farragut's  wooden  fleet  a  great  deal  of  trouble. 
Instead  of  that  he  came  to  close  quarters  in  deep  water, 
exactly  where  his  enemy  wanted  him. 

Farragut  passed  the  order  to  attack  the  Tennessee  ''bows 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

on,"  and  one  after  another  of  the  wooden  ships  crashed 
into  the  ironclad,  wrenching  their  own  bows  and  doing  very 
little  apparent  damage.  As  in  the  battle  between  the 
Cumberland  and  the  Merrimac,  their  broadsides  at  close 
quarters  glanced  harmlessly  off  the  ram's  casemate,  while 
every  now  and  then  the  Tennessee  sent  a  shell  that  tore 
through  the  sides  of  the  ships. 

Once  she  tried  to  ram  the  Hartford,  but  struck  only  a 
glancing  blow  and  went  scraping  along  the  side  of  her 
enemy.  At  that  moment  Farragut  sprang  into  the  mizzen 
shrouds  and  stood  almost  over  the  ram.  For  the  third  time 
that  day  one  of  his  devoted  shipmates  passed  a  rope  around 
him  and  fastened  him  to  the  shrouds  so  that  no  sudden 
shock  might  hurl  him  out.  The  Hartford's  guns  thundered 
away,  but  even  at  ten  feet  the  heavy  broadsides  glanced 
off  the  heavy  casemate.  All  this  while  at  close  quarters 
the  Tennessee  was  able  to  fire  only  one  shell,  for  her  gun- 
primers  refused  to  w^ork  properly. 

Two  of  the  Union  monitors  had  troubles  with  their 
engines,  guns,  or  turrets,  and  were  not  in  condition  to  give 
much  help,  but  the  third,  the  Chickasaw,  was  still  in  good 
shape.  She  was  commanded  by  the  youngest  of  Farragut's 
captains,  George  Perkins,  the  same  young  man  who  piloted 
the  Cayuga  past  Fort  St.  Philip,  and  with  Captain  Bailey 
marched  through  a  yelling  mob  in  New  Orleans.  Perkins 
took  his  ship  close  under  the  Tennessee's  stern  and  smashed 
fifty-two  of  his  eleven-inch  steel  shot  into  her  after  case 
mate,  shattering  the  iron  plates  and  letting  daylight  through 
the  woodwork. 

This  sort  of  pounding  changed  the  looks  of  things  for 
Buchanan.  Already  the  ramming  had  broken  off  the 
smoke-stack  of  the  Tennessee  under  the  casemate,  and  the 
stifling  coal-smoke  made  it  almost  impossible  to  breathe. 
Three  of  the  shutters  on  the  port  side  were  jammed  by 
shot.  The  Chickasaw  had  closed  the  stern  port  in  the  same 
way,  and  the  steering-chains  had  been  cut  through,  so  Bu 
chanan  ordered  the  ram  to  be  headed  back  to  Fort  Morgan. 

183 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR   NAVY 

Just  at  that  time  a  shot  from  the  Chickasaw  jammed 
another  port.  While  a  machinist  was  at  work  trying  to 
loosen  it  another  shot  struck  the  port  fairly,  killing  the  man 
and  sending  a  nut  with  such  force  across  the  deck  that  it 
broke  Buchanan's  leg  above  the  knee.  It  was  almost  the 
same  kind  of  injury  that  he  had  received  in  Hampton 
Roads,  and  in  the  same  leg. 

Captain  Johnson,  who  now  took  command  of  the  ram, 
found  her  in  a  desperate  condition.  She  could  not  be 
steered — there  was  hardly  enough  steam  to  move  her, 
anyway — scarcely  a  gun  could  be  fired,  and  it  was  only  a 
question  of  minutes  before  the  after  part  of  the  casemate 
would  be  broken  down  under  the  terrific  hammering  of 
the  Chickasaw.  After  twenty  minutes  of  playing  target 
for  the  whole  fleet,  and  being  unable  to  bring  a  single  gun 
to  bear  in  reply,  Johnson  surrendered. 

It  happened  that  Johnson  was  a  warm  friend  of  Com 
mander  LeRoy  of  the  ship  Ossipee,  which  just  at  the  mo 
ment  of  surrender  came  bumping  into  the  Tennessee.  The 
next  moment  there  was  a  friendly  shout:  "Hello,  Johnson! 
This  is  LeRoy.  I'll  send  a  boat  for  you !"  And,  by  an  odd 
coincidence,  LeRoy  had  been  one  of  those  who  had  fought 
on  the  Cumberland  in  Hampton  Roads  on  that  March 
morning  two  years  before.  So  when  he  went  aboard  the 
Tennessee  to  take  Buchanan's  surrender,  he  told  the  Con 
federate  admiral  with  a  smile  that  they  had  "met  before." 

The  pleasantest  feature  about  the  naval  story  of  the 
Civil  War  is  the  fact  that  the  very  men  who  fought  each 
other  like  tigers  as  long  as  the  flag  was  flying  were  friends 
again  immediately  after  the  surrender.  These  Confederate 
and  Union  officers  had  served  together  on  shipboard  in  the 
"old  navy,"  and  many  of  them  were  personally  great  friends. 
As  the  wounded  officers  of  both  sides  lay  on  the  deck  of  the 
Metacomet  after  the  battle  they  were  soon  swapping  stories 
of  the  "old  days." 

There  had  been  a  pleasant  reunion  between  the  com 
manding  officers  when  the  Metacomet  captured  the  Selma 

184 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

shortly  before  the  Tennessee  came  out.  Jouett,  of  the 
Metacomet,  had  served  before  the  war  as  a  midshipman 
under  Murphy,  of  the  Selma,  who  had  been  very  kind  to 
him.  Jouett  had  set  his  heart  on  capturing  Commander 
Murphy  and  had  taken  great  pains  to  prepare  all  sorts  of 
good  things  to  eat  in  order  to  please  his  old  friend,  who  was 
fond  of  a  good  table.  When  the  Selma' s  flag  was  down 
Murphy  came  aboard  the  Metacomet  to  give  up  his  sword, 
looking  very  stern  and  dignified  with  his  erect  figure  and 
long  white  hair  and  beard.  Jouett  had  sent  every  one 
forward,  to  spare  the  old  gentleman's  feelings,  and  before 
Murphy  could  begin  his  stiff  little  speech  of  surrender 
Jouett  hooked  one  arm  confidentially  into  his  and  re 
marked:  "Come  on,  Murphy.  I  have  had  breakfast  wait 
ing  some  time." 

Then  when  the  Confederate  officer  sat  down  to  a  break 
fast  of  the  sort  he  delighted  in  but  had  not  tasted  for  many 
a  month  the  old  warrior's  eyes  began  to  twinkle.  ' '  Jouett, ' ' 
he  laughed,  "why  didn't  you  tell  me  you  had  all  these  good 
things?  I  would  have  surrendered  to  you  long  ago!" 

It  was  a  little  over  three  hours  from  the  first  shot  of  the 
battle  to  the  moment  when  the  whole  Union  fleet  burst 
into  cheers  over  the  surrender  of  the  Tennessee.  Besides 
those  drowned  in  the  Tecumsch  the  Union  loss  was  52 
killed  and  170  wounded,  in  comparison  with  which  the 
Confederate  casualties  were  trifling.  But  the  great  object 
had  been  attained.  A  few  days  later,  after  a  heavy  bom 
bardment  from  the  fleet,  Fort  Morgan  surrendered,  and 
Mobile  Bay  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Union. 

"It  was  the  most  desperate  fight  I  ever  saw  since  the 
days  of  the  old  Essex"  remarked  Farragut,  grimly,  and 
unquestionably  it  was  the  greatest  naval  battle  of  the 
Civil  War.  Moreover,  it  came  perilously  near  being  an 
overwhelming  defeat  for  the  Union  cause.  That  the 
threatened  defeat  became  a  victory  was  due  to  the  superb 
courage  and  quick  decision  of  Farragut  himself.  To  use 
the  words  of  the  Confederate  General  Page,  who  took  in  the 

185 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

whole  situation  from  Fort  Morgan,  "Farragut's  coolness 
and  quick  perception  saved  the  Union  fleet  from  a  great 
disaster  and  probably  from  destruction." 

The  capture  of  Mobile  was  the  crowning  achievement 
of  the  hero's  career.  Worn  out  by  responsibility  and 
fighting,  he  went  north  in  December,  1864,  and  received 
the  honors  that  the  grateful  nation  was  eager  to  shower 
upon  him.  In  1866  he  was  created  Admiral  of  the  Navy, 
the  first  in  our  history,  and  there  have  been  but  two  others 
since  who  bore  that  honor.  In  1867  he  commanded  a 
squadron  which  visited  European  waters  and  was  every 
where  received  with  enthusiasm  and  honors. 

Farragut's  career  connected  the  Civil  War  and  the  War 
of  1812.  In  him  we  find  every  fine  characteristic  of  that 
splendid  set  of  officers  who  brought  us  honor  in  1812,  and 
to  these  qualities  he  added  something  still  finer  of  his  own. 
In  the  list  of  American  naval  heroes  the  name  of  David 
Glasgow  Farragut  stands  first. 


XV 

TORPEDOES    AND    THE    "ALBEMARLE" 

History  of  torpedoes  and  submarines — The  Confederate  "Davids" — 
Sinking  the  Housatonic — Construction  of  the  Albemarle — Attack  on 
Union  gunboats — Cushing's  torpedo  attack  on  the  Albemarle — His 
escape. 

THE  torpedo  that  sank  the  Tecumseh  was  probably  one 
of  a  kind  the  Confederates  used  a  great  deal  in  their 
river  and  harbor  defenses.  This  was  a  beer-barrel  with  a 
cone  of  wood  at  each  end  to  steady  it,  a  large  quantity 
of  gunpowder,  and  at  the  top  a  device  for  setting  it  off — 
sometimes  a  trigger  that  exploded  a  cap,  sometimes  a  tube 
of  sulphuric  acid  which  would  spill  on  a  bit  of  metal  and 
start  combustion.  The  word  "torpedo"  during  the  Civil 
War  covered  all  explosives  under  water;  there  was  no  dis 
tinction  as  there  is  to-day  between  a  "torpedo,"  which  is 
fired  from  a  torpedo-tube,  and  the  "mine,"  which  is 
stationary. 

As  far  back  as  the  Revolutionary  War  a  Connecticut 
inventor  named  Bushnell  invented  a  submarine  called  the 
Turtle,  in  which  he  planned  to  go  out  and  place  a  torpedo 
against  the  side  of  a  British  ship  and  blow  it  up.  Although 
his  invention  never  sank  any  ships  of  the  enemy,  it  came 
near  doing  so,  and  the  British  were  fearfully  indignant  at 
such  "infernal  means  of  warfare."  In  the  War  of  1812 
Robert  Fulton  came  forward  with  a  better  type  of  torpedo, 
but  his  ideas  were  coldly  received.  Commodore  Rodgers — 
like  the  British  commodores  in  the  time  of  Bushnell — spoke 
of  torpedo  and  submarine  warfare  as  "dastardly."  Poor 

187 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

Fulton  came  in  for  some  very  unpleasant  names;  the 
epithets  could  not  have  been  more  cruel  if  he  had  been 
caught  blowing  up  his  grandmother  with  one  of  his 
torpedoes. 

It  is  interesting  to  see  how  closely  the  submarine  is 
associated  with  the  torpedo.     The  submarine  idea  is  much 


THE    BARREL   TORPEDO 

older.  We  know  that  the  Dutch  physician  to  King  James  I. 
invented  a  submarine  and  once  gave  his  royal  patient  an 
hour's  cruise  under  the  Thames.  Between  that  time  and 
the  day  of  Robert  Fulton  the  submarine  idea  would  pop 
up  every  now  and  then,  but  without  any  real  success. 

We  are  accustomed  to  think  of  Fulton  as  the  man  of 
the  steamboat,  but  the  fact  is  that  he  was  much  more 
interested  in  his  submarine.  Before  the  War  of  1812 
Fulton  tried  to  sell  his  invention  to  the  French.  His  sub 
marine  had  the  fish,  or  "cigar,"  shape  which  all  the  other 
submarines  since  then  have  adopted,  and  it  was  called  the 
Nautilus.  (Those  who  remember  Captain  Nemo's  sub 
marine  Nautilus  in  Twenty  Thousand  Leagues  Under  the  Sea 
will  know  where  Jules  Verne  got  the  name.)  In  1807 
Fulton  was  given  a  chance  to  show  what  he  could  do  in  the 
harbor  of  Brest.  In  the  presence  of  a  large  crowd  he 
stayed  under  water  for  three  hours  and  blew  up  an  old 
hulk  in  the  harbor  with  a  torpedo.  Fulton  had  been 

188 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

perfectly  successful,  but  the  old  fellows  in  the  French 
Marine  wagged  their  heads  solemnly.  They  said  that  they 
were  afraid  that  anybody  caught  using  a  submarine 
would  be  treated  as  a  pirate,  and  while  they  were  en 
chanted  by  the  marvelous  ingenuity  of  Monsieur  Fulton, 
etc.,  etc.,  they  could  not  buy  the  Nautilus  for  the  French 
government. 

Fulton  then  went  to  England  and  gave  another  per 
fect  exhibition  in  the  Thames.  He  blew  up  an  old 
Danish  ship  put  there  for  the  purpose.  But  the  wise  ones 
of  the  British  Admiralty,  in  discussing  the  matter  over 
their  port,  decided  that  as  long  as  Britain's  strength  lay 
in  her  "wooden  walls  "  it  would  not  do  to  encourage  an  in 
vention  that  would  smash  those  wooden  walls  from  beneath. 
So  they  rejected  Fulton's  invention  then  just  as  a  genera 
tion  later  the  British  Admiralty  rejected  Ericsson's  inven 
tions  of  the  screw-propeller  and  the  revolving  iron  turret. 


A    MODERN    SUBMARINE 


When  the  poor  inventor  turned  back  in  despair  to  his 
own  country  all  the  appreciation  he  got  was  to  be  called  a 
"low  ruffian"  by  Commodore  Rodgers,  the  senior  officer 

13  189 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

of  the  United  States  navy.  But  to  the  day  of  his  death 
Fulton  kept  pottering  over  his  submarine  and  its  torpedoes. 

Another  American  inventor  who  got  interested  in  tor 
pedo  warfare  was  Colt,  famous  for  his  invention  of  the 
revolver.  He  applied  electricity  instead  of  clockwork  to 
the  torpedo,  and  blew  up  an  old  ship  in  the  James  River 
to  show  Congress  how  easy  it  was.  But,  as  usual,  the 
old-timers  would  not  have  it. 

When  the  Civil  War  began,  the  South,  as  we  have  already 
said,  found  itself  compelled  to  adopt  the  newest  "wrinkles" 
in  warfare  in  order  to  oppose  the  fleets  of  the  North.  So 
the  torpedo  and  the  submarine  were  accepted  as  well  as  the 
iron-plated  casemate.  At  first  there  was  much  opposition 
to  these  means  of  fighting,  even  among  the  leaders  of  the 
South.  Such  weapons  were  described  as  "unchivalrous," 
"ruffianly,"  and  "dastardly."  When  it  was  discovered 
how  useful  the  torpedo  was,  North  and  South  got  bravely 
over  that  fine  sentiment.  During  the  war  twenty-eight 
ships  were  sunk  or  damaged  by  torpedoes. 

In  torpedo  work  the  South  led  the  way,  thanks  largely  to 
the  genius  of  Matthew  F.  Maury,  the  great  scientist  of  the 
old  navy.  The  North  was  compelled  to  follow  in  self- 
defense.  In  the  use  of  submarines  the  Southerners  had  no 
imitators  in  the  Northern  navy.  But,  realizing  what  suc 
cessful  submarines  might  do  against  the  blockading  ships, 
the  Confederate  naval  constructors  went  doggedly  to  work. 
What  they  managed  to  put  together  was  a  queer  little  boat 
which  they  called  a  David  because  they  hoped  that  it 
would  sink  some  of  the  Goliaths  out  in  the  blockading 
fleet. 

One  of  these  Davids  deserves  a  special  mention.  It  was 
a  very  simple  craft.  The  propeller  -  shaft  was  turned 
round  by  the  crew  of  eight  men  with  their  hands.  The 
captain  sat  forward  at  the  wheel,  and  handled  the  ropes 
controlling  a  spar  that  projected  several  feet  from  the  nose 
of  the  boat  and  held  a  torpedo  at  the  end.  She  was  de 
signed  to  "dive  under  water,"  but  she  did  it  entirely  too 

190 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR  NAVY 

well.  On  her  trial  trip  she  went  down  to  stay,  and  the  ten 
men  on  board  were  all  suffocated.  She  was  raised,  but 
time  and  again  afterward  she  carried  all  or  most  of  her  crew 
to  the  bottom. 

Submarine  warfare  was  called  "cowardly,"  even  by  some 
of  the  Confederate  naval  officers.  But  what  shall  be 
said  of  those  five  men  and  two  officers  who  volunteered  to 
go  out  in  this  little  death-trap  and  blow  up  the  Housatonic 
off  Charleston  harbor?  When  those  men  stepped  into  that 
David  she  had  already  sunk  five  times  and  caused  the 
death  of  about  thirty-five  men! 

On  this  occasion  they  attempted  no  diving,  but  went  on 
the  surface  with  the  hatch  standing  out  of  water.  It  was 
about  nine  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  February  17,  1864, 


CONFEDERATE   "  DAVID  " 

when  the  watch  on  the  steam-sloop  Housatonic  noticed  a 
strange-looking  thing  rippling  toward  the  ship.  He  gave 
the  alarm,  but  before  the  steamer  could  move  or  fire  a  gun 
there  was  a  muffled  roar  alongside,  and  the  big  ship  lurched 
and  went  down.  Fortunately,  the  water  was  so  shallow 
there  that  as  the  Housatonic  sank  she  settled  on  the  bot 
tom,  with  her  masts  well  above  the  surface,  so  all  the  crew 
but  one  ensign  and  four  men  saved  themselves  by  scamper 
ing  up  the  shrouds. 

Nothing  was  seen  of  the  David  after  the  Housatonic  went 
down,  and  no  one  knew  what  had  become  of  her.  After 
the  war,  when  the  wrecks  were  being  cleared  out  of  Charles 
ton  Harbor,  the  divers  discovered  the  little  submarine 
wedged  in  the  hole  made  by  the  torpedo.  As  the  hatch 
was  found  open  it  is  thought  that  it  was  probably  left  open 
when  the  attack  was  made — perhaps  the  men  felt  safer 

191 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

that  way — and  the  waves  from  the  torpedo  explosion 
swamped  her.  Then  she  was  sucked  into  the  very  wound 
she  had  made  in  the  side  of  the  Housatonic. 

Crude  as  that  little  David  was,  she  still  holds  the  record 
of  having  been  the  only  submarine  that  has  ever  sunk  a 
vessel  in  time  of  war.  And  it  is  not  likely  that  any  other 
submarine  will  be  manned  by  a  braver  crew. 

The  most  daring  and  dramatic  torpedo  exploit  has  to  do 
with  the  story  of  Union  operations  in  those  landlocked 
waters  off  the  coast  of  North  Carolina  known  as  Albe- 
marle  and  Pamlico  sounds.  These  were  important  for  the 
Union  to  control  because,  if  left  in  Confederate  hands,  they 
would  be  a  paradise  for  blockade-runners.  They  were  also 
the  key  to  many  navigable  rivers,  four  canals,  and  two 
railroad  lines.  The  Union  fleet  got  control  before  the 
Confederates  had  made  much  preparation  for  defense,  but 
this  fleet  was  a  queer  collection  of  old  junk  in  the  way  of 
broken-down  ferry-boats,  little  river-steamers,  and  tugs. 
They  were  not  armored;  in  fact,  their  wooden  sides  were  so 
flimsy  that  they  were  well  named  the  "pasteboard  fleet." 
The  Confederates  believed  that  they  needed  only  to  put 
together  another  ironclad  ram  to  shoot  this  pasteboard 
fleet  into  splinters  and  regain  control  of  the  sounds.  Of 
course  it  was  the  business  of  the  Union  vessels  to  prevent 
the  building  of  such  a  ram,  and  the  little  steamers  darted 
up  this  river  and  that,  destroying  military  supplies  wherever 
they  found  them. 

In  spite  of  the  active  work  of  the  Union  flotilla  and  the 
presence  of  Union  troops  in  the  neighborhood,  too,  the 
Confederates  cleverly  managed  to  get  a  ram  built  up  the 
Roanoke  River.  How  they  succeeded  in  constructing  any 
kind  of  ship  at  all  is  a  mystery.  Their  ship-building  plant 
consisted  of  a  blacksmith  shop,  and  the  keel  of  the  vessel 
was  laid  in  a  corn-field.  One  of  the  greatest  difficulties  in 
the  work  was  the  lack  of  iron,  and  Captain  Cooke,  the  tire 
less  builder  of  the  ram,  ransacked  the  country  for  miles  in 
every  direction  to  gather  up  every  stray  nut,  bolt,  or 

192 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

coupling-pin,  till  he  became  known  as  the  "ironmonger 
captain." 

The  new  ram  was  called  the  Albemarle.  Chief -Con 
structor  John  L.  Porter,  to  whom  most  of  the  credit  for  the 
Merrimac  is  generally  given,  made  the  plans  for  the  Albe 
marle,  too,  and  she  showed  a  strong  family  resemblance  to 
the  Merrimac.  Still  she  had  peculiarities  of  her  own.  Her 
casemate — sixty  feet  in  length — was  octagonal  in  shape, 
with  four  inches  of  iron  laid  over  pine  timbers  and  planking 
with  the  usual  sloping  sides.  She  mounted  only  two  guns, 
but  these  were  rifled  hundred-pounders,  and  the  casemate 
was  so  pierced  that  these  powerful  guns  could  be  used  on  a 
broadside  as  well  as  fore  and  aft.  A  very  important  point 
was  that  she  drew  only  eight  feet  of  water. 

In  April,  1864,  the  Albemarle  was  practically  finished. 
On  learning  of  the  existence  of  the  ram  the  Union  officers 
placed  obstructions  and  torpedoes  in  the  Roanoke  River, 
above  the  town  of  Plymouth,  to  keep  her  from  entering 
the  sound.  But  unusually  high  water  in  the  river  gave 
Captain  Cooke  his  chance,  and  on  the  night  of  April  i8th 
he  succeeded  in  getting  the  Albemarle  over  the  obstructions. 
As  the  ram  steamed  down-river  the  workmen  were  still 
driving  bolts  into  her,  and  at  the  same  time  her  captain  was 
drilling  his  crew  at  the  big  guns.  One  instant  he  was  giving 
an  order  to  his  workmen,  the  next  he  was  shouting  to  the 
gun-crew,  but  he  was  not  going  to  lose  a  moment's  time 
in  getting  the  Albemarle  out  into  the  sound. 

It  was  after  midnight  when  she  was  discovered  by  the 
two  Union  picket  boats  stationed  in  the  river  below  Plym 
outh.  Lieutenant  Flusser,  who  was  in  command  of  the 
Miami,  had  provided  chains  and  spars  connecting  the  two 
gunboats  Miami  and  Southfield,  so  that  in  case  the  ram  did 
get  over  the  obstructions  the  gunboats  might  catch  her 
between  them  and  hold  her  till  they  could  pound  a  hole  in 
her  casemate. 

But  Cooke  saw  what  was  expected  of  him,  and  when 
the  two  gunboats  came  on  toward  him  he  sheered  off  and 


THE  STORY  OF  OUR  NAVY 


ALBEMARLE  AND  PAMLICO  SOUNDS 

hugged  the  shore.  Then,  turning  suddenly,  he  passed  the 
bow  of  the  Miami  and  rammed  the  Southfield,  which  went 
down  like  a  stone.  Both  gunboats  had  already  poured  a 
heavy  shell  fire  on  the  Albemarle,  but  had  done  no  harm  at 
all.  Lieutenant  Flusser  fired  a  shell  when  the  ram  came 

194 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

to  close  quarters,  but  the  pieces  of  the  shell,  bursting  on 
the  casemate  only  a  few  feet  away,  killed  Flusser  himself 
and  wounded  eight  of  his  men.  In  the  death  of  the  "lion- 
hearted  Flusser"  the  Union  lost  one  of  its  finest  young 
officers. 

Realizing  the  hopelessness  of  fighting  the  ram  single- 
handed,  the  Miami  then  fled  down-river  and  out  into  the 
sound. 

On  May  5th  the  Albemarle  sallied  out  from  the  mouth  of 
the  Roanoke  River,  followed  by  two  small  vessels  carrying 
troops.  Captain  Cooke  was  to  escort  these  transports  to 
the  Alligator  River,  and  then  he  intended  to  cruise  up  and 
down  the  sounds.  He  hoped  to  destroy  or  frighten  away 
the  "pasteboard  fleet"  and,  on  those  waters  at  least,  to 
recover  the  "sea  control"  for  the  Confederacy. 

As  soon  as  the  Albemarle  appeared  the  Union  gunboats 
promptly  made  for  her,  and  an  exciting  time  followed. 
One  of  the  flimsy  gunboats  boldly  rammed  the  ram  itself, 
and  received  a  hundred-pound  shell  in  her  boiler  in  payment. 
But  the  Albemarle,  though  she  found  it  easy  to  send  a  shell 
tearing  through  the  thin  wooden  sides  of  the  Union  gun 
boats,  could  not  manceuver  fast  enough  to  ram  them  in 
the  open  water  of  the  sound.  For  some  reason  none  of 
her  hundred-pound  shells  struck  at  or  near  the  water-line  of 
any  of  the  Union  flotilla,  so  at  a  time  when  careful  gunnery 
could  have  sunk  almost  the  entire  fleet,  the  Albemarle 
failed  to  sink  or  destroy  a  single  one  of  these  unprotected 
ships.  Meanwhile,  as  was  to  be  expected,  the  gunboats 
had  failed  to  penetrate  the  casemate  of  the  Albemarle. 
But  they  did  injure  the  tiller,  riddle  the  smoke-stack,  and 
crack  the  muzzle  of  one  of  those  two  big  Armstrongs. 
They  also  captured  one  of  the  transports.  As  night  came 
on  the  Albemarle  retreated  up  the  Roanoke  River,  leaving 
the  field  to  the  "pasteboard  fleet." 

The  Albemarle  was  quickly  repaired,  but  she  did  not  try 
to  attack  the  Union  gunboats  again.  Once  she  came  down 
to  the  mouth  of  the  river  to  drag  for  torpedoes,  but  retired 

195 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

when  one  of  the  gunboats  opened  fire  on  her.  From  that 
time  on  she  stayed  tied  up  to  a  wharf  at  Plymouth,  doing 
nothing  at  all  except  to  prevent  the  Union  vessels  from 
going  any  farther  up  the  Roanoke  River. 

But  as  the  Union  officers  out  in  the  sound  were  expecting 
her  to  come  out  at  any  minute,  they  had  to  keep  a  close 
watch.  When  the  rumor  came  to  Washington  that  the 
Confederates  had  a  sister  ship  to  the  Albemarle  almost 
completed  on  the  Roanoke  River,  the  Navy  Department 
decided  that  the  ram  must  be  destroyed  at  once. 

The  plan  decided  on  was  to  run  a  light  steam-launch  up 
the  river  some  dark  night,  take  the  Confederates  by  sur 
prise,  and  blow  up  the  Albemarle  by  means  of  a  "spar 
torpedo. "  As  it  was  with  most ' '  secret ' '  plans  of  the  Union 
in  those  days,  every  detail  about  the  intended  attack  was 
soon  made  known  to  Captain  Warley,  who  had  become 
commander  of  the  ram  on  the  illness  of  Captain  Cooke. 

The  man  selected  for  the  daring  enterprise  was  Lieutenant 
Cushing,  then  only  twenty-one  years  old,  but  already  fa 
mous  for  his  coolness  and  daredevil  bravery  in  the  opera 
tions  about  the  Roanoke  River.  Cushing  left  the  fleet  and 
went  to  New  York  to  superintend  the  building  of  the  two 
launches  that  he  wanted  for  the  attack.  One  of  these  was 
lost  in  Chesapeake  Bay  on  the  way  south. 

With  the  other  he  made  his  way  through  the  canal  from 
Norfolk  to  the  sounds  and  reported  to  the  commanding 
officer  in  October,  1864. 

Meanwhile  the  Confederates  were  going  ahead  with 
their  preparations  as  well.  They  intended  to  make  it 
absolutely  impossible  to  reach  the  side  of  the  Albemarle 
with  a  torpedo.  In  the  first  place,  the  ram  lay  controlling 
the  bend  in  the  river  round  which  her  enemies  must  come, 
and  her  big  forward  gun  was  loaded  with  grape  and  canister. 
There  were  also  one  thousand  soldiers  on  shore  in  Plymouth, 
and  a  double  set  of  sentries  along  the  river.  A  squad  was 
placed  on  the  wreck  of  the  Southfield,  too,  so  that  nothing 
might  come  up-river  without  challenge  and  discovery.  In 

196 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

addition,  a  boom  of  cypress  logs  surrounding  the  Albemarle 
was  laid  well  out  from  the  side  of  the  ram  to  make  it 
impossible  for  any  boat  to  get  within  striking-distance. 
And  yet  the  Navy  Department  had  counted  on  Gushing' s 
attack  being  a  complete  surprise  for  the  Confederates ! 

The  night  of  October  27,  1864,  turned  out  to  be  dark  and 
drizzly,  just  the  conditions  that  Gushing  desired.  So  he 
slipped  out  from  the  flotilla  and  headed  his  little  launch  up 
the  Roanoke  River.  Astern  of  the  launch  trailed  a  cutter 
filled  with  armed  men,  for  Gushing  thought  that  if  he 
succeeded  in  taking  the  Albemarle  by  surprise  he  would 
board  and  capture  her  instead  of  blowing  her  up. 

All  went  well  for  a  while.  The  sentries  had  been  waiting 
a  good  many  nights  for  nothing,  and  wet  weather  helped 
to  dampen  their  watchfulness.  So  the  launch  slipped 
silently  up  the  river  past  all  the  guards  without  discovery 
till  Gushing  could  see  the  Albemarle  herself  lying  at  her 
wharf,  eight  miles  from  _the  mouth  of  the  river.  He  was 
just  about  to  land  his  men  at  the  lower  wharf  and  make  a 
rush  to  board  the  ram  from  the  shore  when  a  hail  came  from 
the  Albemarle  herself.  At  that  Gushing  turned  loose  the  cut 
ter,  with  orders  for  the  men  to  go  down-river  and  seize  the 
Confederate  guard  on  the  Southfield.  Meanwhile  the  crew 
of  the  ram  had  begun  a  musketry  fire,  and  the  bullets 
splashed  all  about  the  launch.  A  sentry  on  shore  gave  the 
alarm  and  set  a  huge  bonfire  ablaze.  Then  for  the  first 
time  Gushing  suddenly  discovered  the  boom  of  logs  which 
lay  between  him  and  the  Albemarle.  This  was  a  dis 
concerting  thing  to  find  out  at  such  a  time  as  that,  but 
Gushing  had  no  idea  of  giving  up.  He  decided  that,  as  the 
logs  probably  had  been  some  time  in  the  water,  they 
would  be  slippery ;  and  he  decided  on  a  bold  move.  Making 
a  wide  circle  across  the  river  in  order  to  get  up  headway,  he 
came  about  and  charged  down  directly  upon  the  logs. 
There  was  a  bump  and  a  lurch,  but  the  launch  "hurdled" 
the  boom  successfully  and  shot  directly  for  the  side  of  the 
ram.  All  this  while  the  little  vessel  was  under  a  musket 

197 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

fire  from  the  ram  and  from  the  soldiers  on  the  bank,  but 
no  one  was  seriously  hurt. 

As  soon  as  the  launch  got  over  the  boom  Gushing  choked 
off  steam  and  let  the  headway  carry  him  alongside.  Then  he 
coolly  stood  up  in  the  bow  of  his  boat  and  adjusted  his  spar 
torpedo.  Ten  feet  in  front  of  his  face  was  the  muzzle  of 
the  huge  forward  gun  of  the  ram,  and  he  could  hear  the 
officer  giving  orders  to  the  gun-crew.  But  Gushing  went 
ahead  as  coolly  as  if  there  were  no  enemy  in  sight.  He 
carefully  lowered  the  spar  with  the  torpedo  on  the  end  of  it 
till  he  could  feel  that  it  was  under  the  overhang  of  the  ram. 
Then  he  pulled  the  line  that  released  the  torpedo,  and  after 
waiting  an  instant  till  it  had  floated  snug  up  beneath  the 
bottom  of  the  ship,  Gushing  pulled  another  line.  This  re 
leased  a  bullet  in  the  top  of  the  torpedo,  which  fell  on  a 
percussion-cap  in  the  powder  at  the  bottom,  and  set  off  a 
tremendous  explosion.  At  almost  the  same  moment — but 
just  a  trifle  later — the  big  gun  went  off,  and  only  the  lurch 
of  the  torpedo's  explosion  saved  the  entire  launch  crew 
from  being  blown  to  pieces.  The  Albemarle  oromptly 
sank. 

As  the  great  column  of  water  caused  by  the  explosion  fell 
back  and  swamped  the  launch,  the  next  minute  found  all  of 


LAUNCH    USED   BY  LIEUTENANT  GUSHING 

Cushing's  party  in  the  water.  Most  of  these  men  sur 
rendered  to  the  Confederates,  and  two  or  three  were 
drowned  trying  to  escape.  Gushing  himself  had  no  inten 
tion  of  being  captured,  and  swam  down-stream.  For  q, 

198 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 


while  he  helped  keep  afloat  a  poor  swimmer  and  after  the 
latter  sank,  exhausted,  Gushing  kept  on,  though  he  was 
himself  very  nearly  spent.  At  last  he  succeeded  in  touch 
ing  bottom  on  the  edge  of  a  swamp  at  some  distance  below 
the  town.  There  he  lay,  half  frozen,  till  daylight,  when  he 
found  himself  within  forty  yards  of  a  Confederate  fort. 
After  a  narrow  escape  from  being  discovered  by  a  sentinel 
he  hid  himself  all  day  in  the  swamp.  There 
he  found  an  old  negro  who  went  to  the  town 
to  ask  about  the  ram  for  him  and  brought 
back  the  cheerful  news  that  the  Albemarle 
"sho  am  done  for!" 

Then  Gushing  plunged  on  through  the  swamp 
till  by  good  luck  he  found  a  little  dugout  left 
by  some  Confederate  sentries.  Taking  this, 
while  the  owners  were  eating  their  supper,  he 
paddled  for  dear  life  down-river,  and  kept  at 
it  till  he  reached  the  sound,  eight  miles  away. 
Fortunately,  the  sea  was  perfectly  calm,  so 
that  he  was  able  to  keep  the  cranky  little 
skiff  afloat  and  going  ahead.  That  evening 
the  fleet  lay  scattered  some  miles  from  the 
mouth  of  the  Roanoke,  and  it  was  only  after 
long,  back  -  breaking  work,  steering  by  the 
stars,  that  Gushing  discovered  one  of  the 
vessels.  After  his  feeble  "Ship  ahoy!"  he  dropped,  ut 
terly  exhausted,  in  the  bottom  of  his  boat. 

Finally  he  was  once  more  in  the  hands  of  his  friends,  who 
had  long  before  given  him  up  for  dead.  As  soon  as  the 
good  news  about  the  Albemarle  was  told,  rockets  shot  up 
into  the  darkness  to  pass  the  word  on  to  other  ships  of  the 
fleet.  With  the  Albemarle  lying  in  the  mud  at  her  moor 
ings,  the  Union  fleet  at  once  took  possession  of  Plymouth, 
and  the  entire  Albemarle  district  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
Union. 

For  his  exploit  in  sinking  the  ram  Gushing  was  honored 
by  the  thanks  of  Congress  and  immediate  promotion  to  the 

199 


SECTION   OF 
TORPEDO 
USED    BY 
GUSHING 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

rank  of  lieutenant-commander.  It  is  hard  to  be  generous 
to  a  successful  enemy;  and  Captain  Warley,  of  the  Albe- 
marle,  honored  himself  as  well  as  Gushing  when  he  de 
scribed  the  latter's  feat  in  these  words,  "A  more  gallant 
thing  was  not  done  during  the  war." 


XVI 

CONFEDERATE    CRUISERS 

English  sentiment  for  the  South — Building  ships  for  the  Confederacy 
— Career  of  the  Alabama — McDougal  in  Japan — The  Alabama  and 
the  Kearsarge — Disappearance  of  American  shipping. 

ONE  of  the  three  lines  of  operation  laid  down  for  the 
Union  navy  was  the  pursuit  of  Confederate  com 
merce-destroyers.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  South 
found  itself  somewhat  in  the  position  of  the  United  States 
in  the  Revolution  and  the  War  of  1812.  That  is,  the 
North  had  the  sea-power,  and  the  South  had  to  buy  or 
build  ships  as  best  it  could.  And,  like  England  in  those 
wars,  the  North  had  a  large  commerce  open  to  attack  on 
the  high  seas.  But,  whereas  in  the  earlier  wars  Americans 
had  a  large  carrying-trade  and  transformed  many  of  their 
merchantmen  into  privateers,  the  Confederate  States  had 
almost  no  shipping  at  all.  That  meant  that  there  was  no 
Confederate  commerce  for  the  Union  fleet  to  destroy,  but 
it  also  meant  that  there  were  no  ships  to  be  turned  into 
privateers. 

In  order  to  get  vessels  which  could  prey  on  the  commerce 
of  the  Northern  states  the  Confederates  turned  to  England. 
To-day  we  rejoice  in  the  fact  that  England  is  our  best 
friend  in  the  family  of  nations;  and  it  is,  or  should  be, 
our  national  policy  to  make  that  friendship  stronger.  But 
in  1 86 1  it  was  very  different.  At  that  time  the  United 
States  was  England's  greatest  rival  in  the  carrying-trade, 
and  when  the  war  broke  out  the  English  had  the  pleasant 
satisfaction  of  seeing  their  upstart;  rival  in  trouble.  The 

201 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

"upper  classes"  in  England  also  were  enthusiastic  for  the 
Confederacy,  because  it  was  based  on  the  slave  system, 
which  was  the  very  opposite  of  democracy.  The  fine 
gentry  of  that  time  felt  that  democratic  ideas  were  getting 
entirely  too  strong,  and  the  smash-up  of  the  United  States 
would  be  a  very  fitting  rebuke  to  people  who  held  danger 
ous  notions  about  a  government  "of  the  people,  by  the 
people,  and  for  the  people."  So  there  was  a  good  sale  for 
Confederate  bonds  in  London,  and  throughout  the  war 
heavy  pressure  was  laid  on  the  British  Ministry  to  intervene 
in  the  great  struggle,  or  at  least  to  recognize  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  South. 

The  day  after  DuPont  captured  Port  Royal,  November 
8,  1861,  Captain  Wilkes,  of  the  San  Jacinto,  overhauled 
the  Trent,  a  British  steamer,  and  took  off  the  Confederate 
agents,  Mason  and  Slidell,  who  were  going  to  England  and 
France  to  plead  the  cause  of  the  South.  This  was  exactly 
the  sort  of  thing  that  Great  Britain  had  been  doing  before 
the  War  of  1812,  except  that  in  this  case  the  persons 
' '  impressed ' '  were  undoubtedly  American  subjects.  Though 
she  had  dropped  the  practice,  England  had  never  yielded 
the  right  to  search  a  neutral  ship  and  take  off  any  English 
men  she  wanted.  But  when  the  shoe  went  on  the  other  foot 
it  pinched  horribly.  Without  waiting  for  an  explanation  or 
an  apology  the  British  government  collected  arms  and 
rushed  troops  to  Canada,  threatening  to  make  war  if  the 
United  States  did  not  give  up  those  men  within  seven  days. 

Captain  Wilkes  was  in  the  wrong,  and  the  agents  were 
turned  over  to  England,  but  the  incident  gave  Lincoln  a 
chance  to  remark  to  the  British  Ministry  that  this  point, 
which  England  had  made  such  a  great  fuss  over,  was  just 
the  principle  the  United  States  had  been  trying  to  make 
her  admit  for  fifty  years. 

From  that  time  till  the  news  of  Appomattox  the  senti 
ment  in  England  and  in  all  the  English  colonies  was  over 
whelmingly  in  favor  of  the  Confederacy.  The  very  news 
papers,  which  for  years  had  been  sneering  at  America  on 

202 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

account  of  slavery — always  picturing  Uncle  Sam  as  a 
brutal  slave-driver — in  1861  began  quoting  Bible  verses 
to  prove  that  slavery  was  inspired  from  heaven  and  printed 
hideous  caricatures  of  Lincoln.  During  the  war  Confed 
erate  cruisers  were  welcomed  in  every  British  port  and 
allowed  to  do  just  as  they  pleased  without  worrying  about 
the  rules  of  neutrality.  And,  what  was  of  most  impor 
tance,  the  English  shipyards  built  the  cruisers  that  the 
Confederates  needed. 

While  any  one  of  these  was  on  the  ways  the  shipwrights 
would  give  it  out  that  the  new  vessel  was  designed  for  the 
"Turkish  navy,"  the  "Swiss  navy,"  or  something  equally 
probable.  When  the  ship  was  completed  she  would  put 
out  to  sea,  followed  by  another  steamer  loaded  with  ' '  hard 
ware."  Then  the  two  steamers  would  meet  at  sea  and  the 
cargo  of  "hardware,"  consisting  of  cannon  and  small  arms, 
would  be  transferred  to  the  cruiser.  The  British  flag 
would  go  down,  up  would  go  the  Stars  and  Bars,  and  the 
Confederacy  would  have  another  man-of-war. 

This  story  was  repeated  again  and  again;  for,  although 
the  American  minister,  Mr.  Adams,  was  untiring  in  his 
efforts  to  collect  evidence  about  these  Confederate  cruisers 
and  present  it  to  the  British  government,  the  latter  was 
reluctant  to  take  any  action.  In  fact,  it  was  only  Mr. 
Adams'  quiet  reply  to  Lord  Russell,  "My  lord,  it  is 
superfluous  for  me  to  tell  you  that  this  means  war,"  that 
kept  a  great  double-turreted  ironclad  from  going  to  the 
Confederates  in  1864.  According  to  international  law,  it  is 
a  very  serious  breach  of  neutrality  for  a  neutral  nation  to 
allow  her  own  citizens  to  build  fighting-ships  for  either 
party  in  the  war,  and  Mr.  Adams  was  always  reminding 
the  British  Ministry  of  this  annoying  fact. 

The  most  famous  of  these  English-built  cruisers  was  the 
Alabama.  She  was  simply  called  "No.  290"  while  she  lay 
in  the  Lairds'  shipyards  at  Liverpool,  because  she  was  the 
2goth  ship  turned  out  by  that  firm.  Mr.  Adams  collected 
plenty  of  evidence  to  prove  that  the  vessel  was  being  built 

203 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

for  the  Confederacy,  and  he  would  not  let  the  British 
authorities  rest  till  they  reluctantly  ordered  the  ship  to  be 
held  in  port.  But  a  kind  friend  in  the  office  passed  the 
tip  by  wire,  and  the  cruiser  slipped  from  her  moorings  for 
a  trial  spin  in  the  Mersey.  She  never  came  back  from 
that  trial  trip,  but  steamed  on  to  Praya,  a  port  in  Terceira, 
one  of  the  islands  of  the  Azores.  There  she  was  met  by 
a  ship  from  London  containing  the  "hardware,"  and  a 
steamer  from  Liverpool  followed  with  the  future  officers 
of  the  man-of-war,  including  Capt.  Raphael  Semmes. 

Every  one  at  Praya  knew  exactly  what  was  going  on,  and 
the  feeble  protests  of  the  Portuguese  officials  did  not  pre 
vent  Captain  Semmes  from  going  right  ahead  with  his  prep 
arations.  On  August  24,  1862,  he  took  his  ship  out  to  sea, 
called  his  crew  together,  and  told  them  of  the  commerce- 
destroying  cruise  he  intended  to  make.  Then  he  read 
aloud  his  commission  as  captain  of  the  Confederate  navy, 
hauled  up  the  Confederate  colors,  and  "No.  290"  of  the 
Lairds'  shipyard  became  the  Confederate  cruiser  Alabama. 

This  famous  ship  is  often  spoken  of  as  a  "privateer,"  but 
this  is  a  mistake.  A  privateer  is  a  privately  owned  vessel 
carrying  a  "letter  of  marque,"  which  is  an  official  per 
mission  for  the  owner  of  the  boat  to  go  ahead  and  make  all 
he  can  by  plundering  the  ships  of  the  enemy.  But  the 
Alabama  belonged  to  the  Confederate  government  and  was 
captained  by  an  officer  in  the  Confederate  service,  so  she 
was  not  a  privateer  at  all.  Moreover,  she  was  not  what 
Secretary  Seward  and  the  Northern  newspapers  called  her — 
a  "pirate  ship."  Semmes  was  no  more  a  pirate  than  any 
other  officer  who  has  ever  attacked  the  commerce  of  an 
enemy.  The  Alabama  belongs  in  the  same  class  as  the  old 
Essex  in  the  War  of  1812.  Nevertheless,  it  is  interesting 
to  note  that  before  the  war  Semmes  himself  had  written  a 
thumping  denunciation  of  commerce-destroying  as  a  means 
of  warfare. 

After  Semmes  had  told  his  crew  of  his  intentions  eighty-five 
of  them  stepped  forward  and  signed  their  articles.  Many 

204 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

of  these  English  sailors  had  served  in  the  British  navy  and 
were  accustomed  to  the  discipline  and  duties  of  a  man-of- 
war.  There  was  a  sprinkling  of  Southern  coast  pilots  who 
had  come  with  the  officers,  and  the  rest  of  the  crew  was 
made  up  by  occasional  enlistments  from  the  crews  of  the 
prizes  taken  by  the  Alabama  during  her  career.  There 
were  Englishmen  among  the  officers  as  well.  Master's- 
Mate  Fullam,  Assistant-Surgeon  Llewellyn,  and  Fourth  - 
Lieutenant  Low  were  Englishmen,  Fullam  and  Low  be 
longing  to  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve.  The  other  officers 
came  from  the  Confederate  states. 

The  Alabama  was  especially  designed  for  her  work,  which 
necessitated  long  cruises  and  infrequent  chances  for  coaling. 


THE        ALABAMA 


She  was  completely  rigged  as  a  barkentine,  and  her  screw 
could  readily  be  detached  from  the  shaft  and  hoisted  so  as 
not  to  hinder  her  progress  under  sail.  She  made  good  speed 
under  canvas,  and  most  of  the  time  Semmes  depended 
entirely  on  sails  in  order  to  save  coal. 

After  leaving  Terceira  he  began  capturing  and  burning 
prizes  at  once.  He  cruised  slowly  across  the  Atlantic 

14  205 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

toward  the  West  Indies,  picking  up  prizes  as  he  went. 
At  Martinique  he  took  on  coal  and  then  continued  his 
course  to  the  Gulf.  Off  Galveston  he  lured  away  one  of 
the  blockading  ships,  the  Hatteras,  an  old  side-wheel  river- 
boat,  and  sank  her  in  a  few  minutes.  From  the  Gulf 
Semmes  cruised  down  the  Brazilian  coast,  then  headed 
across  for  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  Leaving  Cape  Town,  he 
turned  to  the  East  Indies,  where  he  spent  some  months. 
At  last,  having  done  all  the  damage  he  could  in  those 
waters,  he  returned  round  the  Cape  and  headed  north. 
On  June  n,  1864,  he  entered  the  harbor  of  Cherbourg, 
France,  to  give  the  Alabama  an  overhauling  and  take  on 
coal.  By  that  time  Semmes  had  been  on  a  continuous 
cruise  for  nearly  two  years,  having  traveled  seventy-five 
thousand  miles,  burned  fifty-seven  ships,  and  released  a 
large  number  on  bond  or  ransom.  To  the  ships  he  had 
actually  taken  must  be  added  the  far  greater  number 
which  were  kept  in  port  on  account  of  his  presence  on  the 
high  seas.  This  meant,  as  the  English  had  hoped,  that 
the  trade  that  had  formerly  gone  in  American  bottoms 
was  turned  over  to  British  ships.  Many  American  vessels 
were  sold  in  order  that  they  might  have  the  protection  of 
the  British  flag. 

All  this  time  Union  cruisers  were  hunting  the  seas  for  the 
Alabama,  but  Semmes  always  managed  to  give  them  the 
slip.  The  reason  that  he  had  so  much  greater  success  than 
the  other  Confederate  commerce-destroyers — and  there 
were  ten  others — was  not  luck,  but  science.  Semmes 
worked  out  the  exact  time  it  would  take  for  the  news  of 
his  whereabouts  to  reach  the  nearest  Union  cruiser,  and 
how  much  time  it  would  take  that  cruiser  to  make  the 
distance.  The  result  was  that  the  Union  ships  were  always 
just  missing  the  Alabama. 

One  of  these  cruisers  was  the  Wyoming,  under  Com 
mander  David  McDougal.  The  Wyoming  trailed  the  Ala 
bama  to  the  east,  but  lost  track  of  her  in  the  East  Indies. 
At  Singapore  Captain  McDougal  was  astonished  to  re- 

206 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

ceive  flowers  and  files  of  late  newspapers  from  English 
merchants.  For  Union  officers,  accustomed  to  sneers  and 
thinly  veiled  insults  at  every  British  port,  this  was  a 
pleasant  surprise,  but  it  soon  turned  out  that  the  Wyoming 
had  been  mistaken  for  the  Alabama.  It  was  the  first  and 
last  courtesy  the  Wyoming  enjoyed  during  the  cruise. 
As  McDougal  turned  north  to  Japan  Semmes  doubled  on 
his  tracks  and  headed  in  the  opposite  direction.  What 
McDougal  did  in  Japanese  waters  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  Alabama,  but  it  was  too  fine  an  exploit  to  be  left  out 
of  this  story.  He  was  sadly  disappointed  to  learn  that 
nothing  had  been  seen  of  the  Alabama  near  Japan,  but  he 
soon  had  an  urgent  and  unexpected  call  for  his  ship. 

On  his  arrival  he  learned  that  the  opening  of  Japan  to 
the  foreigners  by  Commodore  Perry  had  been  hotly  re 
sented  by  the  "patriotic"  party  in  Japan,  and  a  rebellion 
had  broken  out  which  the  government  was  unable  to  put 
down.  The  rebel  clans  fortified  the  narrow  strait  of 
Shimonoseki  and  proceeded  to  fire  on  all  foreign  ships  that 
tried  to  get  through.  One  of  these  ships  fired  on  was  an 
American  merchantman,  and  the  rumor  came  to  McDougal 
that  she  had  been  sunk. 

Realizing  that  it  was  the  time  for  vigorous  action, 
McDougal  went  to  Shimonoseki  by  way  of  the  Inland 
Sea,  and  on  the  i6th  of  July,  1863,  steamed  in  to  teach 
these  Japanese  rebels  to  respect  the  American  flag.  As 
he  came  to  the  narrows  he  noticed  a  line  of  stakes  in 
mid-channel  which  he  rightly  guessed  had  been  placed 
there  for  the  Japanese  gunners  to  use  in  gauging  their 
aim,  so  he  avoided  them  by  steaming  closer  under 
the  bluff,  although  he  ran  the  risk  of  going  aground. 
This  manceuver  saved  the  Wyoming,  for  the  batteries 
opened  a  tremendous  fire  that  tore  through  the  rigging. 
Ahead  of  the  Wyoming,  where  the  straits  widened,  lay 
three  ships,  heavily  armed  and  manned,  their  crews  yelling 
defiance  at  the  Americans.  McDougal  steamed  alongside 
two  of  them,  exchanging  a  very  hot  fire  at  close  quarters, 

307 


THE   STORY  OF  OUR   NAVY 

then  swung  around  the  bows  of  the  third.  All  this  while  the 
Wyoming  was  under  fire  from  the  heavy  shore  batteries  as 
well  as  the  ships.  Once  the  treacherous  currents  sent  her 
aground  so  that  for  a  while  she  lay  helpless  under  a  hot 
bombardment,  but  after  a  few  minutes  she  pulled  loose,  and 
by  accurate  gun  fire  sank  all  three  of  the  Japanese  ships. 
Then  McDougal  turned  his  attention  to  the  forts  and  com 
pletely  silenced  them.  Finally,  having  overcome  the  last 
trace  of  resistance,  he  took  his  ship  out  again  by  the  same 
way  that  he  had  entered,  only  this  time  not  a  gun  was  fired. 

Some  months  later  the  Japanese  rebels  repaired  their 
forts  and  made  a  stubborn  resistance,  which  the  European 
powers  had  to  help  put  down,  but  nothing  impressed  the 
Japanese  imagination  so  much  as  the  exploit  of  McDougal 
in  the  Wyoming. 

A  Dutch  steam-frigate  had  gone  into  the  straits  shortly 
before  the  Wyoming.  She  went  on  through  into  the  In 
land  Sea  with  thirty-one  shot-holes  in  her  as  souvenirs  of 
Japanese  marksmanship,  and  without  accomplishing  any 
thing.  On  getting  back  to  Holland  the  Dutch  captain 
was  knighted  for  his  "gallantry,"  and  all  the  crew  were 
given  medals.  But  McDougal,  who,  with  a  smaller  ship, 
had  gone  into  the  straits  and  stayed  till  he  had -sunk  the 
ships  and  silenced  the  forts,  received  from  his  countrymen 
nothing  at  all — scarcely  a  newspaper  mention.  So  much 
was  going  on  at  home  in  that  summer  of  1863  that  no  one 
paid  any  attention  to  this  brilliant  exploit  performed  on 
the  other  side  of  the  world. 

The  Wyoming  was  not  the  only  Union  vessel  which  had 
been  given  the  slip  by  the  Alabama.  There  were  several 
cruisers  diligently  scouring  the  seas ;  but  in  the  days  when 
there  were  few  cables,  and  when  all  the  sentiment  at 
foreign  ports  was  in  favor  of  the  Confederate  cruiser,  it  was 
the  most  difficult  task  to  run  her  down. 

When  the  Alabama  entered  Cherbourg  the  United  States 
minister  to  France  telegraphed  the  news  at  once  to  Com 
mander  Winslow,  of  the  U.S.S.  Kearsarge,  at  that  time 

209 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

lying  off  the  little  town  of  Flushing,  Holland.  The  Kear- 
sarge  promptly  pulled  up  her  "mud-hook"  and  steamed  for 
Cherbourg.  On  approaching  that  port  she  steamed  in 
close  enough  to  enable  Winslow  to  see  the  Alabama  at  her 
moorings,  but  he  did  not  anchor,  fearing  that  the  twenty- 
four-hour  rule  would  be  applied  by  the  French  authorities. 
This  means  that  if  there  are  two  hostile  ships  in  a  neutral 
harbor  one  must  be  detained  till  the  other  has  been  twenty- 
four  hours  at  sea.  So  he  steamed  back  and  forth  outside 
the  breakwater,  determined  to  wait  all  summer,  if  necessary, 
to  make  the  Alabama  fight. 

Meanwhile,  Captain  Semmes  had  the  cool  assurance  to 
ask  permission  to  use  the  government  naval  dock  at 
Cherbourg  for  two  months ;  but  that  was  going  rather  far, 
especially  as  the  American  minister  made  an  indignant 
protest  at  once.  So  Semmes  went  ahead  with  the  ordinary 
overhauling  and  coaling  that  he  could  attend  to  in  any 
friendly  port.  Up  to  this  time  he  had  avoided  fighting 
any  of  the  Union  cruisers  because  his  business  was  destroy 
ing  commerce.  But  the  French  officers  at  Cherbourg,  who 
were  longing  to  see  a  fight,  informed  Semmes  that  the  con 
duct  of  the  Kearsarge  amounted  to  a  "challenge,"  and  that 
if  he  were  a  "man  of  honor  "  he  could  not  avoid  going  out  to 
fight. 

At  the  time  of  the  war  the  dueling-code  was  still  taken 
seriously  in  the  Southern  states,  and  this  reference  to 
"honor"  touched  Semmes  on  a  tender  spot,  so  he  sent  word 
out  to  Winslow  that  if  he'd  wait  the  Alabama  would  come 
out.  In  doing  so  Semmes  had  everything  to  lose  and  little 
to  gain,  because  if  he  sank  the  Kearsarge  there  were  many 
other  Union  cruisers  to  take  her  place,  but  the  Confederacy 
had  no  other  vessel  to  take  the  place  of  the  Alabama. 
Probably  Semmes  counted  on  a  victory,  and  hoped  that  a 
victory  in  European  waters  would  raise  the  price  of  Con 
federate  bonds,  which  were  beginning  to  sag  on  the  market. 
He  may  have  felt,  too,  like  David  Porter,  of  the  Essex, 
that,  since  he  had  destroyed  all  the  enemy's  commerce  he 

210 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

could  reach,  it  would  be  a  fine  thing  to  wind  up  the  cruise 
with  the  capture  of  a  man-of-war. 

Meanwhile  the  Kearsarge  steamed  slowly  back  and  forth 
off  Cherbourg  for  five  days.  Shortly  after  ten  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  June  19,  1864,  the  Alabama  left  the  harbor  to 
meet  the  Kearsarge.  As  she  came  out  she  was  accompanied 
by  the  French  ironclad  Couronne,  whose  business  it  was  to 
see  that  the  duel  took  place  beyond  the  three-mile  limit  of 
French  water  along  the  coast.  An  English  steam-yacht, 
the  Deerhound,  followed  at  a  respectful  distance  in  order 
for  the  owner  and  his  family  to  enjoy  the  spectacle  of  a 
naval  battle.  Semmes  had  told  of  his  intention  to  fight  on 
Sunday — Sunday,  by  the  way,  was  regarded  by  his  crew  as 
the  Alabama's  "lucky  day" — so  the  enterprising  railway 
managers  ran  excursion  trains  from  Paris  to  bring  the 
thousands  who  wanted  to  look  on  from  the  bluffs  along  the 
shore. 

The  Kearsarge  led  the  way  out  into  the  Channel.  When 
both  antagonists  were  well  beyond  the  three-mile  limit  the 
Couronne  returned  to  port,  and  when  the  Kearsarge  had 
gone  about  eight  miles  off  shore  she  turned  about  and 
headed  for  the  Alabama. 

The  battle  opened  at  the  range  of  about  a  mile,  with  the 
ships  moving  in  circles  about  a  common  center,  in  order  to 
prevent  either  side's  gaining  a  raking  position,  and  both 
using  their  starboard  batteries.  They  continued  this 
rotary  movement  to  the  end,  while  the  tide  carried  them 
steadily  westward.  At  long  range  the  Alabama's  huge 
rifled  pivot-gun  was  much  better  than  any  of  the  smooth 
bores  of  the  Kearsarge.  In  a  few  minutes  a  no-pound 
shell  crashed  into  the  Kearsarge' s  stern-post  near  her  screw, 
but,  luckily  for  her,  did  not  go  off.  This  was  the  only 
serious  wound  received  by  the  Union  ship. 

As  Semmes  had  shifted  over  an  extra  gun  from  the  port 
side,  the  Alabama  listed  to  starboard  about  two  feet.  This 
reduced  her  speed,  and  Winslow  soon  discovered  that  the 
Kearsarge  could  outsteam  the  Alabama.  So  he  shortened 

212 


THE  STORY  OF  OUR  NAVY 


!  S  2 

*<*A^-¥        ~X< 


III 


If  i     [0     >-  ^-^-'''""'"     /  / ./// 

^^V..^<ri-**'-— ""  /y      Av 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  "ALABAMA"  AND  THE  "  KEARSARGE  " 

the  distance  to  "point-blank"  range,  where  his  eleven- 
inch  guns  would  be  more  effective,  and  the  battle  went  on 
with  heavy  firing  on  both  sides. 

At  this  shortened  range  the  Kearsarge  had  the  advantage, 
and  the  Alabama  began  to  suffer  badly.  The  lighter  bat 
teries  of  the  Kearsarge  were  sweeping  her  spar-deck,  while 
the  heavy  eleven-inch  shells  were  exploding  on  her  berth- 
deck  and  tearing  great  holes  near  the  water-line.  The  firing 
of  the  Kearsarge  from  this  stage  of  the  fight  to  the  end  was 

213 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

one  of  the  few  instances  of  really  good  naval  gunnery 
shown  on  either  side  during  the  Civil  War. 

The  fire  of  the  Alabama  seems  to  have  been  rather  de 
moralized  by  this  severe  punishment.  Although  the  Con 
federate  officers  themselves  thought  the  poor  effect  of  their 
shooting  must  have  been  due  to  damaged  powder,  yet  the 
fact  that  the  injuries  received  by  the  Kearsarge  at  this  time 
were  chiefly  aloft — in  the  smoke-stack  and  the  rigging — 
suggests  that  the  aim  was  wild  and  high.  The  Alabama 
fired  three  broadsides  to  every  one  of  the  Kearsarge,  but  the 
deliberation  of  the  Union  gunners  was  well  worth  while. 

Realizing  that  he  was  beaten,  Captain  Semmes  set  sail  to 
help  him  to  reach  the  shelter  of  neutral  waters,  but  Winslow 
checked  that  move  by  steaming  between  him  and  the  coast. 
The  Alabama  was  already  filling,  but  an  eleven-inch  shell 
about  this  time  gave  her  the  death-blow.  It  exploded  in  the 
engine-room,  let  in  a  flood  of  water,  and  the  Alabama 
settled  rapidly. 

Semmes  then  struck  his  colors  and  passed  the  word  for 
all  hands  to  save  themselves.  The  wounded  were  then 
despatched  to  the  Kearsarge  in  one  of  the  two  serviceable 
boats.  To  the  surprise  of  the  Alabama's  officers,  the  Kear 
sarge  fired  again  shortly  after  the  colors  were  struck.  At 
this  Semmes  was  furiously  indignant.  At  the  same  time 
Winslow  and  his  officers  were  just  as  angry  because  they 
insisted  that  two  of  the  Alabama's  guns  were  fired  after 
the  flag  came  down,  and  backed  up  their  statement  by 
testimony  from  some  of  the  prisoners.  As  Semmes  con 
tradicted  this  afterward,  all  one  can  say  is  that  each  captain 
honestly  believed  the  other  was  guilty  of  bad  faith. 

Meanwhile  the  yacht  Deerkound  came  on  the  scene,  and 
Winslow  asked  the  owner  to  do  what  he  could  to  help  save 
life.  Suddenly  the  Alabama's  nose  shot  upward,  and  she 
plunged  to  the  bottom,  stern  first,  leaving  most  of  her 
company,  including  Captain  Semmes,  struggling  in  the 
water.  As  only  two  of  the  Kearsarge' s  boats  were  service 
able  after  the  battle — and  those  two  stowed  where  they 

214 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

took  some  time  to  get  overboard — Captain  Winslow  took 
every  other  means  of  saving  the  drowning  men.  He  al 
lowed  Master's- Mate  Fullam,  who  had  come  alongside  with 
the  Alabama's  wounded,  to  go  back  and  help  rescue  the 
survivors,  on  his  word  of  honor  to  return  to  the  Kearsarge. 
Fullam  promptly  broke  his  word  by  taking  his  boat,  with 
those  whom  he  had  picked  up,  to  the  Deerhound  instead. 
Finally,  with  forty-two  of  the  Alabama's  officers  and  men 
on  board,  including  Captain  Semmes,  the  yacht  edged  away 
from  the  Kearsarge  and  then  put  on  full  speed  for  South 
ampton.  One  officer  alone,  refusing  to  escape  on  the 
Deerhound,  surrendered  his  sword  to  Captain  Winslow  as 
a  point  of  honor.  This  was  Second  -  Lieutenant  Joseph 
Wilson;  and  Captain  Winslow  arranged  for  his  immediate 
exchange,  as  a  mark  of  his  appreciation. 

Captain  Semmes,  after  surrendering  to  the  Kearsarge,  had 
no  right  to  escape  on  the  Deerhound  except  for  his  firm 
belief  that  Captain  Winslow  had  deliberately  fired  on  a 
surrendered  ship,  and  had  therefore  forfeited  all  rights. 
The  Union  captain  was  criticized  at  home  because  he  had 
not  fired  on  the  Deerhound  and  taken  off  the  prisoners  by 
force,  but  that  would  have  been  another  bad  blunder  like 
the  case  of  the  Trent.  This  Deerhound  incident  led  to  a 
new  rule  in  international  law.  To-day  in  the  same  circum 
stances  a  neutral  vessel  would  be  forced  to  surrender  the 
rescued  prisoners  to  the  victor. 

After  the  battle  of  Mobile  Bay  we  saw  the  pleasant  re 
union  of  Confederate  and  Union  naval  officers  who  had 
been  friends  before  the  war  and  were  friends  again  in  spite 
of  the  war.  Captain  Semmes  had  served  many  years  in 
the  navy  before  the  war,  but  he  had  none  of  that  kindly 
feeling.  Perhaps  because  it  was  that  he  was  the  best- 
hated  man  in  the  Confederate  service  and  had  been  called 
a  "black-hearted,  cowardly  pirate"  so  often  that  he  felt 
very  bitter.  At  any  rate,  he  had  scarcely  landed  in 
England  before  he  wrote  indignant  letters  to  the  papers 
about  Captain  Winslow,  full  of  much  overheated  nonsense 

215 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

quite  unworthy  of  him.  These  provoked  equally  hot  re 
plies  from  the  officers  of  the  Kearsarge,  and  a  lively  news 
paper  fight  went  on  for  some  time.  But  we  do  not  need  to 
dig  it  all  up  again  here. 

Sympathy  in  England  was,  of  course,  almost  entirely 
with  Captain  Semmes,  and  he  was  received  everywhere  as 
a  great  hero.  This  was  perfectly  natural ;  for,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  Confederacy  was  the  popular  cause,  and  Semmes 
had  paralyzed  the  only  commerce  in  the  world  that  rivaled 
that  of  England.  From  one  point  of  view  the  Alabama  can 
hardly  be  considered  as  a  Confederate  ship  at  all.  She  had 
been  built,  armed,  and  equipped  by  Englishmen,  her  crew 
were  nearly  all  Englishmen,  and  so,  too,  were  several  of  her 
officers.  It  might  be  said  that  the  Kearsarge  had  sunk  an 
English  ship,  under  a  Confederate  captain  and  Confederate 
colors. 

But  England  had  to  pay  for  her  fun.  The  "Geneva 
Tribunal,"  which  met  in  1872  to  settle  by  arbitration  the 
claims  made  by  the  United  States  against  Great  Britain 
for  permitting  Confederate  cruisers  to  be  built  in  her  ports, 
awarded  a  verdict  of  $15,500,000  to  the  United  States. 
This  amounted,  with  interest,  to  about  sixteen  millions. 
The  sum  more  than  covered  all  the  actual  damage  done, 
but  our  commerce  never  revived  after  the  war.  Strange  to 
say,  it  was  not  the  Alabama,  but  our  own  government, 
which  destroyed  the  American  carrying-trade. 

After  the  war  the  ships  that  had  gone  temporarily  under 
foreign  colors  for  safety  we  refused  to  allow  to  come  back 
under  the  American  flag.  We  also  refused  to  allow  ships 
built  abroad  to  fly  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  And,  since  we 
began  laying  a  heavy  duty  on  the  things  needed  to  build 
and  equip  a  merchantman,  it  became  impossible  for  Amer 
ican-built  ships  to  compete  with  the  cheaper  ships  of 
Europe.  So,  although  the  Alabama  destroyed  much  and 
drove  whole  fleets  of  ships  to  cover  during  the  Civil  War, 
it  is  due  to  our  own  short-sighted  politicians  that  since  that 
time  the  American  carrying -trade  has  vanished  from  the  seas. 

216 


XVII 

BLOCKADE-RUNNERS   AND   FORT   FISHER 

Description  of  typical  blockade-runner — Blockade  duty — Attempts 
against  Charleston — Importance  of  Fort  Fisher — First  attack — • 
Second  attack,  the  naval  assault — Importance  of  the  naval  blockade 
in  the  Civil  War. 

THE  Confederate  cruisers,  especially  the  Alabama,  did 
the  commerce  of  the  North  a  great  deal  of  harm. 
But  it  was  not  the  sort  of  harm  that  had  any  effect  on 
the  outcome  of  the  war.  The  only  military  result  was  to 
keep  several  Union  men-of-war  busy  hunting  for  them 
abroad  instead  of  doing  blockade  duty  at  home.  And  all 
the  damage  done  by  the  Shenandoah,  another  one  of  the 
English-built,  English-manned  cruisers,  was  just  a  needless 
waste.  She  destroyed  the  whaling  fleet  in  the  north 
Pacific,  but  did  it  after  the  war  was  over. 

There  was  another  class  of  Confederate  vessels,  also 
English-built,  which  were  not  famous  individually  like  the 
Alabama,  but  were  far  more  important  to  the  South  than 
all  the  commerce-destroyers  taken  together.  These  were 
the  blockade-runners. 

In  an  earlier  chapter  on  the  Civil  War  we  saw  that  the 
South  was  wholly  a  farming  country  based  on  slave  labor, 
and  that  manufactured  things  of  every  sort  had  to  be  either 
captured  from  the  North,  like  the  cannon  in  the  Norfolk 
Navy  Yard,  or  bought  from  England.  Since  Lee's  two 
attempts  to  invade  the  North  had  failed,  one  at  Antietam 
and  the  other  at  Gettysburg,  the  South  was  forced  to  de 
pend  entirely  on  England  for  the  things  that  the  soldiers 

218 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

needed.  To  pay  for  them  the  Confederacy  had  little  cash, 
but  plenty  of  cotton,  which  was  just  as  good.  In  those 
days  cotton  grew  nowhere  else  but  in  the  Southern  states, 
and  it  was  a  staple  needed  by  all  the  world. 

It  was  the  business  of  the  blockading  fleet  to  stop  this 
exchange  of  cotton  for  manufactured  goods,  but  that  was 
a  slow  and  difficult  task.  Besides  the  long  coast  line,  with 
its  countless  harbors,  little  and  big,  which  had  to  be  block 
aded,  there  were  the  British  island  possessions,  the  Ber 
mudas,  the  Bahamas,  and  Jamaica,  which  lay  at  the  very 
door  of  the  South.  The  nearest  and  most  important  town 
in  these  islands  was  Nassau,  in  the  Bahamas.  Here  the 
British  merchant  steamers  could  land  their  cargoes  for  the 
Confederacy  without  interference  from  the  North.  Then 
these  cargoes  would  be  transferred  to  swift  little  steamers 
known  as  blockade-runners,  which  would  dash  through  the 
long  straggling  line  of  Union  ships  to  some  port  in  the 
Confederate  States.  A  few  days  later  the  same  boats 
would  come  rushing  back  to  Nassau,  their  decks  stacked 
high  with  the  precious  cotton  bales. 

As  the  business  soon  developed  a  special  type  of  steamer 
we  must  pause  to  see  what  she  was  like.  The  typical 


A    BLOCKADE-RUNNER 


blockade-runner  was  a  small,  side-wheel  steamer  capable 
of  making  great  speed  for  those  days.  She  had  a  shallow 
draught  in  order  that  she  might  slip  over  bars  and  shoals 

219 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

or  hug  the  shore  in  waters  where  the  blockading  ships 
could  not  follow. 

In  order  that  she  might  be  as  nearly  invisible  as  possible 
she  was  painted  a  slaty  gray;  her  raking  masts  had  no 
yards — just  a  tiny  crow's-nest  for  the  lookout.  As  she 
swam  low  in  the  water,  she  had  a  "turtle-back"  forward 
deck  to  enable  her  to  weather  heavy  seas.  Her  smoke 
stacks  were  so  built  that  they  could  be  "telescoped"  or 
flattened  almost  to  the  deck.  As  smoke  is  the  worst  thing 
to  betray  a  steamer,  the  blockade -runner  burned  only 
hard  coal.  The  result  was  that  these  little  vessels  were 
very  hard  to  see  at  a  distance  even  in  broad  daylight,  and 
they  offered  such  a  small  target  that  they  were  very  hard  to 
hit  as  they  dashed  by  at  full  speed. 

Naturally,  the  problem  was  still  more  difficult  when  the 
blockade-runners  "ran"  the  blockading  fleet  at  night,  as 
they  usually  did.  Then  they  showed  no  lights  whatever, 
steam  was  blown  off  under  water,  and  there  was  nothing 
but  the  faint  splash  of  the  paddle-wheels  to  betray  them. 
The  officers  on  these  little  craft  had  all  sorts  of  clever  tricks, 
too,  for  dodging  and  fooling  the  Union  fleet.  Of  course,  the 
blockade  -  runners  were  always  helped  by  signal  -  lights 
displayed  on  shore. 

It  was  risky  work,  but  many  of  these  little  craft  made 
trips  as  regularly  as  if  running  on  schedule,  up  to  the  last 
year  of  the  war.  There  was  so  much  dashing  excitement 
in  the  work  and  such  huge  profits,  besides,  that  many 
English  naval  officers  got  leave  and  went  into  blockade- 
running  under  assumed  names.  In  those  days  it  was  not 
unusual  for  the  captain  of  a  blockade-runner  to  be  paid  as 
much  as  £1,000  for  one  round  trip  between  Nassau  and  a 
Southern  port.  When  cotton  sold  in  the  South  at  eight 
cents  a  pound  and  in  Liverpool  at  fifty  cents  a  pound  it  is 
easy  to  see  that  it  needed  only  a  few  successful  trips  to 
make  the  owners  of  a  blockade-runner  rich.  In  fact,  if  one 
of  these  little  vessels  was  chased  ashore  or  sunk  on  its 
third  venture  the  profits  had  been  enough  on  the  other  two 

220 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

runs  to  leave  the  owners  comfortably  on  the  right  side  of 
the  ledger. 

As  the  Union  navy  buckled  down  to  the  task  of  catching 
these  nimble  little  enemies  the  forces  were  divided  into  two 
parts.  Close  about  the  ports  and  along  the  shore  ranged 
the  blockading  ships  proper,  while  well  out  to  sea  cruised 
a  "flying  squadron."  The  blockade-runner  might  pick  the 
darkest  night  for  slipping  through  the  blockade  in  or  out  of 
port,  but  she  had  to  reckon  with  these  other  ships  in  bright 
daylight  somewhere  near  the  paths  to  Nassau  or  Jamaica. 

For  the  blockading  fleet  the  duty  was  very  wearing. 
Month  after  month  the  vessels  steamed  back  and  forth  on 
their  "beats,"  the  officers  and  men  always  on  a  strain  of 
watching,  and  often  without  even  the  glimpse  of  a  blockade- 
runner  to  break  the  monotony  for  weeks  at  a  time.  It  was 
particularly  bad  during  the  hot  summer  months  when 
nothing  would  keep  fresh  aboard  ship  and  the  heat  was 
intolerable.  Since  those  were  the  days  before  the  scientific 
canning  and  refrigerating  of  food,  officers  and  men  had  to 
live  chiefly  on  salt  meat,  and  scurvy  became  a  far  greater 
danger  than  the  shore  batteries  or  torpedoes  of  the  enemy. 
There  was  little  excitement  and  no  glory  in  blockading,  but 
in  all  the  operations  of  the  North  there  was  no  duty  more 
important,  and  it  was  faithfully  performed.  By  the  end 
of  the  war  the  blockading  squadrons  had  taken  over 
eleven  hundred  and  fifty  ships,  representing  with  their 
cargoes  a  value  of  thirty  million  dollars. 

Meanwhile,  as  the  ships  patrolled  back  and  forth  along  the 
coast  other  squadrons  were,  as  we  have  seen,  attacking  and 
capturing  important  seaports  of  the  South,  like  Port  Royal, 
New  Orleans,  and  Mobile  Bay.  Charleston  had  been  the 
starting-point  of  the  Civil  War,  and  the  Northern  people 
were  very  anxious  to  have  that  city  surrender  to  the 
Union  navy. 

Accordingly,  after  taking  Port  Royal  DuPont  was  or 
dered  to  capture  Charleston,  and  he  was  sent  a  number  of 
monitors  to  help  as  soon  as  they  were  put  in  commission. 

15  221 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

But  he  soon  realized  that  he  had  a  formidable  task.  Natu 
rally,  the  Southerners  had  as  much  interest  in  holding 
Charleston  as  the  Northerners  had  in  capturing  it.  Be 
sides  the  natural  defenses  of  sand-bars  and  crooked  chan 
nels  in  Charleston  harbor,  the  Confederates  had  at  this 
point  strong  forts,  aided  by  torpedoes,  ironclads,  and  a 
large  army.  There  was  no  chance  to  run  by  these  de 
fenses,  as  there  had  been  at  New  Orleans  and  Mobile  Bay, 
because  the  harbor  was  simply  a  pocket. 

After  several  tests  DuPont  discovered  that  it  was  hope 
less  to  attempt  to  capture  the  port  by  naval  bombardment. 
Accordingly,  he  reported  that  Charleston  could  be  taken 


MAP  OF  CHARLESTON  HARBOR 
222 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

only  by  an  army  operating  in  the  rear.  Meanwhile  he  had 
maintained  a  good  blockade.  He  had  destroyed  the  Con 
federate  ram  Atlanta  and  the  cruiser  Nashville.  The  only 
vessel  he  had  lost  was  a  monitor  which  had  been  sunk  by 
the  fire  of  Fort  Sumter  during  one  of  those  useless  naval 
bombardments  which  DuPont  had  been  ordered  to  make 
contrary  to  his  judgment.  But  the  Northern  newspapers 
berated  him  as  a  failure  because  he  had  not  forced  Charles 
ton  to  surrender.  So  DuPont  was  recalled,  and  Dahlgren 
was  sent  to  take  his  place. 

Rear-Admiral  Dahlgren  was  famous  as  the  inventor  of  the 
Dahlgren  gun,  the  favorite  type  of  smooth-bore  cannon 
used  on  ships  during  the  Civil  War.  As  soon  as  Dahlgren 
arrived  he  saw  that  DuPont  was  right,  that  Charleston 
could  not  be  taken  by  any  naval  force  that  the  North  could 
spare.  In  spite  of  the  nagging  he  got  from  the  arm-chair 
war  experts  in  the  North  he  very  sensibly  refused  to  repeat 
a  useless  bombardment.  When  Charleston  fell,  in  Feb 
ruary,  1865,  the  capture  was  brought  about,  just  as  DuPont 
had  predicted,  by  a  Union  army  attacking  in  the  rear. 

There  was  another  harbor  which,  toward  the  end  of  the 
war,  was  much  more  valuable  to  the  Confederate  armies 
than  Charleston.  This  was  the  mouth  of  the  Cape  Fear 
River,  the  port  of  Wilmington,  North  Carolina.  The  many 
shoals  off  the  river-mouth,  which  made  the  place  dangerous 
of  approach  for  the  Northern  men-of-war,  offered  no  obstacle 
to  the  little  blockade-runners.  In  1864,  as  other  ports  were 
taken  or  tightly  closed  by  the  blockade,  Wilmington  be 
came  more  and  more  important  to  the  Confederacy. 
Blockade-runners  brought  in  enormous  quantities  of  food, 
clothing,  ammunition,  cannon,  and  rifles  from  Nassau  and 
carried  back  bales  of  cotton  in  payment.  Toward  the  end 
of  the  year  Wilmington  became  the  last  source  of  supplies 
for  Lee's  army  and  did  a  tremendous  business.  It  was 
therefore  essential  for  the  North  to  get  control  at  that 
point. 

Naturally,  the  Confederates  were  just  as  alive  to  the 

223 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

necessity  of  holding  Wilmington  for  the  South.  They  had 
constructed  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  a  large  earthwork 
called  Fort  Fisher.  This  lay  at  the  end  of  a  long  peninsula, 
with  one  side  facing  the  sea,  and  another  side  built  at  right 
angles  and  extending  across  the  neck  of  land  to  the  river 
in  order  to  defend  the  fort  from  any  approach  by  land. 
Nothing  was  spared  to  make  it  the  strongest  fort  in  the 
Confederacy.  The  walls  were  twenty-five  feet  thick  and 
mounted  forty-four  guns.  In  front  was  a  log  palisade  with 
loopholes  for  rifle  fire,  and  beyond  lay  buried  a  quantity  of 
torpedoes.  To  protect  the  gunners  in  the  fort  there  were 
bomb-proof  chambers. 

It  was  an  immense  fortification,  well  designed  and  care 
fully  built,  but  its  defenders  had  their  difficulties.  There 
were  less  than  two  thousand  soldiers  to  man  the  work,  with 
only  a  small  supply  of  ammunition  for  the  guns.  For  their 
best  gun,  a  i5o-pounder  rifle,  they  had  only  thirteen  shells. 
Furthermore,  the  very  thickness  of  the  walls  made  it  neces 
sary  for  the  men  to  expose  themselves  on  top  of  the  parapet 
if  they  wanted  to  see  anything  within  a  hundred  feet  of  the 
fort. 

On  December  20,  1864,  Admiral  David  D.  Porter  arrived 
off  Fort  Fisher  with  about  sixty  vessels — in  fact,  more  men- 
of-war  than  had  ever  before  been  collected  under  the 
American  flag.  He  was  accompanied  by  General  Butler, 
commanding  sixty-five  hundred  soldiers.  Three  days 
later,  to  please  General  Butler,  an  old  gunboat  loaded  with 
two  hundred  and  thirty-five  tons  of  powder  was  towed 
under  the  fort  by  a  monitor,  the  idea  being  to  blow  a  big 
hole  in  the  fort  by  the  explosion  of  the  powder.  The  rest  of 
the  fleet  retreated  to  a  safe  distance  till  the  clockwork  de 
vice  set  off  the  charge.  When  that  happened  there  was  an 
explosion  that  shook  earth  and  water,  but  all  the  damage 
it  did  to  Fort  Fisher  was  to  crack  a  pane  of  glass  or  two  in 
the  barracks. 

If  Butler's  gunpowder  plot  proved  a  fizzle,  it  was  no 
worse  than  his  land  attack  which  followed.  All  day  on 

224 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

the  24th  the  fleet  rained  projectiles  on  the  fort  without  inter 
ruption.  The  next  day  the  troops  were  landed  to  attack 
the  fort  by  the  land  face,  but  Butler  only  looked  around  the 
corner  and  came  back,  saying  that  "the  place  cannot  be 
carried  by  assault."  Meanwhile,  during  the  bombardment, 
the  Confederates  had  kept  snugly  in  their  bomb-proofs,  so 
that  nothing  had  been  accomplished  for  the  Union,  after  all. 

But  Porter  was  not  the  man  to  be  balked  by  one  failure. 
He  asked  General  Grant  for  a  better  type  of  military  com 
mander  than  Butler,  and  Grant  responded  by  sending 
General  Terry,  a  gallant  and  able  officer.  Meanwhile  the 
fleet  retired  to  Beaufort  for  replenishing  stores  and  repair 
ing  engines.  In  a  fortnight  the  ships  were  back  before  Fort 
Fisher  again.  The  Confederates  made  the  most  of  the 
two  weeks'  respite  by  strengthening  their  defenses. 

The  two  commanders,  Porter  and  Terry,  decided  that 
the  army  should  attack  the  fort  at  the  northwest  angle,  and 
at  the  same  time,  in  order  to  divert  the  attention  of  the 
defenders,  a  naval  brigade  should  make  an  assault  on  the 
sea  face  as  well.  This,  as  everybody  knew,  was  going  to  be 
a  very  dangerous  undertaking,  and,  instead  of  ordering 
officers  and  men  for^he  duty,  Porter  called  for  volunteers. 
But  as  whole  ship's  companies  came  forward  as  volunteers, 
the  members  of  the  assaulting  party  had  to  be  detailed, 
after  all. 

All  day  on  January  i4th  the  fleet  bombarded  the  fort 
again.  On  the  following  morning  the  naval  brigade  was 
landed  about  a  mile  and  a  half  from  the  northeast  angle  of 
Fort  Fisher.  The  landing  was  accomplished  under  cover 
of  a  fire  from  the  ironclads,  which  moved  close  inshore  for 
the  purpose.  All  the  while,  since  dawn,  the  rest  of  the 
fleet  had  kept  up  a  merciless  bombardment.  This  had 
permitted  a  detachment  of  men  to  dig  rifle-pits  near  the 
fort,  with  the  idea  of  filling  them  with  marines,  whose  rifle 
fire  was  to  keep  the  Confederates  down  from  their  parapets 
till  the  bluejackets  were  at  close  quarters. 

The  fire  of  the  fleet  had  done  good  service.  Every  gun 

225 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 


on  the  sea  face  but  one  had  been  dismounted,  the  stockade 
had  been  wrecked,  and  the  elaborate  system  of  under 
ground  torpedoes  cut  to  pieces.  Early  in  the  afternoon  the 
divisions  on  shore  formed  into  line  and  advanced  to  a  point 
about  half  a  mile  from  the  fort.  About  three  o'clock  the 


NEW  JN LET 


FORT    FISHER 
"Line  of  advance"  indicates  the  march  of  the  army. 

order  to  charge  was  signaled  by  the  whistles  of  the  fleet, 
and  the  men  went  forward  on  the  run.  When  the  brigade 
was  about  half-way  toward  the  fort  the  fleet  ceased  firing, 
and  instantly  the  garrison  swarmed  up  on  the  parapet  and 
poured  a  murderous  rifle  fire  on  the  advancing  columns. 

226 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

The  officers,  eager  to  set  an  example  to  their  men,  had  all 
pressed  forward  in  the  lead,  and  the  rear  divisions  of  ma 
rines,  struck  by  the  sudden  hail  of  bullets  before  they 
reached  the  rifle-pits  that  had  been  dug  for  them,  broke  and 
retreated  in  disorder,  with  no  officers  to  rally  them.  This 
left  the  bluejackets  without  the  support  of  the  rifle  fire 
from  the  marines,  and  since  by  a  great  blunder  the  sailors 
had  been  armed  only  with  the  pistol  and  cutlass,  they  were 
helpless  under  the  muskets  of  the  Confederate  garrison. 
Three  times,  however,  they  rallied  and  ran  forward  toward 
the  parapet,  but  they  were  shot  down  like  sheep.  The 
officers  especially  showed  splendid  courage,  rallying  their 
men  under  fire  and  setting  a  good  example  by  pressing  on 
in  advance  till  some  of  them  actually  got  inside  the  stockade 
at  the  foot  of  the  parapet. 

By  a  miracle  Captain  Breeze,  the  commander  of  the  naval 
brigade,  was  unhurt,  though  he  stood  waving  his  sword  in 
the  very  front  of  his  men,  trying  in  vain  to  rally  his  broken 
columns.  The  slaughter  was  very  severe,  and  the  attack 
faltered,  crumpled  up  at  the  line  of  the  stockade,  and 
surged  back.  Those  who  were  able  to  get  back  ran  around 
and  joined  the  columns  of  infantry  which  were  charging 
the  northwest  salient  at  the  same  time.  A  few  of  the 
survivors  crawled  to  the  rifle-pits  or  flattened  out  behind 
some  hillock  of  sand  and  kept  up  a  sputtering  fire  on  the 
fort.  Among  those  who  penetrated  within  the  stockade 
at  the  head  of  the  column  was  a  young  midshipman  who 
lay  badly  wounded  and  helpless  and  a  target  for  sharp 
shooters  in  the  fort.  A  marine  named  Wasmouth  at  the 
risk  of  his  life  picked  up  the  midshipman  and  carried  him 
to  a  place  of  comparative  safety.  A  few  minutes  later  the 
brave  man  was  shot  dead.  The  midshipman  finally  re 
covered  from  his  wounds  and  became  famous  later  as 
"Fighting  Bob  Evans." 

There  was  another  act  of  self-sacrifice  that  ought  to  be 
remembered.  A  young  assistant  surgeon  named  William 
Longshaw  discovered  a  wounded  sailor  lying  helpless  in 

227 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

the  sand,  with  the  incoming  tide  lapping  about  him  and 
threatening  to  drown  him  in  a  few  minutes.  He  sprang 
to  his  feet  and,  paying  no  attention  to  the  bullets  that  sang 
past  his  head,  dragged  the  sailor  up  to  a  place  of  safety  and 
did  what  he  could  for  his  wounds.  A  wounded  marine  was 
lying  with  another  group  that  still  kept  up  a  rifle  fire  from 
behind  a  hillock  of  sand. 

"Surgeon,"  he  cried,  "can  you  look  at  my  wounds,  sir?" 

Longshaw  ran  to  him,  and  just  as  he  was  in  the  act  of 
bandaging  the  man  he  was  shot  dead.  That  very  day  he 
had  received  his  leave  of  absence,  but  had  volunteered  for 
the  assault. 

The  attack  of  the  naval  brigade  had  failed  because  it  had 
been  beaten  back  by  a  concentrated  rifle  fire  to  which  the 
sailors  were  unable  to  reply.  But  it  was  successful  in  that 
it  led  the  Confederates  to  believe  that  the  naval  brigade 
was  making  the  main  assault. 

This  diversion  made  it  possible  for  the  army  to  get  a 
foothold  at  the  northwestern  angle  of  the  fort  before  the 
defenders  could  concentrate  at  that  point.  Although  this 
is  naval  rather  than  military  history,  we  must  pause  a 
moment  to  speak  of  the  superb  courage  of  those  veterans 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  they  slowly  fought  their  way 
from  one  line  of  defense,  from  one  gun  to  another,  and  the 
equally  gallant  and  stubborn  resistance  of  the  Confederates, 
who  contested  every  inch  of  the  way.  Some  bastions  were 
captured  and  recaptured  five  or  six  times  before  the  men 
in  blue  poured  over  them  in  triumph.  Darkness  came  on, 
but  the  battle  raged  only  with  sharper  fury,  and  it  was  not 
till  ten  o'clock  that  evening  that  the  brave  defenders  yielded. 
Then  from  the  parapet  flashed  a  signal-lantern,  and  as  the 
waiting  fleet  spelled  out,  "The  fort  is  ours,"  men  cheered 
from  ship  to  ship  and  guns  of  the  whole  fleet  thundered  a 
mighty  salute. 

The  fortress  had  been  captured  with  a  loss  of  nearly  a 
thousand  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing,  but  the  cost 
was  small  compared  with  the  result.  Its  capture  meant 

228 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

the  speedy  fall  of  Wilmington  and  the  end  of  blockade- 
running  for  the  Confederacy.  Not  even  Richmond  was  so 
important  to  the  South  in  the  winter  of  '64~'65  as  Wilming 
ton.  With  Wilmington  lost,  there  was  no  other  source  of 
supplies  left  open,  and  from  that  moment  Lee's  army  was 
doomed.  As  we  all  know,  the  war  was  practically  ended 
when  Lee's  ragged  and  hungry  troops  surrendered  at 
Appomattox  the  following  April. 

In  this  great  conflict  the  Confederates  had  a  real  ad 
vantage  at  the  outset  in  military  matters.  They  had 
trained  and  experienced  officers  in  plenty.  The  men  of  the 
South  were  accustomed  to  the  use  of  arms  and  an  out-of- 
door  life,  they  were  fighting  on  their  own  soil,  and  the  fact 
that  there  were  slaves  at  home  to  work  the  plantations 
made  it  possible  for  almost  every  white  man  in  the  South 
to  be  conscripted  into  the  Confederate  armies.  But  in 
naval  affairs  the  Confederates  were  at  great  disadvantage. 
They  had  brilliant  naval  officers,  to  be  sure,  but  dependence 
on  slave  labor  left  the  South  without  seamen,  mechanics, 
shipyards,  or  engine- works.  It  is  a  tribute  to  the  energy 
and  resourcefulness  of  the  Confederate  naval  officers  that 
their  famous  "rams"  did  so  well,  in  view  of  the  enormous 
difficulties  attending  their  construction.  But  it  was  hope 
less  to  try  to  rival  the  resources  of  the  North,  backed  by  a 
determination  to  "see  the  war  through." 

When  the  news  of  the  downfall  of  the  Confederacy 
reached  England  a  cartoon  came  out  in  Punch  depicting  the 
end  of  a  gladiatorial  combat.  The  prostrate  South  was 
represented  as  the  gladiator  with  the  helmet  and  the 
short  sword,  the  victorious  North  was  the  one  with  the 
trident  and  net.  In  this  picture  the  trident  and  net  stood 
for  sea  power.  Only  in  later  years  have  we  come  to  realize 
the  full  truth  of  the  cartoon — namely,  that  the  deciding 
factor  in  that  great  struggle  was  the  control  of  the  sea  held 
by  the  North.  If  the  trade  between  cotton  and  supplies 
had  gone  on  the  South  could  have  kept  on  fighting  in 
definitely.  As  this  trade  was  steadily  narrowed  down  by 

229 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

the  Union  fleet  the  Confederacy  grew  weaker,  till  the  fall 
of  Fort  Fisher  left  the  South  helpless.  Only  once  was  the 
sea  power  of  the  North  seriously  threatened,  and  that  was 
the  day  of  the  Merrimac's  overwhelming  victory  over  the 
wooden  ships  in  Hampton  Roads.  For  the  rest  of  the  war 
the  story  of  the  navy  is  one  of  an  ever-increasing  effective 
ness,  of  one  port  taken  after  another,  and  of  a  more  and 
more  compact  wall  of  ships  between  the  Confederacy  and 
the  outside  world.  In  1865  the  blockade  held  unchallenged 
sway  from  Cairo,  Illinois — for  the  Mississippi  River  was  an 
important  part  of  the  line — all  the  way  round  to  Fortress 
Monroe.  As  we  have  seen,  the  work  was  dull  and  hard, 
with  much  sickness  and  little  chance  for  glory,  but  we  must 
remember  that,  after  all,  it  was  the  naval  blockade  that 
counted  most  in  saving  the  Union. 


XVIII 

THIRTY    YEARS    OF    PEACE 

Decay  of  the  navy  after  the  war — Beginnings  of  the  "new  navy"- 
— Wreck  and  rescue  of  the  Saginaw — Jeannette  expedition — Samoan 
hurricane. 

THE  long  period  of  galleys — ships  of  war  propelled  by 
oars — came  to  an  end  about  the  time  of  the  Great 
Armada.  Then  followed  three  hundred  years  in  which  the 
sail  was  supreme.  The  period  of  the  sail  gave  way  in  turn 
to  the  era  of  steam  at  the  time  of  our  Civil  War.  The 
change  from  oars  to  canvas  came  gradually,  but  the 
transition  from  sail  to  steam  was  sudden  and  swift.  And 
steam  was  not  the  only  innovation.  With  it  came  the 
long-ranged  rifle-gun,  the  armor,  the  ram,  and  the  torpedo, 
so  that  ten  years  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century 
revolutionized  naval  warfare  far  more  than  the  preceding 
three  hundred  years  had  done. 

During  the  Civil  War  the  rivalry  of  North  and  South 
rapidly  developed  ironclads  and  torpedoes  in  advance  of 
anything  in  European  navies.  But  with  the  close  of  the 
great  struggle  the  United  States  dropped  back  to  the  very 
end  of  the  procession.  The  country  was  weary  of  the 
burden  of  war  and  its  costly  armaments,  and  reduced  the 
army  and  navy  at  once  to  a  peace  footing.  In  the  case  of 
the  navy  there  was  good  reason  for  cutting  down  the  fleet. 
A  great  number  of  vessels  carried  on  the  naval  list  were  old 
ferry-boats  or  river -steamers  hastily  transformed  into 
gunboats.  Others  had  been  hurriedly  built  from  unsea 
soned  timber,  and  still  more  were  too  badly  designed  to  be 
worth  keeping. 

231 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

But,  while  Congress  weeded  out  the  unfit,  it  neglected  to 
replace  them  with  vessels  of  a  modern  type.  In  this 
policy  Congress  only  reflected  the  indifference  of  the  whole 
country.  People  could  not  see  why  we  should  have  an 
army  or  a  navy  in  times  of  peace,  and  both  were  so  reduced 
that  Thomas  Nast,  the  famous  cartoonist  of  Harper's 
Weekly,  used  to  represent  these  two  arms  of  the  service  as 
skeletons.  The  sad  story  of  Custer  and  his  men  would 
never  have  been  told  if  our  soldiers  had  been  equipped 
with  the  modern  repeating-rifles  which  the  Indians  owned, 
instead  of  the  old-fashioned  Sharp's  rifle  of  Civil  War 
days. 

No  such  tragedy  as  the  Custer  massacre  befell  the  navy, 
because  the  navy  was  not  called  on  to  fight,  but  one  hates 
to  think  what  might  have  happened  if  war  had  suddenly 
broken  out  at  any  time  during  the  twenty-five  years  that 
followed  the  Civil  War.  In  the  year  1 88 1  the  United  States 
navy  was  weaker  than  at  any  time  in  our  history  since  the 
days  when  Barbary  pirates  demanded  tribute  as  the  price 
of  peace.  In  1881  the  navy  contained  not  one  ironclad,  and 
consisted  mainly  of  worm-eaten  relics  from  Civil  War 
days  or  earlier.  Our  naval  officers  had  to  make  cruises 
on  ships  like  the  Powhatan,  a  side-wheeler  built  in  the  forties, 
or  the  Constitution,  a  frigate  of  1797,  and  bear  the  ridicule 
of  the  whole  world.  The  guns  on  these  old  tubs  were  the 
muzzle-loading  smooth-bores  of  the  Civil  War. 

But  the  year  1881  marks  also  the  beginning  of  a  change 
of  public  opinion  about  the  navy.  The  weakness  of  our 
fleet  was  felt  when  we  were  on  the  verge  of  war  with  Spain 
in  1873,  and  again  in  1880  when  France  went  ahead  to  dig 
a  canal  in  Panama  without  any  respect  for  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  When  Vice-President  Arthur  became  President 
he  urged  in  strong  terms  the  need  of  a  modern  navy ;  and, 
although  he  was  hindered  by  the  indifference  of  Congress, 
he  finally  succeeded  in  making  a  beginning.  The  act  of 
March  3,  1883,  provided  for  four  steel  ships,  the  cruisers 
Chicago,  Boston,  Atlanta,  and  the  gunboat  Dolphin.  These 

232 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

were  the  first  of  the  "White  Squadron,"  and  mark  the 
beginning  of  the  "new  navy." 

When  work  on  these  vessels  was  begun  it  was  realized 
that  there  were  no  facilities  in  the  United  States  for  mak 
ing  the  necessary  steel  plates  or  manufacturing  the  guns. 
But  in  five  years  the  prospect  of  building  steel  ships  of  war 
at  home  developed  manufacturing-plants  to  supply  every 
detail  of  construction  needed.  In  1885  four  more  vessels 
were  ordered — the  cruisers  Charleston  and  Newark  and  the 
gunboats  Petrel  and  Yorktown.  The  Charleston  was  the 
first  of  our  navy  to  abandon  the  old-fashioned  masts  with 
yards  and  sails  for  the  simple  "military  mast."  Every 
succeeding  year  saw  new  ships  ordered,  and  in  1890  Con 
gress  took  a  forward  step  by  authorizing  the  construction 
of  three  first-class  battle-ships — the  Indiana,  the  Massa 
chusetts,  and  the  Oregon.  Finally,  our  naval  successes  in 
the  war  with  Spain  in  1898  gave  the  navy  such  an  impetus 
that  we  now  rank  among  the  foremost  naval  powers  of  the 
world. 

The  period  of  over  thirty  years  and  more  between  the 
Civil  War  and  the  war  with  Spain  is  too  long  to  cover  in 
detail,  but  a  few  incidents  can  be  selected  to  show  that, 
miserable  as  were  our  ships  and  guns  during  that  period 
of  neglect,  the  phrase  "naval  decay"  must  not  apply  to 
the  officers  and  men.  The  traditions  of  Jones,  Macdon- 
ough,  and  Farragut  were  as  scrupulously  honored  in  the 
eighties,  when  nobody  cared  about  the  navy,  as  in  the  six 
ties,  when  the  nation  depended  on  the  navy  to  strangle  the 
Confederacy.  Before  the  Spanish  War  only  as  many 
graduates  of  the  Naval  Academy  were  commissioned  as 
were  needed  to  fill  the  vacancies  in  the  list.  These  men, 
of  course,  were  selected  from  the  top  of  the  class,  and  the 
rest  were  retired  to  civil  life.  The  result  was  a  navy 
personnel  of  picked  men. 

The  three  incidents  told  here  cover  this  "period  of 
neglect"  at  about  ten-year  intervals.  The  first  is  the 
story  of  the  Saginaw.  On  October  29,  1870,  the  little 

233 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

steam-sloop  Saginaw  finished  her  appointed  task  of  dredg 
ing  a  channel  for  mail-steamers  at  Midway  Island  in  the 
Pacific,  and  Captain  Sicard  turned  her  bows  toward 
Ocean  Island,  sixty  miles  away,  about  which  he  had  been 
ordered  to  make  a  report.  During  the  night  a  strong 
ocean  current  drew  the  Saginaw  out  of  her  course,  and 
about  three  in  the  morning  a  sudden  crash  sent  all  hands 
on  deck  with  a  rush.  From  the  deck  officers  and  men  were 
driven  into  the  rigging  for  safety,  because  huge  breakers 
were  curling  and  breaking  right  over  the  bulwarks.  A 
few  minutes  of  this  pounding  served  to  drive  the  ship 
higher  up  on  the  reef,  so  that  men  could  return  to  the 
deck. 

It  was  a  time  to  try  the  discipline  of  the  ship.  Nothing 
could  be  seen  in  the  darkness,  and  every  boat  on  the 
weather  side  was  smashed.  Suddenly  the  smoke-stack 
fell  over,  and  a  few  minutes  later  the  loosened  mainmast 
went  by  the  board.  Dawn  showed  that  the  vessel  had 
been  driven  on  a  reef  of  Ocean  Island  itself.  By  that  time 
the  ship  had  broken  in  two,  with  the  forward  half  driven 
still  higher  on  the  reef,  but  the  sight  of  the  island  gave  hope 
to  the  crew,  and  they  worked  with  a  will  to  launch  the 
undamaged  boats. 

All  that  day  officers  and  men  toiled  to  save  as  much  of 
the  ship's  provisions  as  they  could,  together  with  the  car 
penter's  chest  and  the  sailors'  hammocks,  which  served 
as  tents.  When  the  shipwrecked  men  had  time  to  examine 
the  island  they  found  it  was  simply  a  low  sand-spit  covered 
with  bushes.  There  was  no  spring  on  the  island,  the 
water  reached  by  digging  proved  to  be  brackish,  and  for  a 
while  it  looked  as  if  the  seventy  officers  and  men  of  the 
Saginaw  had  escaped  death  in  the  breakers  only  to  face  a 
more  dreadful  death  from  thirst.  Here  the  trained  mind 
of  an  officer  came  to  the  rescue.  By  means  of  the  ship's 
boiler  and  some  rubber  hose  he  devised  a  condenser  which 
was  able  to  provide  forty  or  fifty  gallons  a  day.  The  fuel  for 
the  condenser  was  supplied  by  the  bleached  timbers  of  an 

234 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

old  whaler  that  had  been  wrecked  on  the  island  many  years 
before.  For  food,  the  supply  rescued  from  the  ship  was 
carefully  saved  and  doled  out  to  officers  and  men  at  quarter 
rations.  The  rest  had  to  be  made  up  by  fish  and  seal  meat, 
both  of  which  proved  unwholesome. 

For  the  time  being  the  shipwrecked  men  were  safe,  but 
the  fuel  supplied  by  the  whaler  could  not  last  for  ever,  and 
the  stock  of  provisions  was  scant.  Moreover,  Ocean  Island 
was  so  far  from  the  track  of  steamers  that  there  was  small 
chance  of  rescue.  Something  must  be  done  to  get  help  or 
all  would  perish  together.  So  Captain  Sicard  decided  to 
fit  out  one  of  the  boats  saved  from  the  Saginaw  and  send 
her  with  a  volunteer  crew  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  twelve 
hundred  miles  away,  to  get  help. 

As  soon  as  he  proposed  the  plan  volunteers  pressed 
eagerly  forward  for  the  perilous  undertaking.  From  these 
he  selected  Lieut.  John  Talbot  and  four  sturdy  seamen. 
The  boat  was  only  twenty-six  feet  long,  but  it  was  the 
best  available.  She  was  decked  over  with  painted  canvas, 
leaving  only  a  little  cockpit  open.  A  few  navigating-in- 
struments,  twenty-five  days'  provisions,  and  ninety  gallons 
of  water  were  put  aboard,  and,  just  three  weeks  after  the 
Saginaw  struck  the  reef  the  little  gig  spread  sail  for  the 
Hawaiian  Islands.  Scarcely  had  the  boat  been  five  days 
on  its  way  when  the  heavy  seas  put  out  the  little  fire  that 
was  kept  on  board  and  drenched  all  the  matches,  so  that 
thereafter  there  was  no  way  of  drying  clothes  or  cooking 
food.  For  the  rest  of  the  voyage  the  food  had  to  be  eaten 
raw  and  soggy  with  salt-water,  with  the  result  that  Lieuten 
ant  Talbot  and  his  men  were  miserably  sick  for  days  and 
weeks  at  a  time.  Meanwhile  the  weather  grew  steadily 
worse.  The  pounding  waves  started  leaks  in  the  canvas 
decking,  and  soon  there  was  not  a  dry  spot  in  the  boat. 
Twice  the  little  cockle-shell  had  to  lie  to  with  an  improvised 
sea-anchor  to  keep  from  swamping  in  the  fearful  seas. 
Twice  this  drag  broke  loose,  leaving  the  sick  crew  battling 
for  their  lives  to  keep  afloat.  Three  such  gales  were  en- 

235 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

countered.  Finally,  at  the  end  of  thirty-eight  days,  during 
which  the  boat  had  covered  a  course  of  nearly  sixteen 
hundred  miles,  one  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands  was  sighted. 
Even  then  the  weather  was  so  rough  that  the  gig  had  to  be 
kept  offshore  for  three  days  before  Talbot  dared  to  risk 
a  landing.  On  December  igth,  about  dawn,  the  boat  was 
caught  by  just  such  a  current  as  had  wrecked  the  Saginaw 
herself  and  was  sucked  in  among  the  breakers  on  the  shore. 
Over  and  over  they  tossed  and  rolled  the  tiny  craft,  and  the 
men  were  too  weak  with  sickness  and  exhaustion  to  strug 
gle  long.  Out  of  the  five  only  one,  Coxswain  Halford, 
staggered  ashore  alive.  In  his  arms  he  dragged  one  of  his 
mates,  but  the  man  soon  died  after  reaching  the  shore.  As 
quickly  as  he  could  Halford  sent  the  news  of  the  Saginaw' 's 
plight  to  Honolulu.  Soon  afterward  the  anxious  watchers 
on  Ocean  Island  caught  a  faint  streak  of  smoke  on  the 
horizon,  then  with  a  great  .cheer  they  saw  that  a  relief 
steamer  was  actually  coming  at  last. 

The  only  lives  lost  in  the  wreck  of  the  Saginaw  were  those 
of  the  four  who  perished  in  the  little  gig  on  its  errand  of 
rescue.  The  boat  itself  hangs  now  in  the  Seamanship 
Building  at  the  Naval  Academy;  and  in  the  Memorial  Hall 
of  the  midshipmen's  great  dormitory  stands  a  tablet,  placed 
there  by  the  officers  of  the  Saginaw,  to  the  memory  of  Lieut. 
John  Talbot.  The  inscription  ends  with  this  fitting  quo 
tation:  "Greater  love  hath  no  man  than  this,  that  a  man 
lay  down  his  life  for  his  friends." 

In  the  next  story  the  scene  shifts  from  the  Pacific  to  the 
snowbound  wilderness  of  northern  Siberia.  The  navy  had 
been  engaged  in  polar  exploration  before  the  Civil  War. 
Captain  Wilkes,  who  very  nearly  got  us  into  war  with 
England  over  his  seizure  of  the  Trent,  was  the  first  to  dis 
cover  the  existence  of  the  antarctic  continent  in  1840.  In 
1850  two  ships,  under  Lieutenant  de  Haven,  joined  in  the 
vain  search  for  Sir  John  Franklin's  party.  Both  of  these 
vessels  were  frozen  in  the  arctic  ice-pack  and  drifted  with 

236 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

it  eight  months  over  a  thousand  miles  before  they  got  free 
under  a  midsummer  sun. 

The  Civil  War  interrupted  exploration  for  the  navy, 
but  interest  in  finding  the  north  pole  revived  after  the  war 
was  over.  In  1879  James  Gordon  Bennett,  proprietor  of 
the  New  York  Herald,  contributed  funds  to  co-operate  with 
the  government  in  an  expedition  to  discover  the  north 
pole.  The  idea  was  to  use  a  hitherto  untried  route.  It 
was  known  that  in  Bering  Straits  the  Japanese  Current 
splits  into  two  branches,  one  turning  south  along  the 
western  coast  of  North  America,  and  the  other  veering 
northeast  into  the  arctic  circle.  It  was  planned  to  follow 
this  northerly  current  toward  the  pole. 

Accordingly,  the  steamer  Jeannette  left  San  Francisco  in 
the  summer  of  1879,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 
Commander  C.  W.  de  Long,  on  a  preliminary  voyage  of 
exploration  before  attempting  the  dash  for  the  pole.  But 
scarcely  had  the  little  vessel  passed  Bering  Straits  when  she 
was  met  by  huge  ice-floes  which  forced  her  away  to  the  west. 
De  Long  decided  that  he  would  winter  on  Wrangell  Land, 
which  in  those  days  was  supposed  to  be  a  huge  arctic  con 
tinent,  but  before  the  end  of  the  first  week  of  September  the 
Jeannette  was  frozen  solid  in  the  ice-floes.  A  steady 
westerly  drift  carried  her  along  past  Wrangell  Land,  which 
then  proved  to  be  only  a  comparatively  small  island.  Then 
the  arctic- winter  night  shut  down  on  the  imprisoned  ship. 
Every  day  the  grinding,  cracking  masses  of  ice  threatened 
to  crush  the  vessel  like  a  nutshell,  and  there  was  no  way  of 
escape.  Month  after  month  of  frightful  cold,  hardship,  and 
peril  dragged  by. 

With  the  return  of  the  sun  and  the  long  summer  days  the 
explorers  confidently  hoped  that  they  should  get  free,  as 
Lieutenant  de  Haven's  ships  had  done  at  the  end  of  their 
long  winter's  drifting.  But  not  even  the  July  sunshine 
could  release  the  Jeannette  from  her  icy  prison.  To  the 
despair  of  all,  September  came  again  with  no  escape. 
Another  dreadful  winter  had  to  be  lived  through,  and  this 
16  237 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

time  there  was  much  sickness  on  board.  Under  the  con 
ditions  it  took  all  of  a  man's  nerve  to  keep  from  giving  way 
to  despair.  Again  all  hope  was  fixed  on  the  prospect  of 
better  luck  when  another  summer  came.  Meanwhile  the 
men  were  confronted  with  the  hourly  danger  of  being  ship 
wrecked  and  stranded  by  the  ice,  but  the  stout  little  ship 
stood  the  strain  throughout  the  winter.  At  last  the  long 
days  of  June  brought  thawing,  the  floes  shrank  and  fell 
away,  but  instead  of  freeing  the  Jeannette  on  an  even  keel 
the  shifting  ice  crushed  her  hull  and  sank  her.  The 
officers  and  crew  had  only  time  to  escape  to  the  ice  with 
some  provisions,  sledges,  and  three  boats.  This  disaster 
occurred  on  the  i2th  of  June,  1881. 

The  point  where  the  Jeannette  foundered  was  in  the 
midst  of  the  Arctic  Ocean,  north  of  Siberia.  The  nearest 
source  of  help  was  the  scattered  villages  around  the  Lena 
Delta,  five  hundred  miles  away.  There  was  nothing  for 
the  castaways  to  do  but  to  try  to  reach  that  point  by  boat, 
wherever  there  was  open  water;  otherwise,  by  marching 
over  the  ice,  dragging  the  boats  after  them.  It  looked  like 
a  hopeless  undertaking,  but  it  offered  the  only  chance  of 
escape.  The  natural  hardships  were  added  to  by  the  fact 
that  when  the  Jeannette  was  wrecked  two  of  the  officers  and 
three  of  the  men  were  sick,  their  provisions  were  scanty,  and 
their  boots  and  clothing  worn  through.  Then,  as  if  these 
troubles  were  not  enough,  although  the  party  tramped 
steadily  southwest,  the  northerly  drift  of  the  ice-floes  took 
them  twenty-eight  miles  in  the  opposite  direction  before 
they  could  make  a  single  mile  southward. 

It  was  exactly  three  months  after  the  shipwreck  when 
the  party  reached  the  delta  of  the  Lena  River.  There  the 
three  boats  were  separated  by  a  gale.  Chief-Engineer 
Melville,  in  command  of  the  whale-boat,  managed  to  enter 
one  of  the  mouths  of  the  river.  After  indescribable  suffer 
ings  he  and  his  nine  men  reached  a  little  Siberian  village  on 
its  banks.  One  of  his  men  went  insane  from  the  effects  of 
exhaustion,  starvation,  and  cold. 

238 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

The  second  cutter  must  have  foundered  in  the  gale,  for 
nothing  more  was  ever  heard  of  it.  De  Long,  in  the  first 
cutter,  containing  the  surgeon  and  twelve  men,  also  suc 
ceeded  in  entering  the  river,  and  continued  southward. 
Unfortunately,  no  one  of  the  party  knew  just  where  the 
Siberian  villages  were,  and  it  was  their  misfortune  not  to 
encounter  a  single  native.  They  landed,  and  then,  as  they 
were  on  the  verge  of  starvation,  De  Long  sent  his  two 
strongest  men  to  go  on  up  the  river  ahead  and  find  help. 
The  others  plodded  slowly  after. 

By  the  end  of  October  these  two  messengers,  almost 
dead  from  starvation,  tottered  into  a  village.  They  gave  a 
despatch  scrawled  in  pencil  to  one  of  the  natives  to  be 
carried  to  the  nearest  Russian  official.  But  the  man, 
having  heard  of  Melville's  arrival  in  a  neighboring  village, 
carried  the  message  to  him  instead.  At  that  time  Melville 
was  in  such  a  condition  from  frost-bitten  limbs  and  feet 
that  he  was  unable  to  stand.  By  that  time,  too,  the  early 
Siberian  winter  had  set  in,  but  Melville  knew  only  one  line 
of  duty,  to  try  to  rescue  his  shipmates.  He  made  up  a 
sledging  party,  had  himself  placed  on  a  sledge,  and  started 
for  the  village  where  the  two  sailors  were.  With  them  as 
guides  he  started  out  to  find  De  Long  and  his  men.  Here 
and  there  he  discovered  traces  left  by  the  party,  but  lost  the 
clue  because  De  Long  had  toward  the  end  of  his  march 
crossed  on  the  ice  to  the  opposite  bank.  On  November 
1 4th  a  blizzard  overwhelmed  the  rescuers  and  came  very 
near  blotting  out  the  lives  of  the  entire  party. 

As  soon  as  conditions  permitted  the  next  spring  Melville 
set  out  again,  and  on  March  23,  1882,  discovered  the  bodies 
of  De  Long  and  his  men.  The  last  entry  in  De  Long's  diary 
was  October  30,  1881.  It  told  of  the  death  from  starvation 
of  two  and  the  dying  condition  of  a  third.  Probably  all 
were  dead  by  the  first  of  November.  In  order  that  the 
scientific  observations  and  records  of  the  Jeannette  might 
not  be  lost  De  Long  had  put  them  in  an  inside  pocket  and 
used  his  last  remaining  strength  to  crawl  to  a  little  higher 

239 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

ground  near  the  camp.  Then  he  braced  his  arm  upward  in 
the  snow,  evidently  so  that  his  body  might  be  more  readily 
discovered. 

These  records  of  the  Jeannette — whatever  their  scien 
tific  value — were  paid  for  at  a  dreadful  price  of  brave  men. 
But  it  is  a  proud  thing  for  us  to  realize  that  during  those 
years  of  suffering  in  the  arctic,  ending  in  slow  death  by  cold 
and  starvation,  there  was  never  a  whimper.  As  men  they 
worked  together  and  sacrificed  themselves  .for  one  another; 
as  men  they  suffered,  and  as  men  they  died.  So  the  little 
Jeannette  has  taken  her  place  in  the  honor  list  of  the 
American  navy. 

The  third  story  brings  us  again  to  the  Pacific.  In  1888 
the  German  government  interfered  very  seriously  with 
affairs  in  the  Samoan  Islands.  It  deposed  one  king  and 
set  up  another  in  his  place.  The  natives  refused  to  submit 
to  this  new  king  and  showed  fight.  In  December,  1888, 
German  sailors  landed  under  arms,  but  were  met  by  such  a 
determined  resistance  from  the  natives  that  they  drew  back 
to  their  ships  with  a  loss  of  fifty  killed  and  wounded. 
Then  Germany  declared  war,  and  England  and  the  United 
States  sent  ships  to  protect  their  interests  in  the  islands. 

In  March,  1889,  there  were  ships  representing  these  three 
nations  in  the  harbor  of  Apia.  This  is  a  small  semicircular 
bay  opening  on  the  north,  with  a  coral  reef  extending  in 
front  from  east  to  west.  A  break  in  the  reef  about  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  wide  serves  as  entrance  and  exit  for  the 
harbor.  Within  the  harbor  is  scant  anchoring  -  ground, 
because  from  the  east  shore  there  is  a  wide  mud-shoal,  and 
from  the  opposite  side  projects  another  reef  that  reaches 
out  into  the  middle  of  the  bay,  as  may  be  seen  from  the 
map.  Here  were  collected  three  German  men-of-war — 
the  O/ga,  the  Eber,  the  Adler;  three  American — the  Tren 
ton,  the  Vanaalia,  the  Nipsic ;  one  English — the  Calliope. 
Owing  to  the  cramped  space  in  the  harbor,  the  Trenton 
and  the  Vandalia  anchored  in  the  harbor  entrance. 

240 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

After  several  weeks  of  bad  weather  the  wind  rose  on 
March  i5th  to  a  heavy  gale.  As  the  day  wore  on  the  wind 
only  increased  in  fury,  and  all  the  men-of-war  made  ready 
by  housing  their  upper  spars  and  getting  up  steam.  By 
night  the  storm  was  a  hurricane,  with  the  war-ships  pitch 
ing  and  jerking  at  their  anchor-cables.  About  midnight 
the  Eber  began  dragging  anchors,  and  an  hour  later  the 
Vandalia  was  in  the  same  condition,  both  usiri£  their 
steam  to  keep  from  drifting  upon  the  inner  reef  or  colliding 
with  the  other  vessels. 

Daybreak  found  all  the  ships  dragging  anchors  and 
drifting  down  upon  the  inner  reef.  The  Eber  seemed 
utterly  helpless.  Suddenly  she  was  hurled  upon  the  reef 
by  the  great  combing  breakers,  rolled  over  on  her  side, 
and  in  a  few  minutes  smashed  to  pieces.  By  this  time  the 
Samoans  had  gathered  on  the  shore,  and,  though  the  Ger 
mans  were  their  enemies,  the  instant  they  saw  the  plight 
of  the  Eber  they  grasped  hands  and  made  a  human  life 
line — standing  far  out  in  the  surf  where  no  white  man 
could  have  lived — and  hauled  in  the  few  survivors  who 
came  ashore.  Only  one  officer  and  four  men  of  the  Eber 
were  saved. 

The  next  ship  to  strike  the  reef  was  the  Adler,  but  the 
hull  was  driven  so  high  out  of  the  water  that  all  but  twenty 
were  saved  by  staying  in  the  wreck  out  of  the  reach  of  the 
breakers.  Meanwhile  the  Nipsic' s  anchors  were  dragging 
badly ;  and  just  as  her  crew  were  sending  over  an  eight-inch 
gun  at  the  end  of  a  hawser  as  an  additional  anchor,  the 
Nipsic  was  struck  by  the  Olga,  which  knocked  the  smoke 
stack  of  the  American  vessel  over  and  left  her  without 
sufficient  steam  to  head  the  gale.  The  Nipsic  then  turned 
and,  with  what  steam  she  had,  sheered  along  the  inner  reef, 
cleared  it  successfully,  and  ran  upon  the  beach.  Then,  at 
the  greatest  peril  of  their  own  lives,  the  Samoans  managed 
to  rescue  the  Americans  from  the  forecastle  of  the  Nipsic 
in  the  very  teeth  of  the  tremendous  surf. 

For  a  while  the  four  larger  men-of-war — the  Olga,  the 

241 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 


HARBOR   OF   APIA 

Trenton,  the  Calliope,  and  the  Vandalia — were  still  afloat 
and  off  the  reef.  The  gale,  however,  was,  if  anything,  more 
terrific  than  before,  and  the  big  vessels  began  to  show 
distress.  About  ten  in  the  morning  the  Trenton  was  help 
less.  Floating  wreckage  had  knocked  off  her  rudder  and 
propellers,  and  she  was  drifting  slowly  upon  the  inner  reef. 
At  the  same  time  the  Vandalia  and  the  Calliope  were 
dragging,  too.  It  looked  as  if  all  three  vessels  would  soon 
be  together  in  collision  just  on  the  very  edge  of  the  reef. 

In  this  crisis  Captain  Kane,  of  the  Calliope,  made  a 
quick  decision,  on  which  depended  his  ship  and  the  lives  of 
all  his  men.  He  would  let  go  his  cables  and  try  to  steam 

242 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

out  of  the  harbor  in  the  teeth  of  the  hurricane.  It  looked  like 
a  forlorn  chance,  but  it  was  the  one  thing  to  do.  Clouds  of 
black  smoke  rolled  out  of  the  Calliope  s  stack  as  her  engines 
were  taxed  for  the  supreme  effort.  For  a  few  minutes  the 
ship  remained  stationary,  battling  against  the  wind  and 
sea.  Then  slowly  she  inched  forward,  gathering  headway 
with  every  moment.  To  get  to  sea  the  English  ship  had  to 
pass  close  between  the  helpless  Trenton  and  the  outer  reef, 
and  to  accomplish  the  feat  demanded  superb  seamanship. 
As  the  Calliope  surged  close  to  the  Trenton  the  Americans, 
who  seemed  doomed  to  certain  death  that  very  hour,  sud 
denly  forgot  their  own  danger  in  admiration  of  the  English 
captain's  daring  manoeuver  and  the  faultless  way  in  which 
he  executed  it. 

"Three  cheers  for  the  Calliope!"  shouted  some  one,  and 
the  hurrahs  were  given  with  a  will. 

Down  the  gale  came  the  quick  answering  cheer  of  the 
British  tars,  and  the  Calliope,  wreathed  in  black  smoke, 
weathered  the  harbor  mouth  and  fought  her  way  trium 
phantly  to  the  open  sea, 

Meanwhile  the  Vandalia,  unable  to  steam  against  the 
wind,  had  been  forced,  like  the  Nipsic,  to  skirt  the  edge  of 
the  reef  and  run  up  on  the  beach,  where  she  was  soon 
pounding  to  pieces.  Her  entire  company  crowded  on  the 
wave-swept  forecastle,  but  not  for  a  moment  was  dis 
cipline  relaxed.  One  brave  sailor  volunteered  to  swim 
through  the  surf  with  a  line,  but  he  was  scarcely  overboard 
before  he  was  dashed  to  death  against  the  hull  of  the  ship. 
Officers  and  men  clung  to  whatever  offered  a  hold,  but  one 
after  another,  weakened  by  the  terrible  strain,  was  swept 
overboard.  Unfortunately,  the  ship  was  stranded  too  far 
out  to  be  helped  in  any  way  by  the  life-savers  ashore. 

At  the  same  time  that  the  Vandalia  was  in  such  distress 
the  Trenton  was  drifting  helplessly  toward  the  reef.  The 
01 ga  tried  to  steam  away,  and  in  doing  so  collided  with  the 
Trenton.  The  latter,  now  worse  off  than  ever,  with  leaks 
gaining  on  the  pumps  and  no  means  of  steaming  or  steering, 

243 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR   NAVY 

seemed  doomed  to  perish  like  the  Eber  and  the  Adler  in  the 
smother  of  foaming  breakers  on  the  reef.  As  every  one 
knew,  from  the  anxious  watchers  on  the  shore  to  the 
American  admiral  on  the  Trenton  s  bridge,  when  that  hap 
pened  there  was  small  chance  of  a  single  man's  reaching 
the  shore  alive.  If  only  there  were  some  way  of  moving 
away  from  that  deadly  reef!  The  Trenton  had  sails,  but 
nothing  larger  than  a  tiny  storm-sail  would  hold  against  the 
force  of  that  hurricane.  Meanwhile  she  was  drifting, 
broadside  on,  directly  toward  the  reef. 

Suddenly  Lieutenant  Brown  had  an  inspiration.  He 
proposed  his  idea  to  the  admiral,  and  it  was  instantly  ac 
cepted.  Hoarse  orders  were  shouted  up  and  down  the 
length  of  the  deck.  There  was  a  scurry  of  feet,  and  a  mid 
shipman  led  the  way  for  the  entire  crew  to  clamber  into 
the  weather  mizzen  shrouds.  These  were  soon  black  with 
men  crowded  together,  beaten  flat  against  the  tarred  ropes 
by  the  violence  of  the  wind,  and  clinging  for  their  very 
lives.  Canvas  would  not  hold  against  such  a  wind,  but 
strong  men  could — and  did.  Lieutenant  Brown's  idea  was 
to  make  a  human  sail. 

Under  the  pressure  on  the  port  shrouds  the  Trenton 
heeled  over  to  port  and  pointed  seaward  again.  By  this 
time  her  stern  was  only  a  few  feet  from  the  line  of  leaping 
breakers  that  marked  the  reef,  but  slowly  she  began  to 
forge  ahead,  sheering  close  alongside  of  the  reef — so  close 
that  her  people  hardly  dared  hope  to  get  by.  Foot  by  foot 
the  old  ship  edged  along,  just  cleared  the  end  of  the  reef,  and 
then  drove  full  before  the  gale  toward  the  beach  and  the 
wreck  of  the  Vandalia.  Without  a  rudder  it  was  impos 
sible  to  steer,  and  as  the  big  flag-ship  came  down  on  the 
latter  it  seemed  as  if  a  collision  would  knock  overboard 
the  battered  survivors  of  the  Vandalia  who  still  clung  to 
her  rigging.  Nevertheless,  the  brave  men  on  the  Vandalia 
raised  a  feeble  cheer  for  the  Trenton  and  her  human  sail. 
"Three  cheers  for  the  Vandalia!"  was  shouted  on  the  flag 
ship.  Again  men  who  expected  death  were  cheering  each 

244 


THE    STORY   OF  OUR   NAVY 

others'  gallantry.  The  Trenton's  bandsmen  were  hur 
riedly  mustered,  and  the  strains  of  the  "  Star-spangled 
Banner"  were  heard  over  the  roar  of  the  tempest. 

Now  the  Trenton's  bow  struck  the  beach,  and  she  swung 
around;  but,  instead  of  crashing  against  the  Vandalia  and 
knocking  her  exhausted  crew  into  the  sea,  the  Trenton 
merely  swung  close  aboard.  Instead  of  bringing  death 
the  stranded  Trenton  actually  brought  rescue  to  the  sur 
vivors  of  the  Vandalia,  for  the  Trenton  s  men  were  now 
able  to  help  them  to  drop  off  the  yards  of  the  Vandalia 
upon  the  deck  of  the  flag-ship.  As  she  drove  high  on  the 
beach  her  deck  rose  far  enough  above  the  breakers  for  the 
crews  to  remain  on  board  in  safety  throughout  the  rest  of 
the  hurricane. 

When  the  storm  had  subsided  a  muster  was  taken  of  the 
crews.  It  was  found  that  ninety-one  Germans  and  fifty- 
three  Americans  had  been  drowned.  After  ramming  the 
Trenton  the  Olga  had  steamed  ashore  on  the  mud-flats  at 
the  opposite  side  of  the  bay  from  the  reef  and  escaped  ship 
wreck.  As  we  have  seen,  the  Calliope  got  to  sea,  and  all 
the  rest  of  the  ships  were  lying  wrecked  on  the  beach  or 
on  the  inner  reef. 

The  three  American  vessels,  Trenton,  Vandalia,  and 
Nipsic,  were  old-fashioned  wooden  ships  such  as  our  navy 
had  to  get  along  with  in  those  days.  As  men-of-war  they 
were  not  creditable  to  a  country  as  rich  as  the  United 
States,  but  no  one  can  read  the  story  of  the  Samoan  hurri 
cane,  or,  for  that  matter,  of  the  Saginaw  and  the  Jeannette, 
without  realizing  that  the  officers  and  men  on  these  old 
ships  showed  as  fine  a  standard  of  discipline,  of  cool  re 
sourcefulness,  and  superb  heroism  in  the  face  of  death  as 
the  navy  had  ever  boasted  in  its  proudest  days. 


XIX 

THE    SPANISH-AMERICAN    WAR 

Causes  of  the  Spanish-American  War — Preparations  of  the  United 
States — Comparison  of  navies — Dewey's  preparations  in  the  East — 
Entering  Manila  Bay — The  battle — German  interference — Impor 
tance  of  the  victory. 

THE  island  of  Cuba  figured  in  many  a  controversy 
before  the  United  States  freed  it  from  the  misrule  of 
Spain.  During  the  earlier  years  of  the  nineteenth  century 
our  government  was  afraid  that  England  or  France  was 
going  to  acquire  the  island  and  establish  a  powerful  colonial 
station  at  our  very  doors.  But  after  the  Mexican  War  the 
slavery  party  was  anxious  to  annex  Cuba,  like  Texas,  in 
order  to  increase  the  slave-holding  area  of  the  country. 
As  Spain  refused  even  to  consider  the  matter  of  selling 
Cuba,  and  the  North  was  hostile  to  making  another  war 
simply  to  increase  slave  territory,  the  plan  fell  through. 

Meanwhile  the  bad  government  of  Spanish  officials 
provoked  one  rebellion  after  another,  and,  as  Americans 
were  always  in  sympathy  with  the  rebels,  there  were  many 
filibustering  expeditions  from  our  shores,  carrying  arms  and 
ammunition  to  the  insurgent  Cubans.  The  "Ten  Years' 
War,"  between  1868  and  1878,  was  waged  with  savage 
cruelty  on  both  sides  and  wholesale  destruction  of  property, 
most  of  which  belonged  to  the  Americans.  President 
Grant  threatened  to  intervene,  but,  as  Spain  promised  to 
do  better,  the  threat  was  never  carried  out.  One  incident 
of  this  war  aroused  the  United  States  to  such  anger  against 
Spain  that  the  two  countries  nearly  came  to  blows  over 

246 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

it.  The  American  schooner  Virginius  was  seized  by  a 
Spanish  gunboat  and  taken  to  Havana  on  the  charge  of 
carrying  munitions  of  war  to  the  rebels.  The  officers  and 
crew  of  the  vessel  were  brought  to  trial,  with  the  result  that 
most  of  them  were  lined  up  against  a  wall  and  shot.  Among 
the  victims  were  thirty  Americans.  Only  full  reparations 
and  apologies  for  this  barbarous  act  prevented  war. 

In  1876  General  Campos  went  to  Cuba  with  a  milder 
policy  toward  the  insurgents,  and  succeeded  in  bringing 
to  the  unhappy  island  a  peace  which  lasted  from  1878  to 
1895.  Then  a  new  rebellion  broke  out  which  he  could  not 
put  down.  So  he  resigned  and  was  replaced  by  General 
Weyler.  This  officer  decided  to  crush  the  revolt  with  an 
iron  hand.  He  shot  people  for  small  offenses,  herded  all 
the  inhabitants  he  coald  lay  hands  on  into  the  cities,  so 
that  the  fields  were  left  uncultivated  and  there  was  soon 
nothing  to  eat.  At  that  time  Americans  owned  fifty 
million  dollars'  worth  of  property  in  Cuba,  much  of  which 
was  destroyed  by  Weyler's  policy  and  the  guerrilla  warfare. 
But  the  suffering  of  the  reconcentrados,  the  women  and 
children  huddled  together  in  starvation  camps,  did  much 
more  to  anger  the  American  nation.  President  Cleveland 
offered  to  help  Spain  in  bringing  about  peace  in  Cuba,  but 
the  offer  was  declined.  Later  President  McKinley  sent  a 
polite  protest  against  Weyler's  barbarities,  but  Spain  was 
indifferent  to  this  also.  Meanwhile  the  American  Red 
Cross  Society  sent  quantities  of  food,  clothing,  and  medicine 
to  relieve  the  distress  of  the  reconcentrados,  and  especially 
for  the  five  hundred  to  six  hundred  Americans  who  were 
among  the  sufferers.  Finally,  in  1897,  Weyler  was  recalled, 
but  General  Blanco,  who  succeeded  him,  was  unable  to 
make  matters  much  better. 

As  the  American  newspapers  were  very  sharp  in  their 
criticism  of  Spain  and  General  Weyler,  the  Havana  papers 
took  an  anti- American  tone.  Anti- American  riots  took 
place  in  Havana  as  well,  so  the  battle-ship  Maine  was  sent 
there  as  a  reminder  that  the  rights  of  American  citizens 

247 


THE   STORY    OF   OUR   NAVY 

must  be  respected.  The  Maine  arrived  in  Havana  in 
January,  1898.  In  February  a  private  letter  written  from 
the  Spanish  minister  in  Washington  to  an  editor  in  Madrid 
somehow  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  insurgents,  who  pub 
lished  it.  In  this  the  minister  described  President  McKin- 
ley  as  "weak  and  catering  to  the  mob,"  and  said  some 
other  unpleasant  things  besides.  American  anger  over  that 
incident  had  scarcely  begun  to  find  expression  when  the 
incident  was  forgotten  in  the  horror  caused  by  a  tragedy 
that  followed  a  few  days  later. 

At  9.45  on  the  evening  of  February  15,  1898,  there  was  a 
sudden  and  frightful  explosion  in  the  harbor  of  Havana. 
A  moment  later  a  great  jet  of  fire  shot  up  from  the  maga 
zines  of  the  Maine,  and  the  noble  ship  sank  rapidly  to  the 
bottom  All  but  two  of  her  officers  were  saved,  but  of  the 
crew  of  353  men  only  48  escaped  unhurt.  The  Maine  had 
been  blown  up  in  the  harbor  of  Havana;  the  question  was 
"How?" 

As  soon  as  possible  a  naval  court  of  inquiry  made  a  care 
ful  survey  and  reported  that  the  ship  had  been  blown  up  by 
an  external  explosion.  In  the  words  of  the  report,  she  had 
been  "destroyed  by  a  submarine  mine,  which  caused  the 
partial  explosion  of  two  or  more  of  her  magazines."  This 
fact  was  established  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  by  the 
careful  examination  of  the  wreck  made  in  1912,  when  it  was 
raised,  towed  out  to  sea,  and  sunk  with  military  honors. 

The  Spanish  authorities  made  what  they  were  pleased  to 
call  an  investigation,  too.  They  promptly  reported  that 
the  blowing  up  of  the  Maine  was  due  to  an  explosion  from 
within  the  ship,  but  no  one  took  their  report  very  seriously. 
Popular  feeling  in  the  United  States  laid  the  atrocious 
crime  at  the  door  of  Spanish  officials  in  Cuba.  The  long 
simmering  fires  of  indignation  against  Spain  now  burst  into 
a  flame  of  passion  that  swept  the  country  from  one  end  to 
the  other.  A  few  voices  called  for  moderation,  but  they 
were  drowned  in  the  cry  from  all  sides,  "Remember  the 
Maine!"  Although  diplomatic  correspondence  continued 

248 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

for  a  few  weeks  longer,  intervention  seemed  more  and  more 
certain  to  come.  Finally,  on  April  25,  1898,  the  United 
States  declared  war. 

A  comparison  of  the  two  nations  shows  at  once  the  great 
advantage  of  the  United  States.  Spain  was  one  of  the 
poorest  nations  in  the  civilized  world,  while  the  United 
States  ranked  as  one  of  the  richest.  But  there  was  no  such 
difference  in  the  navies — at  least,  on  paper.  Some  experts 
ranked  the  United  States  as  sixth  among  the  naval  powers, 
and  Spain  eighth,  but  in  Europe  the  Spanish  navy  was 
regarded  by  many  as  superior.  There  were  137  vessels 
of  war  on  the  Spanish  list  to  86  on  the  American.  Besides 
this,  the  long,  exposed  coast-lines  of  the  United  States, 
with  only  a  few  weak  coast  defenses,  offered  tempting 
places  for  fleet  attack  on  the  great  seaport  cities. 

The  fact  is  that  the  Department  at  Washington  did 
not  know  just  how  strong  the  Spanish  fleet  was;  further 
more,  such  was  the  state  of  things  in  Madrid  that  many 
prominent  Spanish  officials  did  not  know,  either.  Later, 
when  all  the  paper  pretense  was  broken  down  by  the  hard 
facts  of  the  war,  it  was  seen  that,  except  for  nine  armored 
ships  ranging  from  6,840  to  9,900  tons,  the  Spanish  navy 
was  made  up  of  old  vessels  of  wood  and  iron  that  were 
unfit  for  modern  warfare.  There  was  not  a  single  vessel 
under  the  Spanish  flag  equal  to  any  one  of  our  four  10,000- 
ton  battle-ships  Oregon,  Iowa,  Massachusetts,  and  Indiana. 
So  far  we  have  spoken  only  of  the  ships  themselves.  Of 
the  comparative  efficiency  of  the  two  navies  we  will  let  the 
events  of  the  war  tell  their  own  story. 

In  October,  1897,  six  months  before  the  declaration  of 
war,  Commodore  George  Dewey  was  ordered  to  take  com 
mand  of  the  Asiatic  squadron.  At  that  time  few  people 
believed  that  war  was  actually  going  to  break  out  because 
of  the  Cuban  situation,  but  Commodore  Dewey  made  the 
most  of  the  month  left  him  before  going  west  by  studying  all 
the  books  and  charts  he  could  find  relating  to  the  Philip 
pine  Islands.  He  well  knew  that  if  war  did  come  it  would  be 

249 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

his  duty  to  attack  the  Spanish  in  the  Philippines.  At  the 
same  time  he  cut  a  good  deal  of  official  red  tape  in  order  to 
get  for  his  squadron  the  ammunition  it  would  need  in  case 
of  war. 

On  April  24th  Dewey  was  in  the  harbor  of  Hongkong 
when  a  cable  message  came  to  him  announcing  the  declara 
tion  of  war,  and  ordering  him  to  proceed  to  the  Philippines 
and  capture  or  destroy  the  enemy's  fleet.  The  news  did 
not  find  him  unprepared.  For  weeks  he  had  been  making 
ready  for  the  conflict,  secretly  arranging  for  the  purchase 
of  coal,  provisions,  and  tenders,  and  seeing  that  officers 
and  men  were  drilled  to  the  top  notch  of  efficiency.  As 
Hongkong  was  a  British  port,  Dewey  had  to  take  his 
squadron  away  twenty-four  hours  after  the  declaration  of 
war  in  order  to  conform  with  the  laws  of  neutrality.  These 
forbid  ships  of  a  nation  engaged  in  war  to  stay  longer  than 
that  time  in  the  port  of  a  neutral  nation.  As  China  had 
not  yet  announced  its  neutrality,  Dewey  took  his  squadron 
to  Mirs  Bay,  about  thirty  miles  north  on  the  Chinese  coast, 
partly  to  complete  his  preparations,  but  more  to  await  the 
coming  of  our  consul  from  Manila,  from  whom  the  com 
modore  expected  to  get  definite  news  about  the  Spanish 
defenses. 

The  consul  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the  27th.  A 
council  of  war  was  held  on  the  flag-ship  immediately,  and 
at  two  in  the  afternoon  the  American  squadron  set  out  for 
Manila,  six  hundred  miles  away.  The  squadron  moved  in 
two  columns,  the  fighting-ships  forming  one  and  the  auxil 
iaries  forming  another,  twelve  hundred  yards  in  the  rear. 
The  fighting-column  consisted  of  the  flag-ship  Olympia,  the 
Boston,  the  Raleigh,  the  Baltimore,  the  Concord,  and  the 
Petrel,  four  cruisers  and  two  gunboats.  The  only  armored 
vessel  was  the  Olympia,  which  had  a  four-inch  protection 
for  the  turret-guns. 

For  weeks  before  the  declaration  of  war  the  papers  in 
Hongkong  had  laid  great  emphasis  on  the  powerful 
fortifications  and  mine-fields  which,  in  addition  to  the 

250 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

Spanish  fleet  under  Admiral  Montojo,  made  Manila  Bay 
"impregnable."  In  spite  of  the  friendly  feeling  of  the 
British  officers  Admiral  Dewey  writes  in  his  autobiography 
that  it  was  impossible  for  the  American  officers  to  get  bets 
at  the  Hongkong  club  even  at  heavy  odds  that  the  Amer 
icans  could  win.  "A  fine  set  of  fellows,"  remarked  the 
Englishmen  after  the  American  fleet  started  out,  "but, 
unhappily,  we  shall  never  see  them  again." 

But  we  have  already  noted  that  this  was  just  the  way 
"war  experts" — especially  in  Europe — talked  and  wrote 
about  the  defenses  of  New  Orleans  in  1862,  and  some  of 
them  took  pains  to  inform  Farragut  that  he  was  going  to 
certain  destruction.  Dewey  at  the  age  of  twenty-four  had 
been  the  executive  officer  of  the  Mississippi  during  that  hot 
night  battle  under  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip.  It  was 
there  that  he  received  his  first  taste  of  hard  fighting,  and 
during  all  that  strenuous  river  campaign  he  was  under  the 
personal  influence  of  Farragut.  "Valuable  as  the  training 
at  Annapolis  was,"  writes  Admiral  Dewey,  "it  was  poor 
schooling  beside  that  of  serving  under  Farragut  in  time 
of  war." 

Through  all  the  days  of  planning  and  preparation  the 
American  commodore  in  1898  took  as  his  guiding  principle, 
"What  would  Farragut  do?"  Like  his  hero,  Dewey  was 
now  sixty  years  old  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  Like  him, 
too,  he  had  the  problem  of  forcing  an  entrance  into  a 
fortified  and  mined  channel,  with  the  gravest  consequences 
hanging  on  his  decisions.  If  the  American  fleet  failed  at 
Manila  the  entire  Pacific  coast  of  the  United  States  would 
lie  at  the  mercy  of  the  Spanish  ships. 

For  Spain  the  issue  of  the  coming  battle  was  quite  as 
important  as  it  was  for  the  United  States,  and  the  au 
thorities  at  Manila  had  much  to  help  them  in  the  advan 
tages  of  a  defensive  position.  Admiral  Montojo's  fleet 
was  much  inferior  in  guns  to  Dewey's,  but  the  Spaniards 
had  torpedoes,  mines,  and  the  shore  batteries,  which  in 
cluded  some  modern  rifled  guns  of  a  heavier  caliber  than 

251 


THE   STORY    OF    OUR   NAVY 

any  in  Dewey's  squadron.  And  accurate  range -marks 
could  have  been  prepared  for  any  portion  of  the  bay. 
Moreover,  by  occupying  Subig  Bay,  about  thirty  miles 
north  from  the  mouth  of  Manila  Bay,  Montojo  could 
have  made  Dewey's  task  very  difficult  and  dangerous,  for 
Subig  Bay  offered  a  splendid  strategic  position.  In  fact, 
intelligent  Spaniards  had  long  before  urged  the  fortification 
of  Subig  Bay;  but,  as  it  was  a  dull  place  for  officers,  too  far 
from  the  pleasant  social  life  of  Manila,  these  suggestions 
had  never  been  carried  out. 

When  war  seemed  certain  Montojo  gave  orders  to  fortify 
Subig  Bay,  but  when  he  took  his  ships  there  on  April  2yth 
he  found  the  cannon  lying  in  the  grass  where  they  had  been 
dropped  over  a  month  before,  and  practically  nothing  done. 
Even  then  Montojo  would  have  done  far  better  to  wait 
for  Dewey  in  Subig  Bay,  but  instead  he  turned  about  and 
steamed  back  to  Cavite. 

The  Spanish  authorities  in  Manila  seemed  to  be  in  a 
strange  condition  of  self-sufficiency.  A  few  days  before 
the  Americans  arrived  the  Spanish  captain-general  issued 
a  boastful  proclamation,  calling  the  Americans  some  very 
unpleasant  names  and  declaring  that  they  were  too  con 
temptible  to  fight.  And  the  Archbishop  of  Manila  caused 
to  be  read  in  the  churches  a  report  that  the  United  States 
had  begged  the  Pope  to  intercede  and  save  the  Yankee 
nation  from  the  terrible  wrath  of  Spain.  As  soon  as  Dewey 
left  Mirs  Bay  the  Spanish  consul  at  Hongkong  cabled  to 
Manila  the  fact  that  the  American  squadron  was  on  its 
way,  but  the  very  afternoon  that  it  was  approaching  the 
entrance  to  Manila  Bay  Admiral  Montojo  and  his  officers 
were  attending  an  afternoon  tea  given  by  Senora  Montojo 
herself  in  Manila,  and  many  of  his  officers  were  still  on  shore 
when  the  battle  began.  In  this  careless  fashion  the 
Spaniards  made  ready  to  defend  the  Philippines  and  dis 
pute  with  the  Americans  for  the  sea  power  of  the  Pacific. 
We  shall  see  presently  how  they  awaited  the  American 
attack. 

252 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

On  the  afternoon  of  April  3oth  the  American  squadron 
arrived  at  Subig  Bay,  but,  to  the  commodore's  relief,  he 
found  no  Spanish  ships.  He  knew  then  that  he  should 
find  the  Spanish  squadron  near  Manila.  There  had  been 
terrifying  accounts  of  the  submarine  mines  at  the  entrance 
of  the  bay,  but  there  was  no  hesitation  in  the  commodore's 
mind  about  entering.  This  was  not  mere  recklessness. 
He  had  reasoned  that  the  three-mile  main  channel  was  too 
wide  and  deep  for  successful  mine-planting,  and  that  the 
contact-mines  which  might  have  been  moored  there  would 
deteriorate  so  rapidly  in  the  warm  water  as  to  be  useless 
within  a  few  weeks  of  their  being  laid.  In  addition  he 
felt  sure  of  careless  and  ignorant  work  in  laying  them. 

But  entering  the  bay  proved  far  safer  and  easier  than 
Dewey  had  anticipated.  While  his  column  was  skirting 
the  coast  about  ten  miles  from  the  entrance  it  had  evidently 
been  sighted,  for  signal-lights  and  rockets  flashed  on  shore. 
Accordingly,  Dewey  expected  to  have  to  run  a  gauntlet  of 
fire  from  the  big  guns  on  the  islands  of  Corregidor,  Caballo, 
and  El  Fraile,  commanding  the  entrance,  as  well  as  a 
torpedo  attack  from  the  Spanish  fleet.  But  when,  about 
midnight,  the  squadron  swung  into  the  narrow  waters  past 
these  islands,  no  searchlight  was  turned  on  them,  no 
vessels  disputed  the  entrance,  no  torpedo-boats  dashed  at 
them  in  the  darkness;  in  fact,  it  seemed  as  if  nobody  was 
even  awake.  When  all  but  the  rear  ships  were  past,  the 
battery  on  El  Fraile  fired  one  shot,  which  passed  between  the 
Petrel  and  the  Raleigh.  The  American  ships  answered  with 
a  few  shots;  and  the  Spanish  battery,  after  firing  two  more 
shells,  was  silent.  The  modern  rifled  six-inch  guns  on 
Caballo  were  not  fired  once,  and  the  fort  on  Corregidor  was 
strangely  silent.  The  garrison  there  saw  the  American 
ships  plainly,  but  for  some  reason,  never  explained,  the 
commanding  officer  could  not  make  up  his  mind  to  give 
the  order  to  fire. 

In  a  few  minutes  the  squadron  was  safe  inside  the  harbor. 
Then  Dewey  slowed  down  to  four  knots,  as  he  did  not  wish 

17  253 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

to  reach  Manila  till  daylight  showed  him  the  position  of  the 
Spanish  fleet.  Meanwhile,  the  men  were  allowed  to  get  a 
little  sleep  beside  their  guns. 

Dewey  expected,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  Montojo 
would  be  found  in  the  anchorage  off  Manila,  where,  in 
addition  to  his  own  guns,  he  would  have  the  powerful 
batteries  that  defended  the  city.  But,  as  daybreak  showed 
only  merchantmen,  Dewey  steamed  toward  Cavite,  having 
first  sent  his  auxiliaries  to  a  harbor  where  they  would  be 


DEWEY'S  ENTRANCE  INTO  MANILA  BAY 

safe.  As  the  American  column  passed  within  two  miles  of 
the  shore  the  Manila  batteries  opened  fire,  but  except  for 
four  shells  fired  by  the  Boston  and  the  Concord  the  squadron 
reserved  its  limited  supply  of  ammunition.  All  the  Spanish 
shots  went  wild.  To  the  American  sailors  crouched  beside 
their  guns  the  order  was  passed,  "Hold  your  fire  till  the 
bugle  sounds." 

At  sunrise  the  Americans  sighted  Montojo's  squadron  of 
seven  ships  ranged  in  a  crescent  formation  off  Cavite,  with 
its  eastern  flank,  near  Sangley  Point,  covered  by  the  Cavite 

254 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

batteries,  and  the  eastern  end  protected  by  a  shoal  and  a 
shore  battery.  From  east  to  west  the  line  lay  in  the  follow 
ing  order:  Reina  Cristina  (flag-ship),  Castilla,  Don  Juan  de 
Austria,  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa,  Isla  de  Luzon,  Isla  de  Cuba, 
and  Marques  del  Duero.  The  cruiser  Castilla  had  protected 
her  sides  by  heavy  iron  lighters  loaded  with  stone.  Two 
more  ships  lay  off  the  southern  extremity  of  Cavite  Point, 
but  took  no  part  in  the  battle  except  to  surrender  when  it 
was  over. 

On  sighting  the  enemy  Dewey  signaled  his  command  to 
close  up  to  a  distance  of  two  hundred  yards,  and  headed  the 
Olympia  toward  the  enemy.  The  American  line  was  as 
follows:  the  Olympia,  Baltimore,  Raleigh,  Petrel,  Concord, 
Boston.  The  ships  steamed  on  in  silence,  heading  on 
a  converging  course  toward  the  enemy's  line.  At  5.15, 
when  the  squadron  was  still  at  long  range,  the  Spanish 
ships  and  the  Cavite  batteries  boomed  a  challenge  and 
thereafter  rained  shells  at  the  advancing  line.  It  was  hard 
for  the  impatient  jackies  to  wait,  but  Dewey  held  his  fire 
for  another  half -hour.  Then  he  turned  to  his  captain  with 
the  quiet  remark,  "You  may  fire  when  you're  ready, 
Gridley." 

The  eight-inch  gun  from  the  forward  turret  thundered  in 
answer,  and  at  the  signal  the  other  ships  opened  fire,  one 
after  another,  with  every  gun  that  bore.  The  Spanish 
ships  were  smothered  in  the  smoke  of  a  very  rapid  fire,  but 
their  aim  was  hopelessly  bad.  After  concentrating  his 
starboard  guns  on  the  eastern  end  of  the  Spanish  line,  as  he 
bore  down  toward  that  end  of  their  formation,  Dewey 
turned  westward  and  steamed  the  length  of  the  enemy's 
line,  pouring  in  a  fire  from  his  port  batteries.  On  reaching 
the  western  end  he  led  his  ships  back  again,  and  repeated 
the  manceuver,  making  in  all  three  runs  from  the  eastward 
and  two  runs  from  the  westward.  This  manceuver  was 
similar  to  that  of  DuPoint  at  Port  Royal  and  had  the  same 
advantages. 

The  Spanish  fire,  which  was  wild  at  best,  was  utterly 

255 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

unable  to  find  this  moving,  shifting  target.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  fire  of  the  American  ships  in  close  formation, 
though  rather  inaccurate  at  first,  became  deadly.  The  two 
largest  Spanish  ships,  which  were  at  the  eastern  end  of 
their  line,  got  the  brunt  of  the  attack  and  suffered  fearfully. 
These  were  the  Reina  Cristina  (flag-ship)  and  the  Castillo,. 
In  desperation  the  Spanish  commanders  resorted  to  the 
ramming  tactics  of  the  Civil  War.  The  Don  Juan  de 
Austria  first  and  then  the  Reina  Cristina  left  their  places 
in  the  line  and  made  a  brave  attempt  to  ram  the  Olympia, 
but  both  were  driven  back  by  a  staggering  fire.  One 
eight-inch  shell  alone  raked  the  Spanish  flag-ship,  putting 
out  of  action  twenty  men  and  wrecking  her  steering-gear. 
Two  more  gallant  sorties  were  made  by  little  torpedo- 
launches  against  the  Olympia;  one  was  promptly  sunk,  the 
other  was  beached  in  a  sinking  condition.  By  seven  o'clock 
the  Reina  Cristina  had  lost  half  her  crew,  her  batteries  were 
useless,  and  she  was  unmanageable,  so  Admiral  Montojo 
abandoned  her  for  the  Isla  de  Cuba.  In  spite  of  her  stone 
lighters  the  Castilla  was  almost  as  badly  damaged  as  the 
flag-ship,  and  she,  too,  was  abandoned.  The  other  ships 
in  the  line  were  in  a  desperate  condition  also,  yet  so  dense 
was  the  curtain  of  powder-smoke  that  the  Americans  could 
not  make  out  what  the  effect  of  their  shooting  was. 

About  7.30  Captain  Gridley  reported  to  the  commodore 
that  there  were  only  fifteen  rounds  of  ammunition  left  for 
the  five-inch  battery.  As  this  amount  could  be  shot  away 
in  five  minutes,  it  was  a  serious  moment  for  the  American 
commander,  especially  as  at  that  time  he  could  not  see  what 
injuries  had  been  inflicted  on  the  enemy.  Accordingly,  he 
decided  to  withdraw  for  a  few  minutes  so  that  there  could 
be  a  fresh  distribution  of  ammunition.  In  a  few  minutes 
Commodore  Dewey  was  relieved  to  learn  that  the  report 
about  the  Olympiads  ammunition  was  a  mistake,  that 
fifteen  rounds  was  the  amount  that  she  had  already  fired. 
As  the  American  ships  steamed  out  of  range  the  lifting 
smoke  began  to  reveal  the  distress  of  the  Spanish  fleet. 

256 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

Realizing  that  the  Spaniards  were  thoroughly  beaten, 
Dewey  ordered  breakfast,  as  the  men  had  had  nothing  but 
a  cup  of  coffee  at  four  o'clock.  During  this  breathing-spell 
the  commodore  summoned  his  captains  aboard  the  Olympia. 
To  the  astonishment  of  all,  the  report  from  each  ship  was 


TRACK  OF  THE  AMERICAN   FLEET 


\ 


SPANISH     BATTERIES 


SPANISH    FLEET 


SANGLEY    PT.      '.        '. 


BATTLE    OF    MANILA,  MAY    I,   1898 
257 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

the  same — not  a  life  lost,  not  a  man  seriously  hurt,  not  a 
ship  damaged. 

Shortly  after  eleven  the  Americans  stood  in  again  to 
finish  matters.  The  only  Spanish  ship  which  remained  to 
oppose  them  was  the  Ulloa,  which  had  taken  position  by 
the  Cavite  batteries  on  Sangley  Point.  The  rest  which 
had  not  sunk  had  taken  refuge  behind  Cavite  Point.  The 
Ulloa  and  the  batteries  defiantly  opened  on  the  approaching 
line;  but,  as  the  guns  in  the  latter  had  been  so  mounted  that 
they  could  not  hit  anything  as  near  as  two  thousand  yards, 
and  the  fleet  repeatedly  took  a  course  inside  that  limit,  the 
rain  of  shells  passed  over  and  fell  far  beyond  the  ships.  In 
a  few  minutes  the  gallant  little  Ulloa  went  down  in  shallow 
water,  with  her  flag  still  flying  and  the  American  sailors 
cheering  her  as  she  sank. 

All  remaining  resistance  was  soon  quenched.  By  12.30 
the  entire  Spanish  fire  was  silenced.  A  fine  incident  of 
courage  and  efficiency  at  the  close  of  the  battle  must  not 
be  overlooked.  Although  the  Spaniards  had  ceased  firing, 
several  of  the  ships  were  not  as  yet  destroyed.  The  Petrel 
was  ordered  to  attend  to  the  work.  Accordingly,  Lieu 
tenant  Hughes,  of  the  Petrel,  with  only  seven  men,  went  in 
a  whale-boat,  boarded  and  set  fire  to  the  Don  Juan  de 
Austria,  Isla  de  Cuba,  Isla  de  Luzon,  General  Lezo,  Coreo, 
and  Marques  del  Duero,  all  of  which  had  been  scuttled  in 
shallow  water  and  deserted  by  their  crews.  This  was  dan 
gerous  service,  because  the  Spaniards  were  supposed  to 
have  left  trains  to  their  magazines,  and  the  near-by  shore 
was  thronged  with  excited  mobs  of  Spanish  soldiers  and 
sailors.  But  the  work  of  the  eight  men  was  done  coolly 
and  thoroughly.  Shortly  after  five  in  the  afternoon  the 
Petrel  rejoined  the  squadron,  towing  a  long  string  of 
launches  and  tugs  captured  from  the  Spanish  ships,  and 
was  greeted  by  tremendous  cheering  from  the  fleet.  By 
that  time  every  Spanish  ship  was  either  sunk  or  burned, 
except  one  transport,  which  was  in  such  good  condition 
that  it  was  saved  for  future  use. 

258 


Mil 

• 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

Thus  the  President's  order  to  Dewey  to  ''destroy  the 
Spanish  fleet  at  Manila"  had  been  obeyed  to  the  letter,  and 
at  one  blow  the  Philippine  Islands  and  the  mastery  of  the 
Pacific  passed  to  the  hands  of  Commodore  Dewey. 

Never  in  history  had  there  been  such  a  one-sided  victory. 
The  total  loss  on  the  American  side  was  four  men  slightly 
wounded,  and  none  of  the  ships  had  been  seriously  hurt. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Spaniards  had  lost  about  four 
hundred  men,  eleven  vessels  were  destroyed,  the  Cavite 
batteries  had  been  knocked  to  pieces,  the  arsenal  was 
captured,  and  the  city  of  Manila  lay  helpless  under  the  guns 
of  the  American  fleet.  In  view  of  the  gloomy  predictions 
made  at  home  and  abroad  about  Dewey 's  chances  in  at 
tacking  Manila,  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  if  the  American 
people  went  wild  with  pride  and  joy  and  said  some  ex 
travagant  things  about  their  sailormen. 

But  Dewey  had  another  and  more  trying  problem  on  his 
hands.  Pending  the  arrival  of  troops  he  maintained  a 
blockade  of  Manila.  The  German  government  had  been 
hostile  to  the  United  States  in  this  war,  going  to  the  extent, 
it  is  said,  of  asking  the  co-operation  of  Great  Britain  in 
intervention.  Although  England  had  signified  a  "hands- 
off  "  policy,  the  Germans  seemed  bent  on  showing  hostility. 
The  German  Pacific  squadron  under  Vice-Admiral  Diede- 
richs  soon  appeared  in  Manila  Bay.  The  presence  of 
neutral  men-of-war  in  a  harbor  controlled  by  one  of  the 
parties  to  a  war  is  permitted  only  as  a  matter  of  inter 
national  courtesy.  All  the  other  men-of-war,  representing 
England,  France,  and  Japan,  had  complied  with  the  cus 
tomary  regulations,  such  as  reporting  to  Dewey  and  apply 
ing  to  him  for  anchorage.  But  the  German  admiral  paid 
no  attention  whatever  to  Dewey.  Every  day  brought 
fresh  instances  of  German  arrogance  and  insolence  which 
strained  the  patience  of  the  Americans  to  the  breaking- 
point.  Finally,  when  word  came  that  the  Germans  were 
actually  landing  supplies  for  the  Spaniards  Dewey  sent  an 
ultimatum  to  Diederichs.  "And  you  may  tell  him,"  he 

259 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

concluded,  instructing  the  lieutenant  who  carried  the  mes 
sage,  "that  if  he  wants  a  fight  he  can  have  it  right  now." 
The  German  was  furious,  and  cleared  for  action.  There 
upon  the  British  admiral,  Chichester,  asked  Dewey's 
permission  to  weigh  anchor  and  take  a  new  position, 
which  was  granted.  Then  the  British  squadron  anchored 
between  the  lines  of  the  German  and  the  American  ships, 
with  the  English  bands  playing  "  Star-spangled  Banner." 
After  this  broad  hint  as  to  what  might  be  expected  from 
the  British  fleet,  Diederichs  decided  that  he  did  not  want 
to  fight  after  all,  and  came  round  to  terms. 

In  recognition  of  the  victory  at  Manila  Congress 
awarded  Dewey  a  vote  of  thanks  and  a  sword,  and  the 
President  immediately  promoted  him  to  the  rank  of  Rear- 
Admiral.  Later  the  rank  of  Admiral  of  the  Navy  was 
revived  and  bestowed  upon  him.  The  same  critics  who 
said  that  the  Spanish  fleet  was  really  quite  the  equal  of  the 
American  and  that  Manila  Bay  was  impregnable  turned 
face  about  after  the  battle  and  began  sneering  at  the 
Americans  for  being  proud  of  Dewey  because  he  destroyed 
a  very  inferior  fleet.  Unquestionably  Montojo's  ships  were 
no  match  for  the  American  squadron;  but  if  Montojo  had 
shown  the  least  enterprise  or  strategic  sense,  or  if  the  men 
in  the  ships  or  forts  had  shown  a  reasonable  efficiency  in 
handling  the  guns,  the  Spaniards  could  have  held  Subig 
Bay,  or  disputed  the  entrance  of  Dewey's  fleet  into  Manila 
Bay,  with  excellent  chance  of  success.  But  it  never  oc 
curred  to  the  Spaniards  that  anybody  would  have  the 
audacity  to  enter  the  bay  at  night,  with  forts  controlling 
the  channel  and  the  lighthouses  extinguished. 

Dewey's  fame  rests,  not  on  his  annihilation  of  a  weaker 
fleet,  but  on  his  long  and  careful  preparation  and  planning, 
his  clear  reasoning-out  of  the  whole  situation,  which  cul 
minated  in  his  superb  night  entry  into  Manila  Bay.  No 
better  answer  than  that  could  have  been  made  to  the 
question,  "What  would  Farragut  do?" 

At  the  time  of  the  war  the  sympathy  of  continental  Eu- 

260 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

rope  was  wholly  with  the  Spanish — they  were  the  "  chival 
rous  "  people — whatever  that  overworked  word  means — and 
we  were  dull,  money-grabbing  louts  who  couldn't  fight. 
The  news  of  the  victory  of  Manila  promptly  stunned  into 
silence  all  European  talk  of  intervention.  If  "chivalry" 
means  courage  it  is  true  that  the  Spaniards  fought  and  died 
bravely  enough  at  their  guns,  but  the  great  lesson  taught 
by  Preble  and  magnificently  emphasized  by  Farragut  was 
that  bravery  in  a  naval  man  is  taken  for  granted,  that  it  is 
only  the  first  of  his  virtues.  To  that  must  be  added  train 
ing,  discipline,  resourcefulness,  clear  thinking,  and  decisive 
action ;  and  it  is  evident  that  this  essential  truth  had  never 
been  taught  in  the  Spanish  navy. 


XX 

THE    SANTIAGO    CAMPAIGN 

Cuban  blockade — Search  for  Cervera — Hobson  and  the  Merrimac — 
Battle  of  Santiago — The  controversy — Spanish  inefficiency  during 
the  war — Treaty  of  peace — Effect  of  the  war. 

WHILE  Commodore  Dewey  was  waiting  and  pre 
paring  at  Hongkong,  just  before  the  declaration  of 
war,  the  North  Atlantic  fleet  was  drilling  at  target  practice 
off  Key  West,  and  a  reserve  fleet  called  the  "Flying  Squad 
ron"  was  waiting  orders  at  Hampton  Roads.  In  spite  of 
the  strained  feeling  which  followed  the  sinking  of  the  Maine 
and  pointed  clearly  to  war  the  Spaniards  had  in  West- 
Indian  waters  only  a  few  light  vessels  and  one  old  cruiser, 
the  Reina  Mercedes,  and  the  engines  of  the  Mercedes  were 
in  such  bad  condition  that  she  could  not  get  up  steam. 
Just  before  the  war  broke  out  the  Spaniards  collected  their 
Atlantic  fleet  under  Admiral  Cervera  in  the  harbor  of  St. 
Vincent,  Cape  Verde  Islands,  and  there  they  stayed  for 
several  days  after  war  was  declared,  although  the  Cape 
Verde  Islands  belong  to  Portugal,  which  was  supposed  to 
be  neutral. 

This  squadron  of  Cervera's  consisted  of  four  armored 
cruisers,  three  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  and  three  small 
torpedo-boats,  with  an  auxiliary  ship  which  acted  as  tender 
for  the  torpedo  squadron.  The  last  four  vessels  were  left 
behind  when  Cervera  started  across  the  Atlantic.  The 
cruisers  were  fine  modern  ships,  with  an  armored  deck, 
protecting  engines  and  magazine,  and  a  six-inch  armor  belt. 
The  newest  of  them,  the  Cristobal  Colon,  had  been  launched 

262 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

only  two  years  before,  but  it  was  characteristic  of  Spanish 
procrastination  that  the  new  big  guns  for  her  forward  and 
after  turrets  were  not  ready  when  they  were  needed  and 
expected.  As  the  old  ones  had  already  been  taken  out  of 
the  ship,  it  meant  that  the  finest  cruiser  of  the  squadron  had 
to  go  out  to  fight  without  her  heaviest  guns.  The  destroy 
ers  were  of  the  most  modern  type,  built  in  England  and 
launched  hardly  more  than  a  year  before  the  declaration 
of  war. 

Although  there  were  no  battle-ships  in  this  squadron, 
it  was  capable  of  striking  a  very  effective  blow,  and  when 
it  finally  sailed  westward  on  April  2gth  for  parts  unknown 
it  made  people  on  our  own  Atlantic  seaboard  very  nervous. 
Unfortunately,  certain  "yellow"  newspapers,  which  had 
done  their  best  to  force  war,  made  as  much  exciting  news 
as  they  could  out  of  the  approaching  Spanish  fleet.  One  of 
them,  which  earned  for  itself  the  name  of  the  "one-cent 
liar"  during  the  war,  published  as  a  Sunday  "feature"  a 
lurid  story  of  a  bloody  battle  in  mid- Atlantic. 

Nobody  knew  where  Cervera's  squadron  was  for  ten  or 
twelve  days,  and  during  that  time,  if  newspaper  rumors 
could  be  believed,  the  whole  Atlantic  was  black  with 
Spanish  ships.  To  quiet  the  fears  in  some  of  our  seaport 
towns  the  government  hastily  organized  a  "northern 
patrol"  squadron  to  guard  the  coast  north  of  the  Delaware. 
Later,  when  the  foolish  panic  was  over,  these  vessels  were 
sent  south  to  join  the  blockade  of  Cuban  ports. 

On  Rear-Admiral  Sampson,  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Atlantic  fleet,  depended  the  responsibility  of  finding 
Cervera's  squadron  and  destroying  it.  He  had  decided 
that  the  natural  aim  of  the  Spanish  fleet  would  be  some 
point  in  the  West  Indies  near  Cuba,  and  probably  at  Porto 
Rico.  Accordingly,  on  the  8th  of  May  he  left  Key  West 
to  intercept  the  enemy,  reckoning  the  time  of  their  arrival 
by  the  rate  of  speed  the  Spaniards  ought  to  make. 

But  they  were  so  slow  that  it  was  not  until  four  days 
later  that  the  arrival  of  the  Spanish  squadron  was  re- 

263  ' 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

ported.  The  destroyer  Furor  had  touched  at  St.  Pierre,  in 
Martinique,  on  the  night  of  the  nth.  Here  Cervera  had 
to  leave  one  of  his  destroyers  on  account  of  broken-down 
boilers.  The  rest  of  the  squadron  was  sighted  the  following 
day,  headed  north. 

Acting  on  this  news,  Sampson  sent  off  ships  to  watch  the 
Windward  and  Mona  passages  and  ordered  Schley's 
"Flying  Squadron"  to  patrol  the  southern  coast  of  Cuba. 
As  soon  as  Sampson  had  coaled  his  own  battle-ships  he  took 
them  to  the  north  side  of  the  island.  For  another  week 
nothing  more  was  heard  of  the  Spaniards.  On  the  i8th  of 
May  three  ships  of  Schley's  squadron  came  close  to  the  en 
trance  of  Santiago  Harbor  and  exchanged  shots  with  the 
fort.  That  very  afternoon  they  steamed  away  again,  and 
at  sunrise  next  morning  Cervera's  squadron  entered  the 
harbor.  It  turned  out  that  Cervera  had  gone  to  the  Dutch 
island  of  Curacoa  to  meet  the  colliers  he  needed  and  had 
arranged  for.  Here  again  the  officials  in  Madrid  failed 
him.  When  he  got  to  Curacoa  he  found,  to  his  dismay, 
that  there  were  no  colliers  awaiting  him ;  and,  as  the  Dutch 
authorities  held  him  to  the  twenty-four-hour  rule,  he  had  to 
steam  away  without  getting  more  than  six  hundred  tons  of 
coal  aboard.  So  he  headed  for  Santiago  for  more  coal  and 
other  supplies. 

Up  to  this  time  there  had  been  so  many  false  rumors 
about  the  whereabouts  of  the  Spanish  fleet  that  the  De 
partment  at  Washington  were  slow  to  believe  that  the 
enemy  was  really  at  Santiago,  especially  as  Schley  had  seen 
smoke  behind  the  forts  at  Cienfuegos  and  reported  as  a  fact 
that  the  Spaniards  had  gone  there  instead.  It  was  not 
till  May  27  that  Schley  satisfied  himself  that  he  was  mis 
taken  and  that  Cervera  was  in  Santiago  Harbor.  Then  he 
began  a  blockade,  and  when  the  news  reached  Sampson  he 
brought  his  fleet  round  from  the  north  to  join  forces  and 
take  command. 

Cervera's  actions  up  to  the  time  he  entered  the  harbor 
had  been  creditable  enough.  But  once  inside  the  wooded 

264 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

headlands  of  Santiago  he  seemed  to  have  been  struck  with 
the  same  paralysis  that  afflicted  all  Spanish  officials  and 
commanders  during  this  strange  war.  He  needed  coal  and 
was  trying  to  get  it  aboard,  yet  he  let  his  whole  squadron 
lie  idle  while  the  American  liner  St.  Paul  captured, 
just  off  the  port,  a  steamer  that  was  bringing  him  three 
thousand  tons  of  coal.  Any  one  of  his  four  cruisers  could 
have  gone  out,  rescued  the  coal,  and  taken  the  American 
ship  as  well.  Furthermore,  he  allowed  Schley  to  blockade 
him  with  an  inferior  force,  remaining  inactive  in  the  harbor 
till  Sampson's  arrival  made  the  odds  against  him  over 
whelming. 

Then  followed  a  month  of  close  blockade.  Since  the 
narrow  entrance  to  the  harbor  made  it  impossible  for  the 
American  fleet  to  attack  the  Spaniards  inside,  Sampson 
attempted  to  bottle  up  their  squadron  by  sinking  a  hulk 
in  the  narrows.  At  3.30  on  the  morning  of  June  3d  Naval- 
Constructor  Hobson,  with  seven  volunteers,  took  the 
collier  Merrimac  directly  into  the  narrows  under  cover  of 
darkness.  But  there  was  still  enough  moonlight  to  make 
her  a  distinct  target,  and  the  batteries  on  each  side  at  once 
opened  a  heavy  cross-fire  of  rifle  and  cannon  as  soon  as  she 
entered  the  channel.  To  the  anxious  watchers  in  the  fleet 
it  seemed  as  if  not  one  of  the  gallant  handful  on  the  ship 
could  be  left  alive.  And  yet,  so  wretched  was  the  Spanish 
marksmanship  that,  although  this  cross-fire  killed  fourteen 
and  wounded  thirty-seven  of  the  Spanish  gunners,  not  a 
man  on  the  Merrimac  was  wounded.  One  shot,  however, 
had  cut  away  the  rudder-chains  so  that  Hobson  was  unable 
to  steer  the  vessel  to  the  point  where  she  was  to  ground  and 
swing  across  the  channel.  On  reaching  the  best  position  he 
could  make  he  set  off  the  explosives  in  her  hull,  but  she 
drifted  farther  in  than  was  intended  and  went  down  at  a 
spot  where  there  was  still  room  enough  for  ships  to  get 
safely  by.  So  as  far  as  its  purpose  was  concerned  Hobson's 
exploit  was  a  failure,  but  the  splendid  daring  of  the  act 
fired  the  nation  with  enthusiasm.  "I  venture  to  say," 

265 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

wrote  Sampson  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  "that  a  more 
brave  and  daring  thing  has  not  been  done  since  Gushing 
blew  up  the  Albemarle." 

As  the  Merrimac  settled,  her  crew  clung  to  a  raft  and 
surrendered  to  a  launch  from  the  Spanish  flag-ship.  A 
pleasant  incident  of  the  war  was  the  courteous  act  of 
Cervera  in  sending  out  his  chief  of  staff  with  a  flag  of  truce 
to  the  American  fleet,  telling  Sampson  of  the  safety  of 
Hobson  and  his  men  and  praising  their  courage.  About 
a  month  later  they  were  exchanged  and  welcomed  back 
to  the  fleet. 

Meanwhile  the  troops  under  Shafter  had  been  landed 
some  miles  to  the  east  of  Santiago  and  were  attempting  to 
capture  the  city  by  assault.  Provisions  were  scarce  in 
Santiago,  especially  as  the  presence  of  the  fleet  made  a 
great  drain  on  the  store  of  supplies.  But  half  starving  as 
they  were,  the  Spanish  soldiers  under  General  Linares 
fought  with  obstinate  courage,  and  succeeded  in  defending 
the  city  with  the  loss  of  only  two  outposts.  Sickness  soon 
broke  out  among  the  American  soldiers,  chiefly  because 
the  most  stupid  mismanagement  in  the  matter  of  food, 
medicines,  and  shelter  hampered  every  step  of  the  American 
army.  General  Shafter,  ill  himself  and  discouraged  at  his 
failure  to  capture  Santiago,  telegraphed  a  gloomy  report  to 
Washington,  early  on  the  morning  of  Sunday,  July  3d,  sug 
gesting  a  retreat. 

The  arrival  of  this  message  brought  deep  anxiety  to 
President  McKinley  and  his  advisers,  but  that  very  evening 
another  cablegram  gave  news  of  a  wholly  different  kind. 
Shafter  had  also  telegraphed  to  Sampson  the  day  before  to 
force  the  entrance  with  the  fleet  at  all  costs,  and  on  Sunday 
morning,  July  3d,  about  nine  o'clock,  Sampson  left  the 
blockading  line  in  his  flag-ship,  the  New  York,  accom 
panied  by  the  gunboat  Hist,  to  go  four  miles  east  in  order 
to  confer  with  Shafter.  The  rest  of  the  fleet,  ranging  in  a 
wide  half -circle,  lay  off  the  harbor  in  the  following  order 
from  east  to  west:  the  battle-ships  Itidiana,  Oregon,  Iowa, 

266 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

Texas,  and  the  armored  cruiser  Brooklyn.  The  regular 
position  of  the  New  York  had  been  between  the  Indiana 
and  the  Oregon.  The  Gloucester,  formerly  J.  Pierpont 
Morgan's  yacht  Corsair,  lay  a  little  to  the  east  of  the 
Indiana  and  much  nearer  the  harbor.  Away  to  the  western 
end  of  the  line,  near  the  Brooklyn,  was  a  small  gunboat,  the 
Vixen. 

At  9.30  the  bugles  sounded  the  regular  Sunday  inspec 
tion,  and  the  officers  and  men  of  each  ship  were  soon  lined 
up  for  review  on  the  quarter-deck.  Suddenly  a  young 
sailor  on  the  Iowa  noticed  an  unusual  amount  of  black 
smoke  rising  above  the  headlands  that  screened  the  harbor. 
A  moment  later  the  black  prow  of  the  Spanish  flag-ship 
appeared  in  the  narrows.  Boom!  a  gun  from  the  Iowa 
gave  the  alarm,  but  every  other  ship  in  the  squadron  caught 
sight  of  the  enemy,  too.  The  bugles  shrilled  the  signal, 
"General  Quarters,"  and  in  a  flash  the  stiff  lines  of  sailors 
and  marines  melted  into  scurrying  groups  as  each  man  made 
at  top  speed  for  his  battle  station. 

The  ships  had  kept  up  little  steam  as  they  rocked  at  their 
stations  doing  blockade  duty ;  but  now,  with  forced  draughts 
and  the  stokers  shoveling  like  demons,  each  ship  in  the  line 
worked  its  utmost  to  get  up  steam,  close  in  on  the  Spanish 
cruisers,  and  destroy  them  before  they  could  escape.  The 
Spanish  column  left  the  harbor  in  the  following  order: 
Infanta  Maria  Teresa  (flag-ship),  Vizcaya,  Cristobal  Colon, 
and  A  Imirante  Oquendo.  As  the  American  squadron  headed 
toward  them  it  was  a  question  for  a  few  moments  whether 
the  Spanish  ships  would  scatter  as  soon  as  they  got  out 
or  whether  they  would  keep  together  on  a  single  course. 
Officers  and  men  on  the  distant  New  York  prayed  that 
the  Maria  Teresa  would  lead  her  column  east,  but  as  soon 
as  she  was  clear  of  shoal  water  she  turned  west,  followed  by 
the  rest  of  the  line. 

"I  wish  you  a  speedy  victory,"  was  the  signal  Cervera 
flew  to  encourage  his  captains,  and  as  the  bows  of  the  flag 
ship  turned  west  her  broadside  opened  on  the  American 

267 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

fleet.  The  next  fifteen  minutes  were  exciting  indeed. 
Of  the  blockading  fleet  the  stanch  old  Oregon,  which  had 
just  arrived  from  a  trip  all  the  way  round  from  the  Pacific 
coast,  bore  off  the  honors  in  getting  up  speed.  But  soon  the 
others  came  charging  down  upon  the  Spanish  line,  too,  their 
guns  flashing  and  booming  and  clouds  of  black  smoke 
pouring  out  of  their  funnels. 

Each  Spanish  cruiser  as  well  was  wreathed  in  smoke 
from  her  own  guns  as  she  wheeled  to  the  right  and  fled 
westward.  But  the  concentrated  fire  was  terrific,  and  the 
cruisers  staggered  under  its  effect  almost  as  soon  as  they 
reached  open  water.  Still  they  kept  going  at  full  speed, 
with  their  guns  booming  incessantly,  and  in  the  clouds  of 
battle-smoke  the  Americans  could  not  tell  for  some  time 
whether  any  of  their  shots  were  taking  effect.  Since  the 
Spanish  fleet  came  out  of  the  harbor  under  full  steam,  they 
got  a  good  running  start,  while  the  American  ships  were 
working  with  might  and  main  to  get  under  way;  con 
sequently  the  battle  soon  became  a  chase,  with  all  the 
American  ships  but  the  Brooklyn  running  westward  on  a 
course  nearly  parallel  with  the  Spanish  column. 

Cervera's  plan  had  been  to  concentrate  his  attack  on  the 
Brooklyn  at  the  western  end  of  the  American  line,  and  by 
putting  it  out  of  the  fight  leave  a  free  road  to  Cienfuegos. 
Besides  the  Brooklyn  there  was  no  other  American  ship  but 
the  New  York  which  could  make  anything  like  the  speed  of 
which  his  four  cruisers  were  capable.  This  plan  was  helped 
by  the  fact  that  the  New  York  had  gone  four  miles  to  the  east 
on  the  very  morning  of  the  sortie.  It  was  also  helped  by 
an  amazing  manceuver  on  the  part  of  the  Brooklyn  herself. 
When  the  Teresa  came  out  the  Brooklyn  steered  in  for  her 
and  was  still  on  a  northerly  course  when  the  rest  of  the 
fleet  were  heading  westward.  In  the  evident  hope  of  run 
ning  down  the  Brooklyn  Cervera  turned  the  bows  of  his 
ship  directly  toward  the  Brooklyn,  and  the  latter,  instead 
of  swerving  to  the  northwest,  made  a  wide  turn  to  the  east 
and  south.  In  doing  so  she  cut  directly  across  the  American 

268 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

line,  and  only  a  lucky  lift  of  powder-smoke  gave  the  captain 
of  the  Texas  a  chance  to  back  his  engines  at  full  speed  to 
avoid  being  rammed  and  sunk  by  the  Brooklyn. 

By  this  movement  the  Texas  was  checked  and  the 
Brooklyn  herself  lost  much  headway  before  swerving  once 
more  to  the  west  in  pursuit.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  wood 
work  on  the  Spanish  flag-ship  she  might  have  escaped, 
after  all,  in  spite  of  the  terrible  slaughter  on  her  decks,  for 
her  armored  hull  was  still  sound.  But  the  exploding  shells 
set  the  woodwork  afire  and  cut  the  water-main.  In  a  few 
minutes  the  ship  was  all  ablaze,  and  to  save  his  surviving 
officers  and  men  Cervera  headed  toward  the  beach,  ran 
aground,  and  struck  his  colors.  The  concentration  of  fire 
on  the  flag-ship  had  spared  the  second  and  third  ships  in  the 
line,  the  Vizcaya  and  the  Colon,  especially  as  they  got  up 
high  speed  and  the  Colon  shielded  herself  from  the  American 
fire  by  passing  between  her  sister  ships  and  the  shore. 
The  surrender  of  the  Teresa  left  the  Oquendo  to  bear  the 
full  weight  of  fire  from  the  rearmost  American  ships  and 
she  soon  went  aground  in  flames  within  a  half-mile  of  the 
Teresa. 

When  the  lifting  smoke  showed  the  Oquendo  also  aground 
every  ship  within  range  trained  her  guns  on  the  Vizcaya,  for 
by  this  time  the  Colon  was  outfooting  the  Americans  and 
seemed  to  be  getting  safely  out  of  reach.  Again  in  the  case 
of  the  Vizcaya  it  was  the  woodwork  that  proved  fatal.  The 
shell  fire  had  set  her  ablaze,  too,  and  at  about  eleven  o'clock 
she  ran  aground  with  flames  shooting  out  of  her  ports  and 
magazines  bursting. 

While  the  big  ships  were  thundering  at  each  other  a 
plucky  fight  with  the  torpedo-boat  destroyers  was  going 
on  at  the  harbor  mouth.  Lieutenant-Commander  Wain- 
wright,  commanding  the  Gloucester,  was  nearest  to  the 
entrance  when  the  Spanish  squadron  was  seen  coming  out. 
Paying  no  attention  to  the  guns  of  the  shore  batteries,  he 
ran  in  close  to  them  and  peppered  away  at  the  big  ships 
with  his  light  guns.  But,  knowing  that  he  could  do  them 
18  269 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

little  harm,  he  bottled  up  steam  and  waited  till  the  de 
stroyers  should  appear.  These  two — the  Furor  and  the 
Pluton — came  rushing  out  at  the  end  of  the  column  of 
cruisers,  and  the  Gloucester  dashed  for  them  at  full  speed, 
pouring  a  steady  stream  of  shells  from  her  rapid-fire  guns. 
The  guns  on  either  of  the  destroyers  were  more  powerful 
than  those  of  the  Gloucester,  not  to  mention  their  torpedoes. 
But,  as  Farragut  said,  "the  best  defense  against  an  enemy's 
fire  is  a  well-directed  fire  from  your  own  guns."  Though 
the  Gloucester  was  nothing  but  a  pleasure  yacht  mounting 
a  few  small  guns,  her  well-aimed  fire  delivered  at  close 
quarters  wrecked  the  two  destroyers,  while  she  herself  was 
untouched  by  a  single  shot.  The  Indiana  got  a  few  shells 
into  them  at  long  distance,  but  the  Gloucester  had  already 
settled  their  fate.  The  Furor  blew  up  in  a  great  jet  of 
steam  and  water;  the  Pluton  barely  reached  shore  before 
she  sank. 

Of  the  entire  Spanish  squadron  only  one  ship  remained, 
but  she  seemed  to  be  sure  of  escape.  This  was  the  Colon. 
She  had  the  reputation  of  making  twenty-three  knots  on 
her  trial  trip,  she  had  escaped  injury,  and  she  already  had  a 
lead  of  six  miles.  There  were  no  ships  in  the  American 
fleet  capable  of  anything  like  twenty-three  knots,  but  the 
nearest  vessels — Texas,  New  York,  Brooklyn,  and  Oregon — • 
stuck  to  the  chase,  making  all  possible  speed.  At  a  signal 
from  Sampson  the  other  ships  gave  up  the  pursuit  and 
turned  to  the  dangerous  work  of  rescuing  the  Spaniards 
from  the  burning  and  exploding  hulks  that  lined  the  shore. 

It  seemed  as  if  only  some  extraordinary  luck  would 
enable  the  Americans  to  capture  the  fleeing  Colon,  but,  to 
their  surprise,  they  discovered  that  they  were  gaining  on  her. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  instead  of  making  twenty-three  knots 
during  this  chase  she  did  no  better  than  fourteen.  It  was 
simply  another  case  of  lack  of  preparation  and  training. 
Had  the  Colon's  fire-room  force  been  trained  and  efficient 
she  could  easily  have  run  away  from  her  pursuers.  In 
stead,  the  leading  American  ships,  the  Oregon  and  the 

270 


\         A. 


THE    STORY  OF   OUR   NAVY 

Brooklyn,  steadily  gained  on  her.  Soon  the  turret-guns 
from  the  American  ships  boomed,  and  jets  of  water  near 
the  Spanish  cruiser  showed  that  she  was  falling  within 
range.  Since,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Colon  had  been  sent 
from  Spain  without  her  heavy  forward  and  after  guns,  she 
was  unable  to  reply  to  this  long-range  fire.  Soon  a  shell 
dropped  just  beyond  the  Colon,  and  her  captain,  despairing 
of  escape,  turned  her  bows  ran  the  vessel  ashore,  and 
lowered  his  flag. 

The  surrender  of  the  Colon  took  place  at  1.20  P.M.  By 
that  time  every  vessel  in  the  Spanish  fleet  had  been  de 
stroyed,  with  the  loss  of  about  350  killed  and  150  wounded. 
On  the  American  side  not  a  vessel  was  seriously  hurt ;  only 
one  man  had  been  killed  and  two  wounded.  No  defeat 
could  be  more  overwhelming.  The  destruction  of  Cervera's 
squadron  led  to  the  surrender  of  Santiago  and,  added  to  a 
similar  disaster  in  Manila  Bay,  it  meant  a  speedy  end  to 
the  war.  On  August  i2th  a  protocol  was  arranged  sus 
pending  hostilities,  and  a  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  by 
our  commissioners  in  Paris  on  December  10,  1898. 

Of  course,  the  American  fleet  at  Santiago  was  far  stronger 
than  the  Spanish.  But  the  wholesale  disaster  at  Santiago, 
as  at  Manila,  was  due  not  so  much  to  the  difference  in  ships 
and  guns  as  to  the  miserable  inefficiency  that  disgraced 
every  step  of  the  Spanish  operations. 

In  the  first  place,  the  reason  Cervera  abandoned  a 
sheltered  harbor  in  the  face  of  a  much  superior  force 
was  that  he  had  been  ordered  out  by  General  Blanco. 
And  Blanco's  reason  was  the  famine  in  Santiago,  which 
made  the  presence  of  the  fleet  more  of  a  burden  than  a 
help.  But  that  very  condition  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
it  had  never  occurred  to  the  Spanish  officials  to  lay  in 
a  store  of  provisions  even  when  they  knew  that  the  city 
was  going  to  be  besieged. 

In  the  second  place,  if  Cervera  was  forced  to  go  out  he 
should  have  made  the  attempt  by  night.  The  thing  that 
had  kept  him  from  trying  a  night  sortie  was  the  powerful 

271 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

searchlight  which  Sampson  kept  playing  on  the  entrance 
during  every  moment  of  darkness.  But  there  had  been 
several  squally  and  foggy  nights  which  had  offered  ideal 
conditions  of  escape,  in  spite  of  the  searchlight,  and  kept 
the  watchers  in  the  American  fleet  tense  with  anxiety. 
And  yet  Cervera  preferred  to  linger  in  port,  only  to  go  out 
to  certain  destruction  in  broad  daylight. 

We  have  already  noted  the  bad  engine-room  work  on  the 
Colon  which  alone  was  responsible  for  the  loss  of  that  ship. 
As  for  gunnery,  the  same  lack  of  training  which  was  dis 
played  in  Montojo's  squadron  was  just  as  evident  in 
Cervera's.  In  spite  of  the  rapid  fire  from  the  Spanish 
ships,  maintained  during  the  first  hour  of  the  fight,  only  two 
American  ships  were  hit  at  all.  Some  light  may  be  thrown 
on  this  wild  shooting  by  the  fact  that  when  the  Teresa  went 
out  the  guns  of  her  secondary  battery  had  never  been  fired 
before.  In  short,  there  never  was  a  better  example  of  the 
fact  that  victories  depend  on  what  has  been  done  before 
the  fight  itself  begins. 

If  there  was  shiftlessness  and  inefficiency  in  the  Spanish 
fleet,  it  was  more  than  matched  by  the  short-sightedness 
of  the  Spanish  government.  The  chief  reason  why  the 
Spaniards  had  been  unable  to  put  down  the  Cuban  rebel 
lion  was  that,  while  a  huge  army  of  two  hundred  thousand 
soldiers  had  been  sent  from  Spain  to  the  island,  scarcely  a 
single  supply  or  ammunition  wagon  had  been  taken  with 
them.  Certain  shipping  companies  made  a  good  profit 
from  every  soldier  they  transported  to  Cuba ;  but,  as  wagons 
took  up  too  much  room  on  shipboard  and  were  therefore 
not  profitable  to  carry,  they  were  left  behind.  The  result 
was  that  the  Spanish  troops  were  unable  to  make  a  march 
of  more  than  a  day  or  two  out  from  Havana  or  Santiago. 

The  Minister  of  Marine,  however,  more  than  any  one 
else,  was  responsible  for  the  ill-prepared  state  of  the 
Spanish  navy.  We  have  already  noted  the  matter  of  the 
Colon's  guns  and  that  of  the  colliers  for  Cervera's  fleet. 
During  the  month  preceding  the  war  Cervera  begged  this 

272 


THE    STORY  OF   OUR   NAVY 

man  for  definite  information  regarding  the  American  ships, 
and  for  charts  of  the  American  coast,  but  the  Minister 
had  nothing  to  give  but  vague  promises.  His  colleague, 
the  Minister  of  War,  was  equally  brilliant.  When,  with 
coal-bunkers  nearly  empty,  Cervera  lay  blockaded  in  San 
tiago  Harbor  by  an  overwhelming  force,  this  amazing 
official  cabled  him  orders  to  run  the  blockade  at  once, 
go  to  Manila  and  destroy  Dewey's  squadron,  and  then 
come  back  again  to  Cuba! 

But  when  the  war  began  no  one  dreamed  that  Spanish 
officials  could  be  guilty  of  such  unbelievable  stupidity  and 
negligence.  It  is  only  fair  to  remember  that  fact  in  these 
days  when  it  is  the  fashion  to  sneer  at  our  victories  simply 
because  they  were  so  easy  and  so  overwhelming.  For 
example,  three  of  the  best-known  military  authorities  in 
Germany  were  consulted  by  an  American  newspaper  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war  as  to  the  chances  of  the  United  States 
in  attacking  Cuba.  All  three  agreed  that  it  would  be  hope 
less  to  try  to  take  the  island  unless  the  Americans  landed 
an  army  of  at  least  two  hundred  thousand  men.  As  it 
turned  out,  with  the  brilliant  support  of  the  navy,  the  army 
accomplished  the  task  with  hardly  more  than  one-tenth 
of  two  hundred  thousand  men. 

The  navy  won  well-deserved  laurels  in  this  war,  but, 
unfortunately,  the  victory  of  Santiago  was  stained  by  an 
ugly  controversy  that  sprang  up  immediately  afterward 
between  the  partisans  of  Sampson  and  Schley  as  to  who 
deserved  the  credit  of  the  victory.  The  ordinary  citizen, 
who  knew  nothing  about  Sampson's  invaluable  services 
before  the  battle  and  of  Schley's  questionable  conduct 
during  the  same  time,  felt  that  the  latter  had  not  received 
full  credit  from  Sampson  when  he  telegraphed  the  news  of 
the  victory.  The  wording  of  this  message,  unfortunately, 
was  left  to  a  subordinate,  and  an  unpleasant  effect  was  made 
which  the  "yellow"  journals  and  certain  politicians  were 
quick  to  take  up  against  Sampson.  The  critics  of  Schley 
answered  back  with  great  bitterness,  and  the  quarrel  was  on. 

273 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Finally  Schley  asked  for  a  court  of  inquiry  (July,  1 901)  to 
examine  his  conduct  during  the  war.  The  court  returned 
the  decision  that  his  service  before  June  ist  was  charac 
terized  by  "vacillation,  dilatoriness,  and  lack  of  enter 
prise."  Admiral  Dewey,  who  was  president  of  the  court, 
said,  however,  that  he  thought  Schley  ought  to  have  the 
chief  credit  for  the  Santiago  victory  because  he  was  in 
nominal  command  during  most  of  the  actual  fighting. 
This  point  had  not  boon  discussed  by  the  court  at  all,  and 
the  statement  made  the  confusion  only  worse.  Schley 
then  appealed  from  the  court  to  President  Roosevelt.  The 
latter  reviewed  the  evidence  and  reported  that  the  court 
had  not  treated  Schley  unfairly;  moreover,  that  after  the 
battle  began  no  ship  took  orders  from  either  Sampson  or 
Schley,  that  the  battle  itself  was  simply  "a  captains'  fight." 
It  is  worth  noting,  too,  that  in  this  quarrel  the  opinion  of 
Schley's  brother  officers,  though  silent,  was  overwhelmingly 
against  him ;  and  this  not  so  much  on  account  of  his  strange 
manceuver  during  the  battle  as  because  of  what  seemed  to 
them  inaction  and  even  insubordination  during  the  early 
part  of  the  campaign. 

It  was  most  unfortunate  for  both  officers  that  their 
unwise  friends  insisted  on  this  controversy.  Schley,  what 
ever  his  shortcomings  during  the  Santiago  campaign,  had 
a  good  record,  notably  in  his  fine  rescue  of  the  arctic 
explorer  Lieutenant  Greely  in  1884.  But  the  controversy 
left  him  estranged  from  many  of  his  brothers  in  arms,  in 
spite  of  his  following  among  the  people. 

The  most  cruel  injustice  fell  upon  Sampson,  who  was 
fairly  hounded  to  his  grave  by  scurrilous  and  venomous 
attacks  in  newspapers,  public  speeches,  and  personal  letters 
from  every  part  of  the  country  he  had  served  so  well.  If 
naval  history  means  anything  it  means,  as  we  have  seen, 
that  victories  are  won  chiefly  by  what  has  been  done  before 
the  actual  shooting  begins.  In  selecting  Sampson  for  war 
command  the  Department  picked  an  officer  who  had  no 
political  friends,  no  "family"  influence,  and  one  who  had 

274 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

not  even  hinted  at  wanting  the  position.  He  was  chosen 
simply  on  his  record  of  splendid  efficiency,  dating  from  the 
day  of  his  graduation  at  the  head  of  his  class  in  Annapolis 
down  to  the  time  when  he  was  drilling  the  Atlantic  fleet 
at  target  practice  in  anticipation  of  the  war.  The  choice 
of  Sampson  was  applauded  by  the  entire  navy,  and  the 
organization  he  perfected,  the  skill  with  which  he  prepared 
for  every  emergency,  and  the  vigilance  of  his  blockade 
confirmed  this  choice  over  and  over.  The  easy  victory 
over  the  Spanish  ships  in  broad  daylight  was  chiefly  the 
result  of  his  tactics  during  the  entire  month  before.  The 
accident  of  chance  which  took  the  flag-ship  so  far  east  that 
she  had  only  a  small  share  in  the  actual  battle  is  a  trifling 
consideration  compared  with  the  real  things  that  made  the 
victory  for  which  he  was  so  largely  responsible. 

In  view  of  all  the  printed  and  spoken  abuse  of  Sampson 
which  broke  him  down  and  yet  drew  from  him  never  a  word 
in  self-defense,  we  may  consider  the  following  quotation 
from  Rear- Admiral  Chadwick,  who  served  under  him  as 
captain  of  the  flag-ship  and  who  was  in  a  position  to  know 
him  thoroughly.  ''Sampson  was  the  hero  by  nature,  for 
nature  made  him  great.  Without  thought  of  self,  of  in 
comparable  simplicity  and  truthfulness,  quiet  and  reserved, 
though  most  kindly,  with  never  a  harsh  word,  with  absolute 
courage  both  physical  and  moral,  with  an  unbending  pur 
pose  when  once  his  decision  was  made,  and  with  a  judg 
ment  which  seemed  unswerving,  he  was  fitly  the  hero  to 
officers  and  men,  and  to  none  more  than  to  those  who  were 
closest  to  him." 

This  unhappy  controversy  in  the  navy,  combined  with 
the  "embalmed  beef"  scandals  in  the  army,  brought  the 
Spanish  War  to  an  unpleasant  close.  But  as  the  smoke  of 
those  conflicts  has  now  cleared  away  we  ought  to  be  able 
to  look  back  over  the  war  and  consider  it  fairly.  Un 
doubtedly  the  conflict  could  have  been  avoided  altogether— 
and  that  is  true  of  most  wars — but  the  results  seem  to  have 
been,  after  all,  beneficial  to  both  nations.  To  Spain  the 

275 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

loss  of  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  was  like  a  successful  opera 
tion  that  removed  two  diseased  members,  because  for  many 
years  these  two  colonies,  with  their  rebellions  and  mis- 
government,  had  been  only  a  heavy  drain  on  the  Spanish 
treasury.  To  the  United  States  the  war  gave  a  new  place 
abroad  among  the  world  powers,  and  at  home  it  served  to 
draw  together  North  and  South  under  the  same  flag  for 
the  first  time  since  the  Civil  War.  For  example,  Gen. 
Fitzhugh  Lee  and  Gen.  Joseph  Wheeler,  who  commanded 
volunteers  in  1898,  had  in  1861  fought  for  the  South;  and 
among  Roosevelt's  Rough  Riders  those  whose  fathers  had 
worn  the  gray  outnumbered  the  sons  of  the  men  in  blue. 
The  war  also  taught  the  army  several  important  lessons 
which  it  has  made  the  most  of  since,  and  the  brilliant 
services  of  the  navy  overcame  throughout  the  nation  the 
old  indifference  and  opposition  to  maintaining  a  fleet,  and 
led  to  a  rapid  increase  in  ships  and  men. 


XXI 

EVENTS   FROM  THE    SPANISH   WAR  TO   VERA   CRUZ 

The  Boxer  Rebellion — Lieutenant  Clark's  work  on  the  Tientsin  rail 
road — Battle-fleet  cruise — Nicaraguan  service — Occupation  of  Vera 
Cruz. 

IN  the  two  years  which  followed  the  Spanish  War  the 
navy  saw  difficult  and  dangerous  service  in  the  Philip 
pines.  The  cruiser  Charleston  was  wrecked  upon  an  un 
charted  reef  off  Luzon,  and  one  small  gunboat  went 
aground  in  a  river  and  was  captured  by  the  Filipinos. 
The  task  of  subduing  the  Filipino  insurrection  fell  chiefly 
on  the  army,  but  the  navy  performed  a  very  important 
service  in  patrolling  the  rivers  and  shores  of  the  territory 
held  by  the  rebels. 

In  1900  trouble  broke  out  in  China.  Certain  over- 
patriotic  Chinese,  like  the  Japanese  in  1863,  banded  them 
selves  together  for  the  purpose  of  driving  all  foreigners 
from  the  Flowery  Kingdom.  To  this  end  they  organized 
a  society  called  the  "Fist  of  Righteous  Harmony,"  which 
was  shortened  by  English  and  Americans  to  the  more 
convenient  name  of  "  Boxers."  The  movement  spread  fast, 
with  wide-spread  attacks  on  mission  stations  and  foreigners 
generally.  Our  minister  in  Pekin  telegraphed  to  Rear- 
Admiral  Kempff  on  the  Newark,  then  at  the  port  of  Taku, 
that  the  American  legation  at  Pekin  needed  protection. 
Kempff  despatched  a  guard  of  United  States  marines,  who 
arrived  at  Pekin  just  before  the  railroad  was  destroyed, 
and  the  American  and  European  legations  were  besieged 
by  the  Boxers. 

277 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

The  situation  at  Pekin  was  critical,  but  the  consuls  and 
officers  representing  the  various  nations  at  Tientsin  talked 
endlessly  without  being  able  to  agree  on  what  should  be 
done.  Disgusted  with  such  proceedings,  Ca.ptain  McCalla 
of  the  Newark  announced,  "Well,  I  have  only  one  hundred 
and  twelve  officers  and  men,  but  I'm  going  to  march  to 
Pekin  at  once,  even  if  I  have  to  go  alone!" 

This  straightforward  speech  had  a  good  effect.  The 
British,  Austrian,  Japanese,  and  Italian  officers  joined  with 
McCalla,  and  finally  the  Germans,  French,  and  Russians 
came  along,  too.  The  allies  succeeded  in  reaching  Lang- 
fang,  a  place  within  forty  miles  of  Pekin,  but  meanwhile 
the  Imperial  troops  had  gone  over  to  the  Boxers  and  ripped 
up  the  railroad-tracks  in  the  rear  of  the  allied  force.  As 
the  railroad  to  Pekin  had  already  been  destroyed,  the  for 
eigners  were  left  stranded,  with  their  communications  cut 
and  their  supply  of  food  and  ammunition  very  low.  After 
a  consultation  the  commanding  officers  agreed  that  it  was 
necessary  to  fall  back  to  Tientsin  to  await  reinforcements. 
The  retreat  was  accompanied  by  some  sharp  fighting,  the 
brunt  of  which  was  borne  by  the  Americans,  who  formed 
the  vanguard.  Hardly  had  the  allies,  numbering  about 
seven  hundred,  reached  Tientsin  when  they  were  besieged 
by  several  thousand  Boxers.  Then  it  became  necessary  to 
rush  men  and  supplies  from  the  seaport  Taku  to  Tientsin. 

While  the  allies  had  been  bombarding  the  forts  at  Taku 
the  American  gunboat  Monocacy,  a  funny,  double-ended, 
side-wheeler  mounting  ancient  smooth-bores,  was  the  rep 
resentative  of  our  navy  at  that  port.  She  was  called  the 
"Noah's  Ark  of  the  Asiatic  Station,"  and  was  the  joke  of 
all  the  other  navies  in  the  Pacific;  but  she  came  out  of 
this  affair  with  flying  colors.  Orders  from  Washington 
obliged  her  commander  to  hold  aloof  from  the  bombard 
ment,  but  after  the  forts  were  abandoned,  and  the  neigh 
boring  cities  of  Taku  and  Tongku  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
allies,  the  admirals  of  the  various  nations  signed  an  agree 
ment  by  which  the  control  of  the  two  cities  should  be  turned 

27$ 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

over  to  the  captain  of  the  Monocacy.  That  is,  he  was  to 
take  charge  of  the  waterworks,  the  public  buildings,  rolling- 
stock,  etc.  Probably  the  choice  of  an  American  officer  from 
a  little  gunboat  was  an  easy  way  out  of  a  tangle  where  the 
officers  of  every  European  nation  distrusted  the  others. 
To  help  him,  the  American  captain  was  given  an  officer  of 
every  nationality  represented  in  the  allied  forces. 

Commander  Wise  of  the  Monocacy  took  for  his  own  per 
sonal  supervision  the  management  of  the  water-supply, 
a  matter  of  first  importance,  for  every  drop  of  drinking- 
water  used  by  the  allied  troops  before  they  entered  Tientsin 
had  to  come  from  the  Taku  waterworks.  The  next  thing 
to  do  was  to  get  the  railroad  between  Tongku  and  Tien 
tsin  into  working  order.  He  turned  to  his  lieutenant, 
George  R.  Clark. 

"Clark,"  said  he,  "that  road  must  be  put  in  commission 
at  once.  Go  ahead." 

Lieutenant  Clark  might  have  answered  that,  being  a 
sailor,  he  knew  nothing  at  all  about  railroading,  not  to 
mention  patching  up  track  and  rolling-stock  that  the 
Boxers  had  destroyed.  But  when  you  are  told  to  do  a 
thing  in  the  American  navy  you  go  ahead  and  do  it,  and 
without  any  remarks.  No  matter  how  hard  the  task  is 
you  are  expected  to  do  it  well,  too.  That  is  what  a  naval 
man  means  by  his  favorite  word,  "efficiency." 

Lieutenant  Clark  promptly  went  ashore  with  a  squad  of 
bluejackets  and  marched  to  the  railroad  yard.  There  he 
found  a  discouraging  spectacle.  Locomotives  lay  in  the 
ditch  covered  with  rust,  and  all  around  were  weather- 
beaten  cars  with  their  wheels  in  the  air.  The  rickety 
single-track  railroad  that  led  from  the  yard  in  the  direction 
of  Tientsin  he  knew  was  ripped  out  in  any  number  of  places. 
And  this  was  the  railroad  that  would  have  to  be  made 
to  work  before  a  single  soldier  or  a  single  round  of  car 
tridges  could  reach  Tientsin. 

Clark  called  his  sailors  about  him  and  told  them  exactly 
what  the  problem  was,  and  they  responded  in  the  way 

279 


THE   STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

that  makes  us  proud  of  our  enlisted  men.  They  took  hold 
as  if  the  whole  affair  were  a  new  kind  of  lark.  It  turned 
out  that  two  of  them  had  worked  on  locomotive  machinery 
before  they  entered  the  navy,  and  they  began  examining 
the  injuries  to  the  locomotives  with  a  fine  professional  air. 
The  others  pried  and  hauled  till  cars  and  locomotives  were 
back  again  on  the  tracks.  As  they  all  knew  how  to  get 
up  steam  on  a  ship's  launch,  they  applied  the  same  prin 
ciples  to  the  engines,  and  before  long  had  some  of  them 
smoking  and  sizzling.  In  less  than  two  days  they  had 
patched  up  five  locomotives;  four  were  manned  by  our 
jackies,  and  the  other  by  a  squad  of  British  sailors,  who 
seemed  to  be  as  delighted  as  the  rest  with  this  novel  style 
of  cruising.  These  engines  were  first  sent  ahead  on  short 
trial  trips,  and  every  one  of  them  that  was  able  to  crawl 
back  to  the  yard  under  her  own  steam  was  called  "ready 
for  duty." 

Meanwhile  Clark  was  overhauling  the  small  outfit  of 
cars,  sawing  here,  building  there,  in  order  to  adapt  them 
for  carrying  troops,  horses,  water,  provisions,  and  am 
munition.  At  the  same  time  he  collected  and  loaded  on 
flat-cars  the  wrecked  telegraph  poles,  in  order  that  tele 
graphic  communication  might  be  set  up  the  instant  the 
line  to  Tientsin  was  clear. 

When  the  cars  were  ready  he  had  worked  out  a  system 
of  operation  by  which  trains  could  be  run  with  the  least 
possible  delay  in  going  and  returning,  and  made  out  a 
schedule  accordingly.  Not  the  least  of  his  troubles  was 
the  matter  of  arranging  for  carrying  the  forces  and  supplies 
of  various  nations,  all  of  whose  commanding  officers  wanted 
to  go  first.  But  he  managed  to  meet  that  situation  with 
fine  tact,  and  things  went  far  more  smoothly  than  he  had 
dared  to  hope. 

Of  course,  the  rickety  locomotives  would  break  down 
from  time  to  time,  and  the  train  crews  of  sailormen 
had  fighting  to  do  along  the  line  as  well  as  railroading. 
It  was  a  familiar  excuse  for  a  late  train,  "Sir,  we  had  to 

280 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR    NAVY 

stop  to  fight  a  crowd  of  Boxers  who  were  putting  obstruc 
tions  on  the  track."  Time  and  again,  too,  the  railroad 
yard  at  Tongku  was  threatened  by  night  attacks,  so  it 
can  be  imagined  that  Lieutenant  Clark  did  not  get  much 
sleep  during  those  busy  weeks. 

But  the  work  was  done.  In  a  few  weeks  thirteen  thou 
sand  men  were  transported  over  the  track  to  Tientsin, 
along  with  several  hundred  horses  and  a  corresponding 
amount  of  water,  ammunition,  and  provisions.  Not  a  life 
was  lost,  not  a  car  went  off  the  track;  the  troops  raised 
the  siege  at  Tientsin,  and  then  went  on  to  Pekin  and  re 
lieved  the  beleaguered  foreigners  there.  The  relief  of 
Pekin  meant  the  collapse  of  the  Boxer  rebellion.  It  is  easy 
to  see  that  the  thing  that  made  the  relief  of  Tientsin  and 
Pekin  possible  was  the  opening  of  the  railroad  from  Tongku. 
The  reason  that  the  feat  deserves  the  space  given  it  here 
is  because  it  is  the  sort  of  thing  that  is  likely  to  go  unap 
preciated  because  it  does  not  play  to  the  gallery.  It  was 
hard,  wearing,  and  very  prosaic  work,  but  it  was  the  ser 
vice  that  counted  most.  It  showed  the  energy  and  re 
sourcefulness  of  our  officers  and  men,  and  is  even  better 
evidence  than  the  splendid  fighting  done  by  our  sailors 
and  marines  at  Tientsin  and  Pekin  of  the  fact  that  our  navy 
understands  the  meaning  of  the  word  "duty." 

The  service  done  by  the  Americans  at  Tongku  did  not 
attract  much  attention  in  America,  but  it  was  appreciated 
by  the  foreign  officers  in  China.  Letters  of  congratulation 
from  commanding  officers  came  in  on  all  sides,  and  when 
the  old  Monocacy  returned  home  her  captain  was  deco 
rated  by  the  German  Emperor  with  the  order  of  the  Red 
Eagle  as  a  mark  of  Germany's  appreciation  of  the  services 
rendered  by  the  officers  and  men  of  the  American  gunboat 
during  the  Boxer  rebellion. 

Since  the  troubles  in  the  Philippines  and  China  our 
navy  has  had  a  respite  from  actual  fighting,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  occupation  of  Vera  Cruz.  Its  problem  has 
been  to  increase  power  and  efficiency  in  readiness  for  war. 

281 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

To  this  end  great  progress  has  been  made  both  in  ships 
and  personnel. 

An  important  event  which  made  for  efficiency  was  the 
cruise  of  the  battle-ship  fleet  round  the  world  in  1907-1909. 
On  December  16,  1907,  sixteen  first-class  battle-ships  set 
out  from  Hampton  Roads  under  command  of  Rear-Admiral 
Robley  D.  Evans,  the  same  Evans  whom  we  saw  as  a  mid 
shipman  lying  wounded  at  the  foot  of  the  stockade  at  Fort 
Fisher.  The  fleet  passed  through  the  Straits  of  Magellan 
and  came  north  to  San  Francisco,  where  Admiral  Evans 
was  obliged  by  ill  health  to  yield  the  command  to  Rear- 
Admiral  Sperry.  From  San  Francisco  the  ships  proceeded 
to  Honolulu,  Auckland,  Sydney,  Melbourne,  Manila, 
Yokohama,  Amoy,  and  Suez.  On  arriving  in  the  Medi 
terranean  the  fleet  divided,  some  of  the  ships  arriving  at 
Messina  just  in  time  to  assist  in  the  relief  of  the  stricken 
city  after  the  earthquake.  Finally,  after  a  cruise  of  forty- 
six  thousand  miles,  the  battle-ship  fleet  arrived  back  again 
in  Hampton  Roads  on  Washington's  Birthday,  1909. 

The  results  of  this  cruise  were  of  great  value.  Just  how 
much  the  friendly  reception  of  the  American  fleet  at  Yoko 
hama  did  to  dispel  the  Japan  war-talk  in  both  the  United 
States  and  Japan  is  hard  to  say;  but  it  probably  did  a  great 
deal.  From  the  naval  point  of  view  the  results  were  very 
important.  The  long  cruise  was  a  practical  test  of  such 
problems  as  the  navy  would  have  to  meet  in  case  of  war 
involving  a  move  against  a  distant  coast.  The  fleet  stood 
the  test  with  great  credit.  It  made  its  own  repairs;  it 
worked  out  new  standards  of  economy  in  coal  consumption ; 
it  solved  problems  of  big-fleet  organization.  At  the  same 
time  the  cruise  showed  clearly  that  we  were  badly  in  need 
of  colliers  and  that  in  many  points  our  battle-ships  were 
capable  of  being  improved.  It  is  far  better  to  discover 
weaknesses  like  these  in  peace  than  in  war. 

In  the  autumn  of  1912  a  naval  force  was  sent  to  restore 
order  in  Nicaragua.  The  trouble  was  quickly  suppressed 
by  our  sailors  and  marines,  with  the  loss  of  only  five  men 

282 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

killed.  Short  as  the  affair  was,  it  lasted  long  enough  to 
prove  the  discipline,  gallantry,  and  accurate  shooting  of 
our  men.  Their  temper  is  well  illustrated  by  one  incident. 
During  an  attack  on  the  insurgent  works  the  commanding 
officer  sent  back  to  the  rear  a  detachment  of  sailors  because 
they  had  landed  in  white  uniforms,  which  were  fatally  con 
spicuous.  The  sailors  retired,  but,  finding  a  little  stream, 
they  rolled  over  and  over  in  the  mud  till  their  white  clothes 
were  plastered  brown.  Then  they  went  back  on  the  run 
to  the  firing-line,  and  a  few  minutes  later,  together  with  the 
marines,  rushed  a  position  described  as  practically  im 
pregnable. 

Two  years  later  trouble  in  Mexico  brought  a  still  better 
opportunity  to  test  the  tone  of  the  present  navy  and 
answer  the  prediction  made  by  some  that  in  the  popularity 
enjoyed  by  the  navy  since  the  Spanish  War  the  service 
would  lose  the  fine  edge  of  proficiency  and  become  careless. 

To  the  long  history  of  Mexican  revolutions  there  had 
been  added,  in  1911,  the  deposition  of  President  Diaz  by 
revolutionists  headed  by  Francisco  I.  Madero.  The  lat 
ter  was  overthrown  and  slain  in  February,  1913,  in  an 
other  revolt  which  brought  to  the  fore  Gen.  Victoriano 
Huerta  as  provisional  president.  He  was  never  officially 
recognized  by  the  United  States.  There  followed  a  long 
chapter  of  increasingly  successful  rebellions  against  Huerta 
by  the  Mexican  "Constitutionalists,"  accompanied  by 
troubles  along  the  frontier,  and  the  loss  of  American  lives 
and  property  in  Mexico. 

In  April,  1914,  several  things  happened  which  looked 
like  deliberate  attempts  to  provoke  trouble.  At  Tampico 
on  April  9th  the  paymaster  of  the  Dolphin  was  arrested 
with  .his  entire  boat  party  and  paraded  up  the  streets  of 
the  city  to  the  jail.  The  officer  and  his  men  were  unarmed, 
but  in  full  uniform,  and  the  American  flag  was  flying  in  the 
stern-sheets  of  the  boat.  About  the  same  time  a  mail 
orderly  was  arrested  in  Vera  Cruz,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
he,  too,  was  in  uniform  and  proceeding  quietly  about  his 

283 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

business.  Furthermore,  the  telegraphic  despatches  from 
our  government  to  our  representative  in  Mexico  City  were 
tampered  with  and  held  up  by  Huerta  officials.  As  all 
these  acts  occurred  within  a  few  days  and  amounted  in 
each  case  to  a  deliberate  insult,  the  President  demanded 
a  complete  apology  and  upheld  Rear-Admiral  Mayo,  at 
Tampico,  in  the  latter's  demand  for  a  salute  to  the  flag  as 
a  reparation  for  the  arrest  of  the  Dolphin  s  paymaster. 
As  Huerta  refused  to  pay  the  salute  as  demanded,  our  fleet 
was  ordered  to  Vera  Cruz,  and  on  April  2ist  Rear-Admiral 
Fletcher  sent  a  landing-party  to  seize  the  custom-house 
at  that  port.  After  some  sharp  fighting  in  the  streets  the 
sailors  and  marines  took  possession  of  the  city  with  a  loss 
of  only  nineteen  men  killed.  Four  days  later  the  three 
leading  South  American  countries,  Argentine,  Brazil,  and 
Chile,  offered  their  services  in  an  effort  to  mediate  between 
the  United  States  and  Huerta,  and  to  put  an  end  to  the 
destruction  of  life  and  property  in  Mexico.  President 
Wilson  accepted  their  friendly  offer  under  certain  condi 
tions,  and  another  period  of  waiting  followed,  with  the 
Americans  in  control  of  Vera  Cruz.  A  little  later  Huerta 
resigned  and  departed  from  the  country,  leaving  the  Con 
stitutionalists  practically  in  power. 

Such  is  a  bare  outline  of  events.  Let  us  see  how  far  the 
navy  showed  readiness  and  efficiency  in  the  crisis.  Within 
eighteen  hours  of  the  call  for  the  fleet  Rear-Admiral  Badger 
had  hoisted  his  flag  on  the  Arkansas  and  steamed  out  of 
Hampton  Roads,  followed  by  such  of  the  fleet  as  lay  in 
Norfolk.  At  the  same  time  other  dreadnoughts  were 
steaming  out  from  other  Atlantic  ports  to  join  the  Arkansas 
in  midocean.  One  of  these  battle-ships  took  on  eighteen 
hundred  tons  of  coal,  provisions  for  one  thousand  men 
for  six  weeks,  enormous  quantities  of  other  supplies, 
rounded  up  officers  and  men  who  were  on  shore  leave,  and 
was  ready  to  trip  her  anchor  in  twelve  hours.  At  the 
Newport  training-station  one  thousand  men  were  all  ready 
to  embark  for  Mexico  within  fifteen  minutes  of  the  receipt 

284 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

of  the  telegram.  When  Secretary  Daniels  told  Paymas 
ter-General  Cowie  that  the  navy  needed  a  large  merchant 
steamer  at  once  as  an  auxiliary  to  the  fleet  off  Tampico 
it  took  the  Paymaster-General  just  sixty  minutes  to  ar 
range  for  the  use  of  the  Ward  line  steamer  Esperanza,  at 
that  time  lying  off  Vera  Cruz.  An  hour  and  a  half  more 
sufficed  to  get  word  by  wireless  to  Rear-Admiral  Fletcher 
that  he  could  use  the  Esperanza. 

When  the  landing  was  made  at  Vera  Cruz,  officers  and 
men  who  had  never  before  been  under  fire  suddenly  found 
themselves  under  the  most  trying  conditions  of  warfare 
imaginable.  They  had  to  advance  along  open  streets,  an 
easy  target  for  numerous  "snipers"  hidden  in  windows, 
towers,  or  behind  barricades.  For  a  detailed  story  of 
how  our  men  behaved  one  must  turn  to  Admiral  Fletch 
er's  report,  which  makes  stirring  reading.  For  example, 
Boatswain's  Mate  Nickerson  of  the  Utah  was  slightly 
wounded  three  times,  but  after  first-aid  bandages  had  been 
applied  he  took  charge  of  a  squad  that  built  an  advanced 
barricade  under  fire.  Here  he  was  wounded  again  three 
times,  two  shots  breaking  his  leg  above  and  below  the 
knee.  In  another  part  of  the  city  Ensign  McDonnell  and 
four  men  from  the  Florida  were  stationed  on  the  roof  of 
the  Terminal  Hotel  to  send  signals  to  the  gunboat  Prairie. 
Naturally,  this  group  were  the  target  for  all  the  snipers  in 
the  neighborhood,  and  the  marvel  is  that  they  were  not 
all  killed.  A  marine  stationed  near  them  was  killed  and 
two  others  wounded,  but  in  spite  of  the  bullets  singing 
about  their  heads  all  day  the  squad  took  and  sent  messages 
without  a  moment's  interruption. 

Meanwhile  the  gunners  on  the  Prairie  had  a  chance  to 
show  what  they  could  do.  They  had  received  the  signal 
that  there  was  a  large  body  of  snipers  in  the  tower  of  the 
Naval  Academy  building.  Long  before  this  the  officers 
had  ascertained  the  exact  ranges  between  the  ship's  an 
chorage  and  every  principal  building  in  the  city  It  needed 
only  the  signal  to  open  fire,  and  the  Prairie  fired  six  times, 
19  285 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 

each  a  perfect  shot.  After  the  sixth  shell  there  was  not 
much  tower  and  no  more  fight  in  the  Mexican  Naval 
Academy. 

In  short,  the  Vera  Cruz  affair,  although  it  lasted  only  a 
day  or  two,  tested  the  navy  and  found  it  keyed  up  to  con 
cert  pitch.  This  must  be  gratifying  to  the  nation  whose 
flag  it  serves;  but  we  should  demand  of  our  navy  nothing 
less  than  the  best.  We  spend  many  millions  every  year 
on  ships  and  men,  not  because  we  desire  war,  but  as  an 
insurance  against  war.  It  was  our  miserable  unreadiness 
for  war  that  brought  us  our  humiliations  in  the  War  of 
1812,  that  dragged  our  Civil  War  through  four  awful  years, 
and,  on  the  part  of  the  army,  made  the  few  months  of  the 
Spanish  War  so  heavy  with  sickness  and  death.  The  bur 
den  of  war  in  these  days  falls  largely  upon  the  navy,  be 
cause  more  than  ever  before  sea-power  turns  the  scales  of 
war.  If  war  must  come,  the  navy  should  be  ready  like 
a  keen,  well-tempered  sword  with  which  the  nation  can 
strike  swiftly  and  decisively. 


XXII 

THE    MODERN    NAVY 

Development  in  ships  since  the  Spanish  War — Improvements  in 
gunnery — Target  practice — The  man  behind  the  gun — The  advan 
tages  of  the  modern  enlisted  man — The  navy  as  an  industrial  school 
— The  marines — The  officers — Conclusion. 

ANEW  naval  policy  has  been  steadily  developing  since 
the  Spanish  War.  That  war  left  the  United  States 
in  a  new  position.  From  being  a  republic  wholly  concerned 
with  its  own  affairs  the  nation  suddenly  found  itself  in  the 
position  of  an  empire  with  distant  colonies  and  new  re 
sponsibilities.  We  became  a  "world  power."  We  in 
sisted  on  an  "open  door"  policy  in  China,  and  stood  firmly 
against  the  partition  of  that  country,  which  the  Continental 
powers  seemed  bent  on  accomplishing  after  the  Boxer 
rebellion.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  affirmed  in  stronger 
terms  than  before,  but  our  government  soon  realized  that 
the  doctrine  was  regarded  by  some  Continental  rulers  as 
"Yankee  bluff,"  which  would  be  respected  only  so  long  as 
it  was  backed  up  by  a  first-class  navy. 

The  result  was  that  new  ships  were  built  in  greater 
numbers  than  ever  before  in  times  of  peace,  classes  at  the 
Naval  Academy  were  doubled  to  meet  the  demand  for 
trained  officers,  and  the  entire  Academy  was  rebuilt  at 
the  cost  of  nearly  eleven  million  dollars.  In  a  few  years 
the  United  States  sprang  from  sixth  to  third  place  among 
the  naval  powers  of  the  world.  Finally,  the  Panama  Canal 
adds  immensely  to  our  sea-power,  because  it  makes  it  pos 
sible  for  our  fleets  to  pass  in  a  short  time  from  one  coast 
to  the  other. 

287 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

But  the  growth  in  numbers  is  not  so  interesting  as  the 
development  of  the  ships  themselves.  A  first-class  battle 
ship  of  the  Spanish  War,  like  the  Indiana,  would  cut  a 
sorry  figure  beside  a  first-class  battle-ship  of  1914,  like  the 
Wyoming,  because  the  latter  has  much  greater  speed, 
tougher  armor,  and  a  far  more  powerful  battery.  In  1905 
the  English  led  the  way  by  producing  a  new  type,  the 
famous  Dreadnought,  which  relied  wholly  on  her  great 
guns  for  battle,  mounting  a  secondary  battery  only  for 
use  against  torpedo-boats.  And,  as  heavier  guns  have 
been  made  or  their  number  on  a  ship  increased,  the  dread 
nought  has  been  superseded  by  a  type  called  the  "super- 
dreadnought."  But  these  names  are  not  official.  Battle 
ships  are  rated  in  three  classes,  and  it  is  significant  of  the 
changes  since  the  Spanish  War  that  a  first-class  battle-ship 
of  that  time  is  now  relegated  to  the  third  class  and  called 
"obsolete." 

The  British,  Germans,  and  Japanese  have  a  type  just 
below  the  battle-ship,  the  "battle-cruiser."  There  is  some 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  its  value  compared  with  that 
of  a  dreadnought,  which  is  cheaper  to  build  than  the 
speedier  but  less  powerful  and  more  vulnerable  battle- 
cruiser.  Opinion  on  this  side  of  the  water  has  decided 
against  it,  and  it  does  not  exist  in  the  American  navy. 
We  have,  however,  the  armored  cruiser  and  the  unprotected 
but  speedy  scout  cruiser,  and  both  these  types  have  de 
veloped  correspondingly. 

The  torpedo-boat  has  undergone  still  greater  develop 
ment,  for  the  modern  "destroyers"  are  several  times  as 
large  as  the  Pluton  and  Furor,  which  represented  the  finest 
of  their  type  in  1898,  and  are  far  speedier.  Our  modern 
destroyers  can  make  about  thirty-three  knots.  Moreover, 
the  destroyer  of  to-day  is  capable  of  making  long  cruises 
independently  of  the  big  ships. 

The  same  thing  is  true  of  the  modern  submarine.  Again 
following  the  lead  of  the  English,  we  are  building  sub 
marines  three  or  four  times  as  large  as  the  type  we  had 

288 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

ten  years  ago.  To-day  a  submarine  makes  cruises  of  sev 
eral  hundred  miles  independently  of  tender  or  squadron, 
and,  as  we  are  just  beginning  to  realize  the  immense  pos 
sibilities  of  the  submarine,  that  fact  means  a  great  deal. 
Submarines  did  not  figure  in  our  Spanish  War  or  in  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  and  the  crude  little  David,  which  sank 
the  Housatonic  in  our  Civil  War,  still  holds  the  honor  of 
being  the  only  submarine  that  ever  destroyed  an  enemy's 
ship,  although  a  new  record  is  likely  to  be  made  in  the 
great  European  war  of  1914.  The  developments  in  the  sub 
marine  have  been  so  marvelous  that  it  must  be  carefully 
reckoned  with.  Recent  fleet  manceuvers  had  made  one 
point  clear  as  daylight — namely,  that  the  most  powerful 
"super-dreadnought"  in  the  world  has  little  protection 
against  these  venomous  little  ships  operating  under  water. 
Of  course,  the  submarine  is  wholly  a  weapon  of  harbor  and 
coast  defense;  but  the  fact  that  it  can  go  out  and  attack 
a  fleet  of  battle-ships  several  hundred  miles  off  the  coast 
without  any  serious  risk  of  getting  hurt  by  the  enemy 
contains  infinite  possibilities. 

An  important  innovation  in  naval  tactics  is  the  aero 
plane.  This,  too,  has  not  developed  very  far  as  a  weapon 
of  offense,  because  its  effectiveness  in  dropping  bombs 
iipon  an  enemy's  fleet  has  not  been  clearly  proved.  But 
there  is  no  doubt  about  its  value  in  scouting;  and  as  the 
naval  aeroplane,  or  "hydroplane,"  can  make  its  flights 
from  the  deck  of  a  battle-ship,  these  scouts  of  the  air  can 
accompany  the  fleet  wherever  it  goes.  A  good  test  under 
war  conditions  was  made  in  the  harbor  of  Vera  Cruz  in 
the  spring  of  1914,  and  the  results  were  very  satisfactory. 

Another  improvement  regarding  the  ships  of  our  navy 
is  in  the  direction  of  fleet  action.  Before  the  Spanish  War 
individual  ships  were  well  handled,  but  the  ships  were  the 
units,  and  when  Rear-Admiral  Sampson  organized  his  fleet 
in  the  blockade  of  Santiago  he  realized  how  much  the  navy 
needed  practice  in  fleet  organization  and  fleet  action.  To 
day  the  unit  of  operation  is  the  fleet,  and  a  new  virtue  has 

289 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

been  added  to  the  American  navy — "  fleet  efficiency" — 
which  did  not  exist  in  1898. 

Such  efficiency  is  a  matter  of  men  rather  than  ships,  and 
it  brings  us  to  another  important  point — namely,  that  the 
development  in  the  materiel  of  the  navy  is  hardly  as  in 
teresting  as  the  improvement  in  personnel.  In  1898  we 
laughed  at  the  pitiable  shooting  done  by  the  Spaniards, 
but  the  wiser  officers  shook  their  heads  at  the  small  per 
centage  of  hits  made  by  the  American  gunners  and  declared 
that  we  must  do  better.  To  this  problem  the  keenest 
minds  in  the  service  have  been  devoted  ever  since  that 
war,  with  the  result  that  modern  American  naval  gunnery 
is  probably  not  surpassed  anywhere.  It  is  estimated  that 
in  1914  the  "man  behind  the  gun"  shot  one  thousand 
per  cent,  better  than  in  1898. 

We  are  rightly  proud  of  our  progress  in  this  regard;  yet, 
since  gunnery  is  the  prime  essential  in  battle,  we  can  never 
be  satisfied  with  anything  short  of  perfection.  During  the 
War  of  1812,  as  we  have  seen,  our  gunnery  surpassed  that 
of  the  English,  but  during  the  years  of  dry  rot  and  politics 
that  preceded  the  Civil  War  it  went  to  pieces  so  badly 
that  during  the  Civil  War  our  naval  gunnery,  with  few  ex 
ceptions,  was  of  a  low  order. 

The  immense  improvement  in  our  naval  gunnery  since 
the  Spanish  War  is  due  to  several  things.  One  of  the  great 
est  obstacles  to  gun  practice  at  the  time  of  that  war  was 
the  fact  that  it  was  so  costly  to  fire  even  a  single  shot  from 
a  turret-gun.  Even  the  practice  of  loading  a  heavy  shell 
wore  out  the  breech  of  a  gun  seriously.  In  1903  a  British 
naval  officer  invented  a  "dummy  loader"  which  enables 
a  gun- crew  to  practise  loading  under  exactly  the  same  con 
ditions  without  injuring  the  breech  of  the  gun  itself.  The 
device  was  adopted  in  our  navy,  with  the  result  that  gun- 
squads  soon  became  so  proficient  in  handling  the  eight- 
hundred-and-seventy-pound  shell  and  the  four  powder- 
bags  that  go  with  it  that  they  could  load  one  of  the  big 
turret-guns  in  less  than  one-quarter  of  a  minute. 

290 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

For  another  still  more  important  device  also  we  have 
to  thank  the  brains  of  the  British  navy.  This  is  the  "  Dot- 
ter,"  familiarly  called  the  "Ping-pong."  By  means  of  this 
instrument  a  small  target  is  made  to  pass  across  the  area 
of  the  gun  as  if  it  were  an  enemy's  ship.  The  gun-pointer 
follows  this  with  his  eye  at  the  telescopic  sight  and  his 
hand  on  the  elevating- wheel.  When  the  lines  on  his  sight 
intersect  on  the  dot  representing  the  center  of  the  target, 
he  presses  a  firing-key.  This  discharges  by  electricity  a 
little  needle  which  pierces  the  target.  The  gun-pointer 
can  then  tell  how  the  shot  would  have  struck  with  relation 
to  a  distant  target  if  the  great  gun  itself  had  been  fired. 
This  invention  is  of  immense  value,  because  it  means  that 
gun-pointers  can  keep  the  gun  on  the  target  continuously, 
and  carry  on  constant  target  practice  without  wearing  out 
the  gun  or  spending  a  cent  of  the  nation's  money  for  powder 
and  shot. 

A  third  device,  just  mentioned,  the  invention  of  an 
American  naval  officer,  is  the  telescopic  sight,  an  incal 
culable  improvement  on  the  old  inaccurate  method  of 
sighting  a  gun.  It  is  estimated  that  without  the  telescopic 
sight  ships  would  have  to  approach  a  target  at  a  fourth  or 
fifth  of  the  present  range  in  order  to  make  the  same  num 
ber  of  hits. 

Another  means  of  improving  American  gunnery  has  been 
the  awarding  of  prizes  and  trophies.  For  many  years  the 
navy  had  offered  prizes  and  medals  for  small-arms  shoot 
ing,  but  it  was  not  till  after  the  Spanish  War  that  rewards 
were  offered  for  proficiency  with  the  great  guns.  Twice 
a  year,  spring  and  fall,  target  practice  is  held  on  the  south 
ern  drill-grounds  off  the  Chesapeake  capes  or  off  Guanta- 
namo.  The  spring  target  practice,  which  follows  the  win 
ter's  drills  at  Guantanamo,  is  the  "elementary"  target 
practice.  This  is  to  test  the  individual  gun-pointers  on 
the  different  ships.  In  this  practice  a  target  is  towed  on 
a  given  course  at  a  given  rate  of  speed,  and  the  ships  in 
turn  steam  past  it  at  a  known  distance  and  rate  of  speed, 

291 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

Thus  all  the  elements  in  the  problem  are  known  except  the 
gun-pointers'  skill.  Only  one  gun  is  fired  at  a  time,  and 
each  pointer  is  given  a  particular  target  to  shoot  at.  In 
this  trial  process  there  is  competition  between  the  various 
gun- crews  of  the  same  ship  as  well  as  between  the  various 
ships  of  the  fleet.  Target  practice  for  the  secondary  bat 
tery  is  held  at  night,  because  these  smaller  guns  are  de 
signed  to  repel  attacks  by  torpedo-boats,  which  would 
only  attack  a  fleet  under  cover  of  darkness. 

The  fall  target  work  is  held  on  the  southern  drill-grounds 
after  the  summer  manceuvcrs,  and  is  known  as  "battlo 
practice."  In  this  conditions  are  made  to  resemble  as 
nearly  as  possible  those  of  actual  battle.  Away  off  below 
the  horizon  a  target  is  towed  on  an  unknown  course  and 
unknown  rate  of  speed.  The  ships  approach  and  open  fire 
whenever  they  like,  except  that  they  must  not  come  within 
a  minimum  range,  and  after  firing  a  few  "ranging"  shots 
the  great  guns  open  in  "salvos" — that  is,  the  entire  broad 
side.  At  this  work  a  ship  has  about  four  minutes  after 
the  opening  shot  to  make  her  score.  After  individual  ship 
practice  comes  "divisional  practice,"  in  which  the  five  bat 
tle-ships  of  a  division  make  their  attack  as  a  unit,  follow 
ing  the  signals  of  the  flag-ship  so  closely  that  all  the  guns 
are  fired  at  the  exact  instant  in  one  tremendous  salvo. 
This  is  typical  battle  practice,  but  details  vary  from  year 
to  year. 

In  order  to  make  a  hit  in  a  seaway  at  a  range  of  eleven 
thousand  yards,  methods  of  ascertaining  the  distance  must 
be  scientific.  We  have  already  noted  the  telescopic  sight 
in  aiming;  the  other  elements  are  the  man  at  the  range- 
finder,  the  spotter,  and  the  fire-control  group,  with  a  fire- 
control  officer  in  the  steel  conning-tower  in  command.  An 
ingenious  instrument,  the  range-finder  placed  in  turrets 
and  tops,  enables  the  operator  to  get  the  range.  As  soon 
as  he  sees  the  number  of  yards  marked  on  the  scale  he 
telephones  it  to  the  fire-control  officer,  who  sends  the 
figure  to  the  fire-control  group,  who  sit  in  a  little  sound- 

292 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

proof  chamber  away  below  decks.  These  men  take  re 
ports  of  the  enemy's  distance,  bearing,  speed,  etc.,  from 
different  parts  of  the  ship,  make  rapid  calculations,  and 
transmit  the  information  to  the  battery.  Meanwhile, 
high  up  on  the  platform  at  the  top  of  each  mast  sits  the 
spotter.  The  spotter  must  be  a  man  of  quick  and  strong 
eye,  intense  concentration,  and  rapid  judgment.  He 
watches  the  splash  made  by  the  falling  shell  near  the  tar 
get  and  telephones  to  the  fire-control  room  to  alter  the  aim 
by  so  many  yards  up,  down,  right,  or  left.  Acting  on  his 
report,  the  fire-control  operators  transmit  the  information 
to  the  turret-crews  to  modify  their  aim  accordingly. 

Of  course,  the  competition  between  ships  at  target  prac 
tice  is  of  the  keenest  because  the  gunnery  trophy  is  the 
greatest  prize  a  ship  can  win.  And  it  adds  to  our  satis 
faction  in  reading  of  the  astonishingly  high  percentage  of 
hits  to  realize  that  the  canvas  target  represents  about  one- 
tenth  of  the  area  that  would  be  exposed  by  an  enemy's 
battle-ship. 

Besides  gaining  the  finest  distinction  in  the  fleet,  the 
gun-crews  who  make  the  best  record  are  awarded  substan 
tial  sums  of  money.  For  the  following  year  they  wear  an 
"E"  on  their  uniforms — meaning  ''Excellent" — and  during 
manceuvers  they  display  a  huge  E  painted  on  the  winning 
turret  and  a  red  pennant  at  the  fore.  (An  "E"  on  the 
smoke-stack  means  that  a  ship  has  won  the  engineering 
competition.)  In  one  year  Congress  appropriates  forty-two 
thousand  dollars  in  medals,  trophies,  and  money  prizes  for 
skill  in  gunnery,  and,  judged  by  the  results,  no  item  in  the 
naval  appropriation  is  better  invested. 

No  small  part  of  the  improvement  in  gunnery  may  be 
credited  to  "the  man  behind  the  gun."  An  important 
change  in  our  navy  is  in  the  type  of  our  enlisted  man. 
Long  after  the  War  of  1812  the  "common  sailor,"  as  he 
was  called,  was  as  a  rule  a  rough  brute  of  a  man  who 
would  do  anything  for  a  glass  of  rum  and  was  kept  in 
order  only  by  a  cat-o'-nine  tails.  Whenever  a  crew  was 

293 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

given  shore  liberty  large  numbers  deserted  outright,  no 
matter  where  the  port  was,  and  all  were  sure  to  get  dead 
drunk.  In  those  days  nobody  thought  of  enlisting  before 
the  mast  unless  he  was  desperately  hard  up  or  an  officer  of 
the  law  was  after  him. 

In  these  days  fewer  desert  than  ever  before,  and  more 
re-enlist.  The  modern  jacky  ashore  in  a  foreign  port  is, 
as  a  rule,  intent  on  seeing  the  sights.  He  arms  himself 
with  a  guide-book  and  explores  museums,  galleries,  and 
ruins,  and  comes  aboard  ship  again  full  of  nothing  worse 
than  a  jumble  of  facts  and  impressions.  While  the  thou 
sands  of  American  bluejackets  were  ashore  in  Vera  Cruz 
in  the  spring  of  1914  not  one  was  reported  drunk;  and  a 
few  months  later,  after  arduous  service  in  and  around  Vera 
Cruz,  when  a  battle -ship  crew  of  about  eight  hundred 
men  were  given  their  first  shore  liberty  in  a  home  port, 
every  man  returned  to  his  ship  as  sober  as  when  he 
left  it. 

The  difference  is  probably  due  chiefly  to  the  difference 
between  the  life  of  the  old-time  and  the  modern  sailor. 
A  sailor  of  the  Hartford  in  1864  sat  cross-legged  on  the 
deck,  with  a  piece  of  oil-cloth  for  a  table,  and  made  a  din 
ner  of  hard  "salt  horse"  and  sea-biscuit.  The  sailor  of 
to-day  gets  a  better  dinner  than  he  would  expect  at  home 
and  better  than  was  served  to  Admiral  Farragut  on  the 
Hartford  in  1864.  Even  in  1914  the  pay  of  the  seaman 
remains  low  compared  with  wages  he  might  make  ashore; 
but  nearly  all  of  it  is  clear  saving.  In  order  to  attract  the 
right  sort  of  men  the  government  offers  them  liberal  com 
forts  aboard  ship  and  chances  for  fun  besides.  Almost 
every  fine  evening  there  is  a  moving-picture  show  on  the 
quarter-deck,  and  frequently  the  men  get  up  minstrel  per 
formances  for  the  amusement  of  the  ship.  3. 5 . 

The  great  joy  of  the  modern  sailor  is  athletics.  In  the 
days  of  sailing-frigates  a  bluejacket  got  all  the  athletics 
he  needed  in  swinging  the  yards  and  making  or  furling 
sail;  but  on  a  modern  battle-ship  there  is  little  room  for 

294 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

exercise  in  the  ship  routine.  In  1900  the  Navy  Department 
made  a  beginning  by  ordering  captains  to  encourage  athlet 
ics  among  the  men,  and  the  movement  has  gone  ahead 
ever  since.  Now  the  Department  provides  athletic  outfits 
for  every  ship,  and  there  is  not  only  an  " athletics"  officer 
for  every  ship,  but  one  also  on  the  staff  of  the  commander- 
in-chief .  While  the  fleet  is  at  its  winter  drill  in  Guantana- 
mo  there  is  plenty  of  sport  to  offset  the  plenty  of  work,  and 
at  the  end  of  the  season  in  March  the  fleet  takes  a  whole 
week  off  for  games  and  races.  The  wide  reach  of  the  bay 
is  ideal  for  boat-races,  which  are  very  popular,  and  there 
are  seventeen  baseball  diamonds  ashore.  A  regular 
"league"  schedule  is  laid  out  to  decide  the  baseball  cham 
pionship  of  the  fleet.  On  these  ball-teams  officers  and  men 
play  together;  but  the  captain  is  always  an  enlisted  man. 
Of  course,  boxing  is  a  favorite  sport  at  all  times.  The 
bouts  are  carefully  supervised  and  limited  to  seven  rounds ; 
but  to  the  American  sailor  the  championship  belt  of  the 
North  Atlantic  Fleet  stands  only  a  little  below  the  world 
trophy. 

All  these  privileges  for  the  enlisted  man  would  make  a 
"taut"  captain  of  the  old  frigate  days  turn  over  in  his 
grave.  Foreigners  like  to  sneer  at  the  way  we  treat  our 
enlisted  men;  they  say  we  have  no  "discipline."  Their 
idea  of  discipline  is  illustrated  by  the  spectacle  often  seen 
by  our  officers  when  visiting  Russian  ships  in  the  East, 
when  an  angry  or  drunken  officer  would  amuse  himself  by 
beating  an  unoffending  sailor  in  the  face.  We  prefer  to 
ship  men  who  would  not  stand  being  beaten  in  the  face  by 
anybody ;  at  the  same  time  we  know  that  no  enlisted  man 
in  the  world  is  more  loyal  to  his  officers  than  the  American 
sailor  or  marine. 

In  short,  our  enlisted  men  are  of  a  much  higher  type 
than  the  navy  has  ever  boasted  before,  and  the  policy  to 
day  is  to  attract  still  more  the  clean,  athletic,  and  am 
bitious  young  men  of  the  country.  Uncle  Sam  is  rather 
particular  about  the  kind  of  lad  he  puts  into  a  sailor's 

-  295 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

uniform,  for  out  of  all  the  men  who  apply  to  enlist  only 
about  one  in  four  is  accepted. 

A  great  advantage  to  the  sailor  of  to-day,  and  one  not 
realized  by  Americans  generally,  is  that  our  modern  navy 
is  performing  a  great  service  in  times  of  peace  as  a  huge 
industrial  school.  Thousands  of  lads  enter  the  navy  who 
could  not  afford  to  continue  at  school,  especially  as  their 
lessons  in  high  school  seemed  too  impractical  to  help  them 
to  "get  a  job."  They  get  in  the  navy  an  all-around  edu 
cation  of  body,  mind,  and  hand  of  the  utmost  practical 
value.  Besides  the  athletics  just  mentioned  there  are 
daily  setting-up  drills  and  the  constant  supervision  of 
medical  officers  to  keep  a  man  in  the  best  physical  trim. 
If  a  man  is  ambitious  to  study  he  can  go  as  far  as  he  likes 
in  the  classes  conducted  by  officers  aboard  ship,  and  in 
1914  there  were  about  eight  hundred  who  found  time 
to  follow  courses  in  correspondence  schools.  For  many 
years  there  have  been  apprentice  seamen  who  have  passed 
the  examinations  for  the  Naval  Academy  and  won  com 
missions  in  the  navy,  and  in  1914  Congress  authorized  fifteen 
extra  appointments  for  the  enlisted  men  alone. 

The  greatest  benefit  to  the  greatest  number  conies  in 
the  learning  of  useful  trades.  The  particular  trade  depends 
largely  on  a  man's  particular  bent;  but  every  year  the 
navy  trains  hundreds  of  electricians,  engineers,  plumbers, 
carpenters,  painters,  pharmacists,  bookkeepers,  stenog 
raphers,  wireless-telegraphers — and  so  on  through  a  long 
list  of  occupations.  For  training  the  specialists  needed 
aboard  the  modern  battle-ship  the  navy  has  several  tech 
nical  schools.  For  instance,  at  Mare  Island  (California) 
and  at  New  York  the  navy  maintains  two  electrical  schools. 
This  department  is  of  the  greatest  importance,  because 
everything  mechanical  aboard  ship  is  done  by  electricity. 
In  addition  there  are  special  radio  schools  for  those  who 
want  to  learn  wireless.  Those  who  have  served  one  enlist 
ment  and  have  shown  proficiency  in  gunnery  are  admitted 
to  gunnery  schools  at  Newport  and  Washington.  In  these 

296 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR    NAVY 

classes  the  men  learn  all  about  the  manufacture  of  cannon 
and  torpedoes  and  the  details  about  the  care  and  use  of 
those  weapons.  For  practical  work  the  men  go  into  the 
naval-gun  factory  in  Washington  and  the  torpedo  station 
at  Newport.  Other  naval  schools  at  Charleston,  Norfolk, 
Newport,  and  San  Francisco  train  the  apprentices  for  the 
numerous  e very-day  trades  needed  aboard  ship. 

Finally,  the  navy  teaches  men  a  very  important  lesson, 
something  that  they  learn  in  no  other  school  in  the  country 
— namely,  to  obey  orders  and  to  do  a  piece  of  work  thor 
oughly.  In  short,  the  thousands  of  young  men  who  yearly 
leave  at  the  end  of  their  enlistment  and  go  back  to  civil 
life  have  been  equipped  to  earn  a  living  and  are  in  all 
other  respects  much  more  valuable  citizens  than  when 
they  entered  the  recruiting  office.  The  American  navy 
is  a  great  democratic  university,  with  an  enrolment  of 
about  fifty  thousand  men  for  a  course  of  at  least  four 
years. 

No  reference  to  the  enlisted  man  would  be  complete 
without  mention  of  the  marines,  who  have  fought,  shoul 
der  to  shoulder,  with  the  bluejackets  in  every  naval  battle 
in  our  history — the  soldier-sailors  of  our  navy.  Aboard 
ship  the  marines  of  the  present  day  act  chiefly  as  sentinels ; 
in  action  or  target  practice  they  man  certain  guns  of  the 
secondary  battery;  but  their  chief  duty  is  to  be  ready  at 
any  instant  to  land  at  any  spot  in  the  world  where  trouble 
is  brewing  for  Uncle  Sam  and  put  it  down.  They  are  the 
advance-guard  of  the  nation,  and  usually  they  leave  little 
for  anybody  else  to  do.  They  see  more  active  service  than 
any  other  corps  under  the  flag.  Between  1900  and  1914 
there  was  only  one  year  in  which  the  marines  were  not 
engaged  somewhere  on  the  firing-line.  In  Tientsin  and 
Pekin  the  marines  covered  themselves  with  glory  during 
the  Boxer  rebellion,  and  they  were  no  less  conspicuous  for 
gallantry  in  the  taking  of  Vera  Cruz  in  1914.  They  came 
in  for  special  commendation  in  Admiral  Fletcher's  report 
of  that  affair.  The  marines  have,  an  enviable  record. 

297 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

There  are  only  ten  thousand  of  them,  but  they  are  the  only 
corps  in  which  there  is  not  a  single  vacancy. 

For  the  officers  as  well  as  the  enlisted  men  the  period 
since  the  Spanish  War  has  meant  a  decided  advance. 
A  comparatively  few  years  ago  young  lieutenants  off  duty 
aboard  ship  would  hunt  for  diversion  as  a  matter  of  course. 
To-day  one  is  more  likely  to  see  them  intent  on  a  war 
game.  The  War  College  at  Newport  distributes  problems 
of  naval  warfare  to  fleet  and  naval  stations.  Solutions  are 
demanded  and  passed  upon  by  the  experts  at  the  college. 
War  games  are  often  played  on  board  ship,  with  two  sides 
in  separate  rooms  and  a  messenger  going  back  and  forth 
with  the  moves.  Such  work  as  this  calls  for  the  sort  of 
mind  that  makes  a  successful  chess-player,  and  is  the  best 
possible  school  of  tactics. 

The  War  College  itself  has  gained  great  importance  and 
influence  since  the  Spanish  War.  Officers,  especially  of  com 
manding  rank,  study  there  the  finer  problems  of  naval 
sciences,  strategy,  and  international  law.  War  games  are 
played,  discussed,  and  the  results  put  on  file  for  future 
reference. 

At  the  same  time,  as  the  modern  battle-ship  has  become 
such  an  intricate  machine,  involving  the  sciences  of  steam, 
electrical  engineering,  ordnance,  ship  construction,  etc.,  no 
course  of  four  years  at  the  Naval  Academy  could  equip 
a  man  completely.  Accordingly,  there  is  now  a  post 
graduate  school  at  Annapolis  to  give  the  young  officers 
more  technical  training,  especially  those  who  wish  to 
specialize  in  some  branch  of  their  profession.  For  those 
who  want  to  make  torpedo  warfare  their  specialty  there 
is  the  torpedo  school  at  Newport,  and  for  those  ambitious 
to  become  aeroplane  experts  there  is  the  aviation  school 
at  Pensacola.  The  ordnance  specialists  naturally  seek 
duty  in  the  naval  gun-factory  at  Washington,  and  so  on. 
The  officer  of  to-day  is  made  to  feel  not  only  the  necessity 
of  being  thoroughly  equipped  in  his  profession,  but  also 
of  adding  something  himself  to  the  progress  of  his  service 

298 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

and  keeping  abreast  of  what  is  done  in  foreign  navies. 
The  navy  has  a  magazine,  the  Naval  Institute,  in  which 
the  officers  discuss  every  conceivable  problem  affecting  the 
navy,  and  in  which  important  works  of  foreign  officers  are 
reviewed  or  their  articles  published  in  translation.  In 
short,  there  never  was  a  time  in  the  history  of  the  navy 
when  officers,  young  and  old,  were  so  keenly  alert  for  new 
ideas  and  set  so  high  a  standard  of  efficiency  for  themselves 
as  to-day. 

We  come  now  to  the  final  word.  We  have  seen  the 
early  struggles  of  the  navy,  how  it  triumphed  over  the 
general  opposition  to  a  navy  by  its  victories  in  the  War  of 
1812;  what  damage  was  done  by  the  politicians  in  the  years 
that  followed;  how  the  navy  pulled  itself  together  in  the 
Civil  War  and  largely  decided  the  issue  by  its  blockade  of 
the  South;  how  the  navy  fell  into  neglect  again  after  the 
war,  but  revived  in  time  to  make  the  Spanish  War  a  matter 
of  less  than  four  months'  duration;  and,  finally,  we  have 
seen  how  since  that  war  the  navy  has  progressed  in  every 
department.  The  objection  that  the  navy  was  an  instru 
ment  of  tyranny  is  heard  no  longer,  but  opposition  is  still 
heard  on  the  ground  of  expense,  even  although  the  cost  to 
the  American  people  of  our  navy  is  less  per  capita  to-day 
than  it  was  for  the  thirteen  frigates  and  sloops  a  hundred 
years  ago.  But  the  difficulties  with  Mexico  in  April,  1914, 
and  the  tremendous  conflict  that  broke  out  in  Europe  in 
July  of  the  same  year  show  that  the  day  of  wars  is  not 
yet  past  in  spite  of  Hague  conferences  and  peace  societies. 
If  war  should  fall  upon  us,  we  must  turn  to  our  navy  as 
our  first  and  strongest  line  of  defense  or  offense.  The 
navy  has  shown  that  it  is  true  to  the  best  traditions  of  the 
past ;  it  needs  only  the  interest  and  hearty  support  of  the 
entire  nation. 


A  NAVAL  CHRONOLOGY 

IN  this  history  of  the  American  navy  it  has  been  obviously 
desirable  to  emphasize  the  essentials,  and  it  has  been  necessary 
to  pass  over  many  minor  features.  In  the  following  chronology, 
however,  practically  everything  of  consequence  is  included,  and 
certain  important  military  battles,  treaties,  and  proclamations 
are  noted  also  in  order  to  give  bearing  to  the  events  that  are 
more  strictly  naval. 

1775,  April  19.     Battle  of  Lexington  and  Concord. 

I775>  October  13.     Congress  establishes  a  Marine  Committee  for 

naval  affairs. 
1775,  November  10.     Marine  corps  organized. 

1775,  December  3.     First  fleet  of  the  United  States  put  in  com 

mission. 

1776,  February    i7~April    17.     Naval   expedition   against    New 
Providence,  Bahamas,  Com.  Hopkins. 

1776,  July  4.     Declaration  of  Independence. 

1776,  October  11-13.     Gunboat  action,  Lake  Champlain;   Amer 

ican  force  under  Benedict  Arnold  defeated  after  desperate 
resistance. 

1777,  September  18.     U.  S.  sloop  Lexington,  Capt.  Johnston,  cap 

tured  by  British  sloop  Alert. 

1777,  October  17.     Surrender  of  Burgoyne. 

1778,  February  6.     Louis  XVI.  acknowledges  independence  of 
American  colonies  and  signs  treaty  of  alliance  and  com 
merce. 

1778,  March  7.  Action  between  U.  S.  32-gun  frigate  Randolph, 
Capt.  Biddle,  and  British  64-gun  ship  Yarmouth.  At 
end  of  fifteen  minutes  Randolph  blew  up;  only  four  saved. 

1778,  April  24.     U.  S.  vsloop  Ranger,  Capt.  Jones,  captures  British 
sloop  Drake  off  Carrickfergus,  Ireland. 
300 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

1779,  September   23.     U.   S.  frigate  Bonhomme  Richard,  Capt. 

Jones,  captures  British  frigate  Scrapis  off  English  coast. 
1781,  May  29.     U.  S.  frigate  Alliance,  Capt.  Barry,  engages  two 

British  sloops-of-war  at  the  same  time  and  captures  both. 
1781,  September  1-7.     French  fleet,  Adml.  DeGrasse,  prevents 

British  fleet,  Adml.  Graves,  from  entering  Chesapeake  Bay 

and  relieving  Cornwallis. 

1781,  October  19.     Surrender  of  Cornwallis. 

1782,  April  8.    Penn.  state  sloop  Ryder  All,  Lieut.  Barney,  cap 

tures  in  Delaware  Bay  British  sloop  Gen.  Monk,  of  supe 
rior  force.     One  of  the  most  brilliant  actions  of  the  war. 

1783,  September   3.     Treaty   of   peace   signed   by   British   and 
American  representatives. 

1794,  March  27.     Construction  of  six  frigates  authorized. 

1795,  September  5.     Treaty  ratified  with  Algiers  for  ransom  of 

prisoners  and  annual  tribute. 

1 796,  March  i .   Proclamation  of  the  Jay  treaty  with  Great  Britain. 
1796,  April  20.     The  President  authorized  to  continue  construc 
tion  and  equipment  of  two  frigates  of  44  guns  and  one  of  36. 

1796,  November  4.     Treaty  of  peace  concluded  with  Tripoli. 

1797,  July  10.     Launching  of  44-gun  frigate  United  States. 
1797,  September  7.     Launching  of  36-gun  frigate  Constellation. 

1797,  October  21.     Launching  of  44-gun  frigate  Constitution. 

1798,  April  27.     Congress  authorizes  purchase  of  twelve  vessels 

for  war  purposes. 

1798,  April  30,     Navy  Department  organized. 
1798,  July  6.     All  French  treaties  declared  void. 
1798,  July  ii.     Marine  corps  established. 

1798,  November    16.     Five   men   impressed   from   U.   S.   sloop 
Baltimore  by  commodore  of  British  squadron. 

1799,  February  9.     Constellation,  Capt.  Truxtun,  captures  French 

frigate  Insurgente  off  Nevis,  W.  I. 

1800,  February  i.     Constellation,  Capt.  Truxtun,  defeats  French 

frigate  Vengeance  off  Guadaloupe,  W.  I. 

1800,  September.  U.  S.  frigate  George  Washington,  Capt.  Bain- 
bridge,  carries  tribute  to  Algiers  and  is  required  to  convey 
the  Bey's  ambassador  to  Constantinople. 

1800,  October  12.  U.  S.  frigate  Boston,  Capt.  Little,  captures 
French  sloop  Bcrceau. 

1800,   December  14.     U.  S.  schooner  Enterprise,  Lieut.  Shaw,  de 
feats  French  sloop  Flambeau  in  a  brilliant  action. 
20  301 


THE    STORY    OF   OUR   NAVY 

1 80 1,  March  3.     Navy  reduced  to  thirteen  vessels. 
1 80 1,  May  20.     Three  frigates  and  one  sloop  sent  to  Barbary 
coast  to  protect  American  commerce. 

1 80 1,  August  i.   The  Enter -prise,  Lieut  Sterett,  captures  the  Tripoli. 

1802,  February  6.     Congress  recognizes  war  with  Tripoli. 

1802,  July  22.     The  Constellation,  Capt.  Murray,  defeats  squadron 

of  nine  Tripolitan  gunboats. 

1803,  June  22.     U.  S.  frigate  John  Adams,  Capt.  Rodgers,  de 
stroys  Tripolitan  ship  of  war. 

1803,  October  31.     U.  S.  frigate  Philadelphia  strikes  reef  near 
Tripoli  and  is  captured. 

1804,  February  16.     Lieut.  Decatur,  with  ketch  Intrepid,  burns 

the  Philadelphia  in  the  harbor  of  Tripoli. 

1804,  August  3,  7,  24,  28,  September  3.  Combined  bombard 
ments  on  Tripolitan  forts  and  attacks  on  Tripolitan  gun 
boats  by  American  squadron. 

1804,  September  4.     Intrepid,  M.  Comdt.  Somers,  blown  up  in 
harbor  of  Tripoli. 

1805,  April  27.     Three  sloops  assist  in  Eaton's  capture  of  Derne. 
1805,  June  4.     Treaty  of  peace  concluded  with  Tripoli. 

1805,  June  12.     U.  S.  gunboat,  Lieut.  Lawrence,  boarded  by  boat 

from  British  fleet,  Adml.  Collingwood,  and  three  men  im 
pressed. 

1806,  April  25.     British  frigate  Leander  fires  upon  American  coast 

ing-vessel  and  impresses  several  of  her  crew. 
1806,   May  1 6.     Great  Britain  issues  an  "Order  in  Council"  de 
claring  coast  of  Europe  from  Elbe  to  Brest  under  blockade. 

1806,  November  21.     Napoleon  issues  Berlin  Decree,  prohibiting 

commerce  with  Great  Britain. 

1807,  June  22.     British  frigate  Leopard  fires  into  U.  S.  frigate 

Chesapeake,  Capt.  Barren,  and  impresses  four  seamen. 

1807,  November  n.  British  Order  in  Council  forbids  neutral 
nations  to  trade  with  France  or  her  allies  except  under 
tribute  to  Great  Britain. 

1807,  December  17.  Napoleon's  Milan  Decree  forbids  trade  with 
England  or  her  colonies  and  confiscates  any  vessel  paying 
tribute  or  submitting  to  British  search. 

1807,  December  18.  Congress  authorizes  building  of  188  gun 
boats,  bringing  total  in  the  navy  to  257. 

1807,  December  22.     Embargo  laid  prohibiting  all  foreign  com 
merce.     In  force  till  March,  1809. 
302 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

1809,  March  i.     Non-intercourse  act  forbids  all  commerce  with 

Great  Britain,  France,  or  their  colonies. 

1 8 10,  January  2.     Napoleon  instructs  Murat,  King  of  Naples,  to 

seize  all  American  vessels  and  their  cargoes. 

1 8 10,  May  i.  British  and  French  armed  vessels  excluded  from 
American  waters. 

1810,  May.  Napoleon's  Rambouillet  Decree  confiscates  Amer 
ican  vessels  and  their  cargoes  in  French  ports. 

1810,  June  24.     U.  S.  brig  Vixen,  Lieut.  Trippe,  fired  into  by 
British  man-of-war, 

1811,  May  16.     U.  S.  frigate  President,  Capt.  Rodgers,  fights 
British  sloop  Little  Belt,  action  of  fifteen  minutes.     Each 
commander  accused  the  other  of  firing  first. 

1812,  April  4.    Embargo  laid  on  all  vessels  in  United  States  for 

ninety  days. 

1812,  June  17.     Orders  in  Council  revoked  by  Great  Britain. 
1812,  June  1 8.     United  States  declares  war  against  Great  Britain. 
1812,  June  23.     U.  S.  squadron,  Com.  Rodgers,  engages'  in  unsuc 
cessful  pursuit  of  British  frigate  Belvidera. 
1812,  July  17-21.     Constitution,  Capt.  Hull,  escapes  capture  after 

long  pursuit  by  British  squadron. 
1812,  July  19.     U.  S.  brig  Oneida,  Lieut.  Woolsey,  successfully 

resists  attempt  of  British  squadron  to  capture  her  on  Lake 

Ontario. 
1812,  August  13.     U.  S.  frigate  Essex.  Capt.  Porter,  captures 

British  sloop  Alert. 
1812,  August  19.    Constitution.  Capt.  Hull,  captures  British  frigate 

Guerriere. 
1812,  October  8.    Lieut.  Elliott  makes  successful  boat  attack 

against  British  brigs  Detroit  and  Caledonia,  Lake  Erie. 
1812,   October   18.    U.   S.  sloop   Wasp,   Capt.  Jones,  captures 

British  sloop  Frolic.     Both  taken  the  same  day  by  British 

ship  of  the  line. 
1812,  October  25.     U.  S.  frigate  United  States,  Capt.  Decatur, 

captures  British  frigate  Macedonian. 

1812,  December   29.     Constitution,   Capt.   Bainbridge,   captures 
British  frigate  Java  off  Bahia,  Brazil. 

1813,  February  24.     U.  S.  sloop  Hornet,  M.  Comdt.  Lawrence, 
sinks  British  sloop  Peacock. 

1813,  June  i.     Chesapeake,  Capt.  Lawrence,  captured  by  British 
frigate  Shannon  off  Boston. 
303 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

1813,  August  2.     U.  S.  brig  Argus,  Lieut  Allen,  captured  by 

British  brig  Pelican  in  Irish  Sea. 
1813,  September  5.     Enterprise,  Lieut.  Burrows,  captures  British 

brig  Boxer  off  Monhegan,  Me. 

1813,  September  10.     U.  S.  squadron,  M.  Comdt.  Perry,  defeats 

British  squadron  on  Lake  Erie. 

1814,  March  28.     Essex,  Capt.  Porter,  captured  by  British  ships 

Ph<rbe  and  Cherub  in  harbor  of  Valparaiso. 

1814,  April  23.  British  blockade  extended  to  entire  coast  of 
United  States. 

1814,  April  29.  U.  S.  sloop  Peacock,  M.  Comdt.  Warrington,  cap 
tures  British  brig  Epervier  off  Florida  coast. 

1814,  June  28.  U.  S.  sloop  Wasp  (2d),  M.  Comdt.  Blakely,  cap 
tures  British  sloop  Reindeer  in  English  Channel. 

1814,  September  i.  Wasp,  M.  Comdt.  Blakely,  sinks  British 
sloop  Avon  off  English  Channel. 

1814,  September  n.  U.  S.  squadron,  M.  Comdt.  Macdonough, 
defeats  British  squadron  on  Lake  Champlain. 

1814,  September  n-October  i.     U.  S.  expedition,  two  schooners 
and  six   gunboats,  M.  Comdt.  Patterson,  destroys    pirate 
stronghold  at  Barataria,  La. 

1815,  January  15.     President,  Capt.  Decatur,  captured  by  British 

squadron  off  Long  Island. 

1815,  February   17.      Treaty  of  peace  with  Great  Britain  rat 
ified. 
1815,  February   20.     Constitution,   Capt.   Stewart,  engages  and 

captures  at  the  same  time  two  British  sloops. 
1815,  March  3.     U.  S.  declares  war  against  Algiers. 
1815,  March  23.     Hornet,  M.  Comdt.  Biddle,  captures  British 

sloop  Penguin. 
1815,  May  19.     Com.  Decatur  sails  from  New  York  to  Algiers 

with  squadron. 
1815,  June  17.     U.  S.  squadron,  Com.  Decatur,  captures  Algerian 

flag-ship. 
1815,  June  30.     Peacock,  M.  Comdt.  Warrington,  captures  British 

brig  Nautilus.     (Prize  released  next  day  when  Warrington 

hears  of  peace.) 
1815,  June  30.     Com.  Decatur  concludes  treaty  of  peace  with 

Bey  of  Algiers. 

1815,  July  31.     Decatur  concludes  treaty  with  Bey  of  Tunis. 
1815,  August  9.     Decatur  concludes  treaty  with  Bey  of  Tripoli. 

3°4 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

1819,  March  3.  Congress  provides  for  war  on  piratical  craft  of 
Spanish-American  colonies. 

1821,  November  5.     U.  S.  schooner  Alligator,  Lieut.  Stockton, 
fired  upon  by  Portuguese  war- vessel  of  same  armament. 
After  action  of  one  hour  and  twenty  minutes  latter  sur 
renders  and  is  sent  to  Boston  as  a  prize. 

1822,  December  20.     Congress  authorizes  squadron  to  suopress 
piracy  in  the  Caribbean. 

1822,  July  21-22.  Landing  partv,  Lieut.  Farragut,  destroys 
pirate  stronghold  in  Cuba. 

1824,  November  14.  Landing  party,  Capt.  Porter,  exacts  repara 
tion  at  Foxardo  for  insult  to  United  States.  (For  this  act 
Porter  was  recalled,  court-martialed,  and  sentenced  to 
suspension  for  six  months.  He  resigned  and  entered  the 
Mexican  navy.) 

1832.  February  6.  U.  S.  frigate  Potomac,  Capt.  Downes.  destroys 
pirate  villages  at  Qualla  Battoo,  Sumatra. 

1838,  August  19.  Exploring  expedition,  Lieut.  Wilkes,  sails  for 
antarctic  regions  and  the  Pacific. 

1840,  January  19.  Lieut.  Wilkes  discovers  the  antarctic  con 
tinent. 

1842,  December  i.  Execution  of  Midn.  Spencer  and  two  seamen 
at  sea  for  attempted  mutiny  on  brig  Somcrs,  Capt. 
Mackenzie. 

1844,  February  28.     Bursting  of  the  gun  "  Peacemaker,"  U.S.S. 

Princeton.    (Secretary  of  the  Navy  among  the  killed.) 

1845,  October  10.     Founding  of  the  Naval  Academy  at  Annapo 

lis,  Md. 

1846,  May  12.  United  States  declares  war  against  Mexico. 
1846,  May  14.  Blockade  of  eastern  coast  of  Mexico  proclaimed. 
1846,  July  6.  U.  S.  squadron,  Com.  Sloat,  takes  possession  of 

Monterey,  Cal. 

1846,  July  6.     U.  S.  frigate  Portsmouth,  Capt.  Montgomery,  takes 

possession  of  San  Francisco. 

1847,  March  9-29.     Naval  operations  at  Vera  Cruz:   landing  of 

troops,  investment  and  bombardment,  resulting  in  surrender 
of  the  city. 

1848,  February  2.     Treaty  of  peace  concluded  with  Mexico. 
1850,  May  26-October,  1851.     United  States  expedition,  Lieut. 

De  Haven,  to  arctic  in  search  of  Sir  John  Franklin. 
1852-1854.     United   States   expedition   to   Japan,    Com.    Perry, 

305 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

established  commercial  relations  between  United  States 
and  Japan. 

1853,  July  2.  Capt.  Ingraham,  U.  S.  sloop  St.  Louis,  threatens  to 
open  fire  on  Austrian  brig  Hiissar  unless  Martin  Koszta, 
a  Hungarian  refugee  to  the  United  States  and  at  that  time 
a  prisoner  on  the  Hussar,  is  surrendered.  Koszta  is  even 
tually  given  up. 

1856,  November  20-22.  Capture  of  forts  at  Canton,  China,  by 
United  States  naval  force,  Capt.  Foote,  in  retaliation  for 
attack  by  the  forts  on  sloop  Portsmouth. 

1858,  October  ly-February,  1859.  U.  S.  squadron,  Flag-Officer 
Shubrick,  proceeds  to  Asuncion,  Paraguay,  to  demand 
retribution  for  attack  on  the  U.S.S.  Water-Witch.  Friendly 
relations  restored  without  recourse  to  arms. 

1860,  December   20.     South   Carolina  passes   ordinance   of  se 
cession. 

1 86 1,  April  13.     Surrender  of  Fort  Sumter  to  Confederates. 

1 86 1,  April  20.  Abandonment  of  Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  Com. 
McCauley,  and  unsuccessful  attempt  to  destroy  naval  and 
military  stores.  The  following  ships  of  the  navy  burned 
and  scuttled:  ships  of  the  line  Pennsylvania,  Columbus, 
Delaware;  frigates  Raritan,  Columbia,  Merrimac;  sloops 
Dolphin,  Germantown,  Plymouth. 

1 86 1,  April  27.  Blockade  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina  ports 
proclaimed.  Subsequently  extended  to  entire  coast  during 
following  month. 

1861,  May  5.     Transfer  of  Naval  Academy  to  Newport,  R.  I. 

1 86 1,  August  3.     Construction  of  Monitor  authorized. 

1 86 1,  August  7.  Contract  awarded  for  seven  armored  gunboats 
for  river  service. 

1861,  August  28-29.  Capture  of  Hatteras  Inlet,  North  Carolina, 
by  U.  S.  squadron,  Com.  Stringham. 

1861,  October  12.  St.  Louis  launched,  first  ironclad  in  American 
navy. 

1861,  November  7.  U.  S.  gunboats  Tyler  and  Lexington  cover 
retreat  of  Grant's  army  at  Belmont,  saving  it  from  rout. 

1 86 1,  November  7.  U.  S.  squadron,  Flag-Officer  DuPont,  cap 
tures  Confederate  defenses  at  Port  Royal,  South  Caro 
lina. 

1861,  November  8.     U.  S.  frigate  San  Jacinto,  Capt.  Wilkes,  re 
moves  Confederate  commissioners  from  steamer  Trent. 
306 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

1 86 1,  November   23.     Escape  of  C.S.S.  Sumtcr,   Capt.  Semmes, 

from  U.S.S.  Iroquois. 

1862,  January  30.     Monitor  launched. 

1862,  February  6.  U.  S.  gunboats,  Com.  Foote,  capture  Fort 
Henry. 

1862,  February  7-8.  U.  S.  squadron,  Flag-Officer  Goldsborough, 
captures  fortifications  defending  Roanoke  Sound. 

1862,  February  14.  U.  S.  gunboats,  Com.  Foote,  make  unsuccess 
ful  attack  on  Fort  Donelson. 

1862,  March  1-2.  Evacuation  of  Columbus,  Ky.,  by  Confed 
erates. 

1862,  March  8.  Destruction  of  U.  S.  sloop  Cumberland  and  frigate 
Congress  by  Confederate  ram  Mcrrimac  (Virginia),  Capt. 
Buchanan. 

1862,  March  9.     Action  between  Monitor  and  Merrimac. 

1862,  March  9.     Confederates  abandon  batteries  on  Potomac. 

1862,  March  13-14.  U.  S.  squadron,  Com.  Rowan,  captures 
New  Berne,  N.  C. 

1862,  March  i5-April  7.  River  squadron,  Com.  Foote,  bombards 
Confederate  defenses  at  Island  No.  10. 

1862,  April  4.  U.  S.  gunboat  Carondelet,  Comdr.  Walke,  runs  past 
batteries  defending  Island  No.  10. 

1862,  April  6.  U.  S.  gunboats  Tyler  and  Lexington  prevent  defeat 
of  Union  army  at  Pittsburg  Landing  (Shiloh). 

1862,  April  6-7.  U.  S.  gunboat  Pittsburg,  Lieut.  Thomson,  runs 
past  Island  No.  10.  Island  surrenders,  batteries  on  penin 
sula  evacuated  by  Confederates. 

1862,  April  20.  U.S.S.  Itasca  and  Pinola,  Capt.  Bell,  demolish 
ship  obstructions,  under  fire,  in  river  below  Forts  Jackson 
and  St.  Philip. 

1862,  April  23-24.  U.  S.  fleet,  Flag-Officer  Farragut,  passes  Forts 
Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  and  disperses  Confederate  flotilla. 

1862,  April  28.     Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip  surrender. 

1862,  April  29.     New  Orleans  surrenders  to  Farragut. 

1862,  May  8.     Baton  Rouge  surrenders. 

1862,  May  10.     Pensacola  evacuated  by  Confederates. 

1862,  May  10.  Action  between  Union  and  Confederate  gunboats 
near  Fort  Pillow;  U.  S.  gunboat  Cincinnati  rammed  and 
sunk. 

1862,  May  ii.  Destruction  of  Merrimac  by  Confederates  to  pre 
vent  its  capture  by  Union  forces. 

307 


THE    STORY    OF    OUR    NAVY 

1862,  May  13.     Union  naval  forces  occupy  Natchez,  Miss. 
1862,  May  15.     Unsuccessful  bombardment  of  Confederate  fort 

on  Drewry's  Bluff  by  Union  squadron. 
1862,  May   25.     Recapture  of  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  by  United 

States  marines. 

1862,  June  4.     Fort  Pillow  evacuated  by  Confederates. 
1862,    June    6.      Squadron    of    U.    S.    gunboats,    Flag  -  Officer 

Davis,    engage    and    destroy    Confederate    gunboats    at 

Memphis. 
1862,    June    2 6- July    22.     Continued    naval    bombardment    on 

Vicksburg. 
1862,  June  28.     Union  squadron,  Flag-Officer  Farragut,  runs  past 

batteries  at  Vicksburg. 
1862,  July  15.     Confederate  ram  Arkansas,  Lieut.  Brown,  runs 

through  Union  fleet  to  Vicksburg. 

1862,  July  1 6.     Congress  creates  grade  of  Rear-Admiral  for  flag- 
officers. 
1862,  July  22.     Union  gunboats  make  unsuccessful  attempt  to 

destroy  the  Arkansas. 
1862,  August  6.     U.  S.  gunboat  Essex,  Comdr.  W.  D.  Porter, 

attacks   the   Arkansas   at   Baton   Rouge.     Latter  is   run 

aground  and  fired  by  her  crew  to  prevent  capture. 

1862,  September  16-17.     Battle  of  Antietam. 

1863,  January  10-11.     U.  S.  gunboat  squadron,  Act.  Rear-Adml. 

Porter,  attacks  and  captures  Confederate  fort  at  Arkansas 
Post. 

1863,  January  31.  Confederate  rams  Palmetto  State  and  Chicora 
make  successful  surprise  attack  on  Union  blockading  squad 
ron,  Charleston.  Two  Union  vessels  disabled. 

1863,  February  28.  U.  S.  monitor  Montauk,  Comdr.  Worden, 
destroys  Confederate  cruiser  Nashville  near  Savannah. 

1863,  March  14.  Attack  by  U.  S.  fleet,  Rear-Adml.  Farragut,  on 
Port  Hudson.  U.  S.  frigate  Mississippi  runs  aground  and 
is  fired. 

1863,  April  7.  Union  fleet,  Rear-Adml.  DuPont,  bombards  forts 
at  Charleston  without  success.  U.  S.  monitor  Keokuk 
riddled  by  Confederate  fire  and  sinks  the  following  day. 

1863,  April  16.     Naval  bombardment  of  Vicksburg. 

1863,  April  29.  U.  "S.  gunboat  squadron,  Rear-Adml.  Porter, 
attacks  and  captures  Grand  Gulf,  Miss. 

1863,  May  2-4.     Battle  of  Chancellorsville, 

308 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

1863,  June  17.  U.  S.  ironclad  Weehaivken  attacks  and  captures 
Confederate  ram  Atlanta  in  Warsaw  Sound,  Ga. 

1863,  June  27.  Boat  party  from  C.S.S.  Archer,  Lieut.  Read,  cuts 
out  revenue-cutter  Caleb  Gushing  at  Portland,  Me. 

1863,  July  1-3.     Battle  of  Gettysburg. 

1863,  July  4.     Surrender  of  Vicksburg. 

1863,  July  9.     Surrender  of  Port  Hudson. 

1863,  July  16.  U.S.S.  Wyoming,  Capt.  McDougal,  attacks  and 
silences  Japanese  ships  and  batteries  at  Shimonoseki. 

1863,  vSeptember  19-20.     Battle  of  Chickamauga. 

1863,  October  5.     Confederate  David  torpedoes  Union  ship  Iron- 

sides  off  Charleston,  but  fails  to  sink  her. 

1864,  February    17.     Confederate    David   torpedoes    and   sinks 
U.S.S.  Housatonic  off  Charleston. 

1864,  April    19.     Confederate  ram  Albemarle  makes  successful 

attack   on    Union   gunboats;     sinks   the   U.    S.   gunboat 

South  field  m  Roanoke  River, 
1864,  March  14.     Two  hundred  thousand  men  drafted  for  Union 

navy. 
1864,  May  5.     U.  S.  gunboat  squadron  engages  the  Albemarle. 

Latter  retreats  up  Roanoke  River. 

1864,  June  19.  U.S.S.  Kcarsarge,  Capt.  Winslow,  sinks  Con 
federate  cruiser  Alabama,  Capt.  Semmes,  off  Cherbourg, 

France. 
1864,  August  5.     Union  fleet,  Rear-Adml.  Farragut,  engages  Fort 

Morgan  and  Confederate  flotilla,  and  enters  Mobile  Bay. 
1864,  October  7.     U.S.S.  Wachusett,  Comdr.  Collins,  captures  the 

C.  S.  cruiser  Florida  in  harbor  of  Bahia,  Brazil. 
1864,  October  27-28.     Lieut.  Gushing  with  torpedo-launch  blows 

up  Confederate  ram  Albemarle  in  Roanoke  River. 
1864,    October    28-31.     Union    gunboats    attack    and    capture 

Plymouth,  N.  C. 

1864,  December  24.     Unsuccessful  attack  by  Union  fleet,  Rear- 

Adml.  Porter,  on  Fort  Fisher. 

1865,  January  13-15.     Second  attack  on  Fort  Fisher.     Fort  sur 

renders  to  the  army. 
1865,  January  15.     U.  S.  monitor  Patapsco  sunk  off  Charleston 

by  Confederate  torpedo. 

1865,  February  18.     Evacuation  of  Charleston  by  Confederates, 
1865,  April  2.    Evacuation  of  Richmond  by  Confederates. 
1865,  April  9.     Surrender  of  Lee  at  Appomattox, 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

1865,  April  12.     Surrender  of  Mobile  to  Union  forces. 
1865,  June  2.     Surrender  of  Galveston  to  Union  forces. 
1865,  August  29.     Conclusion  of  the  blockade  of  the  South. 
1865,  September.    Removal  of  the  United  States  Naval  Academy 
to  Annapolis,  Md. 

1865,  November  6.     Surrender  of  the  Confederate  cruiser  Shenan- 

doah  to  British  authorities. 

1866,  July   25.     Grade  of  Admiral  created  and  conferred   on 
Farragut. 

1867,  June  13.     Naval  brigade  from  the  Hartford  and  the  Wyoming 

attack  and  destroy  a  village  in  Formosa  in  retaliation  for 

massacre  of  crew  of  an  American  ship. 
1870,  May  i6-June   n.     U.  S.  squadron,  Rear-Adml.  Rodgers, 

attacks  Corean  forts.     Latter  stormed  by  landing  party, 

Comdr.  Kimberley. 
1870,  June  17.     Six  boats  from  U.S.S.  Mohican,  Lieut.  Brownson, 

capture  and  destroy  pirate  ship  at  mouth  of  Teacapan 

River,  Mexico. 

1870.  November  i8-December  20.     Cruise  of  the  gig  of  the  U.S.S. 

Saginaw  from  Ocean  Island  to  Hawaiian  Islands  to  find 
rescue  for  shipwrecked  officers  and  crew  of  the  Saginaw. 

1871,  July  3-May,  1873.    North  Polar  Expedition,  U.S.S.  Polaris, 
Capt.  Hall. 

1877,  November  24.     U.  S.  sloop  Huron,  Comdr.  Ryan,  wrecked 

in  gale  off  North  Carolina  coast.     Over  one  hundred  lives 

lost. 

1879-1881.    The  Jeannette  Expedition,  Comdr.  DeLong,to  arctic. 
1880,  March  3.     U.S.S.  Constellation  leaves  New  York  with  cargo 

of  food  for  famine  sufferers  in  Ireland. 
1882,  August  5.     Congress  authorizes  construction  of  three  steel 

war- vessels  and  one  armed  despatch-boat.     Under  this  law 

were  built  the  Boston,  Atlanta,  Chicago,  and  Dolphin — the 

beginning  of  the  "new"  navy. 
1884,  June  22.     Lieut.  Greely,  U.S.A.,  and  six  of  his  exploring 

party  rescued  by  U.S.S.  Thetis  and  Bear,  Comdr.  Schley. 
1889,  March  15-16.     Hurricane  at  Apia,  Samoa.     Loss  of  U.S.S. 

Trenton,  Vandalia,  and  Nipsic. 
1891,  October  16.     Boatswain,  mate,  and  six  sailors  of  the  U.  S. 

cruiser  Charleston  injured  by  mob  in  Valparaiso,  Chile. 

Two  of  the  injured  died,  and  the  incident  nearly  brought 

on  war  between  the  United  States  and  Chile, 
310 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 

1898,  February  15.  U.S.S.  Maine,   Capt.   Sigsbee,  blown  up  by 

mine  in  Havana  harbor. 

1898,  April  22.     President  proclaims  blockade  of  Cuban  ports. 
1898.  April   25.     Congress  declares    that  a  state  of  war  has 

existed  between  Spain  and  the  United  States  since  April 

21. 

1898,  May  i.     U.  S.  squadron,  Com.  Dewey,  destroys  Spanish 

squadron,  Manila  Bay. 
1898,  June  3.     Attempt  by  Naval  Constructor  Hobson  to  close 

harbor  of  Santiago  by  sinking  the  collier  Merrimac  at  the 

entrance. 
1898,  June  28.     President  proclaims  blockade  of  southern  coast 

of  Cuba  and  port  of  San  Juan,  Porto  Rico. 

1898,  July  3.  U.  S.  fleet,  Rear-Adml.  Sampson,  destroys  Span 
ish  fleet  as  the  latter  attempts  a  sortie  from  harbor  of 

Santiago. 
1898,  July  17.    Santiago  surrenders  to  United  States  army  and 

navy. 
1898,  August  12.     Terms  for  cessation  of  hostilities  agreed  upon 

by  Spain  and  the  United  States. 

1898,  December  10.     Treaty  of  peace  concluded  between  Spain 
and  the  United  States. 

1899,  March  i.     Grade  of  Admiral  revived  and  conferred  on 
Rear-Admiral  Dewey. 

1900,  May  29- August  14.     United  States  marine  guard  besieged 

at  United  States  legation,  Pekin,  by  Boxers.  Siege  marked 
by  incessant  fighting  and  gallant  conduct  of  marines. 

1900,  July  9-14.  Assaults  by  force  of  two  thousand  American, 
Japanese,  and  British  forces  upon  Tientsin,  resulting  in 
capture  of  the  city. 

1900,  August  14.     Allies  enter  Pekin  and  end  Boxer  rebellion. 

1905,  December  28-July  9,  1906.  Voyage  of  U.  S.  dry-dock 
"  Dewey "  from  Solomon's  Island,  Chesapeake  Bay,  to 
Olangapo,  P.  I.,  via  Suez  Canal. 

1907,  December  i6-February  22,  1909.  Cruise  of  forty-six 
thousand  miles  round  the  world  made  by  U.  S.  battle 
ship  fleet,  Rear-Admls.  Evans  and  Sperry. 

1909,  April  6.  Civil  Engineer  Peary,  U.S.N.,  discovers  north 
pole. 

1914,  April  21.  U.  S.  fleet  lands  sailors  and  marines  at  Vera 
Cruz  and  takes  possession  of  city. 


INDEX 


Alabama,  the,  203  ff;  picture  of, 
205;  action  with  Kearsarge, 
212  ft>,  "Claims,"  216. 

Albemarle,  the,   193  ff. 

Albemarle  Sound,  map,  194. 

Algiers,  early  trouble  with,  29; 
treaty  with,  30;  war  with, 
118  ff. 

Alliance,  the,  17,  21,  28. 

Apia,  map,  242. 

Armor,  introduction  of,  137  ff. 

B 

Bailey,  Captain,  171. 
Bainbridge,  Captain,  41  ff,   73  ff, 

97,  n8f. 

Baltimore,  the,  31,  54. 
Bancroft,  George,   130. 
Barclay,  Captain,  93  ff. 
Barclay,  the,  99  ff. 
Barron,  James,  55  ff. 
Barron,   Samuel,   50  ff . 
Battle-fleet  cruise,  282. 
Beaumarchais,  24  ff. 
Benton,  the,  picture  of,  149. 
Biddle,   James,    120. 
Blockade,  in  Civil  War,  133,  230. 
Blockade- runners,  2i8ff. 
Bonhomme  Richard,  the,  15. 
Boxer  Rebellion,  277  ff. 
Broke,  Captain,  81  ff. 
Brooklyn,  the,  170,  I78ff. 
Brooklyn,  the  (cruiser),  268  f. 


Buchanan,    Franklin,    140,    176  f, 


181  ff. 


Calliope,  the,  240,  242  f . 
Garden,  Captain,  69  ff,  79. 


Carondelet,  the,  I54ff. 

Carronade,  5. 

Catalano,  43,  45. 

Cayuga,  the,  168  ff,  172. 

Cervera,  Admiral,  262  ff,  271  ff. 

Chesapeake,  the,  54  ff,  56,  81  ff. 

Champlain,  map  of  region,  105; 
battle  of  Lake,  107  ff ;  diagram 
of  battle,  109. 

Charleston,   221  f. 

Chauncey,  Captain,  90  ff . 

Chichester,  Admiral,  260. 

Chickasaw,  the,    183. 

Cincinnati,  the,  152,  158. 

Clark,  Lieutenant,  279  ff. 

Comet,  the,  113  f. 

Confiance,    the,   107  ff. 

Congress,  the,   139  f. 

Constellation,  the,  30,  32  ff,  35  ff. 

Constitution,  the,  30,  40,  47,  62  ff, 
72,  80  f,  132,  232. 

Conyngham,  Gustavus,   12. 

Cooke,  Captain,   192  f. 

Cox,  Acting-Lieutenant,  84,  87  ff. 

Craven,  T.  A.  M.,  178  f. 

Cuba,  Spanish  rule  in,  246;  cap 
ture  of,  273. 

Cumberland,  the,  139  f. 

Gushing,  Lieutenant,  I95ff. 


Dacres,  Captain,  62  ff . 
Dahlgren,  Rear-Admiral,  223. 
Dale,  Richard,  17,  21,  39. 
"Davids,"  190  f,  289. 


Davis,  Captain,   158. 
De  Grasse,  Admiral,  25  ff . 
De  Haven,  Lieutenant,  236  f . 
De  Long,  Commander,  237  ff. 
Decatur,  James?  48. 

3*3 


THE    STORY   OF   OUR   NAVY 


Decatur,    Stephen,    37,  43  ff,  48, 

69,  118,  129. 

Deerhound,  the,  212,  214  f. 
Dewey,  George,  249  ff . 
Diederichs,  Vice- Admiral,  259  f. 
Donelson,  Fort,   152  ff. 
Downes,  Captain,   121. 
Downie,  Captain,  105,  107  ff. 
Drake,  the,  14  ff,  16. 
DuPont,  Captain,  133  ff,  221,255. 


E 


Eagle,  the,  105,  108  ff. 

Eaton,  Consul,  51. 

Elliott,  Lieutenant,  90,  92  f,  96. 

Embargoes,  56. 

England,  attitude  toward  colonies, 
7  ff ;  causes  of  War  of  1812, 
53  ff ;  attitude  toward  North 
in  Civil  War,  201  f. 

Enterprise,  the,  36,  39  ff. 

Ericsson,  John,  137,  143,  189. 

Erie,  battle  of  Lake,  95  ff. 

Espiegle,  the,  79. 

Essex,  the,  39,  70,  73,  97  ff. 

Essex,  the  (gunboat),  150. 

Evans,  Robley  D.,  227,  282. 


Farragut,  David  G.,  enters  navy, 
97;  adventure  on  Alert,  98; 
commands  Barclay,  99  ff ;  in 
battle,  102;  fights  for  pig, 
102  ff,  120,  161  f ;  passes  New 
Orleans  forts,  163  ff;  captures 
Mobile  Bay,  I73ff,  186;  influ 
ence  on  Dewey,  251. 

Fisher,  Fort,  224  ff . 

Flusser,  Lieutenant,  193  f. 

Foote,  Andrew  D.,  149,  154,  156, 
158. 

France,  assistance  during  Revo 
lution,  23  ff;  interference  with 
American  commerce,  30;  naval 
war  with,  30^37;  treatment  of 
American  shipping,  56  f . 

Frigate,  2  f ;  type  designed  by 
Humphreys,  29. 


Frolic,  the,  67  ff ,  77  f. 
Fulton,  Robert,  188  f. 


General  Armstrong,  the,  U4ff. 
Gloucester,  the,  269  f. 
Gov.  Moore,  the,  169  f. 
Graves,  Admiral,  25  ff. 
Greene,  Lieutenant,   145. 
Guerriere,   the,   62  ff,    72  f,   75  ff , 

82,   88. 
Gun,  long,  5. 

H 

Hampton  Roads,  diagram,  140. 
Hartford,  the,   137,   165;    picture 

of,  1 66,  I7of,  I78ff. 
Henry,  Fort,  isof,  153  f. 
Hobson,  Naval-Constructor,  265  f . 
Hopkins,  Esek,  n,  13. 
Hornet,  the,  73,  78,  80. 
Housatonic,  the,  191  f. 
Hull,  Isaac,  36  f,  59  ff,  72  f. 
Humphreys,  Joshua,  29,  67. 
Hydroplanes,  289. 


Impressment,  53  ff. 
Insurgente,  the,  32  ff,  36. 
Intrepid,  the,  43  ff ,  49  ff. 
Island  Number  10,  153  ff;    map, 
155- 


Jackson,  Fort,  164  ff. 
James,  Reuben,  48. 
Japan,  opening  of,  12 1  ff. 
Java,  the,  74  ff,  82. 
Jeannette,  the,  237  ff. 
Jones,  Catesby,  141,  145. 
Jones,  Jacob,  67  ff. 
Jones,  Paul,  12  ff,  16  ff,  26,  28. 

K 

Kearsarge,    the,    209  ff;     picture, 

211. 
Kennon,  Beverly,  164,  i68f. 


3*4 


INDEX 


Lambert,  Captain,  74  ff. 
Landais,  Pierre,  171,  21  ff. 
Lawrence,  the,  95  ff . 
Lawrence,  James,  73,  78  ff. 
Leopard,  the,  54  ff ,  57. 
Lexington,  the,  148,  158. 
Linnet,  the,  108  ff. 
Longshaw,  Surgeon,  226  f . 

M 

Macdonough,  Thomas,  104  ff. 
Macedonian,    the,    69  ff,    77,    82, 

88. 

Maine,  the,  247  f . 
Manassas,  the,  169,  171. 
Manila  Bay,   253  ff. 
Marines,  6,  297. 
McDougal,  Commander,  206  ff. 
Melville,  Chief -Engineer,  238  f. 
Merrimac,  the,  136  ff,  193. 
Merrimac,  the  (collier),  265. 
Mexico,  war  with,   121  f;    recent 

trouble  in,  283  f. 
Mississippi,     importance     of     in 

Civil    War,     147;     map,     151; 

below  New  Orleans,  164. 
Mobile  Bay,  battle  of,  I74ff. 
Monitor,  the,    142  ff. 
Monocacy,   the,   278  ff. 
Montojo,  Admiral,  251  ff,  260. 
Morgan,  Fort,  I75ff. 
Morris,  Lieutenant,  140. 


N 


Napoleon,  53,  56  ff,  113. 

Naval  Academy,  130. 

Navy,  corruption  in  after  War 
of  1812,  127  ff;  campaign  plan 
in  Civil  War,  132-133;  the 
"New  Navy,"  232  f;  modern 
developments,  287  ff. 

Niagara,  the,  93  ff . 

Nicaraguan  expedition,  282  f. 

Nipsic,  the,  240  ff . 

Norfolk  Yard,   I36f. 


O'Brien,  Jeremiah,  10. 
Olympia,  the,  250  ff. 


Page,  General,  175,  179,  185. 
Peacock,  the,  78  ff,  80,  86. 
Pearson,  Captain,  i8ff. 
Perkins,  George,  168,  171,  183. 
Perry,  Matthew  C.,  121  ff,  161. 
Perry,  Oliver  H.,  37,  92  ff,  120. 
Petrel,  the,  258. 
Philadelphia,  the,  39,  40  ff ,  45  ff , 

73- 

Phillips,  Captain,  31  ff. 

Phoebe,  the,   101. 

Piracy,     in     Caribbean,      iigff; 

Qualla  Bat  too,  121. 
Pittsburg,  the,  157. 
Platt,  Charles,  109  f. 
Pope,  General,  154,  156. 
Porter,  David,  32,  33  ff,  37,  120. 
Porter,  David  D.,  172,  174,  224  ff. 
Port  Royal,  capture  of,  133  f. 
Potomac,  the,  121. 
Preble,  the,  105,  108  ff. 
Preble,  Edward,  43  ff,  52,  92,  116. 
President,  the,  39,  66. 
Prevost,  General,  106  ff ,  112. 
Privateers,    H3ff. 

Q 

Qualla  Battoo,  121. 
R 

Ranger,  the,  n,  13  ff. 
Reid,  Captain,  H4ff. 
Revolution,  causes  of,  7  ff . 
River  fleet,  147  ff. 
Rodgers,    John,    33  ff,    51  ff,    66, 
189. 

S 

Saginaw,  the,  233  ff . 
Samoa,  hurricane  at,  240  ff. 
Sampson,    Rear-Admiral,   263  ff, 
273  ff,  289. 


315 


THE    STORY   OF    OUR    NAVY 


Santiago,  campaign,  262  ff ;    bat 
tle  of,  266  ff . 

Saratoga,  the,  105,  108  ff. 
Schley,  Admiral,  264,  273  ff. 
Schools  for  enlisted  men,  296  ff . 
Semmes,  Raphael,  204  f,  2ioff. 
Serapis,  the,   i8ff. 
Shannon,  the,  81  ff. 
Shimonoseki,   208. 
Ship  of  the  line,  2  ff. 
Sicard,  Captain,  235. 
Slavery,    131. 
Sloop  of  war,  2,  4. 
Somers,  Richard,  49. 
Spain,  war  with,  246  ff ;    results, 

275  f- 

Spencer,  Philip,   129  ff. 
St.  Philip,  Fort,  164  ff. 
Steam,  introduction  of,  137. 
Submarines,   187  ff,  288  f. 


Talbot,  Lieutenant,  235  f. 
Tecumseh,  the,  178  f. 
Tennessee,   the,    1 75  ff . 
Ticonderoga,  the,  105,  108  ff. 
Torpedoes,  iSyff,   199. 
Trent  affair,  202. 
Trenton,  the,  240  ff . 
Tripoli,  war  with,  38-52. 
Trippe,  Lieutenant,  48. 


Truxtun,  Thomas,  32  ff,  35  ff,  40. 
Tyler,  the,  158. 

U 
United  States,  the,  30,  69  ff . 


V 


Vandalia,  the,  240  ff. 

Varuna,  the,  169  f. 

Vengeance,  the,  35. 

Vera  Cruz,  occupation  of,  285. 

Vergennes,  25. 

Virginia,  the,   138. 

W 

Wabash,  the,  134,  137. 
Wainwright,      Lieutenant  -  Com 
mander,  269  f . 
Walker,  Commander,  I54ff. 
Warley,  Captain,  196,  200. 
Wasp',  the,  67  ff . 
Whinyates,  Captain,  67  ff. 
Wilkes,   Captain,   202,   236. 
Worden,  Lieutenant,  143  ff. 
Wyoming,  the,  206  ff. 


Yorktown,  campaign  at,  25  f . 


THE    END 


' 


AN    INITIAL  F 

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